MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865A002200020001-6
Secret
NOFORN
C~
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No 0881/75
November 17, 1975
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NOFORN/ORCON
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11662, exemption category:
466(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Iran: EC Officials Optimistic on Trade Pact . .
.1
Nigeria: Armed Forces Purge Launched. . . . . .
. 2
Afghanistan-Pakistan: Afghan Posture on
Banning of Pakistani Political Party . . . . .
. 3
Nov 17, 1975
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Iran
EC Officials Optimistic on Trade Pact
EC Commission officials profess to be optimistic
that some kind of trade agreement with Iran will
eventually be concluded. The parties will probably
meet in December.
e Iranians are no longer
ing tor a pre eren is pact, recognizing that the
US strongly opposes such an agreement. Tehran has
nevertheless made clear that it wants the same pre-
ferential access granted Mediterranean countries for
several non-agricultural products. These presumably
include older Iranian exports like rugs and newer
exports like oil products, petrochemicals, and metals.
The EC is trying for a compromise. It probably
will try, within the context of a non-preferential
pact, to meet Iran's economic interests as well as
the Shah's desire for added prestige.
An economic and technical cooperation arrangement
probably also will be included. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN)
Nov 17, 1975 1
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SECRET
Nigeria
Armed Forces Purge Launched
Nigeria's new military regime has quietly begun
a housecleaning of the armed forces similar to its
earlier purge of the country's public service.
the military housecleaning pro-
y will not result in a significant reduction in
the size of Nigeria's 250,000-man army, the largest
standing force in black Africa. Starting with the
officers corps, discharges will be made on grounds
of incompetence, old age, ill health, and corruption.
Those discharged for bad conduct will be ineligible
for retirement benefits or rehabilitation training for
civilian jobs. The decision to extend the purge to
the armed forces appears to have been taken collectively
by the ruling 22-man Supreme Military Council and is
not a vendetta being pushed by a particular group of
senior officers for reasons of their own.
So far, 20 naval officers have been dismissed
with an undetermined number of army and air force
officers to follow. Housecleaning in the enlisted
ranks will include the demobilization of all former
servicemen recalled to duty during the recent civil
war.
there is a good deal
of discontent among those officers slated for retire-
ment or who fear their turn is next.
those discharged will not pro-
test too loudly for fear of losing what benefits they
will get or being punished severely.
t is unclear at this stage whet er the ouse-
Maning will create a large number of disgruntled ex-
servicemen who could become a source of unrest. So
far, the regime has met with surprisingly little oppo-
sition from the several thousand or so ex-civil servants
who have been dismissed. (SECRET NOFORN)
Nov 17, 1975
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SECRET
Afghanistan-Pakistan
Afghan Posture on Banning of
Pakistani Political Party
Afghanistan has reacted with relative moderation
so far to a Pakistani Supreme Court decision last
month that upheld the Bhutto government's banning
earlier this year of an Afghan-supported political
party. Afghan President Daoud, however, may still
be weighing how to deal with this issue, and he
could decide in favor of a more militant: policy.
The Supreme Court decision, announced on October
30, affirmed Islamabad's decree of last February
labelling the National Awami Party as subversive and
outlawing it. The verdict was quickly followed by
'
s
two blasts of critical commentary on Afghanistan
overnment-controlled radio. Since then-
an pos ure has been surprisingly restraine
...g
given the Daoud regime's long-standing critical
stance toward Prime Minister Bhutto's policy of sup-
pressing the National Awami Party and spurning its
demand for greater autonomy for the two Pakistani
provinces bordering on Afghanistan. The people of
these provinces--Baluchistan and the North-West
Frontier--are ethnically closer to the Afghans than
to most other Pakistanis. Almost all of the Awami
party's domestic support is concentrated in the two
provinces.
Daoud and his
government may still to respond to
the Pakistani Supreme Court's action. Daoud's
decision may be affected by whether Bhutto makes
further legal or other moves soon against already-
imprisoned National Awami Party leaders, especially
party chief Wali Khan. Daoud might decide to launch
a new round of vituperative anti-Pakistani propaganda,
and he could also step up his government's material
assistance to anti-Islamabad elements in the two
border provinces.
(Continued)
Nov 17, 1975
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Daoud will probably try to keep Pakistani-Afghan
frictions from getting out of control, however. He
knows that Pakistan is militarily much stronger than
Afghanistan and also that Islamabad might strike back by
instigating dissidence within his country. Daoud is
aware, moreover, that most of Kabul's foreign economic
benefactors, particularly neighboring Iran, would look
askance at Afghan moves that threatened to disrupt the
region's delicate stability. (CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/
ORCON)
Nov 17, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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