LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001300060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 2, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Latin American Trends
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July 2, 1975
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
July 2, 1975
Venezuela: Military Unrest: Not
New But Troublesome . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chile: Opposition To the Junta's
Labor Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
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Guatemala: Coalition Party Weakened .
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Eric Williams Visits Cuba . . . . . . . . . . 10
Uruguay: Bordaberry Attacks
Personalities, Not Issues . . . . . . . . . 12
Colombia: Carlos Lleras Throws
in the Monkey Wrench . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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Venezuela: Military Unrest: Not New But Troublesome
Military support and respect for President Perez
is still high but there is an increasing trend on the
part of some military officers toward open criticism
of the government's policies and even Perez' personal
conduct in office. There is no indication, however,
that present discontent is of a magnitude to threaten
the political stability of the Perez administration.
The rumors of discontent that have recently sur-
faced appear to center on five broad concerns:
...Movement to the left, especially in what
conservative critics charge are "statist"
economic and social measures;
...the effect of politics on promotion and
assignment policies and the relegation of
the military to a minor role in Venezuelan
political life;
...the anti-US cast in foreign policy that has
accompanied the warming of relations with
Cuba;
...the Perez administration's capacity to lead
Venezuela through its current critical period
of rapid economic development, including the
efficient running of the soon-to-be-national-
ized petroleum industry;
...mismanagement and corruption, even at the
cabinet level.
To this list are added lesser criticisms directed
at Perez personally. These include charges that he
intends to amend the constitution to seek a second
consecutive term, that he plans to cap the establish-
ment of relations with Cuba with an invitation to
Castro to visit Caracas, that a recently shelved
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proposal to incorporate the National Guard into a new
national police force was an attempt to create a
presid tially directed counterweight to the armed
f
Nevertheless Perez is acutely aware of military
criticisms and has maintained an open line of communi-
cations with military leaders. Last year the military's
share of the budget was increased by 40 percent and
military leaders have been given the go-ahead to purchase
additional modern equipment. At the same time Perez'
supreme confidence in his own political position could
lead to a misjudgement in dealing with the military.
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This tendency has been apparent both in Perez' con-
troversial proposal to take the National Guard out
from under the jurisdiction of the defense minister
and place it under civilian control; and evidence
that he was planning to retire the present apolitical
defense minister, General Leal Torres, and ignoring
traditional service rivalries, replace him with a
loyal supporter, Air Force General Paredes Bello.
The danger point in Perez' relations with the
military could come if petroleum nationalization
led to a disruption in production. There have been
persistent fears expressed within and outside the
government that politics, corruption, inefficiency,
and general labor unrest will follow nationalization.
I perez is acutely
aware that everything rides on the maintenance of a
reasonably efficient and profitable oil industry.
His dogged insistence on legislative flexibility in
working out needed post-nationalization agreements
with the private oil companies attests to that aware-
ness.
In the meantime, Perez will see to it that causes
for military criticism are kept to a minimum
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Chile: Opposition To The Junta's Labor Code
The proposed amendments to the labor code drawn
up by the military government have elicited wide-
spread criticism from trade unions, which are fear-
ful that the vague language of the statute will be
employed to curtail existing rights and prevent the
holding of free union elections and strikes.
The preliminary draft of the revised code is
now awaiting suggestions and comments by the union
organizations. Several major unions have requested
a six-month delay to permit more detailed study of
the changes, but the government is determined to
push for promulgation by September 11, the second
anniversary of the junta's takeover.
Among the specific objections of labor leaders
are provisions that appear to allow the lengthening
of the work week and the shortening of vacations.
The loose wording of the article on collective bar-
gaining states that strikes will be allowed "when
economic conditions permit the free play of the in-
terested parties but in no case before March 1, 1976."
Among other sections which seem to give the government
added leeway in interpreting the law to its own liking
are two more dealing with strike approval--once that
right is restored:
.,.Article 313 authorizing the labor and defense
ministries to prohibit any strike that "affects
strategic activities or the economic stability of
the country."
...Article 335 stating that "in cases of strikes
that affect the health, or (general) social-or economic
conditions, or prejudice all or a part of the community,
or affect the security of the country, the government
can decree a suspension."
