SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Top Secret
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August 20, 1975
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
August 20, 1975
USSR-Angola: The Popular Movement's Sugar Daddy . . 1
More on the Serb Affair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Romania: Talks with GM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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USSR-Angola: The Popular Movement's Sugar Daddy
Moscow is pursuing a policy of uncompromising sup-
port for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola. It is not only training Popular Movement troops,
but more important, is delivering military equipment.
These deliveries do not cost the Soviets much, but they
have considerable impact on troubled Angola. Moscow has
sharply increased shipments during the past year, almost
certainly because it calculated that the revolution in
Portugal would foster a change in the status quo in
Angola, which the Soviets wanted to be in a position to
exploit.
Even before the increased shipments began, the
Popular Movement had amassed an impressive array of
Soviet equipment. The Movement's arsenal was well
stocked with a variety of small arms, including machine
guns and grenade launchers, and some heavier items, such
as 82-mm. mortars, B-10 82-mm. recoilless rifles, and
122-mm. rockets.
The new deliveries have continued the flow of some
of this equipment and have added several other types of
materiel, including armored cars, trucks, tracked armored
anti-aircraft vehicles, armored personnel carriers, RPG-7
anti-tank launchers, anti-tank wire-guided missiles, and
rocket launchers. With the receipt of this materiel, the
Popular Movement is far and away the best equipped of the
contending groups in Angola.
The Soviets have used two routes for getting supplies
to the Popular Movement. During the insurgency against
the Portuguese, Soviet equipment was unloaded at the
Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, and from there it was
transported overland through Zambia. The Soviets are
still making some use of Dar es Salaam, but equipment
is now moved into Angola via aircraft and third country
vessels, as well as overland transport. The primary route
over the past year, however, has been via Congo. Equipment
August 20, 1975
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unloaded at Pointe Noire is flown from Brazzaville
into Angola, or shipped down the coast in two con-
verted landing craft used by the Popular Movement.
These landing craft do not need a deep-water port,
and are thus able to deliver cargo to prearranged
rendezvous points hidden along the Angolan coast.
On occasion arms-bearing ships have unloaded into
the landing craft or fishing boats while at sea.
An East German ship and a Yugoslav ship have each
unloaded military equipment in Luanda harbor itself.
Moscow conducts training programs for the Popular
Movement both within the USSR and in Congo. Thousands
of Popular Movement troops have received training in
the USSR since the early '60s; hundreds of trainees
are now in the Soviet Union. A few members of the
Movement have been sent to East Germany to be trained
in intelligence and security subjects. It is no
surprise that Popular Movement troops are better
organized and better led than those of its major
rival, the National Front.
There have been reports of Soviet military
advisers and Congolese troops in Angola assisting
the Popular Movement, but these reports are sketchy
and unconfirmed. What seems more likely is that
the Soviets have asked Cuba to help out with advisers
and technicians. Indeed, eight Cubans arrived in
Luanda on August 3. Officials of the Ministry of
Information, which is controlled by the Popular Move-
ment, have tried to pass them off as tourists.
The Soviets are probably using the Portuguese
Communists as the channel for getting political advice
and guidance to the Popular Movement. As far as we
know, there are no Soviet officials in Luanda or
Angola. Moreover, the ties between the Popular Move-
ment and the Portuguese Communists are close. The
Popular Movement was originally an offshoot of the
Portuguese Communist Party. Agostinho Neto, the
Popular Movement's leader, is an old acquaintance of
Cunhal and seems to share his outlook on Marxism and
Moscow.
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The Soviets probably see the pro-Soviet Marxist
Neto as the kind of liberation movement leader they
prefer to work with. Their relative generosity to
the Popular Movement may be intended to exemplify
the rewards which await those who associate themselves
with Moscow. Over the longer term, the Soviets may
hope that with an amenable government in Luanda,
they will be able to exert a major influence on events
in southern Africa and to limit Chinese advances in
the region.
The Soviets presumably have not lost sight of
the strategic or economic opportunities that might
flow from an Angola under the control of Neto's
Popular Movement. But it is hard to see how much,
if anything, Moscow would actually gain from bases
in Angola. With the opening of the Suez Canal the
south Atlantic seafaring lanes are even less important
to the Soviet navy than they have been. Bases in
Angola could not add significantly to any current
Soviet military activity, and Angola would be
strategically important to Moscow only if the Soviets
contemplated a major new increase of their activities
in the south Atlantic. This seems highly unlikely.
The Soviets themselves have no need for Angolan
or Cabindan resources, but they might want to use
Cabindan oil to supply some of their East European
clients. The Soviets may also want to hinder West-
ern access to the minerals in the area.
The Soviets probably do not expect any immediate
return on their investment. While their arms and
equipment have helped the Popular Movement to assert
control over Luanda, Cabinda, and some other areas,
they have not--and probably cannot--overcome the
Popular Movement's inherent weaknesses. The Popular
Movement's essentially urban character, its relatively
limited personnel resources, and Neto's doctrinaire
and unappealing personality make significant inroads
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into the countryside strongholds of the National
Front or National Union unlikely, no matter how
much equipment the Soviets send.
On the other hand, neither of the other two
groups (or both in concert for that matter) appears
able to defeat the Popular Movement decisively on
its territory. Since there is no support whatso-
ever for a partition agreement, a protracted war
of attrition seems in the offing, and Moscow wants
to make sure the Popular movement is well provisioned
for the ordeal.
August 20, 1975
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More On the Serb Affair
General Ion Serb, arrested in late 1971 on charges
of spying for the Soviets, was executed soon afterward,
b, who was commander
of t fie Bucharest garrison, was not part of a Soviet
plot to overthrow Ceausescu, but did supply the Soviets
with top secret information on military units, facil-
ities, and defense plans for Bucharest and its environs.
I ICeausescu had been aware of
Serb ,s pro-Soviet activities for some time, but had
waited for the right time to unmask him. In the past,
Ceausescu's
counterintelligence service has permitted known Soviet
intelligence operations to continue inside Romania
in order to feed them disinformation. This may ac-
count for Ceausescu's way of handling Serb.
This appears to be the most plausible report
thus far received on the activities and fate of Gen-
eral Serb. Fall-out from the Serb affair included
Ceausescu's decision to play an increased role in
security and military affairs and the dismissal of
party secretary Vasile Patilinet. Patilinet had held
the security affairs portfolio at the time of the
Serb affair. He is now minister of forestry. The
discovery of Serb's activities also led to the
promulgation of a new law on the protection of state
secrets that severely limits exchanges of information
with all foreigners.
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Romania: Talks with GM
Romanian officials met with representatives of
General Motors in July to discuss the manufacture of
a small car in Romania. The talks, which are scheduled
to resume later this month, center on possible GM as-
sistance in constructing a facility capable of turning
out 120,000 cars a year. Much of the production is
planned to be sold in West European markets.
Bucharest is pressing for GM equity participation,
which would be limited to 49 percent under Romanian law.
This arrangement would allow Romania to acquire the nec-
essary equipment without increasing its hard-currency
expenditures. GM, noting the problems of other Western
firms in negotiating joint ventures with Bucharest and
the ambiguity of Romanian laws concerning profit repa-
triation, has offered instead to help Bucharest secure
credits to finance the required investment.
Last year, Romania manufactured about 54,000 Dacia
automobiles under a licensing agreement with Renault.
More than half of these cars were exported, primarily
to other CEMA countries. Bucharest's keen interest in
concluding an agreement with a US firm--which goes
back several years--undoubtedly stems from its desire
for hard-currency earnings from the expected exports.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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