LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
Secret
%UITT HOUE9 0
Latin American Trends
Secret
25X1
July 23, 1975
No. 0519/75
135
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/0SECR~$DP79T00865AO01400130001-3
LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
25X1
CONTENTS
July 23, 1975
Cuba's Small-Farm Owners Threatened .
25X1-
No Future For ORIT?
Venezuela: Division Within the
Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chile: Unions Reject Junta's
Labor Code . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? . . 8
Colombia: The Vestigial National 10
Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Status of Brazil-Soviet Hydro-
electric Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3.
SECRET
25X1
There are signs that the Castro regime is pre-
paring to make yet another attempt to eliminate the
only remaining major form of private enterprise in
Cuba--family farms. Whatever moves are eventually
undertaken are sure to be slow and careful. The
farm owners and their families, probably the most
conservative segment of the population, number over
a million people or more than ten percent of the
total population. They make a significant contribu-
tion to the economy, and the government has no desire
to alienate them.
Apparently learning from his past attempts to get
the farmers to give up their lands voluntarily, Fidel
Castro has yet to lend his own name to current efforts.
Instead, the task of spokesman has been left so far to
Jorge Risquet, the official of the party's secretariat
who is in charge of agriculture, and to Pepe Ramirez,
president of the National Association of Small-Farm
Owners. These two will probably be joined by others
among the leadership in a lengthy propaganda campaign
to convince the peasantry that the mechanization of
agriculture has rendered the cultivation of small,
individual plots an intolerably inefficient luxury.
When action is eventually taken to incorporate the
small farms into state lands, the move will have the
appearance of enjoying the solid backing of the entire
leadership.
Risquet opened the campaign in a speech on May 17
marking National Peasants Day. He warned that at the
Cuban Communist Party's first congress in December of
this year "our party intends to analyze the new types
of organization that must be adopted for agricultural
production... the party may call upon the peasantry to
embark on the path toward socialist types of production
in rural areas." He added that "a revolution in the
July 23, 1975
Approved For Release 2004/08/i'd': IA=FZZIP79T00865A001400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/0~0di:@DP79T00865A001400130001-3
relationships involving production and property...can-
not occur until there is a change in the current methods
of individual exploitation of the land." He paid silent
tribute to the recalcitrance of the older peasants by
praising the "collective mentality of the younger genera-
tion," suggesting that the regime's efforts to wean
younger peasants away from the concepts of their parents
has achieved some success.
Less than a month later, Ramirez echoed Risquet in
an interview published in the party's daily newspaper.
He identified the Fifth Peasant Congress--probably to
be held next May--as another milestone in the regime's
campaign and said that "on that occasion we shall agree
upon socialist forms of production for our peasants, so
that we may be able to apply science and technology to
agricultural and livestock development..." It is thus
clear that the party congress in December will "debate"
how--not if--the peasant sector should be reorganized,
and the subsequent peasant congress will be used to
marshal popular support to rubber-stamp the decisions
made earlier.
Until now the government has in most cases been
satisfied to use a combination of moral suasion and
material rewards to get peasants to give up their hold-
ings voluntarily. This has enabled Castro to claim he
has honored his pledge, made early in the revolution,
not to take the small farms by force. The statements
by Risquet and Ramirez, however, suggest that the regime
now believes the time is near when the peasants can be
pressured into surrendering their lands without serious
political or economic risk.
July 23, 1975
-2-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
SECRET
25X1
No Future For ORIT?
The Inter-American Regional Workers Organization
(ORIT), a long-time fixture of pan-American coopera-
tion, may become another victim of the Latin Americans'
growing penchant for regional associations that exclude
the US.
ORIT's heyday has been over for some time. The
organization thrived as the symbol of democratic labor
unionism in strenuous competition with Communist labor
fronts during the fifties and sixties. The rivalry was
sharp during those days, when organized labor stood as
a major political force in the Latin American struggle
for representative government.
The many political and economic changes in Latin
America over the past decade have considerably weakened
the role of labor in much of the region. Nationalist
sentiment has taken its toll, too, on the commitment to
international trade unionism. The US advisory role in
Latin America through the American Institute for Free
Labor Development (AIFLD) and ORIT's dependence on the
financial support of AFL/CIO have left these organiza-
tions easy targets for smear campaigns by local critics.
A popular accusation over the past few years has been
that they are manipulated by the CIA. Some labor feder-
ations affiliated with ORIT have thus found this associa-
tion damaging to their credibility.
Venezuelan labor leaders have been trying to lead
their counterparts in other countries toward an "authentic"
regional organization, i.e., an all-Latin one. The major
supporter of a revitalized ORIT with continued inclusion
of the AFL/CIO is Mexican labor leader Fidel Velazquez.
But Mexican labor is looked upon by many Latin Americans
as a tool of the government, and therefore carries less
weight than Venezuelan labor.
July 23, 1975
-5-
C, T~
Approved For Release 2004/08/ C1 Rl 79T00865A001400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
SECRET
Restructuring of trade union relationships in
Latin America was a major topic at the recent Execu-
tive Board meeting of the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in Brussels, as the group
prepared for the ICFTU congress in Mexico City in
October. ICFTU has been concerned about the disarray
and ineffective leadership of ORIT, and its unclear
statutory relationship to ICFTU. At ORIT's Eighth
Congress last year, an amendment to its constitution
left dissolution or suspension up to a decision by
the ORIT Congress; previously such action could be
taken only by the ICFTU.
The ICFTU leadership, not wanting a confrontation
with AFL/CIO over the ORIT problem, has maneuvered to
keep the Latin Americans' status off the agenda at
Mexico City. But the Latins are being privately urged
to make a definite decision on the question of a region-
al organization.