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From all indications it would appear that the
government has no intention of altering the limita-
tions it wants to impose on labor. Union requests
for an extension beyond July 8 on the deadline for
comment on the official draft have already been re-
jected by the labor minister. Moreover, the govern-
ment's handling of the recently enacted social statute
of enterprise suggests that the final form of the labor
document will not differ substantially from the current
one. The government has not yet responded publicly to
union appeals for the appointment of several prominent
labor leaders to a "commission" that would review sug-
gestions and complete the final law. But the most
probable response to this is a flat no.
For the most part, organized labor probably will
soft-pedal its reservations and offer only timid op-
position to the eventual decree. The junta, on the
other hand, evidently recognizes the sense of futility
that pervades the labor establishment and will be less
inclined than ever to concede anything to its critics
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Guatemala: Coalition Party wWeakened
The National Liberation Movement, formerly the
dominant member of the governing coalition, was
further weakened and isolated last week when only
two of its members were elected to head congression-
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Eric Williams Visits Cuba
The visit to Cuba of Trinidad and Tobago Prime
Minister Eric Williams from June 18 to 22 was ap-
parently only a partial success. The Cuban leader-
ship proved unwilling to give full support to several
of Williams' proposals.
Williams sought Cuban backing for a special Law
of the Sea arrangement for the Caribbean. Havana's
response was vague and stopped short of full endorse-
ment. Castro and Williams agreed only that "arrange-
ments for the use and management of the marine re-
sources should be examined."
The two prime ministers agreed to propose Havana
as the site and September 1-4 as the dates for the
first meeting of the Caribbean Committee of the UN
Economic Commission for Latin America. The suggested
agenda includes discussions of education and public
health, but not the Law of the Sea as it affects the
Caribbean.
A major reason for Havana's limited cooperation
is probably the competitive personal relationship
between Castro and Williams. As one of the major
leaders of Caribbean independence, Williams has ap-
parently viewed Castro as a young upstart and poten-
tial rival. Castro's coolness toward Williams' pro-
posals can be seen as a response to Williams' own
earlier stand-offishness and lack of response to
past Cuban initiatives.
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In attempting to expand its influence in the
Caribbean, the Cuban leadership has greater expecta-
tions for an enhanced Cuban role in Jamaica and Guyana
than in Trinidad and Tobago. Castro will be careful,
however, to remain on good terms with Williams because
of his desire for - - support in inter-
national forums.
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Uruguay: Bordaberry Attacks Personalities, Not Issues
President Bordaberry has attempted to eliminate
a major source of friction within his ministry of
Agriculture by dismissing both the civilian minister
and his military subordinate.
For the past several weeks the two officials had
sought to undermine each other by resorting to rumor
mongering and attacks of diatribe. The quarrel appears
to have been largely personal, but it served to focus
high-level attention on agriculture, which only last
month was the subject of a major policy dispute between
Bordaberry and the generals over the regulation of beef
sales.
Because this issue--which also involves a conflict
of interests between small and large ranchers--has not
been resolved, Bordaberry's shuffling of personnel is
only likely to prolong the dispute.
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Colombia: Carlos Lleras Throws in the Monkey Wrench
Liberal Party elder statesman and former presi-
dent Carlos Lleras Restrepo, despite his trumpeted
retirement from politics last year, is now behaving
very much like a presidential candidate. Although
the election is not until April 1978, Lleras' resump-
tion of political activity stands an excellent chance
of seriously dividing--and weakening--the Liberal
Party.
Lleras has abandoned his post on the National
Liberal Directorate, at least for the moment, and
established a shadow leadership in the form of a
separate national party headquarters. The new group,
still in the process of organizing, has set up com-
mittees on finance and the economy--as well as sports
and folk dancing. Regional directorates are also
being organized, presumably in such Lleras strongholds
as Santander and Boyaca departments.
To assert himself significantly, Lleras needs
wider support than he seems likely to get, particular-
ly from the party's majority roster of national con-
gressmen. Most of them support Ambassador to the
United States Julio Cesar Turbay, who is currently
toying with the idea of resigning his post and return-
ing home to take on Lleras. President Lopez, who
recently was moved by growing public disorder to de-
clare a nationwide state of siege, is trying to pre-
serve the Liberals' overall image and is remaining
aloof from the intra-party squabble.
Meanwhile, the Conservative Party, numerically
smaller and markedly less dynamic than the Liberals,
is quietly keeping the lid on its own internal prob-
lems and hoping that the Liberals will eventually
fall apart.
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