WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000800070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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The EC in Dublin and Luxembourg. . . . . . . . 4
Peacekeeping Leads to Arguments at the UN. . . 8
Turkish Cypriot Leader Under Fire in
Constituent Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Prospects for Demirel Government . . . . . . . 12
Portuguese Military Leader Promises
Elections Will Be Held . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Dutch Leaders Affirm Support for F-16.
DOS review(s) completed.
April 17, 1975
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The EC in Dublin and Luxembourg
The EC foreign ministers' Dublin-Luxembourg
discussions, April 12-15, devoted some time to
consideration of the changing relationship be-
tween developed and developing states despite
the overshadowing issue of Vietnam and the
need for decisions on continuing EC policies.
The informal weekend meeting near Dublin
spent Saturday on a free exchange of views over
long-term prospects for European union. The for-
eign ministers moved to more immediate concerns
when news from Paris showed that the preparatory
consumer-producer conference might fail despite
US-EC solidarity there against developing coun-
try demands. Talk began in Dublin and continued
in Luxembourg about the Middle East and the
stalled EC-Arab dialogue, Portugal where the EC
is still dubious of the merits of any joint de-
marche, and Vietnam. No major decisions were
made.
Press leaks about the US-EC exchange on
Vietnam caused considerable chagrin. Irish
Foreign Minister FitzGerald, who was chairing
the sessions, described the leaks as false
and misleading because of their negative tone.
He emphasized that the Nine--who offered to
consider urging a cease-fire on both sides
in Vietnam--had unanimously considered the US
message a helpful use of the US-EC consultative
process.
Earlier hopes that the Luxembourg meeting
could note the successful end of negotiations
on the first phase of EC Mediterranean policy
were abandoned earlier this month because
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of continuing disagreement with the Maghreb.
The ministers decided that the agreement with
Israel, which had been designed for parallel
implementation, would nevertheless come into
force on July 1.
The raw materials question and changing
relations between developed and developing
states received peripheral attention in Dublin.
In Luxembourg, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan
outlined his plans for the forthcoming Commonwealth
ministers' conference and for other meetings deal-
ing with the raw materials question. Commission
papers on the topic were taken up, and the coun-
cil requested a complete commission study of the
EC's raw materials needs as soon as possible.
The ministers agreed on the importance of coordin-
ating community positions in advance of meetings
dealing with raw materials and requested the com-
mittee of permanent representatives to set up
the appropriate consultation procedures.
The council also set up a preliminary pro-
gram on consumer protection, approved joint EC
representation in Ankara and Athens on the-Aegean
dispute and agreed on distribution of a second
aid installment under UN auspices to countries
facing the most serious balance of payments
25X1 dise uilibria.
April 17, 1975
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Dutch Leaders Affirm Support for F-16
There are strong indications that the Dutch
government has already made the decision to opt
for the US F-16 as a replacement for its F-104s.
Foreign Minister van der Stoel's chief
advisor on the replacement-issue has confided to
US Embassy officials in The Hague that he is work-
ing on a message to the Dutch ambassador in
Washington instructing him to explore the
possibility of making an advance payment for the
F-16s. Such an arrangement would eliminate the
possibility of a rise in price due to some future
improvement in the dollar exchange rate compared
to the guilder.
Defense Minister Vredeling, testifying before
parliament on April 15, said he would stand by
his decision to recommend the F-16. Vredeling,
a member of the Labor Party, was responding to
the resolution passed by his party congress on
April 11 rejecting both the F-16 and the French
Mirage F-lE.
Vredeling went on to say that the decision
would be made by the cabinet and would not be
subject to a direct vote by parliament. Foreign
Minister van der Stoel, also a member of the Labor
Party, has declared support for Vredeling's
recommendation, according to a Dutch newspaper.
Failing a parliamentary debate on the issue,
the Labor Party's only recourse would be a vote
of no confidence in the government. Although the
Labor Party congress was dominated by young
militants, cooler heads in the party's parlia-
mentary group would probably balk at bringing
down the government over the F-104 issue. One
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compromise solution already mentioned publicly
is a reduction in the number of aircraft to be
ordered. This suggestion is being strongly
resisted by the defense ministry.
