CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000900240002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 12, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Chinese Affairs
Top SMt
May 12, 1975
SC No. 00426/75
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No Dissem Abroad
Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the East Asia - Pacific Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence and from the Directorate of Science and Technology. Comments
and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the
individual articles.
May 12 , 1975
Leadership Appearances: A Non-Pattern. . . . . . 7
May Day and the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
May Day in the Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chiang Ching: Both a Legalist and a
Confucianist Be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
China: Tankers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Another Hat for Chen Hsi-lien. . . . . . . . 25
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Leadership Appearances: A Non-Pattern
A series of major events in Peking--the Kim
Il-song visit, rallies in support of communist vic-
tories in Cambodia and Vietnam and May Day--brought
most of China's leaders into public view. Not all
leaders appeared at all events, however. Some
failed to appear at events they would normally be
expected to attend, and others appeared in unusual
capacities at other festivities.
Among the more surprising inconsistencies was
the non-appearance of Politburo member Chang Chun-
chiao at the festivities surrounding Kim's visit
and both the Cambodia and Vietnam rallies. Chang
has often assumed hosting duties on behalf of visit-
ing foreign communist delegations, but his absence
from all functions associated with visiting com-
munists raises questions about whether he has re-
linquished this role in light of his recent accumu-
lation of other duties. Chang does not appear to
be in any political trouble. He did appear on May
Day, and his article in last month's issue of Red
Flag continues to be cited frequently in the pro-
vincial propaganda, sometimes without reference to
the earlier article by fellow Politburo member Yao
Wen-yuan.
Yao emerged in an unusual role during the Kim
Il-song visit, as the second-ranking participant
in some of the substantive discussions between Kim
and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. While Yao has
often hosted visiting journalists on his own, this
was the first time he is known to have taken part
in substantive talks with a visiting head of state.
Yao appeared at all of the recent events in the
capital, somewhat overshadowing the nominal third
man in the leadership, Wang Hung-wen.
May 12, 1975
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Wang was not present for Kim Il-song's arrival
or departure, and, although he was the highest
ranking Chinese leader at both banquets during the
Kim visit, the speeches for the Chinese side were
given not by Wang but by Teng Hsiao-ping. Wang's
protocol ranking in the leadership obviously does
not automatically entitle him to an important role
in such major events as the visit of Kim Il-song.
Moreover, despite his presence at both the Cambodia
and Vietnam rallies, it was Defense Minister Yeh
Chieng-ying, rather than Wang, who delivered the
speeches.
The appearances of Chiang Ching seemed almost
arbitrary. She was on hand to greet Kim Il-song
but did not see him off. Although she rarely at-
tends state banquets, she was present at the banquet
for Kim but did not attend Kim's reciprocal banquet.
She attended the Cambodia rally but not the Vietnam
rally. Most startling of all she was the only major
leader, other than Mao and Chou, to miss May Day.
Her absence was made even more glaring by the pre-
sentation, given by some ten thousand cultural
workers, of songs from the operas produced under
her auspices. Radio Peking called the presentation
"by far the biggest festival performance in Peking,"
begging the question of Chiang Ching's absence.
Taken together, the recent events in Peking
and the leadership appearances associated with them
may give some clues as to the relative importance
of certain officials. Chiang Ching's political
standing, as usual, remains hazy. Teng Hsiao-ping
is clearly important, perhaps far more so than his
sixth-ranking position in the leadership would sug-
gest. By contrast, young Wang Hung-wen's performance
to date does not seem to equal his standing as third
in the leadership. The other members of the "second
generation," particularly Chi Teng-kuei, who himself
was tied up with the visiting Belgian prime minister
May 12, 1975
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but managed to appear at all the other events, are
taking on greater responsibilities. Although this
pattern has been discernible since the National
People's Congress in January, the most surprising
development is the role of Yao Wen-yuan during the
visit of Kim Il-song. Yao has not seemed to figure
greatly in the growing role of the second genera-
tion, but his future activities may merit close
watching. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 12, 1975
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May Day and the Military
Leadership appearances on May Day suggest that
while party-army relations remain strained, civil-
ian leaders in Peking and regional commanders have
reached a certain accommodation. The campaign to
strengthen the proletarian dictatorship, which has
so far emphasized social order and production goals
and has not been used as a means to attack the mili-
tary, almost certainly appeals to the vast majority
of military men on both counts. While provincial
turnouts are incomplete, and some missing leaders
are soldiers who hold party posts, most top ranking
military men have been accounted for. One previously
absent leader who had been heavily criticized, former
Canton Military Region political commissar Jen
Ssu-chung, has apparently been given a high ranking
military post in the Tsinan Military Region. The
effort to ease military men out of party and govern-
ment posts continues, and with some success, but
Peking's tactics are quite different than they were
during the campaign to criticize Lin and Confucius.
