STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001000230002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 27, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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No Foreign Dissem
P
Chinese Affairs
Top Secret
May 27, 1975
SC No. 00433/75
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No Dissem Abroad
Background Use 9nly/ConroZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive I'ntelligenc:e Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 111652, exemption category:
? 513 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
May 27, 1975
Atmospherics: Waiting for the Other
Shoe to Drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cautious Rectification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
New Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Third World: Hints and Headaches . . . . . . . 13
The Real Number Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Teng Establishes a Foothold in Europe. . . . . . . 18
Merchant Fleet May Get US Radio Gear . . . . . . . 21
Military Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
ANNEX: Miki Trying To Break Sino-Japanese
Treaty Stalemate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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Atmospherics: Waitin for the Other Shoe To Drop
Unity and stability have been the watchwords
from Peking since early this year, but the Chinese
people, accustomed to nine years of relative in-
stability, keep looking for--and are finding--what
they see as signs of continuinq political uncer-
tainties. Mao's prolonged absence from Peking,
his still unannounced return, and Chou's long
hospitalization have undoubtedly contributed to
popular malaise. Moreover, the moderate tone of
the current campaign to study the proletarian
dictatorship continues to be interpreted by many
Chinese as the calm before the storm.
Popular skepticism is perhaps best expressed
in the apparently widespread rumor that Chou's
hospitalization is actually the result of an as-
sassination attempt. Officials in Canton, evidently
sensing differences between Mao and Chou, claim that
Mao has taken no action against the would-be assassin.
Chou's followers allegedly believe Mao is either pro-
tecting the assassin or was himself behind the attempt.
The Soviets have apparently picked up the assassina-
tion rumor and have referred to a recent attempt to
poison Chou. Although there seems to be no basis in
fact for such rumors, they pointedly illustrate Chinese
doubts about--and perhaps disbelief in--the unity
and stability theme.
Further reservations about Peking's official
line surfaced in rumors about the demotion of mili-
tary man Li Te-sheng from party vice chairman to
ordinary member of the Politburo. The official ex-
planation from Peking was that Li requested the
demotion. Canton officials believe, however, that
Li had a run-in with Vice Premier Chen Yung-kuei, a
favorite of Mao's whom Li allegedly ousted from a
meeting of political and military officials.
May 27, 1975
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Since his elevation to a vice premiership, one-
time model peasant Chen has turned in a creditable
performance, most notably on. his recent trip to Mexico.
He now seems at viable government leader rather than a
token representativEe of the Chinese peasantry, but
there are signs that: he is not universally popular.
Canton officials claim that military men other than Li
dislike Chen because the vice premier is responsible
for the unpopular policy of sending demobilized service-
men to work in the rural areas.
Another sign of possible opposition to Chen is
the propaganda play given to the Hsiaochinchuang
production brigade in a way that might be intended
to steal the thunder from Chen's own Tachai model
brigade. The Hsiaochinchuang brigade is associated
with Chiang Ching, and it would be interesting if
both the military and Chiang Ching dislike Chen. If
true, this would be another sign that Madame Mao and
the military have found common ground and would lend
credence to the rumor that she and other leftists in
Peking are behind the protests of demobilized servicemen.
Apart from rumors among local officials, there
are some sign, of cracks beneath the surface unity.
A military man in NCNA, using a slogan attributed
.to Chiang Ching, reportedly attacked in wall posters
the rehabilitated NCNA chief Chu Mu-chih as a "right-
ist." The military man, placed in NCNA during the
Cultural Revolution, has reportedly since been trans-
ferred to another government organization and has not
been publicly identified in his NCNA post since Decem-
ber 1973. Ch-4.i Mu-chih, on the other hand, continues
to appear regularly and to be identified as chief of
NCNA.
Although Peking apparently moved swiftly to
defuse the situation and support Chu Mu-chih, the
NCNA episode is symptomatic of the continuing
resentment by both the leftists and the military
against rehabilitated officials overthrown during
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the Cultural Revolution. This is a long-standing
problem with no easy or quick solution, but Peking's
ability to deal with it smoothly is a plus on the
stability side.
