LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000800350002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 30, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Di sem
9UITT HOUE
Latin American Trends
Secret
106
April 30, 1975
No. 0507/75
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No Foreign Dissem/ControZZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
April 30, 1975
Panama: Government Seeks Treaty
Support ............................... 1
Peru: Still a Part-Time
President ............................. 3
Brazil: Communists and
Congress .............................. 6
Argentine President
Strengthened ..........................7
Colombia: Painful Memories ............. 9
Sugar Producers To Seek Price
Stabilization ......................... 11
Ecuador: A Possible Image
Problem--Again ........................ 13
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Panama: Government Seeks Treaty Support
Top administration officials have begun a series
of visits that will eventually include most hemisphere
nations in a quest for new commitments of support for
Panama's position in the canal treaty negotiations with
the US.
The round of trips was begun by the team of Vice
President Sucre and Foreign Minister Tack, who on April
17 delivered to Brazilian President Geisel a letter of
appreciation from General Torrijos for Brasilia's dem-
onstrations of support. Later in April Tack met with
two of the chiefs of state who had. been present at last
month's summit meeting in Panama City: Colombian Pres-
ident Lopez and Venezuelan President Perez. The foreign
minister told the press that in addition to informing the
two leaders about the status of the canal issue, he had
discussed Panama's aspiration to gain a seat on the UN
Security Council this fall and the meeting of the OAS
scheduled for May. The Panamanians almost certainly
hope to obtain an endorsement of their canal aspirations
at that gathering. The canal negotiations was one topic
covered by Torrijos during a whirlwind visit to Costa
Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala on April 23-5. In the
case of Guatemala, however, the trip may have proved to
be counterproductive, as the Laugerud government has
strongly criticized Torrijos' violation of a promise
not to reveal the substance of the discussions to the
press.
One reason for the emphasis on securing com-
mitments of foreign support is concern about the op-
position to a new treaty in the US. The Panamanian
media, which usually reflect the government's atti-
tudes, are closely following developments in Congress
and in Indochina to determine their impact on the
treaty negotiations and the subsequent ratification
April 30, 1975
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process. Apparently reflecting this uncertainty,
Panamanian officials both publicly and privately
maintain that the US executive branch should con-
tinue to negotiate in good faith even if the pros-
pects for congressional ratification are not bright.
Torrijos' primary objective is still to get a domes-
tically defensible draft treaty; he feels that at that
point his international support could help persuade
the Congress to ratify the pact. (CONFIDENTIAL/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 30, 1975
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Peru: Still a Part-Time President
We continue to receive reports that President
Velasco has been unable to resume his full duties as
chief executive, following a stroke last February 28.
Velasco attended a cabinet meeting earlier this month
and met with the Australian prime minister in April
24, but information from in-
dicates that top military leaders doubt that he is as
strong as he would like them to believe.
There is no move yet to force the President to
step down, and cabinet officers, including Prime Min-
ister Morales Bermudez, feel that direct action against
Velasco at this time would be unnecessary and counter-
productive. They apparently will try instead to en-
courage Velasco's family in efforts to pressure him to
lessen his workload or relinquish power.
Morales Bermudez' influence continues to grow in
contrast to Velasco's sagging credibility. Not only is
the prime minister able to draw on long-standing respect
for his competence, but many officers apparently find
his low-key, professional style of leadership a welcome
change from Velasco's high-handed, arbitrary manner.
We have received few details on how much power Morales
Bermudez has exercised during Velasco's illness and
lengthy convalescence. The picture is further clouded
by Velasco's efforts--certain to continue--to impress
those around him with his will to remain in power.
We continue to believe, however, that Morales
Bermudez will gradually assume increasing responsi-
bilities and solidify his position as Velasco's suc-
cessor. Time is working against the President, and
each day he is unable to reassert his authority lowers
the odds that he will be able to hold on to an effec-
tive leadership position for an extended period.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
April 30, 1975
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Brazil: Communists and Congress
Security officials are seeking to discredit a
number of opposition congressmen by publishing a
list of legislators said to be linked to the illegal
Communist Party. The information is based on exten-
sive interrogations of an arrested former congress-
man who was a member of the Communist central com-
mittee and provided information on party organization
and activities.
