WESTER N EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002100030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 8, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
Q-L
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Secret
OCI--U299- 75
November 3. 1975
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NOCONTFACT
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-? Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
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ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassifIcatlon schedule
of E.O. 11852, exemption category:
* 58(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Data Impossible to Determine
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. 1hey should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Approach of Independence For Angola Stirs
Unrest in Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Spanish Communists Make Concessions on
Joint Communique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Dublin's Bipartisan Policy Toward Ulster
Cracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
French Communist-Socialist Quarrel
Heating Up Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c3
November 3, 1975
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Approach of Independence For Angola Stirs Unrest
in Portugal
Portuguese leftists are citing the arrest last
weekend of two supporters of former president
Spinola to justify their claims that a right-wing
coup is imminent.
The two former military officers, who reportedly
left the country with Spinola following the abortive
coup of March 11, were picked up by security troops
at a camp for Angolan refugees in northern Portugal..
They were said to have Spanish currency and to have
entered Portugal secretly from Spain. The US embassy
in Lisbon reports that several individuals with ties
to the conservative Portuguese Liberation Army may
also have been detained.
Anti-Communist military leaders, including
Prime Minister Azevedo, are appealing for calm and
unity to cool the unrest stirred by anticipation of
Angolan independence next week. An army spokesman
yesterday denied leftist-inspired reports that live-fire
maneuvers are scheduled for this week. He labeled
the story "alarmist" and said such drills could only
lead to a coup attempt from the right.
General Charais, commander of the central
military region, warned the left in an interview
last week that any attempt on its part to overthrow
the Azevedo government and turn Angola over to the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola would spawn a right-wing power play. Charais
believes that the left has alienated a substantial
portion of the population, creating the conditions
for a successful resurgence of the right.
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The left has been agitating to abandon Lisbon's
declared policy of impartiality among the three
Angolan liberation movements and to support the Popular
Movement, but the Azevedo government does not appear
likely to change its neutral posture and further
antagonize either the left or the right. In addition
to internal pressures from left-wing political parties,
the press organs they control, and sympathetic radical
military officers, Popular Movement activists are
arriving in Lisbon on refugee flights to take part in
rallies supporting the Popular Movement. The first
is scheduled for tonight.
As the airlift of refugees from Angola comes to
an end, conservative refugee groups are certain to
become bolder in registering their discontent with
left-wing support for the Popular Movement as well
as insufficient resettlement assistance from the
Lisbon government. The bombing and sacking late last
month of an Angolan cultural center controlled by
the Popular Movement suggests that the returnees do
not intend to shy away from violence. To counter
the left-wing efforts, they have planned a demon-
stration against the Popular Movement for later this
week.
Despite the political turmoil, the 19-man Revolu-
tionary Council is attempting to carry out business
as usual. The Council did not, as rumored, take
action against army chief Fabiao or security head
Carvalho at its session last weekend. It did, however,
approve the long-awaited legal framework for the
investigation and trial of nearly 1,300 members of
the former regime's security police, who have been
detained without charges since the April 1974 coup.
The Council also set up a tribunal to deal with
persons implicated in the March 11 coup attempt and
announced its intention to arrest civilians possessing
military arms.
November 3, 1975
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The anti-Communist members of the Council may
have decided to delay plans against Fabiao and I
)
wing military and civilian groups to equate their
removal with rightist plots to take over the government.1
They may have been further influenced by reports that I
the radical military police hold arrest orders si
n-A i
g
by Carvalho for 500 individuals, including high-
ranking anti-Communist officers. Another likely
obstacle to the anti-Communists is President Costa
Gomes, who has served as the major stumbling block
in previous attempts to oust radical offi
f
cers
rom 25X1A
high positions. (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
November 3, 1975
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Spanish Communists Make Concessions on Joint Communique
The Spanish Communist Party has apparently made
significant concessions in its bid to create a facade
of unity between the two loose coalitions of the
Spanish left.
The joint communique issued Saturday by the
Communist-dominated Democratic Junta and the more
moderately leftist Democratic Platform of Convergence
failed to condemn Prince Juan Carlos out of hand as
the Communists wanted. The communique was also vague
on Communist demands for the immediate establishment
of a provisional government and the calling of a
national referendum to choose between monarchy and
republic. The statement called for a "democratic
break" with Francoism and referred to a "constituent
period" which would lead to a referendum. No deadlines
were set for the referendum.
The three other main "objectives" in the
communique were issues on which there is broad
agreement among the Spanish opposition:
.-Amnesty for political prisoners.
--Freedom for labor unions and political parties
and guarantees of human rights.
--Full political rights and "freedoms" for
2 \ regions.
The communique closed with the statement that
the two coalitions would remain in contact and cooperate
from time to time, but would continue to seek their
own particular objectives.
November 3, 1975
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The leaders of the Spanish Communist Party
reportedly hope to fuse the Democratic Junta and the
Democratic Platform.
The leader of the Socialist Workers' Party,
Felipe Gonzalez, is opposed to a merger and has
reportedly said that cooperation between the two
coalitions will be limited to Joint declarations
on. subjects on which the two have mutual interest
and agreement.
The Communists' immediate aim is probably to
head off any effort by Prince Juan Carlos and his
new government to isolate the Communists from the
non-Communist left. Juan Carlos might seek, for
example, to legalize the left of center Christian
Democratic and Socialist parties. which make up the
bulk of the Democratic Platform. The legalization
of the Communist Party is highly unlikely soon,
although it may become a central issue during the
transition period.
Many of the illegal opposit_L_on parties distrust
the Communists. They cannot afford to oppose legali-
zation of the party, however, for to do so would open
them to charges that they had sold out to the regime.