Local officials are understandably dubious
about the new emphasis on unity and stability, but
they do seem to be overdramatizing the signs of
continuing friction and underestimating Peking's
determination to contain those differences. More-
over, their doubts make unity and stability more
difficult to achieve, a situation that Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping seemed to address when he told the
Central Committee last January that the government's
priority task is to establish a good reputation for
itself. Although Peking's emphasis on unity and
stability seems genuine, it will apparently take
some time before the government establishes the good
reputation it needs. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
CONTROLLED DISSEM)
May 27, 1975
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Cautious Rectification
The proletarian dictatorship campaign seems to
be moving toward the rectification phase that has
been anticipated by many provincial cadre for weeks.
On May 10, for the first time since the campaign
began, a province--Kwangtung--openly called for
rectification of its basic-level party units. In
addition, an article in this month's Red Flag by
Kiangsi first secretary Chiang Wei-ching--after
reaffirming the campaign's moderate themes and re-
hashing its now familiar problems--seems to set out
some guidelines for rectification work.
Chinese leaders--still anxious about the ex-
cesses of the anti-Confucius campaign--clearly in-
tend to keep rectification work controlled and limited.
Peking wants to tighten its control over the economy
and increase cadre responsiveness to party direc-
tives, but without sparking further disruptions; a
new political witch hunt is being avoided.
Moderation is the keynote. The Kwangtung article
specifically admonishes cadre to carry out rectifi-
cation work in a "planned and systematic" manner and
counsels against precipitate action. Kwangtung ap-
parently has entrusted local rectification work to
special teams under the control of the provincial
party committee, undoubtedly to maintain a tight rein.
Chiarig's article stresses education, not purges, as
the true objective of the proletarian dictatorship
campaign, intimating in the process that relatively
few cadre are in danger of losing their jobs. He
also warns cadre to be alert to the "handful of people
who make trouble" to serve their own ends.
An effort is also being made to restrict the
number of permissible targets. Kwangtung Province
is clearly limiting its efforts to cadre at the
May 27, 1975
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county level and below. Chiang, too, is focusing
on the activities of well-to-do peasants and basic-
level cadre. Abuses at the provincial level, which
are likely to be just as prevalent but have a far
greater potential for political mayhem, seem to be
carefully excluded. Perhaps to underline the nec-
essity for caution in carrying out rectification,
Chiang'a article mentions in passing the need to
exonerate individuals unfairly criticized in the
past. Chiang speaks from experience, as he is a
rehabilitated cadre.
Criticism will apparently focus on improper
economic practices among the peasantry and petty
corruption and abuses of authority by low level
cadre. The Chiang article, in particular, lashes
out at all individuals who ignore or subvert state
production plans and party directives. Peasants are
scored for their preoccupation with "cash crops"
and the pursuit of private gain at the expense of
the collective. Cadre are also taken to task for a
variety of sins, including maladministration, in-
fluence peddling, and showing favoritism to friends
and relatives. By and large, Peking seems determined
to keep the larger question of political transgres-
sions outside the scope of the campaign.
As the campaign takes up rectification, Peking
is taking pains to repeat once again that moderate
economic policies are not changing. In his article,
Chiang specifically states that peasants may con-
tinue farming their private plots and participate
in rural free markets as long as the "predominance
of the collective economy" is assured. Moreover,
Chiang asserts that these policies must continue
for a long time because China needs "stability of
policies"--a phrase taken from Teng Isiao-ping's
secret address to the Central Committee plenum last
January.
May 27, 1975
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The rectification rhetoric is likely to exacer-
bate the factionalism in the more troubled provinces,
despite Peking's efforts to keep the proletarian dic-
tatorship campaign low keyed and controlled. Accord-
ing to 'Western press reports, rival groups in Che-
kiang are already using the campaign to attack one
another. Most provinces, however, are likely to
fare better. Almost all seem certain to handle
rectification work with great caution and, indeed,
Kwangtu:ng is still the only province to speak openly
on the subject. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
May 27, 1975
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China Pipelines
Petroleum refinery
Producing oilfield
Shale oil complex
o Gasfield
- Oil pipeline
Sedimentary basin with
promising oil prospects
Railroad
analadea
X
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Thailand Le~'_svurn
7~'tetnam Nauncai mils
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No Foreign Oissem
li S. S. R.
