MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002000320002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 30, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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ecret
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
SC No. 08366/75
October 30, 1,975
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL.. . -- This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11654 exemption category:
558(1), (2). and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Rhodesia: An Overview of Chinese Policy
and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Middle East-Africa-South Asia Staff Notes,
No. 0876/75, dated October 30, 1975, was published
under an incorrect classification. Any copies
received should be destroyed.
Oct 30, 1975
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Rhodesia
An Overview of Chinese Policy and Activities
For the Chinese, the situation in Rhodesia con-
tinues to embody opportunities that have ceased to
exist in Angola. The cause of majority rule in
Rhodesia still enjoys the support of all black Africa,
and Peking's revolutionary approach--though contro-
versial--remains relevant. Moreover, the Chinese
recognize that so far as the Sino-Soviet rivalry for
long-term influence in southern Africa is concerned,
the stakes in Rhodesia are much higher than in Angola.
Peking clearly believes that the days of white rule
in Salisbury are numbered and that whoever has the
ear of the future rulers there will have an instru-
ental role in shaping the eventual outcome through-
out the region.
Peking dabbled with the Rhodesian liberation
ovement in the early 1960s, but its active involve-
ent began in 1964 when it became the major supporter
for the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), com-
posed of urban intellectuals who had broken away
from the Soviet-backed Zimbabwe African People's
nion (ZAPU)? While never numerically as strong as
heir Angolan counterparts, the Rhodesian groups
ere just as given to debilitating factional squab-
ling, and Peking probably discounted ZANU's ability
o mount effective military or political actions
gainst Salisbury in the near term. But immediate
rogress in Rhodesia itself was far less important
o Peking in the mid-60s than the opportunity to
ompete with the Soviets for influence both in the
iberation movement and with presidents Nyerere and
aunda----who at the time played host to all African
iberation groups no matter what the ideological
omplexions.
With exclusive and consistent political and
financial support from Peking, ZANU by the early
1970s had emerged as the most militarily active
(Continued)
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of the two major liberation groups operating out-
side Rhodesia. Peking made no secret of its satis-
faction with ZANU raids in rural areas of northeast-
ern Rhodesia in 1972 and 1973, publicly stressing
the importance of the "armed struggle" and rewarding
now deceased ZANU leader Chitepo with a visit to
China. Following the Portuguese coup in April 1974,
Peking stepped up its arms deliveries to ZANU and
urged its clients to expand their guerrilla opera-
tions, arguing that coupled with the dwindling Por-
tuguese role in Mozambique, this would greatly in-
crease the pressure on Salisbury to reach an accom-
modation with the black nationalists.
Temporary Setbacks
Chinese satisfaction with Rhodesian developments
turned to dismay early this year as Zambia, Tanzania,
Botswana, and soon-to-be independent Mozambique--all
working in concert with Pretoria--succeeded in forcing
ZANU and ZAPU to unite under the aegis of the African
National Council (ANC), to halt guerrilla operations,
and to agree to talks with Salisbury. The prospect
of negotiations alone was probably not overly dis-
turbing to Peking. Black nationalists within Rhodesia
had occasionally talked with Ian Smith's government
over the years, and the Chinese had remained relatively
silent on the subject. The decision by the black Afri-
can leaders to force a merger of the liberation groups,
to pursue exclusively political tactics, and to
cooperate with the South Africans, did, however, cut
entirely the wrong way from Peking's view. The
strength of ZANU lay in its military capabilities,
and ZANU leaders would inevitably take the back seat
to more politically adroit ANC figures in any negotia-
tions. Moreover, Peking's influence with ZANU itself
stood to suffer as the enforced military inactivity
diminished the dependence on Chinese assistance. On
a broader plane, the move by the black African leaders
represented a rejection of Peking's revolutionary
approach in Rhodesia and--so far as the black leaders'
willingness to cooperate with Pretoria was concerned--
throughout the region.
(Continued)
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SECRET SPOKE
The Chinese did little to hide their feelings
over the new initiative. Chinese media kept up
steady criticism through last spring and summer
stressing that "talks must be based on fighting" and
that "while negotiations (were) a form of struggle,
armed struggle must not be given up." Peking also
made strong diplomatic presentations to Lusaka--
which had closed down all the Chinese operated train-
ing bases in Zambia to assure compliance with the
cease-fire---creating strains on Sino-Zambian relations,
and it apparently applied similar heat to the Tanzan-
ful
ians. At the same time, however, Peking was care
to limit the damage to such carefully and expensively
constructed relations, acceding rather quickly, for
example, to a demand that it stop bypassing the ANC
structure by continuing to provide direct assistance
to former ZANU leaders.
Getting Back on Track
Since the breakdown of talks between Salisbury
land the black nationalists in late August, events
in Rhodesia have begun to play into Peking's hand
again. Nyerere and Mozambique's Samora Machel may
have come around to the view that Salisbury's
I resistance to change can only be worn down by resumed
guerrilla operations--or at least the threat of renewed
ilitary pressure. With the serious factional splits
in the ANC in recent weeks, these two leaders report-
edly are backing the militant external group--composed
mostly of former ZANU members. The militants have
l bases
been given approval to establish severs new
along Mozambique's border with Rhodesia. Peking has
long enjoyed dominant influence in both Dar es Salaam
and Lourenco Marques and, having formally agreed
this summer to meet all ANC requirements for training
and equipment, may well be in a position to close out
any Soviet role with the guerrillas whatsoever.
While China's approach to the Rhodesian question
is once again convergent with its interest in main-
taining good relations with Tanzania and Mozambique,
Zambia's position still remain troublesome to Peking.
With the closure earlier this year of the Benguela
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Oct. 30, 1975
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railroad through Angola, Zambia copper exports have
dropped dramatically and Lusaka is hoping that success-
ful negotiations between Salisbury and black Rhodesian
nationalists will enable Zambia to begin using rail
lines through Rhodesia again
As
.
a result, Kaunda
has continued to hold a hard line against guerrilla
use f
o Zambian soil and is apparently promoting the
efforts of the less radical ANC faction--headed by
former ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo--to maintain a dialogue
with Ian Smith. While there is little likelihood that
the Chinese will ever condone Kaunda's conservative
policy, Peking does appear willing to make allowances
for the difficult circumstances the Zambians face.
The Chinese media, for example, have conspicuously
avoided any references to the failure of the Victoria
Falls talks in August in obvious deference to the
sensitivities of Kaunda, who had staked considerable
personal prestige on a successful outcome. Similarly,
Chinese officials made a show of public harmony with
Alexander Grey Zulu, the secretary general of Zambia's
ruling party, when he visited Peking last month al-
though differences were reportedly aired behind the
scenes.
The Chinese can be expected to keep a weather
eye on developments regarding Rhodesia and, with
their recent experiences--including those in Angola--
firmly in mind, take care to anticipate shifts in
regional political currents and any potential openings
for Moscow. Peking can be expected to continue push-
ing the "armed struggle," believing that China's
influence over the black nationalists is directly
related to their dependence on Chinese assistance.
Faced again with concerted African attitudes, how-
ever, the Chinese could come to support a negotiated
settlement provided that the military option is kept
fresh and Peking's clients are assured a strong voice
in the bargaining. In his UN speech, Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua appeared to hold out this possibility
by saying that while "armed struggle is fundamental...
we have always advocated the use of revolutionary dual
tactics (talk/fight)" in Rhodesia. (SECRET NOFORN/
NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
Oct 30, 1975
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SECRET SPOKE
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Secret
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