SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00865A002100080002-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 6, 2002
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 5, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
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CIA-RDP79T00865A002100080002-0.pdf | 129.06 KB |
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
CONTENTS
November 5, 1975
Soviet Position on Spanish
Sahara Antagonizes Rabat. . . .
Ceausescu Warns
Portuguese Against Soviets. . . . . . . . . . .
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Soviet Position on Spanish
Sahara Antagonizes Rabat
The pro-Algerian position Moscow has recently
adopted toward the Spanish Sahara dispute has led
to a deterioration in Soviet-Moroccan relations.
In the UN, the Soviets have sided with Algeria's
view that the Spanish Sahara question should be re-
solved by granting self-determination to the colony's
inhabitants. Soviet UN representative Malik--with
an obvious eye on King Hassan's threatened mass
march into the territory--has urged "restraint and
moderation" on the concerned parties. Pravda also
weighed in on behalf of Algiers earlier this week
in its :First commentary on. the Saharan situation.
The brief article pointed out that the UN General
Assembly has twice voted for the right of self-
determination for the territory's people and voiced
Moscow's opposition to any efforts to deny them
this right.
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To show displeasure over the Soviet position,
King Hassan has canceled the visit of a Soviet dele-
gation that was to put the final touches on a major
Soviet-Moroccan phosphates agreement, according to
a Moroccan Foreign Ministry official.
Moscow's tilt toward Algeria has probably not
come easily. The Soviets have had their problems
with Algeria's espousal of Third World causes, and
they have made some effort over the last year to
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strengthen ties with Morocco. They are particularly
interested in the development and purchase of Moroc-
can phosphates, which have become an important sup-
plement to the USSR's sagging domestic production
and may take on more importance if this year's crop
failure leads to even further Soviet emphasis on
November 5, 1975
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elect to avoid a direct response. In the past, the
Soviets have preferred to increase pressure behind
the scenes in an attempt to block Ceausescu's offen-
sive.
well wit. the men in the Kremlin, but Moscow may
For his part, Ceausescu has been unusually adept
at gauging the limits of Soviet tolerance. He ap-
parently judges that the advantages to be gained
still outweigh the risks of possible Soviet counter-
action. Indeed, he may perceive that he can get at
least t support from some of his East European
allies.
Poli.sh government leaders ot-fered practically
e same
counsel
to
the Portuguese
during
the recent
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visit to
Warsaw
by
President Costa
Gomes.
Moreover,
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the Yugo
s
lavs
told
Lisbon
that Bel-
grade does no favor Portugal's withdrawal from
NATO, nor does it endorse the reluctance of the
Portuguese Communist Party to share power with cen-
trist parties.
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November 5, 1975
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Nothing of what he said in Lisbon wi sit
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Ceausescu Warns Portuguese Against Soviets
Romanian President Ceausescu has bluntly warned
the Portuguese Revolutionary Council against turning
Portugal over to the Communist Party and thus to
Soviet control.
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Ceausescu's denunciation of Moscow was fore-
shadowed in his public toast to Prime Minister
Azevedo shortly after his arrival in Lisbon. At
that time he drew a parallel between Portugal's
current problems and those that once faced Bucharest,
and recommended that all political parties--includ-
ing elements of the bourgeoisie--work together.
November 5, 1975
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Secret
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