WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00865A001700270001-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 21, 2001
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 11, 1975
Content Type:
NOTES
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Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01700270D 01-5
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
gul~l~ a0
F
Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Secret
1, ,1
No. 0266-75
September 11, 1975
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CONTROLLED L'ISSEM
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 01,3725
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
3513(1), (2), and ;3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to DeRermine
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
25X6
Turkish Election Campaign Spotlights Rift
in Government Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Refugees Returning to Portugal Put Blame
on Pro-Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Canada Weighing Romanian Request for
Nuclear Technology. . . . . . . . . . . 6
Too Much Wine in the EC . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Iceland Begins Talks on
Fishing Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
September 11, 1975
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25X1A
Turkish Election Campaign Spotlights Rift
in Government Coalition
The deep differences between the leaders
of the two major parties in the present center-
right coalition--Prime Minister and Justice
Party (JP) leader Suleyman Demirel and National
Salvation Party (NSP) leader Necmettin Erbakan--
have bubbled to the surface as the country approaches
elections on October 12 for one-third of the Senate
seats.
Although the campaign does not legally begin
until September 21, the politicking that is
already underway has displayed the open rift
between Demirel and Erbakan's conservative,
Islam-oriented NSP.
In recent weeks Erbakan has publicly taken
Demirel and the JP to task in the following ways:
--He has criticized the JP for pushing for
an election alliance of the government
coalition parties, while failing to support
NSP candidates running under that banner.
--He has claimed that the economic planks of
the JP platform are nothing more than an
imitation of Western capitalism.
--He has likened the JP to a tasteless,
watered-down soup and characterized
Demirel as a colorless, ignorant, shame-
less, crook who represents European capi-
talists.
25X1 C
Erbakan has critized Demirel's handling of
retaliation against the US arms embargo, claiming
September 11, 1975
25X1 C
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that he would like to see stronger measures taken.
Erbakan has also opposed territorial concessions on
Cyprus, leaving Demirel little room for maneuver
in the intercommunal talks. In addition, Erbakan
has given the Prime Minister a hard time over the
nomination of provincial governors and the amount
of land to be planted in poppies during the coming
year.
Demirel has not yet answered Erbakan in
public because he wants to keep the coalition
intact. reports, however,
that by mid-August relations between the two had
deteriorated to the point that. Demirel could barely
bring himself to speak to Erbakan. The situation
is aggravated by the knowledge on the part of
both Erbakan and Demirel that any NSP gains
are likely to come at the expense of the JP.
Erbakan's post-election plans are still
unclear. He has on several occasions predicted
the continuation of the Demirel government after
the elections, implying continued NSP participation.
The Turkish press claims, however, that an NSP
study exists which recommends the postponement of
any decision on continued participation until
after the election results are analyzed.
The decision is likely to hinge upon Erbakan's
perception of the NSP's long-range interests.
Significant gains in October could lead him to
feel that leaving the coalition and joining the
opposition Republican Peoples Party in calling
for new elections for the National Assembly would
be the best course. Failure by the NSP to increase
its Senate representation or N'SP losses relative
to the JP would limit Erbakan's options and make
him more susceptible to Demirel's blandishments.
(Secret No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem)
September 11, 1975
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25X1A
Refugees Returning to Portugal Put Blame on
Pro-Communists
The influx of refugees from Angola is putting
an increasing strain on the government and is already
changing the political equation.
Only 75,000 of an expected 375,000 Portuguese
have been repatriated so far, with the remainder
awaiting transportation out of the embattled colony
before November 11, the date scheduled for Angolan
independence. The refugees are bitter over the loss
of their homes and the disruption of their lives and
careers and, for the most part, blame pro-Communist
elements in the government and military for their
plight.
The Portuguese government has promised the
refugees assistance in the form of unemployment
payments, medical benefits, and family allowances.
Despite the optimistic outlook of the government
organization charged with dispensing the assistance,
the mechanism is breaking down under the heavy load.
There is a daily influx of between 1,500 and 2,00.9
refugees, and this number will increase as inter-
national assistance in the airlift is geared up.
The government is trying to deal with the
expected discontent of the refugees by moving them
as quickly as possible through the processing center
and providing free transportation to their original
villages. In addition to relying on the traditionally
strong family ties to provide the bulk of assistance,
the government has encouraged the press to adopt a
policy of studied neglect of refugee problems in the
hope of lowering the refugees' political awareness
and-the public's level of concern.
September 11, 1975
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This policy of dispersion already appears to
be backfiring. Most of the refugees are originally
from northern Portugal where relatives, faced with
new burdens and limited resources, have quickly
adopted the refugees' cause. Thus, northern
Portugal, already out of tune with Portugal's
revolutionary leadership, has become a hotbed of
discontent.
The refugees have begun to organize and have
already demonstrated that they have fewer inhibitions
about resorting to violence than their fellow citizens.
Several rallies and demonstrations have erupted into
violent confrontations with counterdemonstrators or
security forces, and refugees participated in many
of the attacks on Communist offices in the north.
These developments give only a small hint of the
eventual impact the 375,000 embittered refugees will
have on this nation of approximately 9 million.
One refugee leader reported that refugees in
northern Portugal had planned a "national uprising,"
but did not carry it out because "highly placed"
officers had asked that they be patient and that
such an action might interfere: with the plans of
anti-Communist officers. If conditions do not im-
prove, however, the refugees' patience will soon
wear thin.
