MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001100040002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 3, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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No Foreign Dissem
54p
TT
RD
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
127
No. 0684/75
June 3, 1975
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No Foreign Dissem/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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SECRET
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Angola-China: MPLA Delegation Visiting Peking . . 1
India: Another Successful Offshore Well . . . . . 3
June 3, 1975
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d'
r
Angola-China
MPLA Delegation Visiting Peking
A delegation from the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola, one of the
three liberation groups that share power in Angola's
transitional government, is currently visiting
Peking. The delegation is led by Lucio Lara, deputy
to MPLA President Agostinho Neto. Lara probably will
attempt to convince the Chinese to reduce or cease
their support to the National Front for the Libera-
tion of Angola, the Popular Movement's major rival,
and perhaps will even seek to obtain some Chinese
aid for Neto's organization.
Peking has provided the Front with modest
amounts of arms and ammunition and has assigned about
100 military advisers to the Front's training camps
in the Republic of Zaire. Peking's decision to
receive representatives of the Popular Movement, may
be in part recognition of that group's growing
political strength in recent months.
The invitation to the Popular Movement also
appears to be part of a larger effort by the Chinese
to establish a degree of influence in all three
Angolan nationalist groups. About a month ago, a
delegation representing the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola, the smallest of the
three nationalist organizations, visited China and
was promised a small amount of military aid, Peking
has provided modest funds to this organization for
at least the past year. The Chinese probably will
continue to channel the bulk of their military
assistance to the National Front. Holden Roberto,
head of the Front, reportedly will visit Peking in
the near future to request additional material
support.
China's move to broaden its influence among
the rival Angolan groups may stem from concern about
a possible rift between Zairian President Mobutu
and the National Front over the future of oil-rich
(Continued)
June 3, 1975 1
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Cabinda. While all the Angolans assert that the
exclave is part of their country, Mobutu has yet to
recognize this claim. Peking may fear the dispute
may eventually cause Mobutu to withdraw his support
from the National Front, a development that would
weaken the Front in its struggle with the Popular
Movement and the National Union. In any event,
contact with the Popular Movement and National
Union at this point can only help ensure that Peking
will be well-positioned when Angola gains its
independence in November--even if this means irritat-
ing Mobutu by dealing with the Popular Movement.
Mobutu has long been at odds with the Popular Move-
ment.
In coming months, the Chinese will seek to keep
their relations with Mobutu and the Angolans on a
generally even keel. This means scrupulously avoid-
ing entanglement in the Cabinda dispute. Late last
year when Mobutu visited Peking, he attempted to
involve the Chinese by requesting military instructors
for Cabindans living in Zaire. Peking not only
turned down the request, but refused to send guer-
rilla warfare instructors for Zaire's regular forces
for fear that Mobutu intended to put Cabindans through
the course. The Chinese, however, gave Mobutu a
substantial quantity of military equipment, including
tanks.
At the same time, China will probably want to
keep its profile with the Angolan nationalist groups
relatively low. Although a handful of Chinese
advisers are working with the National Front at one
of their new bases in northern Angola, it is unlikely
that Peking will allow many Chinese to follow the
Front as it moves the rest of its facilities from
Zaire. Roberto, for his part, probably does not
want to become identified too closely with another
foreign power; the Zairian label tagged on him by
his opponents has been a considerable political
liability. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
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India
Another Successful Offshore Well
India has drilled its fifth successful test
well in the Bombay High area in the Gulf of Cambay,
providing additional confirmation that the field is
a substantial one. At the current pace of explora-
tion and development, however, New Delhi's prediction
that the field ultimately will produce some 300,000
barrels a day is unlikely to be realized until some-
time in the 1980s.
India's efforts to expand domestic oil produc-
tion have been held back by the government's refusal
until recently to accept foreign assistance in explora-
tion and its near-total dependence on Soviet equipment
in developing onshore and offshore fields. With
only one drilling platform available for exploration
and other facilities still in the planning stage,
production from the Bombay High probably will not
exceed 50,000 barrels a day over the next five years.
With onshore output estimated at 180,000 barrels a
day, India's dependence on oil imports will not be
appreciably reduced because oil consumption will rise
to at least 700,000 barrels a day by 1980.
New Delhi retains complete control over develop-
ment of the Bombay High area, but has opened nine
other offshore areas to foreign exploration. The
response has been hesitant, however, because of India's
refusal to share whatever oil or gas may be discovered.
New Delhi further stipulates that it acquire the
entire output at a "fair market price." This dis-
courages investment by major international companies,
which prefer assured petroleum supplies to cash
payments. To date, only two agreements have been
signed, both with independents. (CONFIDENTIAL)
June 3, 1975 3
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Secret
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