STAFF NOTES: LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001800200002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 24, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
9 ^
0
Latin American Trends
SOURCED
Secret
September 24, 1-075
No. 0528/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 010725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
456(1). (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
September 24, 1975
Venezuela: Setting the Goals . . . . .
. .
1
Venezuela: "Brotherhood of the Sword" .
. .
4
Guyana: Dissent From the Pulpit . . . .
. .
6
Latin America: NAMUCAR in Trouble . . .
. .
8
Cuba: Penetrating the News Media
in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
9
Cuba's Ties to Angolan Rebels . . . . .
. .
13
Argentina: Minister With Two
Portfolios . .
Paraguay's Opposition Parties:
The Weak Get Weaker . . . . . . . . .
.. .
17
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Venezuela: Setting the Goals
A recently appointed director of Petroven, the
holding company that will administer the 19 foreign
r~ petroleum companies after January 1, 1976, has given
y~' Y some insight: into the philosophy that will guide the
new organization.
Alirio Parra, who is closely connected with key
officials of the Perez administration, told an embassy
officer on September 9 that there would be "no polit-
ical invasion" of Petroven and "not one single direc-
torship of the operating companies will go to a politi-
cian." He said every effort will be made to mold
Petroven into an efficient oil company that can com-
pete for markets. Parra stressed that local expertise
will be used, and the staff will be kept small--probably
no more than. 100 persons. A major effort will be made
to see that it does not become an overgrown twin of the
national oil company, CVP, which has been widely crit-
icized for its politicization and inefficiency since
its founding over a decade ago. He said that Petroven
intends to transform CVP into an efficient organization
by completely overhauling its management and upgrading
the staff.
In the months ahead several of the small marginal
companies--both foreign and locally owned---will be
absorbed into larger operating units, according to
Parra. Among the more immediate candidates for this
treatment are Mito Juan, Talon, and Las Mercedes oil
companies--owned by prominent Venezuelans--and US firms
such as El Paso/Venezuela Oil, Continental, Amoco, and
Charter Oil.
Later--perhaps in two to four years--the remaining
firms will probably be regrouped into five large com-
panies. The holdings of Shell, Exxon, Mobil and Gulf
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VENEZUELAN OIL INDUSTRY
PRESIDENT Carlos Andres Perez
Advise president on oil policy r----
PRESIDENT
Gen. Rafael Alfonzo Ravard
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Q-)
would remain intact, though under new names and
Venezuelan management; the fifth company would con-
sist of the holdings of the smaller firms including
the CVP. (See September 17, 1975 TRENDS).
High government officials including President
Perez are increasingly concerned that Venezuela will
not be able to manage the oil industry efficiently
after nationalization. The government fears that
labor and marketing problems will develop and efforts
to encourage the search for new petroleum reserves
and to obtain new technology will fail. The demon-
strated inept management in such state-owned indus-
tries as the scandal-ridden petrochemical industry
have added to the general apprehension.
For this reason, the government believes it will
need the assistance and the participation of the
foreign oil companies in the nationalized industry
for some time to come. Parra and other government of-
ficials have attempted to give the impression that the
Perez government was not rushing headlong into nation-
alization but was acting at a measured pace. While
this may be the strategy, there is little evidence that
the government has yet formulated a national petroleum
policy. With little more than three months remaining
before the official turnover of company assets to the
state, only the general outlines of the future industry
have been determined and Venezuelan officials concerned
with setting policy seem to have little conception of
what: will be needed to transform they into specific
guidelines.(CONFIDENTIAL)
September 24, 1975
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Venezuela: "Brotherhood of the Sword"
General Felipe Parraga Nunez has been relieved
as director of plans and operations for the army
general staff as a result of an apparently offhand
remark he made in Uruguay. Parraga reportedly com-
mented that "irrespective of their various political
tendencies, all the soldiers of the hemisphere are
joined by a basic brotherhood of the sword." Coming
in the wake of well-publicized events in Peru and
Ecuador, the statement immediately touched off a wave
of speculation in the Caracas press about the
Venezuelan military's role in society and its attitude
toward the Perez government. Congress president and
Accion Democratica leader Gonzalo Barrios promptly
cautioned the press against speculating about Parraga's
remark, and other government leaders voiced their be-
lief in the strength of the country's democratic tradi-
tions. Defense Minister Homero Leal Torres, reported-
ly embarrassed by the episode, maintained a discreet
silence.
