LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001000290001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
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Latin American Trends
Secret
129
May 28, 1975
No. 0511/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL. SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. ID. 11652, exemption category:
y 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
May 28, 1975
Argentina: Restrictions on Press
Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Panama Deals With Opposition . . . . . . . . 3
Ecuador's Rodriguez: Slighting the
Navy, Securing the Presidency . . . . . . . 5
One Idea To Avoid Nationalization . . . . . . 6
Venezuela: Courting Guyana . . . . . . . . . 7
Honduras: Campesino and Labor
Groups Are Restless . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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Argentina: Rectrictions on Press Freedom
On May 21 the Trends reported the details of an
Argentine executive decree issued on May 14 forbidding
domestic and foreign news media to carry news about
Argentina supplied by foreign wire services. The de-
cree has touched off a furor in Buenos Aires press
circles. Editorial reaction zeroed in on the uncon-
stitutional nature of the edict and generally echoed
La Nacion's assertion that it is "ambiguous, arbitrary,
and absurd."
The government responded quickly. A public serv-
ice message, broadcast over government-controlled TV
on May 18 and 19, warned that "subversive organizations
are using some media in their efforts to influence the
masses." Lest viewers have any doubts about which news-
papers were guilty, the ad clearly showed someone buy-
ing copies of Cronista Comercial and La Opinion.
Moreover, presidential press secretary Villone,
one of Lopez Rega's cronies, visited La Nacion, La
Opinion, and Cronista Comercial to complain aboutt their
criticism of the government. He reportedly warned one
writer of "dire consequences" if the criticism did not
stop.
The government has already withdrawn official ad-
vertising from La Prensa, a long-time critic of Peronism,
and La opinion, which appeals to the left wing of the
Peronist movement. The recent assassination of a writer
for La Onion by unidentified assailants also has
shocked, angered,and frightened the journalistic community.
The victim, allegedly was a former member of the left-wing
Peronist Youth and had once written an article making fun
of Lopez Rega.
Mrs. Peron and Lopez Rega clearly have embarked on
a campaign, to bring the news media under stricter control,
and offenders are likely to be increasingly intimidated
May 28, 1975
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and punished by withdrawal of official advertising.
During his first administration (1946-1955), Juan
Peron brutally silenced or neutralized the country's
two great metropolitan dailies, La Nacion and La
Prensa. It is difficult to picture the present govern-
ment following the same path, but as Mrs. Peron's
economic and political problems worsen it will be
tempting for a man of Lopez Rega's mentality to make
at least a try at it.. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 28, 1975
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Panama Deals With Op,_2osition
The Torrijos government has been distracted from
the canal treaty negotiations by the need to mend
some domestic fences. The recent surge of criticism
may have convinced the administration of the need for
firmer measures to deal with opposition.
During the past several years, the enforced
absence of political activity has enabled the govern-
ment to act :Largely free of criticism from organized
groups. The administration exercises strong control
over most labor unions, students, and the press, and
other institutions, such as the Catholic Church, have
reached accommodations with the government.
For the last month, however, some elements of the
business community who have never trusted Torrijos
have renewed their attacks on the government. The
country's leading business organization--the National
Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP)--has charged that
despite repeated promises, the administration has fail-
ed to consult: businessmen on economic policy decisions.
The government is used to hearing criticism from
this sector, but it apparently was caught by surprise
by a verbal barrage from students in Panama City. On
May 19, a protest march by students from the National
Institute, the country's most prestigious secondary
school, blocked traffic for several hours, and ended
only when the Education Minister agreed to meet some of
the students' demands for improvements at the school.
The demonstration reportedly was organized by the Student
Revolutionary Front, an ultra-revolutionary group that
represents only a small minority of students but has
obtained considerable publicity because of its anti-
government stance.
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The government's sensitivity to this attack was
demonstrated by the way in which friendly students',
teachers', and labor organizations were marshalled for
a counterattack. They charged that the leftist students
were abetting a campaign by "reactionary" Panamanian
groups to introduce anarchy in the economy and create
confusion among the people.
