WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200210002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 25, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Top Secret
NOFORN
gul~~ 1JE
9 ^
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Top Secret
SC'62-75
November 25, 1975
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ORCON/NOCONTRACT
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11852. exemption category:
456(1). (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Data Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Turkish Coalition Leaders Apparently
Reach Accord on Cooperation . . . . . . . . . 1
Finland's Caretaker Government
To Remain in office . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Cod War Heats Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
New Spanish King Courts the Armed Forces . . . 9
New Effort to Revive Cypriot Talks . . . . . . 11
ANNEX: Opposition in Spain Weakened by
Decades of Proscription . . . . . . . 13
November 25, 1975
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Turkish Coalition Leaders Apparently Reach
Accord on Cooperation
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel and his most
troublesome coalition partner, National Salvation
Party leader Erbakan, appear to have agreed on a
rough framework for cooperation within the cabinet,
which could help break the impasse on such issues
as the negotiating position on Cyprus.
reports that Demirel and
Erbakan agree in mi - ovember to try to maintain
,governmental stability by keeping one another in-
formed of policy differences sufficiently vital to
either party as to threaten the coalition.
asserts that Erbakan has already
told Demirel that he will leave the government if
any settlement is reached on Cyprus without his ap-
proval. He has, however, informed the Prime Minister
that despite his adamant public opposition to con-
cessions on Cyprus, which will likely continue, he
would not be totally intransigent on the issue within
government circles. He is primarily concerned with
retaining as much territory in the north as possible
and obtaining a public statement of support from the
Turkish military leadership for any final settlement.
Erbakan has left the
matter o t e as es largely to Demirel because
the subject does not interest him and because a high
profile on this issue would put him in regular con-
tact with the military leadership. Because of his
party's fusion of religious and political beliefs
Erbakan has never been popular with the military--an
institution that views itself as the guardian of
Turkey's secularist foundations. Erbakan's contribu-
tion to the recent government stalemate has not cleared
the air.
November 25, 1975
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A Demirel-Erbakan accord would seem a logical
outgrowth of the political horse-trading that no
doubt has gone on since the October 12 Senate
elections, which strengthened Demirel's party, partly
at the expense of Erbakan's National Salvation Party.
It may also represent a response by the politicians
to urgings by the military earlier this month to put
Turkey's political house in order and turn to the
business of governing the country. (SECRET NOFORN/
NOCONTRACT)
November 25, 1975
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Finland's Caretaker Government To Remain in Office
President Kekkonen today asked Finland's care-
taker government to remain in office after repeated
attempts to form a majority government had failed.
Kekkonen appointed former governor Martti
Miettunen on October 29 to form a broad-based majority
government. This effort failed because of the re-
fusal of the Social Democrats and the Communists to
participate. Both the Social Democrats and the
Center Party subsequently declined to put together
minority governments.
Kekkonen had little choice but to ask the cur-
rent non-political government headed by Keijo Liinamaa
to stay on. He had wanted a majority coalition,
including the Social Democrats and the Communists,
that would have had the necessary parliamentary
backing to make the difficult decisions on the
country's economic problems. After a poor election
performance in September, however, the Social Demo-
crats decided they needed more time to reorganize.
The Communists are deeply divided and would rather
remain in opposition than assume any share of
responsibility for enacting difficult economic
legislation.
The Liinamaa government is in no position to
adopt tough measures to deal with the country's
pressing economic problems. It will fall to a suc-
cessor government to reduce inflation--now running
at an annual rate of 18 percent--and cut the trade
deficit of $2 billion.
There is little indication that an election
will be held within the next few months. Most
November 25, 1975
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parties would like a breather from the current
political turmoil. The next serious effort to
form a coalition based on the current parliament
may not come until February, and some Finns
speculate a "political" government may not emerge
until next fall. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 25, 1975
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Cod War Heats Up
London's decision to send naval vessels to
Icelandic waters will almost certainly increase the
likelihood of incidents at sea, and dim hopes for
an early renewal of negotiations on a fishing agree-
ment.
Confrontations between Icelandic coast guard
and Royal Navy ships will further embitter Icelandic
public opinion. There may be some anti-NATO spill-
over, with opponents of a fishing agreement arguing
that Iceland should leave the alliance if its members
refuse to support Iceland on this vital national
issue.
The worsening political climate could also
endanger the recently concluded fishing agreement
between Iceland and West Germany. The agreement
was scheduled to be debated today in the Icelandic
parliament.