At that time, regional commanders were the targets
of severe criticism, and seven of them were stripped
of their provincial party posts in one bold stroke.
The current standing of the military is typified
by the appearances of two military region commanders
who are also politburo members. Shenyang commander
Li Te-sheng led the turnout in Liaoning. Li, who
lost his post as head of the PLA's General Political
Department last year and was dropped from the politburo
standing committee this year after running into
serious trouble during the anti-Lin., anti-Confucius
campaign, had been conspicuously absent from large
turnouts in Liaoning in April to greet Kim Il-song
on his arrival and departure from China. Li's
political standing remains shaky, but he apparently
remains Shenyang Military Region commander.
May 12, 1975
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Canton Military Region commander Hsu Shih-yu,
who was reported to be visiting a "grassroots unit"
on May Day, was the only one of the provincial-based
politburo members who did not head a turnout in his
provincial capital. The peculiar treatment accorded
Hsu seems a sign of political weakness and serves to
emphasize his separation from the locus of political
power in the region. However, the party first sec-
retary of Kwangtung was also absent from Canton,
which tends to cloud the meaning of the turnout.
Other recent indicators are consistent with
Peking's carrot-and-stick approach toward the mili-
tary. Two provincial military figures who were
heavily criticized last year and seemed likely purge
candidates continue to appear in Peking. Han Hsien-chu,
who was rotated from Fukien to Kansu, and Hsieh
Chen-hua, who headed Shansi until a play produced
there was branded a "poisonous weed," were listed
among members of the party central committee appear-
ing in the capital. Neither leader has appeared in
his province in some time, but they have not yet been
replaced, either.
Several military men were publicly rehabilitated
or given active posts for the first time on May 1.
Fu Chung-pi, who was Peking Garrison commander until
his fall in the 1968 purge of acting chief of staff
Yang Cheng-wu, is now listed with ranking officers
of the Peking Military Region. A continuing relation-
ship with Yang, who is now a deputy chief of staff,
cannot be established, but Fu certainly has no strong
ties to his superior, Peking Military Region commander
Chen Hsi-lien. The appointment appears to be another
example of the civilian leadership using checks and
balances to control a politically sensitive military
command. Another professional soldier who fell
early in the Cultural Revolution, former artillery
commander Wu Kuo-hua, has also returned to active
May 12, 1975
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ranks, while Tan Cheng, who was the head of the
General Political Department and a vice-minister
of defense in the 1950s, was listed as "attending"
the festivities.
Pressure on the military nevertheless continues.
Wu Hsiu-chuan, a former head of the party's
International Liaison Department, is either a deputy
chief of staff or, more likely, a deputy director
of the General Political Department. In either case,
Wu seems to continue the trend of placing putative
civilians in high military posts. Moreover, domestic
propaganda seems to be telling PLA men that they
will no longer receive preferential treatment in
the form of urban employment upon demobilization.
Numerous articles also continue to emphasize that
local military leaders are to support their party
and government counterparts at all times. (SECRET
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ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
May 12, 1975
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May Day in the Provinces
May Day turnouts in the provinces were con-
siderably larger than a year ago when the anti-
Confucius campaign was raging, but less impressive
than those for National Day (October lst) when a
major effort was made to project an image of sta-
bility and unity. Accounts of this year's festivi-
ties are notable principally for their blandness.
There were no major surprises this year. No
new first secretaries were named, nor were any
purges revealed. Five provinces--Anhwei, Heilung-
kiang, Hupeh, Liaoning, and Shansi-.-still do not
have a publicly identified first secretary, and
civilians continue to head 16 of the 29 provincial-
level units. Military men lead the other eight.
Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien, and Kiangsu--four
of the more troubled provinces--failed to publish
detailed accounts of their local celebrations,
indicating that the situation remains unsettled
there. Heilungkiang, whose first secretary appar-
ently was purged recently, also failed to provide
a name list of those in attendance. Yunnan, on the
other hand, turned out in force despite its con-
tinuing factional struggles.
A few provincial leaders appeared in Peking.
Most notable were Jen Jung and Lu Jui-lin, the
bosses of Tibet and Kweichow, respectively. Jen may
be discussing Tibet's long-standing economic and
supply problems with officials at the center. Lu
may be in Peking to discuss Kweichow's persistent
factionalism, although rumors of poor health neces-
sitating trips to the capital for medical treatment
continue to surface.
