SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200100002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
9 0
0
Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Secret
November 19, 1975
No. 0775/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
058(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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NOCONTRACT/ORCON
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
November 19, 1975
Soviet Reaction to Lebanon's Turmoil. . . . . . . 1
Ceausescu Toasts Le Duan,
Needles Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Czechoslovakia: A Spark in the Ashes . . . . . . 6
Romanians Fete Syrian Prime Minister. . . . . . . 7
How the Soviets See G. M. Korniyenko. . . . . . . 8
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Soviet Reaction to Lebanon's Turmoil
9
The Soviets have publicly welcomed the current
breathing spell in Lebanon and have expressed the
hope that it will lead to an end to the turmoil.
They clearly would prefer to see a more leftist
Lebanon come out of the current crisis but fear
this cannot be accomplished without taking the lid
off the Arab-Israeli powderkeg.
Moscow is worried that turmoil in Lebanon might
eventually trigger Syrian and Israeli intervention.
This would certainly require the Soviets to in-
crease their support of the Arabs and could touch
off broader Arab-Israeli hostilities that Moscow
wants to avoid.
The USSR is concerned that civil war and
foreign intervention could force the fedayeen to
abandon their base of operation in Lebanon and dis-
perse to other Arab countries. The unwelcome re-
sult would be reduced Soviet influence and in-
creased fedayeen dependence on Arab governments.
Finally, Moscow has complained that the
Lebanese situation is distracting the fedayeen and
Damascus from objectives more important to the
Soviets--specifically, undercutting US political
ascendency in the Middle East and isolating Cairo.
The Kremlin, for example, wants Yasir Arafat to
come to Moscow to discuss the post-Sinai II situ-
ation, but because of the turmoil the visit has
been postponed.
Because of the conflict between Soviet interest
in supporting the left and avoiding an intensification
of the fighting, the Soviets have at times employed
mixed tactics.
November 19, 1975
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ization to steer clear of the fighting and to
support the efforts of the Lebanese government to
assert control over the situation.
At the same time, the Soviets have made it
clear that they will support the PLO if its own
people and facilities are threatened in Lebanon.
In October, they gave tangible evidence of this
support in the form of increased arms shipments
including 30 rocket launchers especially designed
for street-to-street combat.
The Soviets have also weighed in with Damascus.
They have praised Syrian efforts to mediate the
crisis, and evidently told Asad last month in Mos-
cow that they supported his efforts to reduce
tensions in Lebanon.
While the Soviets have not tried directly to
stir up the Lebanese situation, they predictably
have supported their friends on the left. Moscow
has consistently championed Lebanese "progressive
forces," supporting their positions on the issues
at stake and stressing that they have worked for
a negotiated end to the conflict. The Soviets
clearly hope the crisis will increase leftist influ-
ence in Lebanese political life and strengthen the
position of the relatively small, pro-Soviet
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP).
The USSR may have encouraged the LCP to en-
hance its standing with the Lebanese left by par-
ticipating in the fighting. In the early stages
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They have consistently praised the "restraint
and maturity" of Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian
Liberation organization for staying out of the
fighting and have labeled those fedayeen elements
actively involved in the conflict as "terrorists."
Reporting from sources within the PLO confirms that
Moscow has privately warned the PLO of the dangers
of Israeli intervention and has advised the organ-
November 19, 1975
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of the conflict, the LCP was prominent behind the
barricades; in April and May, the Soviets unsuc-
cessfully urged the PLO to arm the party.
But Moscow apparently has not given the LCP
all the help it wanted. In September, Lebanese
party leaders complained about the lack of stronger,
more direct Soviet backing. In October, when the
fighting intensified and the conflict threatened
to draw in outsiders, the Soviet embassy in Beirut
reportedly directed the LCP to withdraw from the
fighting.
There is no indication that Moscow has rushed
arms to the leftist combatants, but neither is there
any sign that the USSR has sought to halt the flow
a,- of Soviet-made arms from Arab countries to them.
Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party has
continued to buy arms directly from East European
j countries, while the sources of East European-made
arms that the Phalangists had acquired commercially
have dried up.
Moscow undoubtedly thinks that as :Long as the
Phalangists are heavily armed, the Lebanese left
must have the wherewithal to protect its interests
~j and forestall a right-wing threat to the Palestinian
J foothold in Lebanon. In any event, the Soviets
recognize they cannot close Syrian, PLO, Libyan,
and Iraqi arsenals to the left.
Moscow apparently hopes that the Lebanese
crisis can be ended through political and social
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left but which will not jeopardize Lebanon's terri-
torial integrity or stability. The need for such
a peaceful settlement of the conflict has been
the prevailing theme of Moscow's public comment--
including its broadcasts to the Arabs--throughout
the crisis. Last week, Soviet Ambassador Soldatov
met with Prime Minister Karami and publicly backed
his efforts to achieve stability.
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If intensive fighting resumes, the Soviets
will probably continue to do what they can to prevent
fedayeen or Syrian actions that could lead to
general hostilities. At the same time, Moscow will
seek to preserve its credentials with the fedayeen
and Lebanese leftists, perhaps by offering more
explicit assurances of Soviet action in the event
the Muslim position is threatened and by moving
directly to ensure that the leftists continue to
be adequately armed. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/
ORCON)
November 19, 1975
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Ceausescu Toasts Le Duan, Needles Soviets
President Ceausescu took advantage of Le Duan's
visit to Romania from November 13 to 17 to assert
once more Bucharest's determination to pursue its
independent policies, free from Soviet interference.
