LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001200220001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 25, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
ULL L1EYfflE
Latin American Trends
Secret
1.1, 5
June 25, 1975
No. 0515/75
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No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Background Use OnZy/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
June 25, 1975
Cuba Trains Arab Guerrillas in Yemen . . . . . 1
Chile: Pressing The Hard Line. . . . . . . . . 5
Argentina: The Dialogue That Never Was . . . . 6
Colombia: Lopez Fails University Test. . . . . 8
Guyana: A Rip-Off That Backfired . . . . . . . 9
El Salvador: Campesinos Enter
Political Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Peru: New Government Party . . . . . . . . . . 12
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Cuba Trains Arab Guerrillas in Yemen
Cuban military advisers, along with their Soviet
counterparts, are reportedly training Palestinian Guer-
rillas in South Yemen. Members of Fatah and the Black
September Organization are being instructed in terrorist
tactics to prepare them for attacks on Israel from
Lebanon.
Havana's ties with the Palestinians and particular-
ly with Yasir Arafat and Fatah have grown increasingly
close. Arafat traveled to Cuba last November and fol-
lowing his visit a permanent office representing the
Palestine Liberation organization was established in
Havana. Last month it was reported by
that Fatah members are receiving military train-
in' g and political indoctrination in Cuba. Members of
Fatah may have once before received training in Cuba in
1966-67. A Cuban intelligence officer reportedly visited
Fatah guerrilla camps in early 1969 and may even have
gone as an observer on a Fatah incursion into Israel.
Cuba's involvement with Palestinian terrorists is
one more sign that Havana's relations with Israel have
deteriorated completely. In the mid-1960s Castro clear-
ly admired Israel and welcomed its technical assistance;
at the same time he was contemptuous of the Arabs.
Havana's desire for revolutionary allies in the Third
World together with Soviet pressure led to the breaking
of diplomatic ties with Israel in September 1973. During
the October war of 1973 Cuba sent a battalion of tank
personnel to Syria as a gesture of support, but the train-
ing of Palestinian guerrillas to fight in Israel demon-
strates even more strongly Havana's irrevocable decision
to side with the Palestinians.
It appears that Cuba may cooperate with the South
Yemenis in establishing a base for training selected
Middle Eastern guerrillas. Last September a small
June 25, 1975
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number of dissident Islamic separatists from Ethiopia
were receiving Cuban training in South Yemen
Guerrillas of the Popu ar
Front for the Liberation of Oman are apparently also
being given instruction at the same camp as the
Palestinians.
Cuba has had some presence in South Yemen since
the late 1960s and has substantially increased it since
early 1973. This has included medical teams, fishing
and poultry technicians, air force instructors, and
most importantly military advisors training paramili-
tary forces. Fidel Castro plans to visit South Yemen
this summer and further economic and military agreements
are likely to result. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO
DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
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Chile: Pressing The Hard Line
President Augusto Pinochet has told Chileans to
put aside any thought of elections, implying that there
would not be any for the next several generations.
Pinochet made it clear that the military intends to
stay in power for a long time and that the moratorium
on political activity is of indefinite duration.
Speaking in the southern city of Concepcion, the
Chilean President said: "Eventually I will die, and
whoever succeeds me also will die, but there will be
no elections." He admonished provincial authorities
to solve their own problems and to forget about politics.
To drive this point home, the President said that those
who do not understand the government's determination to
suspend elections either "do not wear pants or are row-
ing against the current." This barb was directed
against the junta's critics, and the implication is that
they lack machismo--an insult of the gravest sort to the
Latin male.
Earlier this month Pinochet had launched a sharp
attack against "destructive criticism" and urged that
all stories of a political nature be banned from the
press. He was probably referring to former President
Frei's published interview suggesting that the junta's
economic performance was lackluster. The government is
increasingly sensitive about its economic policies, and
junta leaders appear to be warning their detractors that
they will not brook any opposition, no matter how tame.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
June 25, 1975
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Argentina: The Dialogue That Never Was
President Peron has held another of her infrequent
meetings with Ricardo Balbin, the leader of the major
opposition party--the Radical Civic Union. As in pre-
vious sessions, Mrs. Peron heard Balbin's tactful
criticisms of her administration, but was not particu-
larly forthcoming or conciliatory. The only notable
difference was the presence of Foreign Minister Vignes,
who acted as Mrs. Peron's secretary in place of Lopez
Rega, who was temporarily out of the country.