The British decision to send three frigates
into the area came after British fishermen threatened
over the weekend to abandon Icelandic waters if they
did not receive naval protection. Icelandic patrol
boats have engaged in various harassing actions and
cut the lines of six British trawlers in the last
eleven days.
Negotiations between Iceland and Britain col-
lapsed last week after the two sides were unable to
agree on the size of the British catch. London
wants an annual catch of 110,000 tons, and Reykjavik
has refused to budge beyond 65,000 tons.
November 25, 1975
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The last round of talks was complicated by the
personality of British negotiator Hattersley, whom
the Icelanders found abrasive. A Foreign Office
spokesman indicated that Hattersley is not the
government's regular negotiator, but stopped short
oe of saying that another official would take over for
the British if and when talks resume. (CONFIDENTIAL)
NOFORN )
November 25, 1975
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New Spanish King Courts the Armed Forces
King Juan Carlos' initial efforts have
been primarily aimed at wooing the military in the
apparent hope that firm support in the armed forces
will help free his hand in the political sector.
US defense attaches in Madrid report that the
reaction of the Spanish military to the King has
been enthusiastic so far. Juan Carlos assumed the
rank of captain general--the same rank Franco held--
and took his oath as king in uniform. In addition
to stressing the importance of the military in his
accession speech, the King addressed a special mes-
sage to the armed forces. He reiterated the role
of the military as the guarantor of the fundamental
laws, noted especially the military contribution
in Spanish Sahara, and pledged to work closely with
them. The formal ceremony on Thursday honoring the
King is expected to include a military review to
demonstrate military loyalty to the head of state.
The King's efforts may already be beginning to
pay dividends as the three service ministers re-
portedly contacted a leader of the extreme right--
either Blas Pinar or Jose Antonio Giron--to warn
against using military veterans organizations to
further their political objectives. The restrained
behavior of the Falangists and veterans at Franco's
burial may reflect this warning.
While giving tentative signs that some degree
of political liberalization will eventually emerge
in Spain, Juan Carlos is also paying attention to
Franco's old supporters. Having angered some elements
of the far right by failing to mention Franco's
National Movement in his accession speech, the King
moved to placate them by giving his first official
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audience to the National Confederation for Veterans,
whose members include many ultra rightists.
The Catholic church in Spain has offered its
support to the King and evolutionary change. This
has been the message of proclamations by the presi-
dent of the Bishops' Conference and the archbishop
of Barcelona, as well as in the funeral oration given
by the cardinal primate.
The initial reaction among the political opposi-
tion has been mixed. Some oppositionists expressed
disappointment that the King did not announce
specific steps toward liberalization or an immediate
amnesty for political prisoners in his accession
speech. Christian Democratic leader Ruiz Gimenez,
however, said that he thought the King said as much
as he could before the Cortes, which is dominated
by right wingers who would have been affronted by
any liberalizing gestures on the eve of Franco's
burial. Felipe Gonzalez, leader of the principal
Socialist party, has said he will give the King a
month to make clear his intentions for a democratic
transformation. On the other hand, Santiago Carrillo
and some of his colleagues in the Communist-dominated
Democratic Junta coalition group found the King's
speech totally unacceptable.
An indication that the present calm in Spain
may not last came with the first outbreak of violence
since the death of Franco. The mayor of a small
Basque town was assassinated on Monday, apparently
by members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty group.
A communique was issued later in which an unidentified
speaker warned that similar acts would follow because
"the Spanish state has not changed."
The terrorist group may have acted in the fear
that the recent gestures made by Juan Carlos and the
government to accommodate regional aspirations will
diminish the appeal of terrorism. The terroists
probably hope to resume the cycle of violence and
repression in order to keep alive Basque resentment
against the central government. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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New Effort to Revive Cypriot Talks
French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues will
meet tomorrow with the Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers--who are in Paris for a Council of Europe
meeting--in an effort to revive the moribund Cypriot
intercommunal talks. The French initiative is a
follow-up to President Giscard's visit to Athens
and Sauvagnargues' visit to Ankara earlier this fall.
Sauvagnargues is likely to find the Greeks in
favor of resuming the negotiations now that the UN
General Assembly has favorably considered their case.
Cypriot President Makarios declared his readiness,
on Monday to resume intercommunal talks on the basis
of the UN resolution which, among other things,
called for the removal of foreign troops from Cyprus
"without further delay."
The Turks, however, are piqued at the UN's
treatment of their case, and will be reluctant to
agree to an early resumption of the talks. Ankara
nevertheless has again rebuffed Turkish Cypriot
leader Denktash who called for a declaration of
independence for the Turkish Cypriot zone. Turkey
will probably veto his threat to oust UN forces from
the zone.