In the short term, the effect has been and
will continue to be to give support to the anti-
Communist faction within the military and to the
democratic parties. But unless these groups are
able to deal significantly with the refugees' prob-
lems---and that seems doubtful--they will become a
volatile element in Portugal that will create further
instability.
Portugal is already faced with rising unemploy-
ment and other serious economic problems. The influx
of the refugees will swell the unemployment rolls,
place a greater strain on housing, medical, and
educational facilities, and even add to Portugal's
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balance-of-payments deficit by requiring greater
imports of food and other consumer. items. The anti-
Communist military faction of Melo Antunes and the
Socialist Party of Mario Soares have argued that
they are best able to attract needed foreign as-
sistance to deal with Portugal's failing economy.
If they are unable to follow through and make
some substantial progress in dealing with those
problems, the effect will be to create a climate
conducive to a power move by either the extreme
right or extreme left. Even now, for instance,
the refugees represent a growing pool of manpower
that might be used by former president Spinola in
a move to return himself to power. (Confidential)
September 11, 1975
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25X1A
Canada Weighing Romanian Request for
Nuclear Technology
Canada is edging closer to a nuclear coopera-
tion agreement with Romania, the first Communist
state to seek Canadian help.
Canadian officials report that Romania re-
cently asked for a heavy water plant and attendant
technology--including licensing rights for the
international market--a CANDU nuclear power reactor,
and a fuel fabrication plant with associated
technology.
The request follows several years of sporadic
talks. One of the most important recent problems
has been safeguards, a particularly sensitive issue
for Ottawa since it believes that India misused
Canadian technology to develop a nuclear device.
The formalization of the Romanian bid suggests
that Bucharest and Ottawa have narrowed, if not
eliminated, differences over safeguards. Ottawa
now is interested in US views on the prospective
agreement and whether it would be compatible with
existing restrictions on sales of certain equipment
to communist nations.
Italy, South Korea, Argentina and Pakistan
are in various stages of acquiring Canadian nuclear
material and technology. No agreement has been
completed, however, primarily because of the safe-
guards problem. (Secret No Foreign Dissem)
September 11, 1975
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25X1A
Too much wine in the EC
The EC is seeking both immediate and long-
term solutions to the wine surplus, which is caus-
ing a sharp dispute between 'F'rance and Italy and
between these two and West Germany.
Italian exports of wine into France are at
an all time high because of two succeeding bumper
crops and because of variations in the lira-franc
exchange rate. At the council of EC farm ministers
early this week, France asked for EC permission to
restrict the entry of Italian wine. No agreement
was reached but the French cabinet, under strong
pressure from French farmers, imposed restraints
unilaterally on September 10. Rome is consider-
ing retaliatory measures.
The EC Commission must now decide whether to
stretch EC regulations to legitimize the French
action, or attempt to persuade Paris to pull back.
The Commission may threaten to take France before
the EC Court of Justice, a tactic which has pre-
viously been effective with France.
The long term ramifications of the controversy
now appears to be less serious than when it erupted
last spring because progress has been. made toward a
fundamental reorganization of community wine pro-
duction. The broad lines of a program to bring
order to community wine production have been sketch-
ed. They include a two-year ban on new plantings
and stricter quality control. Agreement is still
lacking on the level and price of compulsory dis-
tillation of surplus wine into industrial alcohol.
West Germany, which is under severe budget con-
straints, is reluctant to underwrite the substantial
expense involved. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)
September 11, 1975
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25X1A
Iceland Begins Talks on Fishing Problem
The Icelandic government is under pressure
from domestic interests to take a hard line
in the fisheries negotiations with Britain
that began this week. Nevertheless, there is
some sentiment within Prime Minister Halgrimmsson's
Independence Party to accept something less
than total exclusion of foreign fishermen
from Icelandic waters.
The key question is whether Iceland
should allow any foreign fishing within a
50-mile zone once its unilaterally declared
200-mile limit comes into effect on October
15. British fishermen currently operate
within the 50-mile zone under a two-year
agreement signed in November 1973.
The US embassy in Reykjavik believes
that the Independence Party is inclined to
agree to continued British fishing on a "sharply
reduced" basis. The decision of the coalition
Progressives to await the British demands before
adopting a position does not augur well for
a speedy conclusion to the negotiations.
In the weeks before the talks began,
many public and private organizations demanded
that Icelandic negotiators grant no concessions
whatsoever. The Communist-dominated Peoples
Alliance, as well as sizable numbers of supporters
of the coalition parties, believe that the
50-mile zone should be reserved for Icelandic
fishing.
September 11, 1975
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On the broader question of fishing rights
in the 200-mile zone, sentiment is growing
in all political parties to condition agreement
with the EC countries on implementation of
the EC-Iceland tariff agreement. Bonn has
blocked the tariff pact and imposed a ban
on purchases of Icelandic fish after Iceland
refused to permit German freezer trawlers
to operate off the coast. Alleged fishing
violations by the West Germans recently have
created a hostile climate in Iceland that
probably will force Reykjavik to take a tough
stand in talks with Bonn. Informal talks
could resume shortly at the UN between foreign
ministers Agustsson and Genscher. (Confidential
No Foreign Dissem)
September 11, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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