In spite of Mrs. Peron's effort to pay lip service
to the political dialogue initiated by her late husband,
her apparently total dependence on Lopez Rega has dis-
couraged constructive contacts with all political sectors,
including other Peronist officials. Balbin is under pres-
sure from his party,as indicated by his reported statement
to the President that their meetings must produce results.
Other spokesmen for the centrist Radicals now openly state
that if no action is taken on their complaints, the party
will issue a document saying that the "dialogue is dead."
Balbin may well be in danger of losing his mantle to
someone more aggressive because of his efforts to play the
role of a constructive critic. In the past his detractors
have characterized Balbin as an "old hack" and last week
the extremist Montonero organization revived this charge
in a full-page announcement published in several prominent
US and European newspapers. The announcement was paid
for by the huge Bunge and Born Company as part of an
agreement with the Montoneros to facilitate the release
of two kidnapped company executives. The article speci-
fically attacked Balbin as one of the politicians who
play at constructive opposition based on dialogue and
respect: for the institutions" and "one of the masters of
all the skills to make the popular struggle their own,
without ever representing their (the people's) interest."
June 25, 1975
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More important than the possible replacement of
Balbin, however, is the fact that none of the opposi-
tion political parties has developed viable alterna-
tives to the government's increasingly unpopular
policies. Historically it has been precisely their
absence of democratic options that has ultimately
facilitated the intervention of the armed forces as
the "guardians of the republic." (CONFIDENTIAL)
June 25, 1975
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Colombia: Lopez Fails University Test
Colombian President Alfonso Lopez has lost a
round in his battle with the students, faculty, and
staff of the National University.
The present crisis has developed in recent weeks
as virtually the entire university community has dem-
onstrated loudly and often violently in support of
students, interns, and residents associated with the
university's medical school. The medical personnel
have been striking in an effort to gain control of the
large university hospital. They, as well as the other
students and faculty members, and sympathizers on other
campuses throughout the country, see the problem as an
assault on university autonomy.
President Lopez, searching for a scapegoat--and
perhaps also believing that the university problem could
be readily solved--last week fired the university rector.
Significantly, when he took office last August, Lopez
appointed the rector, a Marxist, in the hope of solving
then current and anticipated problems with the university
community. Instead, the problems have multiplied. The
student body and the academic council, a faculty body,
have rejected Lopez' firing of the rector, as has the
newly appointed replacement rector.
Lopez is now faced with a fired rector who will not
leave and a new appointee who has not only refused the
appointment, but has also withdrawn altogether from
university life. Once the present exam period is over,
Lopez will probably be obliged to compromise, with the
Marxist rector stepping down and the university community
electing a successor. Meanwhile, the problem of the
medical personnel and their hospital--the issue under-
lying the demonstrations and the rectorship debacle--
remains unresolved. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Guyana: A Rip-off that Backfired
Two small foreign companies are being investi-
gated by the government preparatory to their national-
ization. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham
ordered an investi-
operating in Guyana--has been receiving a fee from
the recently nationalized Demarara Sugar Company with-
out reporting that income to the government for tax
purposes. Burnham reportedly is incensed over what he
regards as Bookers' duplicity. Since Guyana already
owns part of Demarara Sugar Terminals through its take-
over of the Demarara Company in late May, Burnham
probably believes that a complete takeover of the
Sugar Terminals is a logical next step. Bookers' "rip-
off" also hastens the final denouement when Guyana
takes control of the entire sugar industry. (See
Trends, June 4, 1975) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
gation into the holdings and operations of Demarara
Sugar Terminals, an affiliate of Bookers Sugar Estates
Ltd., and GUYTRAC, a Canadian firm and the local repre-
sentative of US Caterpillar Tractor Co. Burnham's
action apparently was in part precipitated by his dis-
covery that Bookers--the last major foreign firm
June 25, 1975
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El Salvador: Campesinos Enter Political Arena
With the 1977 presidential election less than two
years off, leaders of the country's largest campesino
organization, the Union Comunal Salvadorena, have begun
a campaign to promote the candidacy of a little-known
battalion commander. Though the organization's rank
and file have not voiced unqualified support for the
officer, the endorsement by its leadership marks the
organization's first direct involvement in politics,
and could eventually loosen the tight hold the military
and the oligarchy have on politics. With an estimated
50,000 dues-paying members and the capability of reach-
ing a much larger audience, the organization could be
an unwanted opponent for a government plagued by de-
clining popular support.