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New Pipelines
China is involved in a multimillion dollar con-
struction program to build pipelines to exploit its
extensive petroleum resources. At its outset, the
program was aimed mainly at overcoming limitations
for transporting crude oil within China. The need
to pay for rising imports and the sudden increase
in world oil prices in 1973, however, led the Chinese
to accelerate pipeline construction to take advantage
of new export opportunities.
The sudden push in construction has increased the
nation's pipeline network to more than 3,600 miles,
five times the 700 miles that existed in 1970 when
the program began. More than 1,500 miles were laid
in 1974 alone.
After the world oil crisis in 1973, Peking
shifted the direction of the program to support
export-oriented activities. New pipelines were built
to link the producing oil fields of the northeast
and Manchuria to deep-water ports suitable for tank-
ers used in the international oil trade. At the same
time, oil ports were improved, and a major new port
capable of handling supertankers is being built near
Dairen.
The new pipelines and associated port improve-
ments promise to make China a major crude oil ex-
porter to the non-communist countries of Asia. Crude
exports have grown from 1 million tons in 1973 to 4.5
million tons in 1974. The new pipelines will enable
China to handle scheduled exports of 10to 12 million
tons this year and 20 million tons in 1977.
Crude oil earnings are now the single largest
source of hard currency, and this source will grow
over the next few years. If planned pipelines and
May 27, 1975
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port facilities are completed as expected, China
will have the capability to export 50 million tons
of crude oil by 1980. At current prices, exports
on that scale would yield some $4 billion dollars
annually. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
May 27, 1975
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The Third World: flints and
China's enthusiasm for a number of Third World
economic issues may be waning somewhat, judging from
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at the welcoming
This
banquet for North Korean President Kim Il-song.
was an occasion when there seemed to be little need
for Teng to raise Third World issues at all but, in
contrast; to recent speeches addressed to other
visitors,, the vice premier made a point of including
this area in his review of the world situation. More
men-
curiously, having raised the issue, he bypassed
tioning the. recently concluded UN Industrial Develop-
ment Organization and the Law of the Sea conferences,
as well as producer cartels--issues Instead,
ntinue vice
receive play in the Chinese press.
premier confined his treatment of the ThirdWorldhto
developments in southern Africa. This sugges
Peking is redefining its order of priorities with
respect to Third World problems.
Teng's remarks on southern Africa were clearly
intended to underscore Peking's consternation over
the turn of events in that area during thepast
number
months. The Chinese have been unhappy with a
of Zambian initiatives that began early'this year.
President Kaunda has been instrumental in pressuring
the three black Rhodesian liberation groups, based
in Zambia, to unite under the aegis of the African
National Council (ANC) and enter into talks with
the white minority government in Salisbury. Lusaka
has also proceeded to make sure that the three guer-
rilla groups in the ANC could not individually con-
tinue their operations against Rhodesia.
These moves have not gone down well with the
Chinese. Peking has backed the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU) since the 1960s, and at the
time of the recent crackdown it seemed to be in
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the best position to wage an effective campaign
against the Rhodesian government. ZANU's chief
rival is the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),
which is backed by the Soviet Union.
From the time that Kaunda first began to take
these initiatives, the Chinese did little to hide
their feelings. NCNA began to stress the importance
of armed struggle in southern Africa, while dispar-
aging negotiations as a "political deception" fos-
tered by Rhodesia and South Africa to split the
ranks of the black nationalists. The Chinese have
also used diplomatic channels to try to turn the
Zambians around.
Sino-Zambian relations took a sharp turn for
the worse last month when Peking lodged a strong
protest over Lusaka's decision to close down all
guerrilla training camps, including ZANU's. For
their part, the Zambians are angered by China's
position. Suspicions have also been raised and
Kaunda reportedly has told his security services to
monitor Chinese instructors currently training the
Zambian army.
Peking obviously believes that the stakes are
high enough to spend some of the political capital
that it has accumulated over the years in Lusaka.
The Chinese may calculate that Salisbury's days are
numbered and whoever controls power there will enjoy
a decisive role in shaping the future of southern
Africa. As things now stand,, with ZANU as part of
the ANC, Peking's influence is necessarily diluted.