The government also reportedly is ready to take
stronger action against its increasingly outspoken
critics. A brief takeover :by pro-government students
of a radio station that has been notably hostile to
Torrijos may be a foretaste of the sort of measures the
authorities will adopt. Torrijos believes that the
present period is particularly important for the treaty
negotiations,, and he fears that any sign of disunity at
home will be seized on by those who claim that his regime
does not really represent the Panamanian people and
therefore cannot speak for them in the negotiations.
(CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
May 28, 1975
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Ecuador's Rodriguez: Slightin the Navy. Securing
the Presidency
Two changes in President Rodriguez' cabinet have
increased by one the number of portfolios held by the
army--at the expense of the navy. These changes, plus
the appointment of a new navy commander, also strength-
en Gen. Rodriguez' personal position.
Rear Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano, former min-
ister of government, has been named commander of the
navy. His cabinet post will be filled by General
Guillermo Duran Arcentales, former minister of educa-
tion. The education portfolio has been given to
General Gustavo Vasconez Vasconez, former army chief
of staff.
The navy's loss of a cabinet post to the army is
somewhat offset by the elevation of former navy com-
mander Admiral Sergio Vasquez Pacheco to a six-month
tour as chief of the joint command. He replaces an air
force general. The navy retains only the natural re-
sources portfolio, the most important one economically
as it includes both petroleum and fishing within its
sphere.
The new navy commander, Admiral Poveda, is one of
the few naval officers to have supported Rodriguez with
fair constancy since the military took power in 1972.
As government minister, with responsibility for internal
security, he was of considerable value to Rodriguez.
He now can be expected to play down the country's tradi-
tional army-navy rivalry. The pro-Rodriguez management
of the government ministry will continue under General
Duran, another Rodriguez supporter. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 28, 1975
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One Idea To Avoid Nationalization
A respected Nicaraguan banker, Ernesto Fernandez
Holmann, has quietly approached US Embassy officials
in Managua with a novel proposal that the five Central
American republics and Panama establish a mixed private
and public consortium to purchase the United Brands'
tropical marketing operations, as well as the company's
banana producing and related properties in the area.
With the US-based corporation facing an increased public
clamor for nationalization of its assets throughout the
area as a result of its alleged bribery of Honduran of-
ficials, Fernandez' audacious and imaginative scheme
might assuage nationalist pride and prevent an imbroglio
that could leave bananas rotting in the fields, while
offering United Brands a graceful exit with compensation.
Fernandez believes that as little as $150 million
would be necessary to conclude the deal. Raising this
amount in Central America and Panama would be difficult.
Fernandez suggested obtaining substantial backing from
the Venezuelan. Investment Fund, but US officials in
Caracas doubt that the Fund would be willing or able to
participate in. the scheme. Although his proposal has
not been presented to United Brands and financing will
probably prove a serious obstacle, Fernandez has
received enough encouragement from tentative discussions
with his official and private sector contacts in the six
isthmian countries to proceed with. a presentation to the
area's chiefs of state. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
May 28, 1975
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Venezuela: Courting Guyana
President Perez' invitation to Prime Minister
Forbes Burnham to visit Caracas next month is the
latest move to improve economic and political contacts
with his neighbor.
The Guyanese, for their part, are approaching the
profferred invitation with caution. Foreign Minister
Ramphal told the US ambassador recently that Burnham
is insisting that an agenda be carefully prepared be-
forehand, so each side will have a clear idea of the
issues to be discussed.
The Guyanese reserve stems not only from memories
of Venezuelan involvement in an uprising by foreign
settlers in the disputed Essequibo region during the
1960s but also Venezuela's aggressive assertion of its
claims to more than two thirds of Guyana's national
territory. Now the Guyanese are receiving different
signals from Caracas. Most recently Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Escovar has intimated to visiting Guyanese
officials that the Perez administration wants to find
some formula to put the border issue to rest permanent-
ly and that all Perez needs is some "face-saving gesture"
on the part of Guyana. Ramphal and Burnham welcome pros-
pects for settlement of the thorny problem. However,
they are clearly skeptical how Perez could compromise
the Venezuelan claims put forward in the past without
seriously alienating nationalist and military groups
in his country. Further, the suggestion that the first
move must come from Guyana is certain to be dismissed
by Guyanese officials as not only unrealistic but
politically impossible.