July 23, 1975
-6-
Approved For Release 2004/0 > Et -' DP79T00865A001400130001-3
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
SECRET
Division Within the Opposition
Internal strife within the Social Christian
Party (COPEI), the principal opposition group, could
weaken its vote-getting ability in the 1978 presi-
dential campaign, which is already in its opening
phase. Left-wing leader Luis Herrera Campins is chal-
lenging the party's moderate founder, former President
Rafael Caldera. At stake is the secretary--generalship
of the party, a traditional stepping stone for the
presidential candidacy.
Herrera is dissatisfied with Caldera's leadership
and has accused him of imposing party candidates for
national elections. Herrera's leftist leanings and
lack of loyalty to Caldera are calling into question
the ability of the former president to maintain his
control of the party if Herrera should win the
secretary-generalship. The test of strength between
the two men will come later this year at the COPEI
national convention. Herrera has strong support from
the youth organization and from a number of influential
leftist party leaders.
The party has been in disarray since its defeat in
the 1973 presidential election. Unable to succeed him-
self as president, Caldera chose Lorenzo Fernandez as
the COPEI candidate. Herrera, who claimed that he was
the party's choice, opposed this maneuver as an illegal
effort by Caldera to maintain his own influence. This
bickering has weakened the party, and its efforts to
restore unity are hampered by the conflict between the
left wing, headed by Herrera, and the establishment
personified by Caldera.
July 23, 1975
25X1
25X1
-7-
Approved For Release 2004/089cC fRTDP79T00865A001400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
SECRET
25X1
Chile: Unions Reject Junta's Labor Code
Following the widespread criticism that greeted
the military government's proposed amendments to the
labor code the junta decided
to shelve p ans for its promulgation during the second
anniversary of the coup on September 11. The labor
minister's announcement that the revisions would under-
go intensive study by a commission that included labor
and management representatives was probably a result
of the almost universal condemnation of the proposals
by the workers' organizations and the strong reserva-
tions reportedly held by the management sector.
According to an article in Ercilla, a weekly news
magazine affiliated with the Chris' an Democratic Party,
the most bitter objections by Chilean trade unions were
reserved for the failure to repeal Decree-law 189,
which among other things gives the government control
over the appointment of labor leaders. Naturally labor
leaders believe that this decree-law is an infringement
of union freedoms. As an example, Ercilla points out
that virtually no one dissents at union meetings for
fear of being reported to the authorities.
The government would have found it awkward to cram
the draft down the throats of labor and management arbi-
trarily once strong dissatisfaction had surfaced. Never-
theless, the junta will be reluctant to go very far in
conceding the substantial changes wanted by its critics.
Government hypersensitivity to any hint of labor opposi-
tion is likely to ensure that a hard line prevails.
Meanwhile, in another development, seven promi-
nent labor officials were arrested on July 18 in the
northern copper mining region. They reportedly are
July 23, 1975
-8-
Approved For Release 2004/ATRDP79T00865A001400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004 SE
: Cl RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
E- ET
to be sent to the Tres Alamos detention camp outside
Santiago. Although the labor leaders were ostensibly
detained for violating the curfew and participating
in political meetings, there is little evidence so far
that this was the case. On the basis of current infor-
mation the arrests do not appear to presage a large-
scale aurae by the government.
If the government does not negotiate a release
with national labor leaders soon, however, relations
can be expected to deteriorate even further. The re-
sulting chill could then cause a complete breakdown
of labor-government communication on the controversial
labor code revision and perhaps provoke some open
resistance to the government.
July 23, 1975
-9-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
SECRET
Colombia: The Vestigial National Front
A minor cabinet shuffle this month has again
demonstrated President Lopez' commitment to political
parity. Although the 16-year National Front coalition
of the Liberal and Conservative parties all but ended
prior to Lopez' election campaign last spring, the
constitution requires parity in appointive office
until 1978.
Minister of Justice Alberto Santofimio Botero, a
Liberal, resigned his post to return to party politics.
Minister of Mines and Energy Eduardo del Hierro Santa
Cruz, a Conservative, also resigned. In filling these
positions, Lopez interchanged parties, but maintained
the existing numerical equality. Conservative Samuel
Hoyos Arango, a lawyer and economist, became justice
minister, and Liberal Juan Jose Turbay, an economist
and recent presidential adviser, took over the mines
and energy portfolio. Before announcing the new ap-
pointments, President Lopez, the de facto leader of the
Liberal Party, met with ranking opposition leaders, in-
cluding Conservative Party president Ignacio Velez
Escobar.
There may be additional cabinet changes as prepara-
tions for next year's mid-term elections begin. Minister
of Finance Rodrigo Botero, Minister of Labor Maria Elena
de Crovo, and Minister of Public Works Humberto Salcedo
Collantes--two Liberals and a Conservative--are rumored
to be on the way out.
July 23, 1975
-10-
Approved For Release 2004/DP79T00865A001400130001-3
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001400130001-3
SECRET
25X1
Status of Brazil-Soviet Hydroelectric Projects
Moscow is expanding its participation in Brazil's
power development program. On July 4, Brazil and the
USSR signed a $52 million contract for the Sobradinho
hydroelectric power projects. Beginning in 1977, the
Soviets will supply five 175-megawatt turbines under
long-term credits. The Soviets also are providing
turbines for the Capivara Plant scheduled for comple-
tion in 1976. Recently a Soviet bank co-managed a
$140 million loan for construction of the Capivara
Plant and other power-related projects. Negotiations
for Soviet participation through Western consortia in
the massive Itaipu hydroelectric prolect are continu-
ing. F7 I
July 23, 1975
~`_ _11-
Approved For Release 2004/08/?F:((H_ EP79T00865A001400130001-3
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01400130001-3