LATIN AMERICA TRENDS
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Secret
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Latin American Trends
State Dept. review completed
Secret
September 10, 1975
No. 0526/75
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
September 10, 1975
Chile: Clampdown on the Universities
Regionalism: With and Without the US . . . . 4
Nicaragua: Anderson Articles Fallout
Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cuba: Provinces to Disappear . . . . . . . . 7
Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely . . . . . . 9
Stalemate in Surinam . . . . . ... . . . . . . 11
Chile: Church Again Blasts Regime . . . . . . 13
Cuban Chronology for August 1975 . . . . . . . 15
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Chile: Clampdown on the Universities
The pattern of arrests and dismissals of univer-
sity personnel and students over the past month sug-
gests that a massive purge is unfolding. The latest
round of detentions has struck a damaging blow at the
universities' capacity to function usefully in Chile's
educational system.
A government-directed shakeup of the administra-
tion of the University of Chile is apparently under
way. A new vice-rector has been named to head the
eastern campus in Santiago, a focal point of the
student and faculty dissent. More faculty members
have been discharged at the Catholic University in
Santiago, where conflict again erupted last week.
Only three or four members of the 15-man political
science faculty now retain their jobs. Press sources
claim that the dismissals stemmed from plans to hold
a seminar on "the crisis of democracy in the world"
which was to have included participation by former
President Eduardo Frei. The majority of those arrested
at the Catholic University were members of Frei's
Christian Democatic Party.
While high level Chilean officials, including Pres-
ident Pinochet, have alleged that the expulsions and
arrests were prompted. by illegal political activity on
the campuses, there is some evidence that a more probable
reason was the government's intention to replace dis-
senters with government supporters. The number of per-
sons jailed or ousted from the universities is not clear.
Meanwhile, many appeals for writs of habeas corpus sub-
mitted on behalf of those still being held have been re-
jected by the courts.
The wives of some professors in custody have denied
the government's charges and have told US Embassy of-
ficers that their husbands were not political activists
September 10, 1975
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but victims of personal grudges. Some charge that dis-
gruntled colleagues--seeking promotions or bitter over
losing their jobs--have fingered others as Marxists.
So far, the government has been vague about the
specific nature of its charges, which has reinforced
questions about the legitimacy of its actions. The US
Embassy says the over-all effect has been the trampling
of university autonomy and deteriorating morale in the
educational community. Representatives of the University
of California, which has an educational exchange agree-
ment with the University of Chile, are concerned about
the continued existence of educational freedom in Chile
and are considering terminating the exchange program.
Whatever may be the government's intentions in
moving against the universities, it will further damage
Chile's image abroad and have a negative effect on hopes
for a meaningful liberalization of its security restric-
tions.
September 10, 1975
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Regionalism: With and Without the US
Increasing involvement in international confer-
ences has given the Latin American governments a
broader context in which to examine and sharpen the
focus of their own special interests.
The Latins' experiences in various UN activities
and especially their connnection with the Group of 77
and the nonaligned movement have convinced them of the
value of solidarity with other blocs with similar
problems and aspirations. At the same time, the Latins
have become more conscious of themselves as a region
and have a clearer sense of how they can meet certain
needs on a regional basis. Despite the poor results of
most regional and subregional experiments of the past,
the Latin Americans are taking a new look at the poten-
tial benefits of the OAS and the proposed Latin American
Economic System (SELA), the former with and the latter
without the US.
At broad, global forums, the Latins have seen their
interests diluted in the flood of grievances from less
developed areas and they have also seen the intensity of
the Latin cases fade alongside the bitter determination
of the participants in the Middle East and other politi-
cally divided areas. While the Latins value the concept
of a new international order and other third-world prin-
ciples and agree with the tactic of mass lobbying, they
are also aware of specific economic and political goals
that might be better served by efforts within the
regional community.
Playing on this theme, the new and energetic secre-
tary general of the OAS, Argentina's Alejandro Orfila,
is winning converts to his conviction that the pan-
American forum can be a key court for the presentation of
Latin American positions, propositions, and complaints to
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Washington. Orfila strongly advocates a de-Latinization
of the OAS procedures, which after years of juridical
disputation have become mired in minutiae.
Orfila evidently has sold his practical approach to
Mexican President Echeverria, one of the OAS' strongest
critics. Echeverria has instructed his delegates to
back Orfila fully in the effort to revitalize the OAS
and take the lead in bringing greater decisiveness and
rationality into the organization. Echeverria has also
contacted his rival for Latin leadership, Venezuelan
President Carlos Andres Perez, to ask for Venezuela's
cooperation with Orfila. Both Mexico and Venezuela
seem ready to increase their financial support of the
OAS as well.
Working committees have begun assembling in Panama
to labor over the statutes and principles of SELA, which
will be the subject of a full Latin and Caribbean con-
ference there beginning October 15. SELA--a brainchild
of Echeverria and Perez--is slowly developing accept-
ability in the rest of the hemisphere as a forum in which
the Latins can marshal their assets in practical business
schemes. In SELA, they can cope with differences in size
and development among the countries by means of special
privileges for the poor. Gradually, SELA is emerging as
the vehicle by which the Latins can find the consensus
with which they hope to challenge the US at the OAS.