Since its founding in 1971, the fast-growing
organization had abstained from partisan politics on
the grounds that cooperation with the government was the
best way to influence policymakers. It refused to be
drawn into election campaigns, prohibited its members
from holding public office, and even expelled four mem-
bers who participated in the 1974 municipal elections.
In recent months, however, its leaders have grown
increasingly impatient with the government. They sup-
ported President Molina's long-promised "land transfor-
mation" bill, but the program has yet to be unveiled.
Campesinos publicly backed the 1974 Land Rent Law, but
were discouraged when their suggestions for strengthen-
ing it were ignored. Moreover, poverty and unemployment
in the countryside have steadily eroded the peasants'
standard of living since Molina entered office in mid-
1972.
With this in mind, the organization now plans to
flex its new-found political muscle. The campaign for
the officer, Lt. Col. Joaquin Flores, is being directed
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by influential coffee grower Leonel Gomez. Gomez, one
of few landowners friendly to the organization, fears
that peasants will revolt unless their problems are
soon resolved. He has friends across the political
spectrum, and is well connected with the military--
particularly with younger officers. Gomez' rather
ambiguous ideas include trade and diplomatic relations
with all countries, restriction of Salvadoran invest-
ment abroad, redirection of financing from urban pro-
grams to rural areas, and a purge of corrupt govern-
ment officials.
Lt. Col. Flores is a 40-year-old career officer of
humble origin and is Gomez' close friend. Flores has
never been active politically before and does not lead
any significant faction within the military. Neverthe-
less, he has a favorable reputation among younger of-
ficers, and is considered honest. He hopes to ride the
crest of what he perceives to be a wave of discontent
among the younger officers, a force more powerful at
present than his own incipient candidacy. Flores says
he believes the government must give priority to im-
proving agricultural production at the expense of
industrialization. (CONFIDENTIAL)
June 25, 1975
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Peru: New Government Party
."he Velasco government is still trying to form
its own political organization to defend the revolu-
tion and to eliminate Communist influence in the
government, but competition among leaders of the var-
ious pro-government groups is delaying the formation
of the organization and is likely to make it ineffec-
tive in any case.
A major role in the development of this organiza-
tion--to be known as the Political Organization of the
Peruvian Revolution (OPRP)--is expected to be played by
the Revolutionary Labor Movement (MLR). A militant,
anti-communist labor and political action group founded
in 1972, the Movement has been involved in clashes with
communist labor and youth groups. It is favored by the
moderates as a means for stopping communist penetration
of the OPRP and for advocating their interests in the
government. Current plans call for the MLR to convene
a national congress in October to elect its leaders and
announce its political platform.
Despite restrictions against members of the tradi-
tionally anti-military American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance (APRA),the group may have a role in the new
organization. APRA and the MLR are known to oppose
each other, but they share anti-communist sentiments
and the MLR is seeking APRA youth support for the new
organization.
The.OPRP has been in planning since last February,
but it does not appear to be amounting to anything sub-
stantial. Its purpose is to unify the various pro-
government factions into a united political front, but
this appears unlikely since the factions are nothing
more than vehicles for political leaders to gain support
and influence in the government. Furthermore, OPRP's
restrictions against the Communists and the probability
that it will respond poorly to their demands may lead to r
unrest and disagreements between the government and the
party. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
June 25, 1975
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Secret
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