Meanwhile, the Turkish General Staff, which
is becoming increasingly annoyed at the Demirel
government's failure to confront the country's
foreign and domestic problems, is reportedly con-
sidering a plan to withdraw a substantial number of
the approximately 32,000 Turkish troops still in
25X1C Cyprus.
the plan has already been approved by General Staff
Chief Sancar and is now being examined by the service
chiefs. If the service chiefs approve, the withdrawal
reportedly will be implemented without recourse to
the government.
November 25, 1975
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Although portrayed as a cost-saving measure,
such a move would be made in part with an eye to
the approaching reconsideration by Congress of the
question of military aid to Turkey. The move might
also reflect a genuine desire by the General Staff
to break the deadlock in the intercommunal talks,
as well as a wish to push Demirel into action on
the diplomatic front. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON/NOCONTRACT)
November 25, 1975
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opposition in Spain Weakened by Decades of
Proscription
The tranquility of the transition
period in Spain will depend in large mea-
sure on the reaction of the political
opposition to what it perceives to be the
attitude of King Juan Carlos toward politi-
cat liberalization.
The initial reaction of the opposition
to the King's accession speech last Satur-
day was mixed. Christian Democratic leader
Ruiz Gimenez said he thought it was the
most the King could say to the Cortes,
which is dominated by right-wingers who
would have been affronted by a liberalizing
gesture on the eve of Franco's burial.
Other opposition leaders expressed disap-
pointment that the King did not announce
specific steps toward opening the political
process. The leader of the Spanish Com-
munist Party, Santiago Carrillo, and some
of his colleagues in the Communist-dominated
Democratic Junta coalition found the speech
totally unacceptable.
An analysis of the opposition, its
strength, and the rote it hopes to play
in post-Franco Spain follows.
November 25, 1975
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The political opposition in Spain has been
weakened by nearly four decades of proscription and
today consists, for the most part, of poorly organ-
ized survivors of political parties and regional
organizations. Many of the groups have "exile" as
well as "interior" party structures. Personalities
are often more important than the groups they lead,
and rival factions are divided as much by their de-
votion to different leaders as by ideology.
Opposition leaders last year attempted to over-
come their differences by moving to combine their
parties into a coalition. They made some progress,
but the emergence of two rival coalitions destroyed
any visions of a unified front.
The initiative for a merger came from the Com-
munists, who pushed the formation of the Democratic
Junta in the summer of 1974. The Junta fell far
short of Communist hopes, mainly because of a legacy
of distrust among Spanish leftists, who remember the
ruthless Communist purges of anarchists, Socialists,
and others during the closing days of the Spanish
Civil War. Most Socialists and Christian Democrats
refused to join.
The most important non-Communist party to join
was Tierno Galvan's Popular Socialists. Tierno has
considerable personal prestige and some influence in
leftist circles, but his group is very small ar}d
lacks popular support.
Easily the Strongest
The Communists are easily the strongest and
best-organized force in the opposition. They number
about 5,000 active members in Spain and at least
twice that many abroad, mostly in France. The party,
outlawed since the end of the Civil War, has been
harshly repressed by the Franco government--in
contrast to its toleration of many other opposition
parties--and Communist leaders rarely venture into
Spain.
November 25, 1975
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Santiago Carrillo Solares, now 60, has been
secretary general since Dolores Ibarruri accepted
the honorific title of president in 1960. He lives
in Paris.
The main source of the Communists' strength is
their dominance over most of the Workers Commissions
formed in the 1960s. Communist organization, disci-
pline, and financial backing have helped make the
commissions the most dynamic political mechanism
available to the Spanish worker. The commissions
will be particularly useful to the Communists if
King Juan Carlos does not open other avenues for the
workers to take their grievances to management.
The Communists also have at their disposal an
instrument for political propaganda in Radio Espana
Independiente, which broadcasts from Romania. The
Communists find some support in the Spanish universi-
ties and have gained considerable influence in the
media.
Communist attempts over many years to infiltrate
the military have so far produced no apparent results.
The basic Communist aim, however, has been to en-
courage the neutrality of the military during the
post-Franco evolution of Spain's political system.
Serious Rift
Although better disciplined than the rest of
the Spanish opposition, the Communists have not
escaped dissension. In fact, a serious rift has
reportedly arisen between the Central Committee in
Madrid and exiled senior leaders in Paris. The
Madrid Committee recently overrode Carrillo's in-
sistence on rejecting Juan Carlos and setting up a
provisional government; the Committee termed his
plan "unrealistic."