To make matters worse, ZANU's role within the ANC
has been eroded to the benefit of ZAPU since the
merger. Moreover, the Chinese probably bel4.eve
that opposition to South Africa is an emotional
issue on which Peking can capitalize. Lusaka's
willingness to work with Vorster cuts in the wrong
direction, from China's point of view.
May 27, 1975
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At this point, the Chinese are probably hoping
that their outspokenness will deter the Zambians
from further undercutting ZANU. At best, Peking
may look for a Zambian tilt in favor of ZANU as it
jockeys for influence within the ANC. Should the
talks between Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and
the ANC break down completely, this, at least, would
leave ZANU in a better position to rebuild than its
rival, ZAPU. Thus far, however, Peking's criticism
of Zambian policy has earned it little more than
Kaunda's pique.
Peking's problem is to determine how far it can
push Lusaka without jeopardizing, in any major way,
the relationship it has cultivated there over the
years. As yet there is no indication that Zambia
is considering cutting back China's aid program in
the country, but Kaunda is clearly unreceptive to
Peking's criticism. The Chinese undoubtedly are
carefully monitoring Kaunda's reaction to their
protestations and probably expect they can avoid
irreparable damage to their relationship with Zambia.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
May 27, 1975
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Despite the protocol ranking of young Wang
Hung-wen as the third man in the leadership, it has
become increasingly clear that the man who follows
Mao and Chou in terms of actual power is Teng Hsiao-
ping. Following a shaky start after his rehabilita-
tion two years ago, Teng has amassed a number of
important positions, all of which he seems to be
using with authority and confidence. In fact, he
has come more than full circle since his ouster in
1966 at the pinnacle of his power. At that time,
he was outranked by three men in relatively good
health; today both Mao and Chou have some health
problems, leaving Teng the man in charge of day-to-
day affairs, with at least some authority to make
decisions on his own.
Teng has moved effectively in both foreign
affairs--his recent visit to France where he was
accorded head-of-state treatment being a prime
example--and in domestic politics, where he has had
a hand in quelling political disturbances in the
provinces. In the latter capacity, particularly
in his reported personal intervention in the dis-
turbances in Chekiang Province, Teng has bested
Wang Hung-wen, who apparently was given initial
responsibility for handling provincial disruptions.
At least some degree of calm has reportedly
been restored to -troubled Chekiang, and the credit
appears to belong to Teng rather than to Wang.
Local officials reportedly were critical of Wang's
inability to resolve problems there last winter.
Two reports indicate that Teng, in his capacity
as army chief of staff, turned to the PLA to restore
order. According to one account, Teng transferred
a division of troops from Peking to Chekiang;
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The Real Number Three
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another report claims he moved the 20th army, which
remained loyal to the former Chekiang party boss
and was therefore a major source of the problem,
out of the province and moved a neutral army in
from a neighboring province. In any case, Mao
himself reportedly criticized Wang when he asked
both men how to handle the Chekiang problem. After
hearing their answers, Mao reportedly told Wang to
learn from Teng Hsiao-ping's approach. Whether
the story is true, it is another indication that
local officials put more stock in Teng's abilities
than in Wang's and that they believe this attitude
is shared by the leadership in Peking.
The Chekiang "competition" between Wang and
Teng does not mean that young Wang is in political
trouble. It does indicate that he seems to need
more seasoning before handling major problems, that
Teng is the major problem-solver for now, and that
he has won the confidence of national and local
officials.
Teng's powerful positions, and his apparently
successful use of them, have evidently transformed
the man himself. His open display of affection
for his youngest granddaughter upon his return to
Peking from France--an uncharacteristic personal
touch almost never shown by Chinese leaders--was a
far cry from the diffident Teng who had to be led
by the hand into the banquet hall in April 1973
for his first public appearance since the Cultural
Revolution. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
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Teng Establishes a Foothold in Europe
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to France
in mid-May, along with China's new association with
the European Community, has given Peking a useful
foothold in Europe from which it hopes to encourage
anti-Soviet policies.
Teng's visit appears to have resulted in con-
siderably improved relations with France, virtually
a return to a "special relationship." Relations had
languished in recent years following President Pompi-
dou's trip to China in late 1973, which exposed dif-
ferences over Chinese hostility to Moscow and over
French views on European cohesion.