This episode can generally be regarded as a tem-
pest in a teapot but it does reflect the acute sensi-
tivity of Venezuelan politicians to reports of mili-
tary discontent and to indications that the armed
happy with the present government and might like to
alter it, their interventionist designs are frustrated
by Perez' wide popular support--even in the military--
and the fact that, for the most part, things are going
well for Venezuela. Furthermore, President Perez
closely monitors military attitudes and has several
times acted promptly to remove some of the causes of
military discontent.
~.1 Although there are undoubtedly officers who are un-
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For example, a proposal to establish a national
police force including the National Guard has been
shelved. The military had expressed concern that such
a force could be used as a counter-balance to the
r present monopoly of power enjoyed by the armed forces.
More recently, Perez finessed the problem of selecting
a new defense minister and controlling inter-service
jockeying for that position by keeping the incumbent
in the job at least until the end of the year.
Given Perez' strong position generally, there is
no foreseeable prospect of the military's becoming un-
happy enough with the administration to consider inter-
vening in the present government. Should the politicians
make some grievous error, however, such as mishandling
the nationalization of the petroleum industry, then the
military's attitude toward the government could become
a critical factor. (CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
September 24, 1975
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Guyana: Dissent From The Pulpit
The Roman Catholic and Anglican Bishops in Guyana
have publicly joined critics of Prime Minister Burnham's
drive to transform the country into an authoritarian
socialist state.
In a Pastoral letter in the church-controlled Catholic
Standard, Bishop Benedict Singh zeroed in on "socialists
who restrict freedom so much by government control that
the people are no better off than under capitalism." He
went on to criticize the suppression of "worthwhile ex-
pressions of opinion" in the government-controlled media,
the credibility gap between the people and the country's
leaders, and the lack of representative local government.
Singh concluded with an admonition to Guyanese "to speak
up and denounce injustice."
Singh has expressed his misgivings about developments
in Guyana privately and has avoided an open quarrel with
the government until now. He apparently perceived
Burnham's recent announcement that all church-owned schools
would be taken over next year as a direct and serious threat
to the future of the church in Guyana. Singh's colleague,
Anglican Bishop Knight did not directly criticize the
government's actions, but, he warned of the possible evils
of socialism.
Although the bishops' remarks were given relatively
little coverage in the press, they obviously nettled Prime
Minister Burnham, who attacked right-wing critics in a
still unpublished speech to party leaders in late August.
Although criticism from two of the country's major reli-
gious leaders is disquieting to the government, their
statements are obviously insufficient to detract Burnham
from pursuing his socialist goal. Involvement of the still
quiescent and dispirited leaders of the East Indian com-
munity and of additional middle class blacks will be
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necessary before such criticism gives Burnham pause.
At present, there is little likelihood that those
disparate groups will join forces or that a leader
can be found to marshal opposition to the Burnham
government. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Latin America: NAMUCAR in Trouble
The recently formed eight-nation Caribbean Multi-
national Merchant Fleet (NAMUCAR) is already encounter-
ing problems. A Venezuelan official claims that only
Cuba and Venezuela have thus far paid their share of
an assessment due on June 30 to finance initial admin-
istrative operating expenses. He referred to "serious
disagreement" among the charter members and said many
of them obviously expected Venezuela to foot the bill.
At the time of its organization last May, support-
ers believed that the fleet would foster regional co-
operation and provide additional, and possibly cheaper,
freight service. Not all Latin American nations shared
that concept, however, and several openly opposed the
fleet on the grounds it would compete with existing or
planned national fleets; others objected to Cuba's par-
ticipation. Trinidad and Tobago's Premier Eric Williams
took the strongest stand when he charged that the project
was a vehicle for "recolonization" of the Caribbean by
Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia.
