MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001100230001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79T00865AO01100230001-5
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
N2
m
Middle East
Africa
South Asi
Secrete
No. 0689/75
June 10, 1975
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 Appitov 'orerignle3ssse0in1o0vzaserrDPT oa0Y65A001100230001-5
Background Use Only/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 58 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Angola: Nationalist Groups May Be Edging
Toward Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ivory Coast: Houphouet-Boigny Provides
for a Constitutional Successor. . . . . . . . 6
Mozambique: Signs of Soviet Interest. . . . . 8
June 10, 1975
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Angola
Nationalist Groups May Be
Edging Toward Civil War
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola and the National Front for the Liberation
of Angola, the principal nationalist groups in the
transitional government, may be edging Angola
toward civil war.
The two groups have clashed repeatedly during
the past two months in northern Angola, as well as
in Luanda and Cabinda. The Popular Movement appears
determined to establish military superiority over
its long-standing rival.
Last week, the Popular Movement also attacked
units in Luanda of the smaller National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola. The National
Union, which has tried to remain aloof, fought back.
None of the three has the supplies or the
mobility to wage a sustained military campaign, but
the two larger groups appear to be preparing for
that eventuality.
Bitter Rivals
The rivalry between the Popular Movement and
the National Front dates back to the late 1950s,
the early years of Angolan nationalism. Throughout
the insurgency against Portugal, which began in
1961, the two groups fought each other almost as
much as they did the Portuguese.
In the early years, the National Front was
dominant and was favored by the organization of
African Unity. By the late 1960s, however, it was
overshadowed by the Popular Movement, which was able
to swing most African states behind its cause. It
also received a steady stream of military supplies
from the USSR.
The transitional government installed last
January has encouraged more competition than coopera-
tion. It was constructed on a system of checks and
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
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balances in which members of one liberation group
find themselves working, as government officials,
with subordinates from the other groups.
The integrated political, military, and police
organizations of the transitional government have
failed to maintain order because of the conflicting
interests of the three participating groups.
Portuguese officials are not very effective
because they are caught in the middle. Portugal
still has about 24,000 troops in the territory, but
most of them are stationed in and around Luanda.
All of them are anxious to go home and would probably
be unwilling to get involved in prolonged fighting.
Separate Armies
A major problem is that the independence agree-
ment allows each of the three to maintain a separate
army. Each group is required to contribute to an
integrated national army, but all have shirked this
commitment, steadily building up their own military
forces, particularly in the northern half of the
territory and in and around Luanda.
The National Front and the Popular Movement
draw the bulk of their tribal support from northern
Angola and maintain their heaviest concentrations
of troops there.
The two largest groups have established important
bases in northern Angola and dominate major supply
routes to Luanda. The National Front has gained
control of the port of Ambrizete, in northwestern
Angola, partially relieving it of its dependence on
Zaire.
Fighting in northern Angola on May 28 was started
by a Popular Movement drive to disrupt the Front's
supply routes and to force the National Front out of
areas where the Movement's tribal supporters pre-
dominate. The Movement apparently suspected that a
similar operation was launched by the National Front.
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
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. Reliable figures on the troop strengths of the
respective groups are difficult to obtain. The
groups inflate or deflate their own figures according
to political necessity.
It would appear, however, that each of the two
major groups has about 8,000 to 10,000 troops in
Angola, the bulk of which are in northern Angola.
The third nationalist group, the National Union,
has about 3,000 troops.
The Popular Movement apparently has several
thousand troops in Cabinda, where it has long been
active. The other two groups have much smaller forces
there.
The National Front may have an additional 10,000
troops in Zaire being trained by Chinese and Zairian
instructors. It is also recruiting former Portuguese
army officers who have been purged by the military
government in Lisbon as "politically unreliable."
Advantage in Luanda
The Popular Movement has demonstrated that it
can quickly mobilize large groups of well-armed
irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct advantage
in the capital city.
In recent months, the Popular Movement has been
receiving more military supplies from the Soviets.
These supplies are sent to Congo--long an important
base for the Popular Movement--and are forwarded to
Angola, usually by charter flights.
The National Front's support from Zaire has
fallen off because of Zaire's financial difficulties.
Support from China and to a lesser extent Romania has
not made up the difference. As a result, Front presi-
dent Holden Roberto will not meet his goal of having
10,000 trained men ready to enter Angola in the next
month or so.
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
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The National Front is actively--some reports
suggest desperately--seeking additional weapons and
money abroad, particularly from West European and
Persian Gulf countries. The fragmentary information
available suggests the effort has not been very
successful.
Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country
suffered years of civil war, is particularly sensi-
tive to the prospect of similar turmoil in Angola.
Both Zaire and Zambia, moreover, rely heavily on
rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their
copper.
Mobutu remains adamantly opposed to the Soviet-
backed Popular Movement gaining control of Angola,
but he does not seem able to provide the Front with
what it needs to attain military superiority.
