LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001100250001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
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Latin American Trends
Secret
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June 11, 1975
No. 0513/75
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State Dept. review completed
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
June 11, 1975
Chile: Frei Criticism Tests Junta's
Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Colombia: Using And Abusing Labor . . . . . 3
Panama: Successful Mission to Cuba . . . . . 4
A New University in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . 5
Costa Rica: Figueres Schemes . . . . . . . . 6
Anguilla: The Mite That Harried
The Lion, Act III . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Panama: The National Guard:
A Look at the "People in Arms" . . . . . . 11
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Chile: Frei Criticism Tests Junta's Tolerance
In his first public interview since the military
coup, former President Eduardo Frei strongly attacked
the government's economic policies in an. apparent at-
tempt to probe the acceptable limits of dissent. While
junta member and air force commander General Gustavo
Leigh retorted with a thinly veiled but sharply worded
blast at Frei and "demagogic politicians," the govern-
ment avoided a confrontation course with the prominent
Christian Democratic Party leader.
The widely circulated newsweekly Ercilla, a sup-
porter of the Christian Democrats, carried the article
in which Frei disagreed with the government's economic
recovery program and argued that greater reliance on
the free market mechanism at a time of severe economic
difficulty will only worsen the country's situation.
Frei did not spell out any clear solution of his own
but suggested that state intervention was necessary to
break inflationary psychology.
Most of Frei's comments dealt with economic matters,
but political overtones were obvious in his statement
that solutions for Chile's "problem" were not to be
found exclusively in the economic realm. He noted that
political, social, and human factors weighed heavily in
the resolution of current difficulties facing the country.
In a direct allusion to Chile's unfavorable image abroad,
Frei stated that a high price would have to be paid domes-
tically if Chile failed to obtain badly needed foreign
economic assistance.
In addition to the mudslinging response by General
Leigh--whose attacks on politicians and government
critics frequently border on slander--several other
staunch junta supporters came to the government's de-
fense in the press and in some cases accused Frei and
his party of "cowardly and underhanded" opposition.
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Outside of Leigh and his supporters, however, other
government figures seemed inclined to adopt a more
moderate approach in dealing with the opposition.
As long as criticism remains within certain con-
straints, such as the dialogue advocated by Frei, the
government probably will accept a limited degree of
challenge on some issues. If the economic or secu-
rity situation begins to slip badly, the junta can be
expected to revert to stringent measures to clamp down
on all detractors-.
The murder last week of an army officer, apparent-
ly at the hands of left-wing extremists, may give mili-
tary leaders some pause and perhaps harden their reluc-
tance to loosen up any further on the political front.
The killing marks the first major incident of terrorism
since the junta overthrew Allende, and if responsibility
is attributed to the left, the government may tighten up
restrictions and abandon any thought of moving toward a
more tolerant policy in dealing with its opponents.
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Colombia: Using And Abusing Labor
Colombian President Lopez is apparently encour-
aging the creation of a new democratic labor confed-
eration as part of his massive effort to achieve social
peace without a state of siege. This can be expected
to weaken the two existing democratic confederations
whether or not a new group is actually established.
His first preference appears to be a merger of
two existing confederations--the Union of Colombian
Workers (UTC) and the Confederation of Colombian Work-
ers (CTC). This seems impossible, however, since both
are so factionalized that they are unable either to
cooperate with each other or to work effectively with
the Ministry of Labor.
In this situation, Lopez appears to be pushing for
an entirely new organization built around the two
largest subgroups of these confederations. The sub-
groups--located in Cundinamarca Department and head-
quartered in Bogota--have remained fairly aloof from
the problems of their parent organizations. Indeed,
they have continued their tradition of working well to-
gether and with the government. Other constituents of
the UTC and CTC could be expected to rally to a new
national grouping, which Lopez hopes would be suffi-
ciently unified to participate equally with the govern-
ment in planning and executing social reforms.
Whatever comes of all this, it seems inevitable
that the strength of the UTC and CTC constituents,
even though factionalized, will be diluted by the
creation of a competing third national group. Major
action is likely to follow the appointment of a new
minister of labor, which is likely to occur in the
next few weeks.
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Panama: Successful Mission to Cuba
A special Panamanian mission that visited Havana
on June 5-6 secured Prime Minister Castro's pledge to
support Panama's candidacy for a seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council this fall. Castro also promised Cuba's
"unconditional support" for Panama's aspiration to
gain full sovereignty over the canal.