The published information says the Communist
Party entered into contact with the congressmen
prior to last fall's elections, in which the op-
position made substantial gains, and supported their
candidacies. Those named are among the most out-
spoken critics of government policies and alleged
abuses of power, including torture and the holding
of political prisoners. Although no charges have
been placed against the congressmen, security of-
ficials have called for the arrest of five other in-
dividuals said to be Communists.
The security officials may hope eventually to
force the cancellation of the mandates of at least
some of the congressmen mentioned, thus depriving
the opposition of some of its most effective leaders.
There is, of course, precedent for removing members
of congress. One deputy was stripped of his mandate
as recently as last year and imprisoned after pub-
licly insulting the visiting Chilean head of state.
Security officials undoubtedly realize that
they need a much stronger case than they now appear
to have to press for the ouster of one or more con-
gressmen, given the climate of political liberali-
zation fostered by President Geisel. Thus they may
be content to let their recent action serve merely
as a warning against further civilian attacks against
them. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 30, 1975
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Argentine President Strengthened
President Peron has
emerged relatively unscathed
from a series of meetings with
labor and political leaders
over the past three weeks.
This, plus the fact that Mrs.
Peron has gotten her wishes on
the line of presidential suc-
cession, has strengthened her
position considerably.
The meetings were held
against a backdrop of rising
criticism of Mrs. Peron's
leadership and the govern-
ment's inability to halt the
economic decline. There were
rumors that a dramatic con-
frontation would occur with
labor bosses and politicians
pushing for Lopez Rega's
ouster. Some thought the
military might join the
campaign. Several sources
also reported that labor was
planning to demand a larger
role in policy making.
President Peron Addressing
Labor Leaders
Some of these issues were raised during the
sessions but the outcome was generally inconclu-
sive and anticlimactic. Criticism was aimed in
Lopez Rega's direction and there were complaints
about Gomez Morales' handling of the economy. The
participants also pointed to the absence of pres-
idential consultations with them. Mrs. Peron re-
sponded by stoutly defending all her ministers--
particularly Lopez Rega and Gomez Morales--and
April 30, 1975
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promising to meet with her interlocutors more often.
An important factor in the turnabout of Mrs.
Peron's political fortunes was the Peronist vic-
tory--however modest--in the provincial elections
in Misiones on April 13. There was great fear in
Peronist circles that leftists would make a good
showing. When they failed, Lopez Rega was credited
with masterminding the defeat. He also undoubtedly
manipulated his son-in-law's reelection on April 25
to the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, where
he now stands next in line for the presidency.
Lopez Rega's roughshod tactics in the bal-
loting for congressional offices will cause new
strains in the government's political coalition,
already beset by economic problems and labor's cam-
paign for a greater share of power. Despite all
this, public dissatisfaction with the government
will have to worsen considerably before the Pres-
ident--or Lopez Rega--is seriously challenged.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
April 30, 1975
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Colombia: Painful Memories
Colombia's state-owned radio network has re-
ported the alleged political murder of a prominent
Conservative Party leader. Such a report--partic-
ularly if true--must recall to many Colombians the
violent 1940s and 1950s, a period during which vir-
tually open warfare between Conservatives and Lib-
erals claimed more than 100,000 lives.
In the present case, Conservative Hernando
Alvarez Correa, a former national congressman and
former mayor of Caicedonia in the Conservative
strong hold of Valle Department, apparently drove
into an ambush on a highway near Caicedonia.
Alvarez Correa was questioned last year in con-
nection with the murder of a Liberal Party official
in the same area.
It is puzzling that the government radio net-
work has suggested a political motivation for the
murder, meaning in the Colombian context that it
reflected differences between the two major parties
rather than within either one of them individually.
It is doubly puzzling in that the radio arm of the
present Liberal administration has apparently im-
plied that a Liberal killed Alvarez Correa.
The explanation of this anomaly probably lies
in the government's apparent effort to play up guer-
rilla operations, crime, and even anti-government
demonstrations to prepare the public for the imple-
mentation of a state of siege. It seems likely that
a network copywriter, aware of a general guideline
to make the most of crime and violence, decided in-
dependently to use the murder of a Conservative to
rekindle fears of the inter-party Violencia.