The strangest turnout was in Kwangtung where
Chao Tzu-yang, the party boss, Hsu Shih-yu, Canton
May 12, 1975
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Province
Anhwei
Ineh_anu
Fukien
.ei1unokitna
t]Fld
size ot_ Turnout
No information
No details reported
No information
No details reported
Large
riunan No details reported
zi upen No details reported
.nner Mongolia No details reported
No information
No details reported
Lar qe
No coverage by FBIS
No details reported
No coverage by FSIS
No coverage by FBIS
No information
Larne
Turnout_Led By
-responsible persons"
"responsible persons"
Liu Chien-hsun,
!st secretary
Liu Tzu-hou,
!ct secretary
"responsible persons"
'responsible persons"
Tang Tsun-lun, party
secretary
Hsien Heng-han,
ist secretary
Wang Huai-hsianq,
secretary
Wei Kuo-china,
.it secretary
Kung Shih-chuan,
'y,n[it ical coeesissar
'canton MR
Li Pao-hua, 2nd
secretary
Li Te-shenq, Shenyang
44 commander
Pal Ju-ping, 1st
Se-,retary
Saifudin, let
secretary
Chen King-i, MD
-nmmander and ranking
party secretary
Sung Chang-kenq,
:arty secretary
Chou Hsinq,
_s'_ secretary
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YU Tai-chunq, lit secretary, did
not appear. Ranking secretary Wu
Tao turns out in Peking.
Much criticized Lanchou MR commander
Han Hsien-chu appears in Peking.
Three of the province's four party
secretaries miss the turnout.
Chao Tzu-yang, 1st secretary, and
Chiao Lin-i. Canton mayor, do not
attend local celebrations. Hsu
Shih-yu, Canton HR commander, spends
May Day with a "grassroots unit."
Lu Jui-lin, 1st secretary, attends
the Peking celebrations.
Former 1st secretary Hsieh Chen-hua
attends the Peking festivities.
A Jen Ssu-chung, who may be the ex-
Canton MR political commissar who
disappeared during the anti-Con-
fucius campaign, attends the
Shantuna rally.
Jen Jung, 1st secretary, appears
in Peking.
Chang Chianq-lin, 2nd secretary and
top party figure in Tsinqhai, does
not appear.
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Military Region commander, and Chiao Lin-i, Canton's
mayor, all failed to attend the provincial rally.
Hsu was reportedly with a "grassroots unit" some-
where, but no effort was made to account for Chao's
and Chiao's absence. There is no evidence to sug-
gest that either man is in political trouble. In
their absence, Kung Shih-chuan, the second ranking
military man stationed in the province, led the
turnout. Kung's role is mildly surprising because
he was apparently stripped of his provincial party
titles as a result of the anti-Confucius campaign,
although he retained his military posts. It was
apparently in that capacity--as well as a member
of the Central Committee--that he led the turnout
in Kwangtung.
The top party figures in Inner Mongolia and
Tsinghai also missed local celebrations. As was
the case in Kwangtung, no explanation was offered
for their absence, and neither man seems to be in
political difficulty. Inner Mongolia's number two
man did attend the festivities in Peking as a mem-
ber of the Central Committee.
May Day turnouts indicate that the campaign to
study the proletarian dictatorship has had little,
if any, effect on provincial leaderships so far.
Both national and local leaders have successfully
managed to keep the campaign focused on impersonal
behavior patterns and away from the specific actions
of individuals, including their own. Recent report-
ing, however, suggests that this phase of the
campaign may be coming to an end, and that criticism
of individuals--which could lead to changes in some
of the less stable provinces--will begin shortly.
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Chiang Ching: Both a Legalist
and a Confucianist Be
Although the anti-Confucius campaign has faded
into the background, some discussion of the histor-
ical struggle between legalists and Confucianists
continues to surface in the propaganda. Two such
articles recently received in Washington seem to
take opposing views of Chiang Ching.
Last year, Chiang Ching's supporters appeared
to make a case for her to be chosen as Mao's suc-
cessor by painting a favorable picture of Empress
Wu, generally regarded as a terrible ruler. The
spruced-up image of the empress, suddenly called
a "legalist," was countered by wall posters that
attacked Empress Wu and linked her directly to
Madame Mao.
Chiang Ching's supporters evidently tried again
in early January with another article on the virtues
of the "legalist" empress. The timing of the article,
just after the party central committee had completed
a new slate of government officers that omitted
Chiang Ching, may be significant. The article smacks
of some vengeance over the obstacles Empress Wu/
Chiang Ching had to overcome to win positions of
power.
In addition to repeating the earlier theme that
Empress Wu ruled China well for many years after her
husband's death, the article made some specific claims
that seem to resemble more recent events. Striking
what appeared to be a rather vindictive note, the
article lashed out against the court elders who objected
to the emperor's marriage to Wu and who vigorously de-
fended the emperor's current wife as one who "should
not be divorced lightly." The passage seems to refer
to the controversy surrounding Mao's marriage to
Chiang Ching, which many party officials opposed,
and their support for his highly respected wife, Ho
May 12, 1975
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Tzu-chen, who had made the Long March. In its de-
fense of Wu, the article noted the emperor was at-
tracted to her because, among other things, she
was "well versed in literature," apparently an
allusion to Madame Mao's cultural aspirations.