Although present financial difficulties may still
be overcome, it will be many years before trained mari-
time personnel are available and the fleet becomes ef-
fective enough to challenge foreign ship operators in
the region. Further, the Venezuelan government is un-
doubtedly irritated by the attitude of some Latin states
that its massive oil wealth obliges it to fund regional
ventures. Unless the financial problems are resolved,
the Perez government may begin to reassess its support
for the fleet. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Cuba: Penetrating the News Media in Latin America
Havana is making a concerted effort to expand its
/ influence in the Latin American news media at the ex-
pense of the US. In the past year, the Castro regime
has:
--opened new field offices in three countries for
44s its news and propaganda agency, PRENSA LATINA;
--inaugurated the world's only press service in
the Quechua language;
--launched MERIDIANO 80, a fortnightly journal of
news and features tailored for Latin American audiences;
--pressed vigorously for the formation of an organ-
ization of Latin American journalists that would exclude
any US news agency personnel or "pro-imperialist"
journalists;
--campaigned broadly against the so-called ideologi-
cal penetration of Latin America by US news and cultural
media.
The Cuban goal is clearly political--to discredit the
US and minimize US influence. MERIDIANO 80, for example,
apparently has the primary purpose of portraying the US
in the worst light. In a typical issue, eleven of the
twelve articles were devoted either entirely or in part
to disparaging the US. The one remaining article, com-
prising one page, was a laudatory account of the state of
public health in Cuba. The journal also included full-
page advertisements for Cubana Airlines, tourist trips
to Cuba, and a PRENSA LATINA children's publication aimed
at countering the "insidious" influence of Sesame Street,
Popeye, and other US productions that are popular in Latin
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UL_I 1 DE 1975 AND I No.4
iL, A, it
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America. So far, the distribution of MERIDIANO 80 is
1 limited to Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, and
Peru with a total circulation of about 20,000.
PRENSA LATINA, which functions as an intelligence
collection agency as well as a propaganda dissemination
organization, has added offices in Ecuador, Colombia,
and Jamaica to its branches in Argentina, Mexico, Peru,
Panama, and Venezuela, and has stringers in many other
Latin America capitals. Moreover, following the announce-
ment in Lima that Quechua would also be recognized as a
national language, PRENSA LATINA in June began to inter-
sperse news items in Quechua in its press transmissions
to Lima. The half dozen items per day so far are trans-
lations of items also transmitted in Spanish and do not
contain original material. Discredited in the early and
mid 1960s as a biased and amateurish press agency, PRENSA
LATINA has acquired considerable professional polish in
intervening years and has improved the quality of its
reporting markedly. Although still obviously biased, it
is being accepted as a legitimate news source by an in-
creasing number of newspapers and broadcasting stations
in much of Latin America.
PRENSA LATINA's deputy director, Carlos Mora Hernan,
together with Baldomero Alvarez Rios of the Cuban Jour-
nalists Union, represented Cuba at a meeting held in Lima
in August to make preparations for the First Congress of
Latin American Journalists scheduled for October 9 to 12.
At the Congress, a new journalists' organization will be
formed to compete with the Inter-American Press Associ-
ation, which Havana views as a tool of the CIA because
it includes newsmen and women from the US press. The
new professional group--to be called the Latin American
Journalists' Federation--will, according to the Cuban
Communist Party newspaper, be "inspired by the criteria
of national liberation, sovereignty, and economic redemp-
tion for the people of Latin America."
September 24, 1975
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Delegations from 23 countries are expected to at-
tend the Congress; although it ostensibly is to be a
meeting of Latin American journalists, representatives
from at least four English-speaking Caribbean nations
will be included, and a delegation from the Prague-
based International Organization of Journalists will
be on hand. The Congress' organization committee is
headed by Venezuelan Senator Eleazar Diaz Rangel, who,
like Chile's exiled Hernan Uribe, Mexico's Luis Jorda,
Peru's Genaro Carnero Checa, and others at the August
meeting, has close ties with Havana. The Cubans have
been working to form the new press group since last
October and will exert strong behind-the-scenes in-
fluence when it is finally formed. (SECRET)
September 24, 1975
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Cuba's Ties to Angolan Rebels
The Castro regime's support for revolutionary
groups in Latin America is at an all-time low, but
Havana continues to demonstrate its revolutionary
commitment elsewhere. One example is its support to
the pro-Soviet Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA). In this enterprise Havana cooper-
ates closely with Moscow.
The Castro government first demonstrated its
support for the MPLA by providing guerrilla training
and political orientation in Cuba as early as 1961.
Since then, the flow of trainees has varied depending
7 on the degree of warmth in Havana's relations with
the MPLA at a given time. The 40 who received in-
struction in 1962 may have been a representative
group. This training is likely to continue, but on a
very small scale.