April 30, 1975
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The murder itself was most likely a guerrilla
attack, and can be dismissed as unfortunately one of
many such operations in rural Colombia. The radio net-
work's allusion to political violence can probably also
be dismissed as the work of an overzealous writer.
High administration officials must surely have seen to
it by now that no further network mention of Liberal-
Conservative warfare is made. Nevertheless, this pre-
sumably spurious reference, after so long a period of
relative silence, must have sent a chill through both
parties and perhaps resensitized them to this old--
but not gone--issue. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 30, 1975
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Sugar Producers To Seek Price Stabilization
According to a New York Times article on April
25, about 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries
agreed during a closed-doors meeting last week in
the Dominican Republic to lobby jointly at the May
15 meeting of the International Sugar Organization
(ISO) in London for a stabilized sugar price at be-
tween 20 and 30 cents per pound. (The price of sug-
ar has recently been 20 to 25 cents, compared with
an all-time high of 65 cents last November.) While
the Times story has not yet been confirmed, there is
considerable evidence that the Latin American and
Caribbean producers do intend to seek at least a min-
imum price structure. For the scheme to be success-
ful and still avoid the label of an OPEC-style pro-
ducer cartel, the ISO is an ideal forum because it
includes a wide spectrum of both consumers and pro-
ducers. The 20-cent minimum - 30-cent maximum is
intended to ensure profitability for the producers
without damaging long-term sales volume or imposing
serious hardships on consumers.
The nations represented at the meeting in the
Dominican Republic account for about half of the
world's sugar exports but only 30 percent of the
world's production. Cuba attended; Chile, Uruguay,
Grenada, and Surinam refused invitations; and the
United States and the British, French, US, and other
Dutch dependencies in the Caribbean were not invited.
Prior to the meeting, Cuba and Mexico were the strong-
est advocates of a sugar cartel, setting relatively
high prices; even among those nations which ordinar-
ily oppose such arrangements, however, there was general
agreement on the need for somehow limiting the wide
swings in sugar prices.
April 30, 1975
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Under the heading of related business and despite
some serious disagreements, the delegates made substan-
tial progress toward converting their ad hoc meetings
into a permanent regional sugar institution. Proposed
at the first producers' conference at Cozumel, Mexico,
in November 1974, this new Group of Latin American and
Caribbean Sugar Exporters will operate an information
exchange service, promote technical cooperation, and
do the groundwork for future regional and international
sugar.
The conferees approved a budget of $658,000 for a
permanent secretariat in Mexico and agreed to finance
expenditures by contributions based on each member's
volume of sugar exports. At Brazil's insistence, draft
statutes were dropped from the agenda and now will be
transmitted to the individual governments for their com-
ments. The secretariat will attempt to work out any ob-
jections and to obtain consensus on any necessary modi-
fications. (CONFIDENTIAL)
April 30, 1975
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Ecuador: A Possible Image Problem--Again
Civilian politicians and journalists are con-
tinuing their anti-government propaganda campaign,
encouraged by the Rodriguez administration's over-
reaction to their preliminary attacks.
In mid-April, two prominent lawyers who have
apparently, been politically inactive during the
Rodriguez years were arrested for complicity in the
distribution of a document purporting to list jour-
nalists being paid by various government departments.
One of the lawyers, Enrique Gallegos, may have been
charged because he was a campaigner for populist
Assad Bucaram, whose presidential potential in 1972
caused Rodriguez and the military to take power.
The other, German Alarcon, has almost no political
background, having headed the National Civil Registry
and been an officer of the National Federation of
Lawyers.
The government has also issued a vaguely worded
arrest order for Julio Prado, the widely respected ed-
itorialist and former foreign minister who has been
the most outspoken press critic of the regime. Prado
is taking advantage of his situation by writing from
underground. He has pledged to appear in court if he
is charged with libel.
After several years of increasing technocratic
sophistication, the military government is reacting
to the sudden thrusts of opposition with all the sen-
sitivity it showed in its early months. The progress
achieved during the years since then could be jeopard-
ized if the public's present image of the administra-
tion begins to sour. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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