The article also complained that those in power,
including the court "secretary-general" and some
who held important government positions, constantly
conspired against her. Upon assuming the throne,
the article noted that Empress Wu removed 36 such
officials, including the prime minister. These
actions were portrayed in the article as praise-
worthy, legalist policies.
By contrast, an article in March on the struggle
between Confucianism and legalism complained bitterly
that. the Confucianists used opera to attack the
legalists, distort historical facts, and advance
their own cause. Although the article was cast in
historical terms and the operas attacked are ancient
ones, the complaints could easily apply to the model
operas created under Chiang Ching's guidance.
The article claimed that the operas glorified
certain Confucianist figures, whose names were
widely used in the anti-Confucius propaganda last
year to represent Lin Piao, and eulogized historical
generals who advocated policies of "national betrayal."
Chiang Ching's operas, in fact, glorify some military
men who undoubtedly were originally intended to
represent Lin Piao, and several of her operas glorify
the military in general. Last year's anti-Confucius
propaganda, inter alia, accused not only Lin but some
regional military commanders of harboring traitorous
ideas.
The article noted that none of the old operas
praised the major legalist figures and that one,
"The Stubborn Prime Minister," even attacked a
May 12, 1975
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respected legalist. One of Chiang Ching's operas
is open to similar charges. Perhaps somewhat akin
to "The Stubborn Prime Minister," it not only does
not praise Premier Chou En-lai but actually appears
to denigrate him and portrays him as "stubborn."
Lest there be any doubt that the discussion of
ancient operas has current relevance, the article
accuses "Lin Piao and company" of using the Confucian
practice of producing operas as "monuments" to
themselves. Any operas created after Lin gained power
in 1966 in fact were done so under Chiang Ching's
tutelage. Consequently, the article's criticism of
operas created by Lin "and company" can only refer
to Chiang Ching's model operas.
Although the article lauds the "revolution in
Peking opera," it attributes this not to Chiang Ching
but to "the proletariat." It concludes with
ritualistic praise for the model operas but calls
for "continued effort" to root out Lin Piao's
influence, particularly the distortion of history,
in the cultural sphere. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 12, 1975
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Peking is making a major effort to expand its
international tanker fleet. The fledgling fleet--
600,000 dead weight tons acquired since mid-1974
for more than $150 million--could reach 1 million
tons by the end of the year. Tankers account for
about 80 percent of the international merchant fleet
total tonnage purchased during the first four months
in 1975. By world standards, it is a small fleet.
The newly acquired tanker fleet will carry an
increasing share of China's growing petroleum ex-
ports. Crude oil deliveries totaling nearly 9
million tons are scheduled for this year--8 million
tons of it to Japan--of which the Chinese may carry
as much as one third. The fleet has already car-
ried one million tons of crude to Japan since July.
Chinese tankers will also participate in deliveries
of 650,000 tons to the Philippines, with chartered
tankers carrying the initial consignments. (SECRET)
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Another Hat for Chen Hsi-lien
Peking regional military commander Chen Hsi-
lien has added another job to his growing list of
responsibilities. The only military man among the
newly appointed vice premiers of the government,
Chen was identified on May 11 as a member of the
Military Commission, the organization through which
the party maintains its control over the military.
Radio Peking coyly refrained from specifying whether
Chen is a "leading member" of the Military Commis-
sion or "the" leading member. The distinction is
important because he could either be one of several
vice chairmen of the commission or the ranking vice
chairman, a job generally thought to belong to De-
fense Minister Yeh Chien-ying.
Despite Yeh's presence at the military sports
meet at which Chen's new job was publicly revealed,
it was Chen rather than Yeh who gave the opening
address. Chen welcomed the participants "on behalf
of the Chinese PLA," the only military leader other
than Yeh Chien-ying to use those words since the fall
of Lin Piao. Chen's speech dwelt on military training
and preparedness and made no reference to a political
role for the PLA.
Chen seemed to clash with moderate leaders in
Peking when he led an attack during the summer of
1973 on the use of university entrance examinations.
He was also attacked by historical analogy during
last year's anti-Confucius campaign. Since that time,
however, he has performed well in his capacity as
vice premier and has shown no recent signs of opposi-
tion to current moderate policies. His apparently
docile behavior in recent months can perhaps best be
explained by the number of new jobs he has been given.
He was transferred to Peking in the rotation of mili-
tary commanders at the end of 1973, thereby' bringing
May 12, 1975
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him to the center of political power, allowing him
to participate in the national government, and
giving him an opportunity possibly limited when
he was stationed in Liaoning--to be present at all
Politburo meetings. The range of Chen's current
jobs suggests that he is one of the most important
members of the regime. (CONFIDENTIAL)
May 12, 1975
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