WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
5~ITT KD~M
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Secret
No. 0309-75
November 19, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIBDepartments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11852, exemption category:
458(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declas& fled on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Portuguese Communists Warn Again of
Rightist Coup Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The EC-Nine and the Arabs Go to
Abu Dhabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Italian Socialists Main Winners in
Scattered Local Elections. . . . . . . . . . . 4
Terrorism in Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
November 19, 1975
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Portuguese Communists Warn Again of Rightist Coup Plan
Increasing tension between the government and the
Communists has given rise to renewed Communist warnings
of a rightist coup, further discussion of a plan to
move the government to the north, and, in the Azores,
demonstrations protesting "anarchy" on the mainland.
Yesterday, two Communist-dominated Lisbon dailies
alleged that a coup would be launched today by prominent
anti-Communist officers led by Northern Military Region
Commander Pires Veloso. The Communists charged that the
commander, upset by the large pro-Communist demonstration
on Sunday, decided on a coup to put an end to "this sort
of mutiny." The Armed Forces General Staff denied the
story and said legal action would be taken against the
two newspapers.
Pires Veloso has been a target of the Communists
since he was named to replace the pro-Communist former
commander in September. Like other prominent members
of the present government who have been harshly attacked,
Pires Veloso has been particularly zealous in stamping
out Communist influence in his command.
Although in this instance the coup rumors appear
to be inspired by the Communists to serve their own
ends, the possibility of a rightist attempt cannot be
ruled out. Leftist strength in the Lisbon area, however,
would likely give the rightists pause before undertaking
action there at this time.
Discussion of a plan to move the government to
Porto continued in the popularly elected constituent
assembly yesterday. The plan, first broached last week
when Prime Minister Azevedo was prevented from leaving
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his residence for two days by pro-Communist demonstrators,
reportedly is favored by the center-left Popular Democrats
and Socialists but is seen by the Prime Minister and
others as premature. While the constituent assembly,
whose job is to draft the new constitution, presumably
could move its own proceedings to Porto, it has no
authority to decide for the government. One government
official has described the plan as "hot air."
Meanwhile, the continuing political uncertainty
in Lisbon prompted demonstrations in the Azores on
Monday. They were in support of a tough statement
issued last weekend by the islands' governing junta
decrying what it described as a state of anarchy on
the mainland.
The demonstrations Monday were denounced by the
Socialists, who have sought to divorce themselves from
separatist sentiment in the Azores. There was considerable
clamor for independence during the demonstrations, which
were well attended on almost all of the islands in an
unprecedented show of solidarity.
These demonstrations are a clear signal to Lisbon
of the widespread concern in the conservative islands
over recent events on the mainland which, if not
checked, could advance the independence cause of the
Azorean Liberation Front. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 19, 1975
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The EC-Nine and the Arabs Go to Abu Dhabi
Both Arab and EC leaders hope that their next
meeting, which will be at the expert level in Abu
Dhabi November 22-27, will show progress toward
specific projects of economic and technical cooper-
ation. In a preparatory meeting early this month,
Arab League Secretary General Riyad underlined the
need for developing cooperative projects which
would justify the continuation of the meetings of
experts and the pursuit of the dialogue. He thinks
proposals of priority interest should be chosen at
Abu Dhabi. West German foreign office officials
also believe that the central question is how to
maintain Arab interest in the dialogue.
The EC is still resisting PLO representation
that is identifiable as such within the Arab dele-
gation and resolution of the problem has apparently
been postponed once more. Riyad and Italian For-
eign Minister Rumor, representing the EC presidency,
agreed in Cairo on November 6 to discuss the prob-
lems of a higher level meeting and the choice of
attending delegates after the Abu Dhabi sessions
have been concluded. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
November 19, 1975
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Italian Socialists Main Winners in Scattered
Local Elections
The results of scattered local elections last
weekend in Italy will add little to the momentum
generated by the Communist Party's electoral success
last June nor will they provide solace for the
embattled Christian Democrats. The Socialists,
however, may receive a slight psychological boost.
The contests--held in 125 small towns comprising
less than one percent of the electorate--were of
marginal significance, but a sharp increase for
the Communists might have contributed to the bandwagon
effect they have cultivated since scoring unprecedented
gains in nationwide local elections last June.