The Cabinda Problem
The three Angolan groups and the Portuguese
regard Cabinda, long administered as a district of
Angola, as an integral part of the territory. The
OAU supports this position.
Mobutu, however, would like to see Cabinda
detached from Angola, and is pushing the view that
the Cabindans should be allowed to decide their own
political status. He has allowed a small Cabindan
separatist group to establish a headquarters in
Kinshasa and has given it modest financial and
technical support.
A rival faction of the Cabindan separatist group
is based in Brazzaville. Both factions have repre-
sentatives in Cabinda, where each has a public follow-
ing. Neither faction is able to challenge the three
larger groups for control of Cabinda.
None of the three larger groups has enough
popular support in Angola to win a majority in a
constituent assembly election that is supposed to
be held before the end of October. The assembly is
to select a head of government to assume office upon
independence.
(Continued)
June 10, 1975
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The National Front suffers a severe disadvantage--
Roberto's failure to return to Angola. Roberto fears
assassination and recognizes he cannot turn out the
crowds that Agostinho Neto and Jonas Savimbi can.
Roberto is finding it more and more difficult
to coordinate his group's political and military
operations from Zaire, however, and will probably have
to move into Angola soon.
The three groups could agree to postpone the
national election, thus reducing the immediacy of the
competition between the Movement and the Front. Only
the Movement, however, now seems to favor a postpone-
ment.
All three, along with the Portuguese, stand firm
on November 11 as the date for independence. Unless
the three can compromise on a head of government,
Angola will become independent without a strong central
leader.
Agreement to Meet
The leaders of the three groups have agreed to
meet in Kenya beginning next Sunday, according to an
announcement made late yesterday by the Kenyan foreign
minister. The purposes of this meeting are to attempt
to stop the fighting in Angola and to discuss the
shape of a post-independence government.
Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union,
which has remained out of most of the fighting, could
emerge as a compromise choice as head of state. Holden
Roberto and Agostinho Neto will have to subordinate
their rivalry for the sake of Angolan unity; if they
do not, any compromise arranged at a summit will only
postpone an all-out conflict between the two
antagonists. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
June 10, 1975
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SECRET
Ivory Coast
Houphoue t-Boignyy Provides for
a Constitutional Successor
The Ivorian constitution is being amended
at President Houphouet-Boigny's direction to
designate, for the first time, a specific
successor to the president.
The constitutional amendment provides
that, upon the president's death or total disability,
the president, of the national assembly shall assume
the presidency and serve out the president's re-
maining term of office.
The mantle of succession clearly has been
placed on Philippe Yace, the government's number
two man. Yace has served for 15 years as presi-
dent of the national assembly and secretary general
of the country's sole political party. The 55-year-
old Yace, who suffers from periodic bouts of ill-
health, had generally been considered IIouphouet-
Boigny's unofficial heir-apparent. He probably is
better known to most Ivorians than any of Houphouet-
Boigny's other close associates who have been waiting
in the wings for the president's nod. Yace has been
seen at the Presidents side on all important public
occasions and during the latter's recent extensive tours
of the interior.
If Yace succeeds to the presidency, he could
nevertheless face some problems in gaining full
acceptance. So far, he has been given little chance
by Houphouet-Boigny to develop a significant base of
support outside the ranks of the party stalwarts. One
of his drawbacks stems from the fact that he comes
from a small coastal tribe with little political clout.
Yace also has acquired enemies as the-President's
(Continued)
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hatchet-man and he is not well liked by many
students and young educated government and party
workers.
The President himself appears to be in
generally good health as he approaches his 70th
birthday. He is now winding up his third 5-year
term since Ivory Coast became independent in 1960
and is certain to stand for reelection this November.
As long as Houphouet-Boigny remains in power Ivory
coast may be expected to continue as-one of black
Africa's notable success stories where an impressive
degree of political stability and economic progress
has been achieved. (CONFIDENTIAL)
June 10, 1975
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SECRET
Mozambique
Signs of Soviet Interest
A Soviet merchant marine delegation was
in Mozambique the last week in May, adding fuel
to rumors of closer cooperation between the USSR
and Mozambique after the latter attains indepen-
dence on June 25. One Soviet delegate, noting
the presence of a Soviet merchant ship in the
port of Beira, reportedly remarked that "many
more" ships would be coming in the near future.
He was probably exaggerating, since there is little
likelihood of any greatly increased trade between
Mozambique and the USSR. The Soviets do plan to
establish diplomatic relations and sign a new trade
agreement on Mozambique's independence day.
The Soviets, who over the years have sent arms
to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)
via Tanzaniz and Zambia, may now try to establish a
more formal military aid relationship.
e USSR might train the new Mozambique navy
er independence. The Tanzanian foreign minister
claims that the Soviets had attempted earlier this
year to get Mozambique to agree formally to grant
naval port facilities to Soviet ships. He said
that Samora Machel, president of FRELIMO, had
turned them down after consulting with the Tanzanian
government. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
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