Carrillo is being pressed by some young Com-
munists, who reportedly disagree with his relatively
November 25, 1975
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mild approach and resent his attempt to work with
Socialists and Christian Democrats.
25X1C reported in August that the Communists were
osing considerable numbers of young workers to ex-
tremist groups and some university students are said
to be turning to more revolutionary organizations.
2
On international issues, the attitudes and po-
sitions of the Spanish Communists are close to those
of the Italian Communists. Carrillo's relations
with Moscow have been particularly strained since he
denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968.
Like Berlinguer, Carrillo stresses his inde-
pendence from Moscow and has criticized the Portuguese
Communists for their hard-line tactics. Carrillo
professes to favor a more gradual approach to change.
He recently said, for example, that he cannot object
to the US military bases in Spain as long as the
Soviets keep troops in Czechoslovakia.
Rival Coalition
A second opposition coalition, the Platform of
Democratic Convergence, was formed last summer as a
counterweight to the Communist-controlled Junta. The
Platform has some 15 opposition parties, organiza-
tions, and trade unions. It is dominated by Socialists
and Christian Democrats. Its program calls for a new
democratic constitution that would create a federal
state and a number of autonomous regions.
Most of the groups adhering to the Platform
would accept gradual evolution toward a democracy
like others in Western Europe--although there is
considerable squabbling over how gradual the evolu-
tion can be. The Platform probably has tried to
accommodate too many viewpoints. One extremist
group recently withdrew to protest the Platform's
moderation regarding the transition period, and
another is expected to follow suit.
November 25, 1975
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The Socialist Workers Party--the major Socialist
faction in Spain--is the dominant force in the Plat-
form and the Communists' main rival on the left. The
Socialist Workers Party and its affiliated trade
union were revitalized in 1972 after party "young
turks" in Spain wrested control from "old guard"
exiles in France. The party is now led by Felipe
Gonzalez, a young, articulate lawyer from Seville.
Four Christian Democratic factions--Ruiz Gimenez'
Christian Democratic Left and three regional groups--
have joined the Platform, and a fifth, Gil Robles'
Popular Democratic Federation, is expected to join
soon.
Gil Robles and Ruiz Gimenez say that the various
Christian. Democratic factions are already collabora-
ting closely, and that some form of union in inevitable,
but the diversity and bitter personal rivalries among
these factions makes effective unity unlikely.
Little Cooperation
Cooperation between the Junta and the Platform
coalitions has been limited. In early September they
did join in condemning the government's new law on
terrorism and its execution of five terrorists. A
few days later Carrillo misrepresented the joint
communique as an agreement on a common program,
leading several Platform groups to issue immediate
denials.
In spite of the friction, the two again issueda joint communique at the end of October, this time
setting out objectives for the transition period.
Agreement, however, took two weeks of arduous negotia-
tion and some major concessions from the Communists.
Socialist Felipe
Gonzalez has said that cooperation between the two
coalitions will be limited to joint declarations on
subjects of mutual interest, and major differences
do separate the two coalition:
November 25, 1975
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--The Communists and others in the Junta report-
edly hope to merge the two coalitions into a
single popular front. Platform leaders are
not prepared to go beyond establishing a
committee of coordination.
--The Junta believes that the structure of the
Spanish government must be completely reor-
ganized. Platform leaders believe that
modification of the existing structure will
be sufficient.
v
--The two differ over how to handle demands for
autonomy in the Basque provinces and Catalonia.
All opposition groups are in general agreement
that the two most pressing issues in post-Franco
Spain will be amnesty for political prisoners and
legalization of political parties. There are deep
disagreements among Spain's leaders over whether
such actions should be taken and, if they are, whether
the Communists should be included.
At this point, Juan Carlos seems likely to ex-
clude the Communists. Some members of the opposition
believe that exclusion will only benefit the Communists
and that the Communists could be challenged more
effectively in open competition. The Communists would
almost certainly react to exclusion by stepping up
the opposition to Juan Carlos.
Juan Carlos probably believes that excluding
the Communists would be an acceptable risk, in view
of the pressure he will come under from conservative
members of the establishment. Jose Antonio Giron--
a powerful Falangist politician--and other prominent
figures of the far right have publicly condemned the
idea of active political parties in Spain.
Juan Carlos knows that Giron and his followers
have played a major role over the past year in
scuttling Prime Minister Arias' limited moves toward
political pluralism. (SECRET NOFORN/ORCON)
November 25, 1975
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