The Panamanians initially seemed to have little
chance of making a successful bid for the Security
Council seat because Argentina had already lined up
votes from several Latin American countries. However,
the foreign ministry now is optimistic that since an
Argentine was elected secretary general of the OAS,
Buenos Aires will cede the Security Council seat to
Panama. Despite this optimism, there are no firm in-
dications that the Argentines will give up the seat.
In the meantime, the Panamanians will probably
continue their campaign to garner votes from countries
that are not already committed to back Argentina.
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A New University in Cuba
Havana and Moscow will reportedly establish a
university in Cuba for Latin American students once
most Latin American governments have resumed diplo-
matic relations with Cuba. The Soviet Union would
provide most of the financial support and part of
the faculty, but Castro is certain to insist that
Havana have the dominant voice in running the uni-
versity.
The curriculum would likely entail conventional
Soviet indoctrination in "agitation and propaganda,"
while emphasizing the preparation of students to
organize workers, peasants, and youth at the grass
roots level. Castro will take pains to assure other
Latin American governments that he is not opening a
school for guerrilla training.
Locating the university in Cuba would have sev-
eral advantages from the perspective of Havana and
Moscow. Students returning home would be less polit-
ically suspect than those now attending Patrice Lumumba
University in Moscow, and the increasing sense of com-
mon interest with Cuba in some Latin American countries
would reduce prospects that they would be stigmatized
as Cuban agents. Latin students would doubtless be more
attracted to--and be more at home in--Cuba than Moscow.
Establishing the university would be a clear signal
that the Cuban and Soviet approaches toward Latin
America are more compatible than ever before_
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Costa Rica: Figueres Schemes
Former Costa Rican president Jose Figueres con-
tinues to indicate that he is eager to resume the
presidency he left in May 1974.
Figueres has reportedly been sending his repre-
sentatives on visits to political groups ranging from
the far left to the extreme right in an effort to
solicit support for a coup against President Oduber.
To date, he has found little backing from them, but
many Costa Ricans believe that Figueres has rounded
up other supporters and collected arms for a move to
oust Oduber.
When Figueres showed up for a meeting with Panama's
Torrijos last month in neatly tailored military fatigues
with two oversized general's stars on the collars, rumors
raged through San Jose that he had decided to solve the
USLast
county 's problems by removin Oduber fromtppower.
week
Emba cia a e ormer president has informa-
tion that about 20 "Castro Cubans" landed on Costa Rica's
Caribbean coast. The invasion story is highly improbable,
but Figueres may have had reasons for reporting it. He
may have wanted to spread alarm that Cuban insurgents
were intending to threaten the country and that he must
return to power to thwart the menace.
Although a coup attempt by Figueres cannot be ruled
out, it is more likely that he will fight to regain the
presidency by conventional means. He is pushing hard for
a constituent assembly to make radical changes in the
constitution. He wants to strengthen the executive
branch and abolish the constitutional provision that
prohibits ex-presidents from running again. Figueres
probably has enough influence to persuade the Congress
that a constituent assembly is necessary.
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Oduber meanwhile is showing signs of yielding to
Figueres' pressure. He reportedly said last week that
he favors a constitutional change allowing presidential
re-election. He added, however, that such a change
should not be made merely to cater to certain indivi-
duals, an obvious reference to Figueres. Figueres is
likely to argue that excluding one former president
means excluding all, including the incumbent.
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Anguilla: The Mite That Harried The Lion, Act III
The United Kingdom has agreed to grant its Carib-
bean dependency of Anguilla (population 5400) a new
constitution and a greater degree of local autonomy,
thus ending--at least for a while--a comic-opera
rebellion that has lasted seven years.
As a step toward eventual independence for its
remaining colonies in the Caribbean, Britain granted
a number of them internal self-rule in 1967. Previ-
ously administered as a single entity, the islands of
St. Kitts, Nevis, and Anguilla became one of several
states "in voluntary association with Great Britain."
Long neglected by the colonial administration and
experiencing even poorer treatment at the hands of the
new government dominated by the more populous St. Kitts,
Anguilla evicted 17 Kittitian policemen at gunpoint in
May 1968 and, a few days later, formally declared its
independence from the Associated State of St. Kitts-
Nevis-Anguilla.
At first the Anguillans sought annexation by the
United States; when that failed, they sought a reimposi-
tion of British protection. When the British proved
unsympathetic, Anguilla unilaterally declared itself a
republic in January 1969. Two months later Britain
landed a force of marines, paratroopers, and London bob-
bies "to restore law and order" on the island, using the
apparently spurious pretext that Anguilla was threatened
by black radicals and/or the Mafia. One platoon of
troops waded ashore to a welcome by 60 television and
newspaper journalists, who promptly dubbed the unopposed
landing "the Bay of Piglets."