The many Latin American barriers of cultural division,
regional rivalries, and differing political and economic
systems will remain as formidable as they have been in
the past. But Latin advocates of regional cooperation are
increasingly confident that the lessons of old failures
and the new momentum for altering international relation-
ships will lift them over these hurdles.
September 10, 1975
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Nicaragua: Anderson Articles Fallout Continues
President Somoza continues to orchestrate his
counterattack against Jack Anderson's published al-
legations of Somoza's abuses, including AID fund mis-
use.
The major daily Novedades-?-owned by Somoza--has
headlined and praised Ambassador to the US Sevilla-
Sacasa for his efforts to rebut the charges. The
Nicaraguan Government has also quickly released a US
State Department note, in reply to a formal request
from Sevilla-Sacasa,stating that no official documents
were given to Anderson and that there are no claims
regarding illegal expenditures of AID funds by any
Nicaraguan government organization.
Other aspects of the counterattack have included
the firing of Somoza's press secretary and increased
censorship of La Prensa. This daily is owned by op-
position leader Joaquin Chamorro, who Somoza believes
to be the source of information for Anderson's columns.
Somoza is also beginning efforts to have his rubber-
stamp congress stage an official show of support.
Because the original Anderson articles were seen
by few in Managua, the Nicaraguan strongman allowed
Novedades to publish laundered translations of the
columns. However, given that his selective editing
may be exposed and that his continued public campaign
may spark another column by Anderson, Somoza may find
that he has succeeded only in generating further embar-
rassment for himself.
September 10, 1975
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Cuba: Provinces to Disappear
A specially administered area in eastern Cuba
may be the forerunner of a new political-administra-
tive subdivision designed for adoption throughout the
country. The new jurisdictional structure could be
introduced as early as next year, but the timing prob-
ably depends on popular acceptance of the new concept.
Cuba currently comprises six provinces, which
themselves are divided onto 59 regions and 416 munici-
palities. The draft constitution now under study de-
fines Cuba only in terms of regions and municipalities
and makes no mention of a provincial level of public
administration. This treatment of the highest tier of
government below the national level matches the ambi-
guity of previous cryptic indications of structural
changes, suggesting that the Castro regime was sending
up trial balloons to test popular receptivity to the
demolition of a sociological feature having deep his-
torical roots. The matter was finally brought out more
clearly by Castro himself on July 26, when he explained
that the reorganization was required by "social and
political reality."
The Tunas territorial subdivision in Oriente pro-
vince gives a hint of the new system. The territory is
made up of three of the province's 13 regions, and con-
sists of 6,664 square kilometers with a population of
382,000 people--compared to the province total of 36,601
square kilometers and 3,008,000 people. The territory
is governed from a key regional transportation center for
the area, and its governor is Faure Chomon, a member of
the Cuban Communist Party Secretariat, who was shifted
to the territory in late 1970.
Using the Tunas territory as a guide, the new
political-administrative structure is likely to consist
of between 20 and 25 units at the regional level. Be-
cause no information is available on the subdivision of
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the Tunas territory itself, however, no valid conjecture
can be made about the reorganization at the municipality
level. Whatever the breakdown, the impact will be con-
siderable. The structures of the party, several of the
mass organizations, and some government ministries are
based largely on the provincial political-administrative
boundaries, and major changes in these entities would
have to be made to accommodate the new system.
September 10, 1975
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Argentina: Major Scandal Unlikely
Peronist legislators have side-tracked Radical
Party efforts to investigate the financial dealings
of President Peron and former social welfare minister
Jose Lopez Rega.
The controversy was touched off by press reports
in mid-August that President Peron had diverted about
$800,000 from Peronist welfare funds to her late
husband's estate. Spokesmen for Mrs. Peron blame the
improper transfer on her lawyer--former Interior Min-
ister Benitez--and claim that she is taking steps to
correct the mistake. Other Peronists, however, have
attempted to defend the action by noting that the check
was intended to cover a portion of the inheritance due
the sisters of Peron's former wife Evita. They also
argue that only a fraction of the amount congress ap-
propriated to Juan Peron two years ago in restitution
for property confiscated during his overthrow in 1955
had been put into his account. The Radicals claim
that their repeated requests for a full accounting of
the amount budgeted for restitution have not been
answered by the government.
The Radicals have been fairly low-key in their ef-
forts to launch an inquiry. Their proposal, which would
set up a special investigatory commission, suggests a
calculated effort to gain favorable publicity for the
party while avoiding an uncontrolled escalation of the
debate on political corruption. The Peronists have
nevertheless responded to the disclosures with great
apprehension, probably out of fear that a thorough in-
vestigation would reveal extensive misuse of government
funds by Mrs. Peron's administration.
September 10, 1975
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Because the problem of gr