In his toast to Le Duan on November 17, Ceau-
sescu declared that his party seeks closer relations
with all Communist and workers parties, thus impli-
itly including the Chinese. He also said that Ro-
mania wants to strengthen socialist unity by stressing
the equal rights of all parties, noninterference in
internal affairs, and respect for every party's right
independently to establish its political line in keep-
ing with the realities of its own situation.
Ceausescu went on to say that respect for in-
dependence in party affairs must also apply to state
relations. He invoked the spirit of Helsinki to
promote some favorite themes--elimination of foreign
military bases, withdrawal of all troops within na-
tional borders, and the discontinuance of military
blocs.
In an allusion to Bucharest's long struggle
against Soviet hegemony, Ceausescu lauded the North
~-~ Vietnamese for demonstrating that a people's deter-
j,- urination n to defend their national interests and
their "sacred right" to develop along the road of
socialism can carry them to victory no matter what
the odds or the sacrifices.
Le Duan's visit, which came on the eve of the
latest round of preparatory talks in East Berlin for
a European Communist conference, gave Ceausescu an
ideal opportunity to drive home basic Romanian posi-
tions. Party secretary Stefan Andrei will press the
Ceausescu line during the current deliberations in
the East German capital. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 19, 1975
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Czechoslovakia: A Spark in the Ashes
Czechoslovak dissidents recently used a "little
theater" performance on the outskirts of Prague dis-
creetly to demonstrate their solidarity and their
subtle defiance of the regime.
According to the embassy, an unannounced, un-
advertised, and admission-free performance of John
Gay's "Beggars Opera" allowed a "full cross section"
of dissident intellectuals to gather publicly in
7 strength and to enjoy dramatic fare uncommon in
Husak's "normalized" Czechoslovakia. Unluckily for
the local official who permitted the performance,
the adaptation of the play was not the approved
version by Berthold Brecht that has run successfully
in East Berlin.
Instead, the players performed an adaptation
by an outspoken critic of the regime, Vaclav Havel,
who has turned the play into a stinging political
satire aimed at the present leadership. The em-
bassy notes for instance, that the language of the
explanation to the beggar-thief on why he should.
cooperate with the police could have been lifted
verbatim from any recent speech by Husak on Czech-
oslovak cooperation with the Soviet Union.
The dissidents successfully hoodwinked the
security forces by concealing the preparations for
the performance and by passing word of the event
quietly. The regime's reaction to the performance
was rapid and tough. Its organizer was interrogated
by police for 13 hours and sternly warned against
publicizing the event in Western countries. In ad-
dition, the entire cast was threatened with arrest.
The dissidents themselves have sought to suppress
'the story, apparently satisfied this time with
their modest show of resistance. (CONFIDENTIAL).
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November 19, 1975
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Romanians Fete Syrian Prime Minister
Bucharest reportedly believes that the visit
of Syrian Prime Minister Ayyubi last week went "much
better than expected."
In an effort to put the best face possible on
the visit, both sides put aside bilateral differences
on a number of problems--Arab annoyance with Romania's
'v-absence from the UN during the vote on anti-Zionism,
the Arab boycott of the Romanian national airline
TAROM, and the presence of Romanian cargo on board
the first ship to pass through the Suez Canal en
route to Israel. Media coverage centered on the
economic aspects of the talks, but recent Romanian
efforts to play a peace-making role in the Middle
East undoubtedly worked their way,onto the agenda
(Staff Notes, November 4).
Ayyubi arrived with a long list of complaints
about past Romanian-Syrian economic relations, ac-
d B 1,m st
c re
b
warned Ayyubi to avoid being drawn into a political
discussion with Ceausescu.
assa or in u
cording to the Egyptian am
The Egyptian also asserted that President Sadat
apparent concession to Bucharest--a Syrian pledge to
assist Romanian efforts to participate in the non-
aligned movement "in appropriate forms." Damascus
had reportedly opposed previous Romanian efforts to
establish formal ties to the nonaligned. (CONFIDENTIAL)
ast. The communique does, however, contain one
The final communique is similar to others
signed by Romania and the more militant Arabs.
There is, for example, no reference to "guaran-
teeing the security of all states" in the Middle
November 19, 1975
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How the Soviets See G. M. Korniyenko
USA Ins a Director Georgy Arbatov, is able to
distinguish between good information and analysis
and that which is spectacular but speculative and un-
reliable. Korniyenko's apparent dislike of Arbatov
does not extend to all members of his institute.
He admires De ut Director Zhurkin, for one.
Brezhnev personally prefers Ar atov
as an expert on American affairs, but that Brezh-
nev's assistants, including A. M. Aleksandrov, who
allegedly have a greater understanding of American
affairs, recognize Korniyenko's greater strengths.
Korniyenko is in close touch with Yu. Firsov, an
assistant to Council of Ministers chairman Kosygin.
According to one of the deputy chiefs of the
USA Department, which Korniyenko headed until his
recent promotion, Korniyenko believes relations be-
tween the US and the USSR are based on serious com-
petition that must be played honestly and without il-
lusions. Each country has certain interests and will
seek benefits from any situation or negotiation and,
therefore, the need for compromise should be rec-
ognized. One cannot trick the other side into uni-
lateral concession. The deputy described his former
chief as a sober and logical man.
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Another subordinate said that Korniyenko is
supported not only by First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov, but also by Boris Ponomarev, head of the
Central Committee International Department. The
source described the relationship between Korniyenko
and Ponomarev as excellent and said that Korniyenko
once worked under Ponomarev in the International
Department.
The glowing characterization of Korniyenko by
his subordinates may be true, but an element of
self-interest cannot be ruled out. Institutional
rivalry was almost certainly a factor in
unfavorable comparison of Arbatov with Korniyenc .
There is no evidence to support the source's state-
ment that Korniyenko once worked for Ponomarev.
(SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
November 19, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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