For five years, on-again-off-again negotiations
between the British,.the government on St. Kitts, and
Anguillan leader Ronald Webster made no progress. During
this period, however, British administrative control
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and economic assistance brought substantial improve-
ments in Anguilla's infrastructure, far above anything
the St. Kitts government would or could have provided.
In late 1974 Webster threatened a new unilateral
declaration of independence unless Britain granted
Anguilla the permanent status of an internally self-
governing colony. Webster's ploy brought Britain's
promise of expanded home rule, but the legal tie with
the associated state government will continue, even
though it will probably have little meaning. British
hopes that this solution would satisfy :both parties
died aborning when Premier Robert Bradshaw of St. Kitts
promptly denounced it. The Anguillans, however, are
apparently satisfied.
In recent months, a new factor has further compli-
cated the matter. The US has held preliminary discus-
sions with the United Kingdom on the possible use of
Dog Island, an uninhabited cay near Anguilla, as a naval
weapons range to replace the controversial Culebra
Island installation near Puerto Rico. Both Anguilla
and St. Kitts claim jurisdiction over Dog Island and
expect exclusive representation in further negotiations
and exclusive receipt of any rent payments that might
follow.
In drafting Anguilla's new constitution, the British
will most likely consult often and in depth with both
island governments. If past experience is any guide, the
process will be slow and deliberate, with Britain waiting
for a moderation of passions and possibly even a change
in the leadership of the Anguillan and St. Kitts govern-
ments. Less righteous posturing on the part of Anguilla
and some economic and political concessions by St. Kitts
might yet reunite the islands in a single associated
state to the practical advantage of both.
In a less antagonistic atmosphere, Britain might use
the promise of a continuing but modest economic and
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development program as an effective bargaining lever.
In return for Anguilla's recognition of the authority
of the associated state government, Britain might
channel funds to St. Kitts, while retaining enough
oversight authority to guarantee that the Anguillans
received their fair, previously agreed upon share.
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ANNEX
Panama: The National Guard:
i.n Ar A Look at t:he "People
Since displacing the old civilian elite from
government in l968, the National Guard has been the
dominant source of power in Panama.
American Trends offers a synopsis o The Latin
a recent assess-
f men- of tTe iticaZ behavior of the
Embassy Political officer Robert HommeGuard by US
Prior to seizing power on October ii, 1968, the
National Guard was a semi-independent and generally
compliant partner of the ruling Principally concerned with maintainingaitssorganiza-
tional and command integrity relatively free from po-
litical interference, the Guard was
genr-
sive to civilian authority, largely none-part ally respond
more disposed to Political restraint than themilitary
in most other Latin American countries.
This tradition of military restraint was not so
much the result of a greater commitment to constitution-
alism as it was a reflection of Panama's unique polit-
ical development. For the first 33 years of its inde-
pendence, Panama's internal and external security was
provided by the US under the terms of the 1903 treaty.
When these missions were transferred to Panama in 1936,
they were assumed by its small
1953 was reorganized as the Natiooli force,
nale Guard. ThecU in
military presence in the Canal Zone remained, however,
and the Guard as a result retained essentially a police
function.
The Guard was also confronted with an entrenched
Political establishment, which had ruled since independ-
ence through highly personalized political
parties
dominated Panama's economic life. In exchange for its
acquiescence in this closed-circuitsYthe tem, thl ts
oligarchic
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regimes generally respected the Guard's institutional
autonomy and tolerated a certain measure of graft.
When the Guard did intervene, it was not to change the
system, but to arbitrate disputes within it. On the
only occasion prior to 1968 when a Guard commander
ruled the country--Colonel Jose Remon, from 1951 to
1955--he organized a conventional political party
rather than involve the Guard directly in government.
The Guard used its influence on behalf of Presi-
dent Robles in the 1964 election, and in the 1968 con-
test it attempted to prevent Arnulfo Arias--whom it
had ousted in 1941 and 1951--from again reaching the
presidency. Charismatic and demagogic, Arias repre-
sented, in the Guard's eyes, the one political leader
with both the will and the ability to challenge the
Guard's traditional independence and command integrity.
Ten days after he took office and attempted to punish
the Guard for its blatant opposition, it ousted him in
a bloodless coup.
