LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200080002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
NOFORN
gul
?rE
Latin American Trends
Secret
17
November 19, 1975
No. 0536/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
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ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to .
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 118152, exemption category:
438(1). (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Data Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 19, 1975
Argentina: Calabro Comes on Strong . . . . . . 1
Brazil: Gambling in Angola . . . . . . . . . . 4
. . . . . . . . . . . 5
Panama: Labor Shift a Bow to Business . . . . 7
OAS Reverts to Doldrums . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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Brazil: Gambling in Angola
Brazil's rush to recognize the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola on the day the African
territory became independent requires more explanation
/ c than the Brazilians have so far seen fit to give. At
first glance, the action seems to contradict the policy
? implicit in the instructions given to the Brazilian
mission in Luanda when it was established last January,
which were to observe events closely, but to stay out
of domestic matters.
Foreign Ministry officials can maintain that rec-
ognition does not mean approval and that. Brasilia has,
in strict legal terms, merely acknowledged that the
MPLA is in de facto control of the Angolan capital. The
firmness of this shaky posture, however, will almost
certainly be tested by the warring African movements in
actions that could prove highly embarrassing to the
Brazilians. The diplomatic gesture probably has already
caused some chagrin among conservative Brazilian military
officers, who see that their government is virtually
alone in recognizing a regime that owes its existence
to Soviet and Cuban military support.
The act of recognition seems to be a gamble that,
over the long term, the Angolans will remember only that
Brazil was among the first to recognize the new nation.
Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira has said
privately that a major consideration was to spur the
establishment of relations between Brazil and Mozambique
--which followed on November 15. Ultimately the Brazilians
seek to expand trade relations and forge closer diplomatic
ties with the emerging nations of Portuguese Africa. These
aspirations may prove to be overly optimistic despite
Brazil's apparent eagerness to erase the past. Because of
Brazil's historical involvement in the African slave trade
and its tacit support of Portuguese foreign policy, it is
only slightly less resented than the Portuguese themselves.
(CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)
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Moreover, Calabro's tactics are only possible
given the fragmented state of the Peronist movement.
His defection may well encourage others to leave the
fold, thus dividing the movement still further. In-
deed, at least one significant splinter group has
recently intensified its level of activity. The
splintering of Peronism, however, will not reduce the
political importance of workers, who form its very
basis. With or without a formal movement, workers
will continue to make demands that must be met; without
the discipline of the union organizations they would
be more difficult than ever to control.
To the extent that Calabro's actions contribute
to the weakening of President Peron's position, mili-
tary and other critics of her government are apt to
welcome his success. Some, however, particularly the
military, are not pleased by the prospect of yet another
demagogue riding to power on a wave of labor support.
Calabro's rhetorical style last week certainly was
reminiscent of Juan Peron's ringing speeches to throngs
of the faithful.
If indeed it should eventually become apparent that
Calab=ro is what Argentines want, the military will prob-
ably have little choice but to allow him to proceed with
his attempts to gain the presidency. For the moment,
however, the officers are hoping that events will lead
to a definitive descrediting of Peronism so that they
or civilians they deem responsible can go about the
business of governing Argentina without the burden of
the myth of Peron. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 19, 1975
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A_rgentina? Calabro Comes on Strong
The growing prominence of Victorio Calabro, lead-
ing Peronist opponent of the administration, poses
problems both for presidential loyalists and for other
administration critics.
Though formally expelled from the Peronist party
for his strong criticism of the President, the Buenos
Aires governor maintains that he, and not those in
Government House, represents true Peronism. To drive
home this point, Calabro last week organized a rally
in La Plata, the provincial capital. Some 30,000
turned out to hear Calabro,who is also a union official,
hurl defiance at the government and at Peronist party
officials. He of made
support within mbuild an ovement,in-
dependent base pPort
His speech was replete with references to the
teachings of "our leader, General Peron, and to the
harm the administration has done to wages and employment
prospects with its economic policies. When some in the
crowd chanted "Calabro, President," he "begged them to
desist, saying he had come not to "fight the government
in order to get another office" but only to expose the
country's great problems.:
Now that he is out of the ruling party, Calabro is
relieved of restraints on his anti-government rhetoric.
Some within orthodox Peronism undoubtedly counseled
against his expulsion from the party for fear of unleash-
ing an unpredictable but potent force, but they succeeded
only in delaying the decision. In the aftermath of the
rally, impressive because it was well-attended even though
held in an outlying city against official wishes, Peronists
have sought to play down its importance. One legislator
termed Calabro's statements "subversive.
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Calabro is a formidable political figure. He is
an official of the metalworkers, the most influential
of the unions, and governor of the nation's most
important province. As governor he is eligible, under
the current succession law, to be chosen President by
congress if Mrs. Peron should leave office before her
term expires. His labor credentials are particularly
noteworthy at a time when the prestige of labor's top
leaders, Lorenzo Miguel and Casildo Herreras, is
seriously declining.