In Enid-1965 Cubans apparently began to work with
the MPLA in Congo (Brazzaville). Of the several hun-
dred Cuban military advisers who trained the local
j militia and staffed the president's security guard,
some also provided training for the paramilitary forces
of the MPLA. In Cabinda and Angola, a few Cubans par-
ticipated in MPLA guerrilla operations, and one was
reportedly killed in Cabinda in April 1966.
Havana also supplied material support in the form
of food, clothing, and even Soviet small arms.
Reports of Cuban involvement with the MPLA now in-
clude the following activities:
--Some 50 Cubans cooperate with Soviets in
training MPLA cadres in Congo at Dolisie
and in Angola at Massango and Massangano.
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--Cuban doctors and medical technicians
serve with the MPLA and probably staff
medical facilities along the Cabinda-
Congo border.
--A handful of Cuban advisers serve in com-
bat with MPLA units.
--Cuban technicians run the former Portuguese
airbase at Saurimo in Angola. (SECRET/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
September 24, 1975
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Argentina: Minister With Two Portfolios
Angel Robledo, who currently is both foreign
minister and minister of interior, has become one of
the key political figures in Argentina.
Robledo is a moderate Peronist who first attain-
ed national prominence as minister of defense, a post
he handled with distinction from may 1973 to August
1974, when he resigned following a dispute with the
then powerful secretary of the president and social
welfare minister, Jose Lopez Rega. During his term
Robledo quickly earned the respect of the military
high command, although he had no. previous experience
in national security affairs. He then served as ambas-
sador in Mexico and briefly in Brazil before he was
named foreign minister on August 11, 1975.
Since his return to the cabinet, Robledo has sought
to strengthen relations with other members of the polit-
ical coalition that returned the Peronists to power, and
with major opposition groups in Congress. His background
as proven opponent of Lopez Rega and his close ties to
provisional Senate President Italo Luder--according to
one embassy source they have been friends since student
days---have undoubtedly served him well.
Following President Peron's departure for a month's
vacation on September 14, Acting President Luder peremp-
torily named Robledo to replace Vicente Damasco as min-
ister of interior when the retired army colonel resigned
after an argument with Luder on September 15. Robledo
will eventually have to give up the Foreign Ministry to
devote full attention to his duties as interior minister.
which include conducting national elections and suppress-
ing terrorism.
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At this point Robledo appears to be an astute
tactician content to cooperate with Acting President
Luder; he has not indicated that he has presidential
aspirations. His position, however, could make him
de facto "prime minister" if President Peron returns
to office. (CONFIDENTIAL)
September 24, 1975
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Paraguay's Opposition Parties: The Weak Get Weaker
In recent months Paraguay's already anemic op-
position political parties have been further weakened
I by government harassment, their own dearth of ef-
l~~r fective leadership and their inability to decide on
a strategy for next month's municipal elections. Their
continuing decline practically guarantees that Presi-
dent Stroessner's eventual successor will come from
the military or the ruling Colorado Party.
The chief target of the government's harassment
has been the Radical Liberal Party, the largest legal
opposition group. Within the last five months one of
its congressional leaders was forced to withdraw from
politics because of criminal charges brought against
him, the party president was accused of being a Marxist,
and the party vice president was briefly jailed for
publishing an allegedly libelous article. These develop-
ments have put the Radical Liberals on the defensive
and fostered some reluctance on their part about partic-
ipating in the municipal elections. In the 1973 presi-
dential elections the Radical Liberals received only 13
percent of the vote and it is doubtful that they can
match that performance next month.
The government's objective in repressing the party
is to see it eventually displaced by the smaller and
less organized Levi Liberal Party. In pursuit of this
goal, the government is planning to provide some convert
funding to the Levi Liberals for the October elections.
The most pathetic case among the opposition parties
is the minuscule Revolutionary Febrerista Party, which
is composed of middle and upper-class businessmen and
intellectuals in Asuncion. This mildly socialist group
is undecided about participating in the elections. The
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Febreristas received 2.6 percent of the vote in the
1968 national elections, the most recent in which
they participated. The party's sorry state was under-
scored at its annual convention in early August, when
it was forced to select a reluctant 77-year-old party
stalwart as president because most of its younger, more
attractive leaders were either in prison or in exile.
(CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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