The French received Teng warmly, giving him
treatment that exceeded the requirements of protocol.
President Giscard indicated that Teng's visit under-
scored the "exceptional quality" of French-Chinese
relations. The Vice Premier responded that Chairman
Mao himself is "greatly interested" in the development
of relations.
The two sides agreed. to hold periodic political
consultations at the ministerial level, including
regular sessions prior to UN General Assembly meetings
and to increase trade and cultural exchanges. They
also decided to set up a mixed economic commission,
and Teng quickly consented to French requests for a
change in Air France's routes over China. The French
agreed to return visits to Peking by President Giscard,
Prime Minister Chirac, and Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues.
Spokesmen from both sides indicated that they
found more in common than either had realized. Both
spoke out against. "super power hegemony" and for the
independence and maintenance of the "personality" of
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nations. Chirac noted "with satisfaction" China's
support for European construction and solidarity,
saying Teng's visit was a "positive element" for
Europe. The two countries also agreed on the need
for reorganization of energy and raw material mar-
kets and for new relationships between industrialized
and Third World states.
The visit provided Peking a highly visible plat-
form from which to affirm Chinese views on Europe,
the Soviet threat, the international situation, and
the post-Vietnam role of the US. NCNA gave heavy
coverage to favorable comment regarding the visit
by leading French spokesmen and the European press.
Moscow, apparently concerned that Peking might suc-
cessfully rally anti-Soviet forces in Europe, is en-
gaged in a strong propaganda attack against Chinese
diplomacy in Europe.
Peking clearly expects to use its foothold in
Europe, particularly its periodic consultations with
the French and its new accreditation with the EC in
Brussels, for similar purposes in the future.
Perhaps with this in mind, Teng placed a more
moderate cast on some Chinese views that have not been
well received by the Europeans in the past. He played
down the inevitability of war between the US and the
USSR, claiming instead that "super power" rivalry over
Europe would "one day" lead to war. Teng also ex-
pressed optimism, citing progress toward West European
unity, which he said would stabilize the international
situation. Teng stressed that China required a rela-
tively placid international environment to develop its
own economy, now in its infancy, and that Peking would
prefer a peaceful and stable world.
Tend pulled no punches regarding the Soviets,
and the -intensity of his anti-Soviet views reportedly
antagonized some French officials. He made it clear
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that, of the two "super powers," Moscow was by far
the most threatening. He emphasized Moscow's am-
bitions in Europe, and told the French that Peking
was not seriously concerned about Soviet attempts
to encircle China. Teng said that Soviet policy in
Asia was aimed at undermining the US position
there, but he also used formulations which indicated
Peking remains vigilant regarding the Soviet threat
to China. He particularly attacked the European
security conference, terming it a Soviet effort to
dupe the Europeans; Peking is concerned that agree-
ment on this issuE: could boost prospects for the
long-standing Soviet proposal on collective security
in Asia.
In contrast, Teng appeared optimistic about
Washington's role in world affairs. He reasserted
a view that has become more common in the wake of
the Indochina war that the US had been overextended
and now, freed from burdens in Indochina, could play
a more active role in world affairs and concentrate
on Europe and Japan. While he called in public for
increased unity arnong European states, in private he
told the French that European security depended in
large part on close European solidarity with the US.
Teng's strong comments on this score were reminiscent
of the very positive line the Chinese took toward
Washington in 1972-73. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
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China is seeking US equipment to upgrade radio
gear currently used by its international merchant
fleet because of new requirements imposed by the
International Telecommunications Union. The new
regulation, enacted in early 1974, prohibits double-
sideband radio equipment on international merchant
ships after January 1, 1976; all ships must be
equipped with single-sideband radio equipment by
January 1, 1978.
China has already acquired some US-made single-
sideband transceivers through its Hong Kong suppliers.
Although the Chinese are capable of producing single-
sideband equipment, they may not be able to meet the
standards set by the International Telecommunications
Union., Furthermore, the equipment produced in China
for maritime use is limited in supply and consigned
primarily to the Chinese navy.