The 44-year-old governor is a product of the rough
and often corrupt world of labor politics. Active in
unionism since his youth, he has been a metalworkers
official since the early 1950s. He has been at odds for
some time with Lorenzo Miguel,the national head of the
metalworkers as well as secretary general of that group
of unions that profess greatest loyalty to Juan Peron.
Calabro may well have been behind a number of recent
strikes designed to embarrass Miguel, until recently
a leading supporter of the President who has generally
been anxious to preserve labor peace. Even though
Calabro's path to the presidency of the nation may be
blocked, he appears to be well on his way to becoming
the number one man in labor. As such he could have a
strong voice in determining the success or failure of
whoever does become the chief executive.
The emergence of Calabro as a Peronist challenger
is likely to complicate the anxious search for a solu-
tion to the party's and the nation's leadership problem.
In the first place, it adds to the number of potential
contenders for the presidency. Interior Minister Robledo
and Economy Minister Cafiero are already strong possi-
bilities, along with Senate President Luder, who exercised
presidential duties during Peron's recent month-long
absence. The positions of all three have suffered at
least a temporary setback, however, due to their failure
to control the erratic President.
November 19, 1975
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The presidential information office announced on
November 8 that the minister and vice minister of
labor, Rolando Murgas and Luis Shirley, would be re-
placed by Adolfo Ahumada and Arnulfo Boutet, respect-
ively. The new minister, Ahumada, was an influential
member of the National Legislative Commission (in
effect,Panama's day-to-day legislature), a member of
the inner group of Panama's canal negotiating team,
and a leftist former member of Panama's communist
party. By contrast, Boutet, who moves from his post
as governor of Chiriqui province, is described as a
"moderate conservative."
The shift results from the need to dump Murgas,
who had become somewhat of a political liability. As
architect of Panama's liberal labor code and a partic-
ipant in many labor dispute actions that were consider-
ed antimanagement, he was doubly disliked by business.
Torrijos is presently seeking to foster good relations
with the oligarchy-linked business community, most of
which still has a basic mistrust of the Panamanian
strongman. His fence-mending efforts have highlighted
meetings and seminars between government spokesmen and
business representatives. Murgas' ouster is part of
this dialog effort, which has been prompted by Torrijos'
concern for maintaining domestic tranquility since he
knows he will probably have to wait until 1977 for a
breakthrough in the treaty negotiations with tighter
economic times possible in the interim.
Management has certainly hoped that Murgas would
go, and the US Embassy feels that the Ahumada-Boutet
team will be regarded as a gain by the business com-
munity, with Ahumada's leftist cast balanced by his
reported pragmatism and Boutet's more moderate style.
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However, business will undoubtedly take a long hard
look at this new duo--to see whether Ahumada's leftist
leanings are really countered when it comes down to
practical matters. Business recognizes that Murgas
did not operate in a vacuum and that the ministry's
pro-labor stance owed much to Torrijos' own view of
labor as one of his natural new constituencies sup-
porting his leadership. It is Ahumada's leftist
credentials that make him acceptable to labor, and
Torrijos has an interest in preserving them and the
appearance of a leftist, `revolutionary' regime.
(CONE'IDENTIAL/NOFORN)
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OAS Reverts to Doldrums
The lack of a clear role for the Organization of
American States beyond its humanitarian and cultural
business is evident in the deterioration of the ef-
fort to reform the OAS charter. The plan to redefine
and restructure the OAS remains unfulfilled after
nearly three years of work. What has evolved instead
of some fresh conceptual thinking is the use of the
original charter as a Christmas tree on which to hang
popular Latin principles of international law and as-
sertions of the economic rights of underdeveloped
countries. The new draft charter as it stands fails
to smooth the way for a cooperative relationship, and
in fact seems merely to restate points of disagreement
between the US and the rest of the hemisphere. This
situation has developed in large part because most of
the delegates have allowed the Peruvian and Mexican
representatives to take and hold a leadership position,
which they have used to promote their favored third-
world points of view.
Most governments are obviously sending their dip-
lomatic talent where the action is: the UN, numerous
international economic conferences, and Latin-only
regional forums such as the new Latin American Economic
System.
The spirit of hemispheric unity has suffered too
from the Belize affair, in which the Caribbean English-
speaking members line up forcefully on the side of
Belizean independence while the Latinos tend to side
with Guatemalan claims on the colony.
Chile's offer to host the next OAS General As-
sembly created another minor flap. Mexico has severed
relations with Santiago and other governments are also
reluctant to grant a regional honor to the Pinochet
November 19, 1975
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government. The Permanent Council has voted to post-
pone the assembly from April until June 10, ostensibly
because of the press of business but more pertinently
as a hint to Santiago to withdraw its invitation.
Without the reestablishment of dialogue between
Latin America and the US, the OAS seems disposed to
languish, showing spurts of vitality only as the Latins
react against some newly perceived affront from
Washington. Moreover, from the Latin point of view,
"dialogue," by definition, entails an affirmative and
substantive response from Washington to oft-repeated
Latin demands. (CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)
November 19, 1975
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