Although motivated by self-preservation rather
than ideology, the 1968 coup radically changed the
Guard's role and opened a new chapter in the history
of Panama's political development. Having for the
first time taken direct control of government from
civilians, and sensitive to the need to rationalize its
disregard for constitutional procedures, the Guard de-
cided to picture the new administration as a "revolu-
tionary" regime committed to creating a modern, pro-
gressive, and more just society and nation.
Strongly identifying with the middle class, from
which most of its officers were drawn, the Guard shifted
from being the principal supporter of the oligarchy to
its-chief adversary. Under the leadership of Brig. Gen.
Omar Torrijos, the Guard now was to become "The People
in Arms." Torrijos consulted with his senior subordi-
nates on a wide range of policy issues. The General
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Staff, far more than the emerging new civilian bu-
reaucracy, was the final arbiter of national programs
and priorities. An abortive coup within the Guard in
December 1969, however, convinced Torrijjos that he had
to consolidate his position by securing support outside
the Guard. Advocating a moderately reformist program,
Torrijos worked to forge a constituency of students,
workers, and peasants, and he also reached a modus
vivendi with the Communists. The election of a legis-
lature, the adoption of a new constitution, and the in-
direct election of a new President and Vice President
in 1972 gave the Torrijos government legal standing.
The constitution elevated the Guard to a sort of "fourth
branch" of government, and gave Torrijos for six years
the dual role of Guard commander and chief of government.
The National Guard and civilian bureaucrats and
advisers constitute the new elite that runs Panama under
Torrijos. The civilian component has come increasingly
to the fore as the government has had to cope with the
complex problems of running and developing the nation.
As this has occurred, the direct participation--but not
the ultimate power--of the Guard in governmental affairs
at the national level has diminished. The members of
the General Staff, none of whom is particularly sophisti-
cated, experienced, or professionally qualified to deal
with complex socio-economic problems, have remained in-
volved in national decision-making, but increasingly
have had only a general input into most domestic pro-
grams. The Guard hierarchy has accepted this civilian
ascendancy, but does not entirely trust the technocrats'
motives and methods. Of most concern to some officers
is the degree of the influence exercised by leftist of-
ficials and advisers and their own uncertainty over the
General's long-range plans for social and economic re-
forms.
Faced with reconciling its concern for order with
its desire for change, the Guard has adopted an approach
designed to encourage progressive reform without severe
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economic dislocations or unnecessary social antago-
nisms. While it has accorded considerable emphasis
to fostering social stability, the Guard has not
neglected the preventive aspects of maintaining in-
ternal security. The Guard is still largely organized
as a police establishment, and the individual Guards-
man is a respected and feared law enforcement agent.
Working closely with the community, attuned to its
moods, and familiar with its personalities, the Guard
officers have made violent crime less common than in
many other Latin countries.
Complementing these police capabilities, and in
many respects more important in terms of Torrijos'
concept of internal security, is the Guard's extensive
and increasingly professional intelligence apparatus.
Responsible for all facets of intelligence and national
security, the Guard's G-2 is directed by the competent
Lt. Col. Manuel Noriega--probably the second most power-
ful man in Panama. Operating in an environment in which
organized domestic political opposition is regarded as a
threat to the Torrijos system, the G-2 has focused its
surveillance and penetration efforts on the country's
politically-conscious movements and organizations. Exiled
former Guard officers and politicians, students, pro-
fessional groups, the Communists, and probably members of
the civilian government bureaucracy are subject to surveil-
lance, wire-tapping, and on occasion, intimidation and
reprisals.
Despite its pre-eminent role under Torrijos, the
Guard has been reasonably frugal in handling its finances
and has not indulged in a policy of rapid or inflated pro-
motions. However, this self-denial has left its members
exposed to the pinch of inflation and the inherent frus-
trations of a long-time-in-grade promotion system. To
solve their economic problems, many senior officers use
their positions for economic advantage. Although
Panamanians are long accustomed to corruption, it does
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tarnish the Guard's revolutionary image and provides
ammunition for the institution's opponents.
Even if Torrijos were to leave the scene, there
is little likelihood of a drastic shift in the role
of the Guard or major changes in the country's insti-
tutional structure and political direction. For the
foreseeable future, the Guard has no intention of re-
turning to the barracks and surrendering its broad
political role. The senior officers take seriously
their role as "The People in Arms," they fully share
Torrijos'desire for social and economic improvements,
and they are convinced that the pre-1968 oligarchy-
dominated party system or any comparable variation
cannot be responsive to Panama's needs.
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