SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Soviet Union
Eastern Europe
Top Secret
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August 19, 1975
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
August 19, 1975
Pravda "Observer" on Portugal. . . . . . . . . . 1
Hungarian Statement of Solidarity
with Portuguese Communists. . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Coup in Bangladesh--Moscow's Reaction. . . . 4
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Polish Regime Restricts Information on
Helsinki and German Agreements. . . . . . . . . 8
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Pravda "Observer" on Portugal
On August 19, Pravda published an authoritative
"Observer" article on the situation in Portugal. Un-
like most Soviet commentary on the subject, the article
expresses Moscow's views directly, rather than through
the mouths of the Portuguese Communists or other
intermediaries.
Like other recent Soviet coverage, the general
tone of the "Observer" article is defensive and pes-
simistic. As the distress of the Portuguese Commu-
nists has deepened, the Soviets' seeming confidence
about the course of events in Portugal has given way
to increasing criticism of outside meddling.
Much of this change in emphasis may be intended
to prepare the foreign and domestic audience for the
possibility of a Communist debacle in Portugal and to
identify villains for the period of recrimination that
would inevitably follow. The Soviets may be trying to
rebut recent statements by high US officials by build-
ing a case that it is really Westerners, not the Soviets,
who are interfering in Portugal.
The "Observer" article draws an explicit analogy
between the present situation in Portugal and events
in Chile just before the overthrow of Allende, a theme
that first appeared in a Soviet broadcast to Hungary
on August 15. NATO, the Western press, Western eco-
nomic organizations and, for the first time, "interna-
tional social democracy" are severely criticized in the
article. The Chinese are also dragged into the cast of
evildoers; they are accused of cooperating with inter-
national reaction by fomenting discord in Angola and
the Azores.
Pravda charges that the Portuguese Socialists are
providing a rallying point for reactionaries by attacking
the Communists, but the tone is less strident than when
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Moscow was denouncing the Socialists immediately after
they left the government. Indeed, Pravda calls for
"concerted action" by the Armed Forces Movement, the
Communists, Socialists, and other left progressive
forces. The Soviets have repeated this theme, which
is now at least nominally in accord with Cunhal's own
professed policies, more frequently in recent days.
.The Soviets would clearly like to see the Portu-
guese Communists recover from their present isolation,
but there is little indication they believe their
exhortations will have much practical effect. Pravda
concludes with a call for "massive solidarity" with
the forces fighting reaction in Portugal. Under the
circumstances, this is the minimum that Moscow might
be expected to say to preserve their revolutionary
credentials. Pravda offers no practical advice and
provides no clues about what, if any, action the
Soviets themselves might take in support of the
Portuguese Communists.
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Hungarian Statement of Solidarity
wit Portuguese Communists
The Hungarian Communist party has become the
first in Eastern Europe to issue a formal statement
of solidarity with the Portuguese Communist Party.
In a 113-word statement to the PCP Central Commit-
tee that had clearly been coordinated with Moscow,
the Hungarian party Central Committee expresses
shock at the "increasingly organized" attacks
against Portuguese democratic development; cites
cooperation between the "democracy antifascist
forces" as the best defense; and assures "the
Portuguese Communists and the antifascists" of
Hungarian solidarity.
The Hungarian declaration, made no promise
of any aid. Verbal statements such as this pro-
vide an easy way for the Soviets to display their
support of the Portuguese Communists, and the
Hungarian statement will probably be followed by
others from Eastern Europe.
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The Coup in Bangladesh--Moscow's Reaction
The Soviets have been publicly noncommittal
about last week's coup in Bangladesh, but--like
most observers--undoubtedly see it as a setback
for Soviet and Indian interests in Bangladesh.
Moscow had its problems with former President
Mujib, who resented Soviet niggardliness in pro-
viding economic aid. The Soviets felt, nonethe-
less, that he was the only person who could keep
Bangladesh from disintegrating under the burden
of its economic problems. They welcomed his as-
sumption of more authoritarian power not only be-
cause it was in keeping with their own political
traditions, but also because they hoped it would
enable him to deal more effectively with Bangla-
desh's problems.
The coup seems to have taken Moscow by surprise.
The day before, one of the USSR's South Asian "ex-
perts" in Moscow had said he thought Mujib had a
good chance of ridding the Bengali government of
its administrative chaos and corruption because
Mujib enjoyed broad popular support, especially
among younger cadres. The day of the coup, Soviet
officials in Dacca were busily scurrying about
town trying to find out about the origins of the
coup and the orientation of the new regime.
The Soviets are probably uneasy about Pakistan's
early recognition of the new regime, fearing that a
Pakistani-Bengalee rapprochement can take place only
at the expense of Dacca's ties to New Delhi and Mos-
cow. They are also unhappy about the alleged pro-
US sympathies of the coup leaders. Their greatest
concern, however, is that the new government will
move to improve Bangladesh's relations with China.
Until they have a better idea of which way the
wind in blowing, the Soviets are unlikely-to do or
August 19, 1975
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say anything that would antagonize the new leaders.
Moscow will probably let India take the lead in
testing the sincerity of the new government's pledges
that Bangladesh will continue to follow the same
foreign policy as before. The Soviets will caution
India against overreaction even though India ap-
parently needs no such advice. 25X1C
1while India a ieves a new
government is anti-Indian and anti-Soviet, it will
"wait and see."
The Soviets may be worried about the "domino
effect" of events in Bangladesh or neighboring India.
Moscow has supported Prime Minister Gandhi's power
grab, but even prior to the coup expressed concern
over the possibility of a right-wing reaction to
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The Polish regime's unwillingness to publish
either the full text of the final document signed
at the Helsinki conference or the details of its
recent accord with Bonn indicates that Warsaw is
concerned about coping with public reactions.
Despite its outpouring of support for the
Helsinki document and its calls for giving the
document the force of international law, the Polish
leaders apparently believe that the freer movement
issues embodied in Basket Three could create un-
acceptable popular demands. At Helsinki, party
chief Gierek appeared defensive about Basket Three,
and excerpts of the CSCE agreement published in
Trybuna Ludu, the party newspaper, have carefully
juxtaposed stipulations on sovereignty and non-
interference with the passage on freer exchanges.
A Foreign Ministry official commented to a US
diplomat that nothing in Basket Three would be ac-
ceptable if it interfered with the socialist system
and its ideals.
News media in Warsaw have also failed to publish
the full details of the agreements that Gierek and
West German Chancellor Schmidt reached in Helsinki.
Polish officials initially justified the limited
coverage by explaining that they did not want to
jeopardize the ratification process in Bonn. Al-
though Warsaw has now told the public that Poland
will receive substantial sums of money, it still
has not mentioned the provision that permits 120,000
ethnic Germans in Poland to emigrate in the next
four years.
All the East European regimes face the basic
dilemma of balancing popular expectations raised
Polish Regime Restricts Information
on Helsinki and German Agreements
August 19, 1975
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by the Helsinki summit with preservation of the
Communist value system. The problem facing the
Polish leadership is compounded by the strong
pro-Western sentiment in Poland, which is likely
to lead to a flood of travel and emigration ap-
plications. The Poles will also be expected to
mesh their response to domestic hopes with
Soviet efforts to improve the bloc's ideological
cohesion. If past Polish practices are accurate
indicators, Warsaw will do little more than pay
lip service to calls for increased ideological
indoctrination.
August 19, 1975
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