Thus while the border issue cannot be ignored in
any meeting between Perez and Burnham, other more
pressing topics are likely to dominate the meeting.
Venezuelan officials are concerned with Guyana's rapid
May 28, 1975
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evolution into a one-party socialist state and there
is fear that as the pace quickens, Burnham will become
even more radical and less susceptible to Venezuelan
suggestions for moderation. The Venezuelan ambassador
in Georgetown has recently taken to planting articles
in the local press giving glowing accounts of the
future benefits to flow from closer Guyanese ties
with Venezuela. There are a number of economic induce-
ments which Caracas could offer the Guyanese, ranging
from an extension of the $15-million concessionary loan
granted last year to expansion of bilateral links with
respect to trade, technical cooperation, and joint
ventures.
In return for such assistance, the Venezuelans are
expected to press for Guyana's support for a Caribbean
basin conference later this year and the already an-
nounced Venezuelan-14eaxican proposal for the establish-
ment of a Latin American Economic System. In addition,
the Venezuelans are probably eyeing Guyana's large
bauxite resources in their plans for expanding their
aluminum industry. Some progress may already have been
made along these lines. A Guyanese delegation recently
visited Caracas to discuss possible Venezuelan economic
and technical assistance. The chief of the delegation,
Minister for Economic Development Desmond Hoyte, report-
ed to the cabinet that the talks were fruitful although
no specific agreements were struck. Nevertheless the
groundwork appears to have been laid for a meeting of
the two leaders, the first ever with a Venezuelan presi-
dent. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Honduras: C:ampesino and Labor Groups are Restless
Campesino and labor groups, restless over the
slow pace of social progress, are skeptical of the
new Melgar administration. Workers feel that labor's
pro-government attitudes in the past were unrewarded,
and fear that, despite the change in leadership,
government apathy toward their growing unemployment
and poverty will continue. Unlike the politically
adroit Lopez, who had cultivated the labor sector
over the years, the new leaders--relatively unknown
to labor--will not win its support on promises alone.
Leaders of the influential north coast labor
federation, which includes the two large banana company
unions and the 30,000-strong campesino association
ANACH, are concerned that the private sector interests
will be favored over their own, and that labor will be
excluded from the regime's rural reform planning. The
banana company unions are particularly disturbed by
the unemployment that resulted from Standard Fruit's
refusal to rehabilitate facilities destroyed by Hurri-
cane Fifi last September. The new administration has
reconfirmed the Lopez regime's commitment to assume
responsibility for one installation. The unions are
hoping that a second large facility will be purchased
by the state, divided, and resold to workers. Union
leaders have warned the new leadership that labor's
attitude will be more vigilant and aggressive until
the government responds to its needs.
Leaders of ANACH, who have long pressed for broad-
based changes in the pattern of land ownership, are
worried, about their organization's survival under the
Agrarian Reform Law promulgated last January. While
the regulations regarding the law's implementation have
yet to be formulated, the program anticipates that
campesinos will be formed into cooperative groups.
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ANACH leaders generally support the plan, but want
the law broadened to include a viable role for their
organization--the largest campesino group in Honduras.
Last week, campesinos affiliated with the much
smaller but more militant Social Christian confedera-
tion stepped up their tactic of land invasions in order
to force the government to make good its promise to
distribute unused land among the workers. It is un-
clear how many groups were involved,but the illegal
invasions greatly disturbed the government. After the
military was placed on alert and instructed to remove
the invaders by force, the campesinos agreed to back
off. The leaders of ANACH refused to support the
action of their competitors, but agreed that the in-
vasion was justified. If ANACH's policy of cooperation
proves to be ineffective, the leaders may well adopt
more militant: tactics.
For the moment, it appears that all labor and
campesino groups want to avoid violence and will give
the government some time. However, workers are becoming
increasingly impatient, and unless the new leadership
acts to improve their lot soon, the potential for a
serious confrontation remains high. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 28, 1975
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