They also feel that the status of illegality favors
the Communists and that the Party's weaknesses can
only be exposed if it is brought out into the open
political arena.
SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT)
Franco's continuing presence makes it difficult
for. Juan Carlos to respond adequately to demands from
the left. Privately the Prince has indicated a
willingness to move ahead with liberalizing measures.
but. as long as Franco clings to life, ultra-rightists
in the government will be able to use him as an excuse
for obstruction. The left, meanwhile, will be expecting
Juan Carlos to make steps in their direction. If he
feels too circumscribed by his unclear position to
act decisively, his hesitancy could lead to demonstra-
tions by the left which in turn could provoke a back].a:h
by the right leading to violent confrontations.
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3
Dublin's Bipartisan Policy Toward Ulster Cracks
Jack Lynch, leader of the opposition Fianna Fail
party in Dublin, last week called upon the British
to "implement an ordered withdrawal from involvement"
in Ulster. The Fianna Fail statement asked London to
continue to subsidize the province during a transition
period and reiterated the party's call for eventual
unification through peaceful means.
The move, which coincides with the emergence of
strains in bipartisan British policy toward UlL3ter,
may reflect a challenge to Lynch by the party's
right-wing leader, shadow health minister Charles
Haughey. Haughey was nearly sacked by Lynch for gun
running for the Provisional IRA in 1971, but he has
since worked himself back to the from; bench. The
statement reportedly came after a bitter debate in
the party's parliamentary delegation and a close vote
engineered by Haughey.
Although Dublin's coalition government still
supports the current British plan for creating a
power-sharing government in Ulster, a resurgence of
right-wing authority within the Irish opposition
bodes ill for a political solution. Moderate as well
as hardline Protestants in the north will interpret
the Fianna Fail statement as confirmation of Dublin's
inherent desire to annex the province.
November 3, 1975
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:Protestant militants will be faced with an
agonizing decision if the British withdrawal concept
gains widespread acceptance, which seems likely. If
reason prevails--and there is little in the records
to suggest that it will--the loyalists might seek an
interim compromise solution that involves sharing some
important governmental functions with Cat'-,olic politica
leaders. The ugly alternative might be a large military
campaign by loyalists t: -ecur_e areas in Ulster that
have heavy concentrations of Protestant population,
hoping to keep these areas free of Dublin's administra-
tion, at least for a while. (SECRET NOFORN)
November 3, 1975
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Y3
French Communist-Socialist Quarrel Heating
Up .Again
The credibility of the left alliance has
been further damaged by the growing intensity
of French Communist criticism of the Socialists
in the last few days. The alliance has already
been seriously undermined by the public squabbling
between the two parties over the past year and,
most recently, by the decision of their junior
partner, the left Radicals, to open a dialogue
with the government. If the two major left
parties do not begin soon to.patch up their differ-
ences, the alliance will not be able to present a
credible alternative to the voters in the municipal
elections in 1977--or even to survive on paper
that long.
The Communist leaders have noted a steady
decrease in the votes their party has drawn in
by-elections over the last year and a concomitant
increase in Socialist votes. The Communists con-
clude that socialist inroads into previously Com-
munist blocs of support will lead to their perman-
ent replacement as the major left party and spokes-
man of the workers. The Communists also see them-
selves losing to the Socialists what little appeal
they had among the uncommitted voters and have
no hope for improvement before the municipal elec-
tions. Consequently, the party's committment to
the alliance's common program is in question and
the leadership may well be thinking of returning
to a policy of go-it-alone opposition to the
government which would at least calm restless
members who have been uncomfortable with the
alliance. Party chief Georges Marchais, who is
closely associated with the alliance policy--and
November 3, 1975
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who may not be fully recovered from a heart attack
suffered last January--could be replaced. He has ~.
never enjoyed wide popularity within the party.
The Communists do not want to break the alli-
ance themselves, and their recent attacks may be
designed to spur the Socialists into making the
break. Socialist leader Francois Mitterrand has
consistently refused to respond in kind, however,
and has thereby strengthened his image as a states-
man. He also does not want to bear the blame
for breaking the alliance. By remaining silent,
however, the party leaders are irritating the
Socialist rank-and-file--especially in the pro-
vinces where the alliance is not popular--who are
beginning to expect a more aggressive stance from
their leadership. Moreover, the party could lose
ground among the center and uncomitted voters who
want to see a clear distinction between the Social-
ists and the Communists.
The Communist-Socialist debate has also
affected relations between the two largest labor
organizations. The Socialist-leaning CFDT leaders
last week heard a report that charged that the
left alliance is now no more than a formality and
that the two parties are exploiting their differences
to gain votes but are ignoring the workers' interests.
The report marked the first explicit statement by
a member of the opposition that the quarreling
has undermined the alliance's ability to present
itself as a credible alternative to the government
majority.
The Communist-dominated CGT, like its sponsor,
is concerned about losing its dominant role on the
left. In the last few weeks the confederation has
indicated it will act independently of the CFDT
when it believes it can reinforce its position
among the workers by doing so. The more the Com-
munist party seems to be losing ground to the
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Socialists, the more compelled the CGT will be to
assert its majority position in organized labor
in order to strengthen the party's claim to repre-
sent the workers.
the CFDT is likely to find
art
it
s p
For
, Z it expedient to follow Mitterrand's lead in trying
to play down the squabbling. Both unions in fact
have a greater immediate need than the two parties
to maintain at least a minimum level of cooperation
2 or they will lose even more of their already weak-
ened ability to get the workers into the streets
to protest government policies. (CONFIDENTIAL)
November 3, 1975
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