If China decides to equip its entire interna-
tional. fleet of 300 ships with US equipment, a sizable
market: would be opened to American firms. Moreover,
the Chinese have an active shipbuilding program and
are continuing to purchase many used vessels from
Japan and Western Europe. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 27, 1975
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Military Notes
Wu Hsiu-chuan, an old-line civilian cadre who
was rehabilitated last July, along with former army
chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu, was identified for the
first time as a deputy chief of.staff at a reception
given by the Cameroon ambassador on May 20. Recent
turnouts indicate Ita ranks lowest among the nine
deputies.
Wu was the director of the party's Interna-
tional Liaison Department before he was purged in
1967. He seems to have political ties to both Chou
En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping. His appointment appears
to be the latest in a series engineered by the mod-
erates in Peking to place trusted civilians in key
military posts as a. check on the professional sol-
diers. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Some professional soldiers, however, seem to be
doing quite well. Foochow Military Region commander
Pi Ting-chun led a military friendship delegation to
Sudan on May 19. He is the third military region com-
mander to go abroad in a little over six months, but
the first of the eight regional commanders rotated
under a cloud a year and a half ago to do so. Mod-
erates in the national leadership seem to be using
more carrot and less stick on senior military men
since the de facto end of the anti-Confucius campaign
last year. Pi's trip is symptomatic of the renewed
court being made some military men. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 27, 1975
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Miki Trying To Break
Sino-Japanese Treaty Stalemate
Japanese Prime Minister Miki has come up with
a new "four-point" policy in an attempt to break
the current logjam in negotiations for a peace and
friendship treaty with Peking, but his move appears
unlikely to satisfy the Chinese.
The main obstacle to agreement has been Peking's
continuing insistence on a clause opposing "third-
party hegemony in Asia, an obvious slam at the USSR.
The same phraseology was accepted by Prime Minister
Tanaka in the 1972 Sino-Japanese joint communique
announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations;
it also appeared a few months earlier in the Sino-US
"Shanghai communique."
Tokyo has been. trying to avoid repeating the
clause for fear of harming relations with the USSR.
The Japanese have pressed for less specific language,
to be included in the preamble rather than in the
main body of the treaty, on the theory that its impact
on the Russians could be diluted.
Miki's four points--which have apparently been
conveyed to the Chinese as a sign of his "sincerity"
in the matter---are essentially a reaffirmation of the
1972 communique and its relevance to the current nego-
tiations. Miki's formulation also rejects the idea of
suspending negotiations, as many Japanese leaders have
suggested.
.The Prime Minister's move comes shortly after the
conclusion of a visit to Peking by leaders of the
Japan Socialist Party, who were pressured by the Chi-
nese not only to endorse the hegemony language of the
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1972 communique but to condemn the super powers--
the USSR and the US--by name. The Socialists' ca-
pitulation, a tradeoff for Chinese statements sup-
porting the Socialists' campaign to get US bases
out of Japan, has complicated Tokyo's negotiating
problem.
Tokyo is in a dilemma. The treaty itself is
not immediately critical, at least in Tokyo's view,
to further progress in Sino-Japanese relations, which
are cordial. But Prime Minister Miki needs it in
time for ratification during the current Diet session
in order to improve his sagging domestic political
position. The treaty is only one of six major items,
including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Miki
failed to push through the Diet during its regular
session, which expired on May 25, forcing Miki to
obtain a 40-day extension.
Foreign Minister Miyazawa and many of his top
aides are concerned that Peking will be able to take
advantage of Miki's political problems to win total
acceptance of China's position on the hegemony issue.
They are urging caution, using the argument that
party hawks--anti-Peking and right-wing elements--
may be able to block any treaty containing strong anti-
hegemony language resulting in damage to Miki per-
sonally.
For their part, the Chinese in the past several
weeks have been claiming that the treaty cannot be
signed unless the anti-hegemony clause is included in
the body of the treaty. Not long before the Social-
ist delegation's visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao
Kuan-hua had told Japanese officials that China was
willing to wait "five to ten years" to conclude a
treaty if this is what was necessary to have an anti-
hegemony clause included., Other Chinese officials
have also said privately that it would be better to
have no treaty than one without this clause in the
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body of the document. Moreover, Chinese leaders have
begun to talk publicly about the treaty. Liao Cheng-
chih recently hinted that deletion of the clause would
be a step backward from the 1972 Sino-Japanese com-
munique, while Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien has specifi-
cally rejected the idea of putting the hegemony clause
in the treaty's preamble..