Although the Communists' tally of 29.4 percent
of the vote is a marked improvement over their
performance in the same towns during the previous
elections (1970), it is overshadowed by the fact
that the party dropped back from the 33.4 percent
it scored in June.
There were no disasters for the Christian
Democrats, but their total of 36.9 percent represents
a slight drop compared to both 1970 and 1975. The
Christian Democrats are pointing out that separate
candidacies by party dissidents cut into their
vote in several of the larger towns, but the results
will still be interpreted as further, if inconclusive,
evidence of Christian Democratic decline.
The Socialists will view their 14.4 percent--
a substantial increase over both 1970 and 1975--
as a good omen. They are hoping to gain at least
as much in the 1977 parliamentary race in order
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to reinforce the pivotal position they occupy between
the two larger parties.
While both the Socialists and Communists did
well in the weekend contests, the miniscule number
of voters involved makes it impossible to determine
whether the trend toward the left, as revealed
in June, is continuing. A more meaningful test
will come this spring in another round of local
elections that will involve about one-fourth of
the electorate and include such key constituencies
as Rome, Genoa, and the region of Sicily. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 19, 1975
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Terrorism in Spain
Prince Juan Carlos' most pressing problem after
he assumes power will be to satisfy those who are ex-
pecting substantial reform and not alienate those who
oppose all change. Although compromise is always
possible with established political forces, the no-
quarter tactics of Spain's assorted terrorist groups
virtually guarantee that at least some of them will
challenge him no matter what policy he pursues.
'There are three main currents of Spanish
terrorism--regional nationalists, the ultra right,
and the extreme left. Each pursues different, at
times conflicting, goals. Violence is the only com-
mon thread among them.
Since 1968, terrorism has claimed the lives of
at least 100 Spaniards, approximately one third of
whom were terrorists themselves. More than half the
fatalities occurred in the past two years, and, since
mid-October, hardly a day has passed without at least
one terrorist incident.
The Basques
Much of the violence is attributed to a small
guerrilla organization called Basque Fatherland and
Liberty. Although generally considered Marxist, its
principal faction emphasizes nationalism; this faction
avoids alliances with other movements. A second
faction would prefer an autonomous, Marxist-Leninist
Basque state within a Marxist federation of Spanish
states. This faction welcomes the collaboration of
other groups.
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Basque militants are usually recruited from uni-
versities and high schools where they have received
a strict Catholic education. The number of militants
either underground in Spain or in exile in southern
France, does not exceed 500 and may be considerably
smaller. Another estimated 700 are in Spanish jails.
Most of the population of the four Basque prov-
inces does not condone violence; not all Basques are
convinced that the militant's goal of independence is
desirable. Many would be satisfied with some autonomy,
particularly in economic and cultural matters.
The people of two of the Basque provinces, Alava
and Navarra, are much less restive than those in the
other two. Alava and Navarra have greater administra-
tive privileges and financial independence--their tax
earnings, for example, are not sent to Madrid--than
any other Spanish provinces. These privileges were a
reward bestowed by Franco for help during the civil
war.
On November 11 the cabinet ordered the prepara-
tion of a new administrative statute for the other
Basque provinces.
Although the news was favorably received, another
decree authorizing the teaching and use of minority
languages provoked resentment. The Basques felt that
this action did not give them anything that was not
rightfully theirs and were further irked by a clause
confirming that Spanish is the country's official
language.
Basque nationalism is, in any case, a minority
movement in the Basque country. Industrialization of
the area during the past two decades has attracted an
annual average of 20,000 workers from other parts of
Spain. Today, less than half of the 3 million in-
habitants of the four provinces are of Basque origin.
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The Basque Nationalist Party is more representa-
tive of the Basque population than the Fatherland and
Liberty group. The Nationalist Party is cast in a
Christian Democratic mold and emphasizes both demo-
cratic and Basque traditions. It is the best or-
ganized and most experienced political group in the
area, and it could play a leading role if Madrid re-
laxed its ban on expressions of Basque nationalism.
