STAFF NOTES: MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001800320002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 30, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01800320002-7
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
jL\EE X10
Ur
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
No. 0860/75
September 30, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01800320002-7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01800320002-7
No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only
ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division. Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
China-Angola: Peking's Problems . . . . . . . . 1
Afghanistan: Major Cabinet Reshuffle . . . . . 4
Sept 30, 1,975
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China-Angola-
Peking's Problems
As the deadline for Angolan independence draws
nearer, Peking's involvement with the contending
factions there appears to be growing even more
troublesome. China's latest setback involves Tan-
roups. Peking apparently decided to respond to a
equest for aid from Savimbi several months ago
hen units of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement
ppeared to be moving toward a clear-cut military
ictory over both the National Union and Holden
oberto's National Front--which has received the
nion, the smallest of Angola's three liberation
zanian President Nyerere's refusal to forward a
shipment of Chinese arms to Jonas Savimbi's National
)ulk of Chinese assistance.* Some 90 tons of Chi-
ese arms arrived in Dar es Salaam in late August
estined for delivery to the National Union via
,ambia under an agreement reached some time ago
y Nyerere, Zambia's Kaunda, and Savimbi. The Tan-
;anians, however, have been sitting on the shipment
or over a month.
* In his speech at the UN last week, Foreign Minister
Chiao Kuan-hua claimed that Peking had "stopped giving
new military aid to the three Angolan organizations"
when Portugal agreed to grant Angola independence on
November 11. From the Chinese viewpoint, "new" is
undoubtedly the operative work in this statement;
China has continued to try to honor old commitments
to its Angolan clients by funneling arms through
African intermediaries such as Zaire, Zambia and
Tanzania.
(Continued)
Sept 30, 1975
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3
Peking is no doubt incensed over Nyerere's
reneging on the arms shipment--as well as by the
unsuccessful effort by Nyerere and Mozambique's
Samora Machel to gain formal recognition for the
Popular Movement at the Lusaka meeting. The Chi-
nese reaction, however, may be tempered by the need
to limit the damage to the carefully and expensively
constructed Sino-Tanzanian relationship and by the
realities of the situation in Angola.
China's move to shore up the National Union
was most likely undertaken originally as part of an
effort to nudge Savimbi's group toward a formal alli-
ance with Holden Roberto's fading National Front.
Peking probably reackoned that the Popular Movement
might then agree to a cease-fire and the re-estab-
lishment of a tripartite transition coalition. The
chances for such a development have diminished, how-
ever, in the face of the unyielding rivalry between
the Popular Movement and the National Front and by
Savimbi's failure to show much interest in formally
aligning himself with the Front. Under these condi-
tions, Peking would appear to have little to gain and
much to lose if it tried to apply the sort of pres-
sure that might make Nyerere reverse his stand on the
arms shipment.
Zambia's stand in the bruhaha over the embargoed
arms may provide some small measure of consolation
(Continued)
Sept 30, 1975
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aunaa, or course, had good reason to make a show
of support for Savimbi since the Benguela railroad--
which previously carried a significant portion of
Zambia's copper exports and will again become impor-
tant once the fighting stops in Angola--runs through
National Union territory. Nevertheless, Peking will
probably be heartened that Kaunda has not been stam-
peded into the Popular Movement camp and will read
this as a sign of improvement in Sino-Zambian rela-
tions. In recent weeks both Peking and Lusaka have
apparently been trying to repair damages to their
ties caused by a blow-up this spring over differing
views on the Rhodesian question. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
Sept 30, 1975 3
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Afghanistan
Major Cabinet Reshuffle
President Daoud last weekend carried out his most
extensive cabinet change since he was restored to
power in a military coup two years ago. The changes
suggest a further reduction of the influence of the
left.
Finance Minister Abdul Ellah was named second
deputy prime minister, further diluting the influence
of the leftist, first deputy prime minister, Hassan
Sharq. Sharq's position had already been weakened
by the removal or downgrading in recent months of
several of his supporters in the bureacracy.
Two other leading leftists also were losers. In
an apparent demotion, Faiz Mohamad was moved from the
powerful position of minister of the interior to an-
other cabinet post. His.successor, Abdul Qadir, is
said to be a member of an anti-leftist faction that
may be led by General Haider, the powerful commander
of army forces in the Kabul area. Another leftist,
Ghulam Bakhtari, lost his job as minister of agricul-
ture.
The US embassy in Kabul observes that the changes
should add to the competence of the cabinet. Abdul
Ellah's elevation may be an exception. Daoud seems
to trust him, but other politically aware Afghans say
he is inexperienced and has limited ability. Presi-
dent Daoud himself remains as prime minister, minister
of defense, and sinister of foreign affairs. (CONFI-
DENTIAL NO FOREI'=`1 DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Sept 30, 1975 4
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Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01800320002-7