This somewhat firmer bargaining posture stands in
contrast with how the Chinese were, behaving in late
February at the time of the preceding round of talks.
a Chinese official
predicted to a confidant tKat ng would ultimately
agree to the Japanese demand for the elimination of
the hegemony clause. He said that this would be
preferable to having the negotiations become deadlocked
and ratification postponed indefinitely. In fact, in
the late autumn and early winter in the first stages
of the negotiations, Peking showed enormous cordiality
toward the Japanese and seemed determined to have the
treaty negotiated and signed as quickly as possible.
In light of Peking's previous flexibility on the
issue, the shift to a firmer line is probably, in
part, a bargaining ploy to draw the Japanese closer
to the Chinese position. China has previously used
similar tactics in negotiating with Tokyo. At the
outset of the civil aviation talks in 1973-74, China
conveyed the impression that the issue would be easily
resolved, but hardened its position as the talks pro-
gressed. A compromise agreement, favorable to the Chi-
nese, was ultimately achieved.
In fact, the Chinese still have an incentive to
conclude a peace and friendship treaty before the Japa-
nese Diet finally recesses around July 1. Peking has
always been concerned about the durability of Miki's
China policy and the influence of pro-Taiwan elements
within the Liberal Democrat Party. A treaty, of
course, would make it considerably more difficult for
May 27 , 1975
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Miki or any successor to turn Sino-Japanese relations
from their current course. The Chinese also have
considerable incentive to insist that "anti-hegemony"
language appear in the treaty. Peking sees this as
an opportunity to drive a wedge between Japan and the
Soviets, putting another obstacle in the path of
Soviet-Japanese cooperation.
The Soviet factor, in fact, probably has played
a part in determining Peking's bargaining tactics in
the negotiations. The Soviet embassy in Tokyo has
campaigned vigorously against the anti-hegemony clause,
and this action has undoubtedly reinforced Chinese
determination that the clause be retained. While the
conservative Japanese politicians who have been argu-
ing against the anti-hegemony language are more in-
terested in maintaining some distance from China than
they are in relations with Moscow, their argument that
the clause would jeopardize Japanese relations with
the USSR is bound to raise Chinese hackles.
Moreover, the Chinese have almost certainly ac-
corded higher priority to inclusion of the clause as
a result of recent developments in Indochina. Peking
seems genuinely to believe that the Soviet Union's
position in Asia has been strengthened by Hanoi's vic-
tory and therefore probably feels that the inclusion
of the anti-hegemony language is imperative to prevent
erosion of China's equities in the region. In par-
ticular, Peking apparently believes that Moscow will
revive its long-dormant proposal for an Asian security
pact in the wake of the new situation in Indochina,
and it may see the clause as an initial means of ar-
resting any Soviet move in this direction.
In light of these considerations, Miki's latest
initiative is not likely to cause the Chinese to back
away significantly from their current position. In
fact, the Japanese foreign office fears, with some
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justification, that Peking may now feel that the cur-
rent has again begun to flow in its direction. This
does not mean, however, that at least some compromise
is out of the question. There is probably some flex-
ibility in the Chinese position, particularly on
whether the anti-hegemony language appears in the body
of the treaty or in the preamble. Peking may well
believe that a compromise permitting the Japanese to
"save face" by relegating the clause to the preamble
would mitigate some of Miki's present political prob-
lems.; such a compromise would give China all of the
advantages--albeit slightly diluted--of having the
clause in the body of the treaty.
Much is likely to depend on Chinese readings of
the Japanese political situation, which was accurate
last year when the aviation treaty was negotiated, but
which may not be so acute in present circumstances.
In any event, the Chinese are constrained by their
underlying concerns and to some degree by their bar-
gaining position. In these circumstances, extensive
watering down of the anti-hegemony language in a way
that would obscure the essentially anti-Soviet nature
of the clause--a ploy that the Japanese have con-
sidered--is probably out of the question for the Chi-
nese. But if Peking is indeed willing to settle for
treatment of the issue in the preamble to the treaty,
there is at least an even chance of concluding the
negotiations in time for introduction of the treaty
into the Diet this summer. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
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