Without further concessions from the central
government, however, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
is likely to gain in popularity among the young. Its
exploits give it an image of "doing something" about
the Basque problem, and the harsh repression by the
government creates sympathy for its cause.
Similar, but less intense, sentiment in favor
of autonomy exists in the four northeastern provinces
that make up Catalonia. When the economy of the area
prospers, as it has for more than a decade, little
serious talk is heard about separatism.
Catalans in general appear more attracted to
commerce than to politics. Barcelona, for instance,
rivals Madrid in size and is Spain's most important
industrial and commercial center. Catalan industrial-
ists are reluctant to support movements that might
disturb their business in other Spanish provinces.
Catalan political opposition groups are divided
and ineffective. Most are led by aging people who
have little appeal to the young. The Unified Socialist
Part of Catalonia--widely regarded as an affiliate of
the Communist Party--has been the most prominent re-
cently. It joined the Communist-dominated Democratic
Junta last year and recently demanded the release of
all political prisoners and the establishment of pro-
visional governments for both Spain and Catalonia.
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Extremist groups do not operate on a large scale
in Catalonia. The best known, Red Flag, has connections
with the Communist Party and is active among students
and labor organizations.
Right and Left
Spain's political outlaws are not confined to
the far left. Terrorists are quite strong on the far
right.
A group calling itself the Death Commandos has
warned 17 prominent Catalans associated with reform
groups to leave Spain within 24 hours after Franco's
death or face assassination.
The Spanish National Socialist Party--complete
with a swastika symbol--has operated in Madrid and
Barcelona for a number of years. It reportedly has
links with the Spanish security police, who have on
occasion enlisted the party's help in handling
political disturbances.
The National Socialists specialize in identifying
and bombing "Marxist" bookstores and leftist organiza-
tions. They once attempted to burn down the palace
of the archbishop of Barcelona because of his sympa-
thetic attitude toward workers' grievances.
Another group, the Guerrillas of Christ the King,
has gained considerable notoriety because of a
vigilante-style campaign against Basque terrorists.
In recent months, the group has executed several
Basques in retaliation for terrorist assassinations
of Spanish policemen. It has also caused diplomatic
problems with France because of raids across the border
looking for Basque exiles.
Over the years, the group has been equally hostile
toward any group that favored altering Franco's system.
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SECRET
Under Franco, Spanish ultra-right groups have
had the advantage of operating as fairly open, quasi-
legal entities, tolerated by the regime. Right-wing
extremists are interviewed in the press and at least
two rightist organizations conduct training camps for
urban warfare.
The ultra-rightists have a political arm called
New Force. Led by Blas Pinar, prominent in the civil war,
the organization denounces any deviation from the
principles Franco set out in 1936. It therefore is
basically anti-monarchical and presumably will oppose
Juan Carlos.
Over the years a variety of far-left anarchical
groups have appeared. Most have faded away without
having made much impact, victims of internal disputes
or government suppression.
The Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary
Front is an important exception. Organized in 1971
by militants of a Communist splinter group, the or-
ganization may now have as many as 500 members. Many
of them are in France, but are expected to return to
Spain in increasing numbers once Franco departs.
The front has put special emphasis on preparing
for intensive and violent revolutionary action when
Franco dies. The Spanish security service is aware
that this group has made Juan Carlos a primary target
for assassination. The front's deep-seated animosity
toward the US also poses a threat to American property
and US citizens in Spain.
A Virtual Certainty
Political violence is virtually certain to be a
problem for Juan Carlos. If, as seems likely, he
allows freer political expression, the far left will
not be satisfied while the ultra right will be out-
raged.
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To the extent that Spanish society becomes more
open and more tolerant of dissent, the prospects of
the terrorists rallying support will dwindle. With
this in mind, Spanish officials may modify the harsh
anti-terrorist law now on the books to avoid making
martyrs.
Juan Carlos will very likely still. have trouble
dealing with terrorism. If the government pursues
left-wing fanatics with more vigor than it does the
fanatics on the far right, Juan Carlos will be ac-
cused of perpetuating the Franco system. If the
crackdown is applied in an even-handed manner, Juan
Carlos will risk losing the whole-hearted support of
a large part of what is now Spanish ruling class.
(SECRET NOFORN)
November 19, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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