There have also been favorable signs in
Copenhagen, where the Dutch. ambassador told his
US counterpart that the Dutch government would
hold to its original decision to buy the F-16.
The ripples caused by the Dutch Labor Party's
resolution also seem to be subsiding in Denmark.
The Danish media, which had initially equated
the Dutch Party's statement to a government
decision, yesterday emphasized that the Labor
Party resolution is not binding on the govern-
ment. One of Denmark's most influential news-
papers, Berlingske Tidende, called on the Danish
government to stop dithering around waiting for
the Dutch to make up their minds and get on with
its original plans to buy the F-16. The parlia-
mentary defense committee's chairman told US
embassy officials in Copenhagen esterday that
III=-,71=r-,It-hjncr is back on track."
April 17, 1975
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Peacekeeping Leads to Arguments at the UN
The Security Council meeting today to re-
new the mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces
in the Sinai points up the general agreement
that exists among UN members on the positive
contributions such forces have made and con-
tinue to make since the first one was estab-
lished in June 1950. Despite this broad appre-
ciation, however, UN states have never been
able to agree on guidelines to be followed in
establishing and subsequently monitoring these
operations.
The principal stumbling block to negotia-
ting guidelines continues to be the Soviet's
attitude on how the peacekeeping operations
should be controlled and the national represen-
tation, both of the forces in the field and of
the Secretariat officials headquartered in New
York. The Soviets insist that the primary re-
sponsibility for establishing and conducting
peacekeeping operations should remain with the
Security Council--as the UN organ chiefly
responsible for the maintenance of internation-
al peace and security. In line with this policy,
the Soviets have long tried to circumscribe the
responsibilities of the Secretary General in
supervising the day-to-day activities of the
peacekeeping forces and to restrict his role
chiefly to one of reporting on the progress of
peacekeeping operations and of implementing
Security Council directives.
To ensure that the permanent members of
the Security Council retain the primary power
in peacekeeping operations, the Soviets continue
to urge the establishment of a permanent com-
mittee that would be responsible for day-to-day
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operations of any peacekeeping forces. This
Article 29 Committee--named after the article
empowering the Security Council to establish
those subsidiary organs which it deems neces-
sary to carry out its functions--would advise
the Secretary General on all aspects of the
peacekeeping force's functions and thus would
effectively have a veto over any initiative by
the Secretary.
The Soviets have also resurrected the
Military Staff Committee as an alternative
mechanism of control. The Military Staff Com-
mittee, an organ of the Security Council, was
originally established as the body responsible
for supervising the implementation and direc-
tion of military operations conducted by the
Security Council. When political factors pre-
vented it from assuming such military respon-
sibilities, the command functions were dele-
gated on an ad hoc basis which was determined
by how, and under whose responsibility, the
peacekeeping force in question was established.
The other major Soviet concern is the
question of equitable geographic representation.
The Soviets have long felt that Warsaw Pact
members have been discriminated against when
the troop composition of peacekeeping forces is
determined. At the same time, they feel that
inequitable geographic distribution within the
UN Secretariat itself further prejudices Mos-
cow's chances of a fair share of peacekeeping
slots.
positions.
Earlier hopes of resolving these issues
in a smaller negotiating group made up of four
of the five permanent Security Council members--
China has consistently refused to accord the UN
any peacekeeping authority--have been setback
by the reaffirmation of these traditional Soviet
April 17, 1975
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Turkish Cypriot Leader Under Fire in Constituent
Assembly
Rauf Denktash is facing his first serious
challenge as leader of the Turkish Cypriot
community in the continuing debate over a
constitution for the "Turkish Federated State
of Cyprus."
Debate has been unexpectedly acrimonious
in the Turkish Cypriot constituent assembly,
with most of the disagreement focused on the
powers of the presidency. This has necessitated
several extensions of the deliberations which
began on February 24 and were to be completed
by April 9.
A majority of the speakers have argued
that the powers to be accorded the presidency,
which Denktash is expected to assume, are
inordinate and could lay the basis for an
authoritarian regime. The delegates have
already substantially modified the original
draft that for the most part was formulated
in Ankara. While the draft still provides
for a strong presidential system, Denktash's
critics have succeeded in reducing the presidential
term of office from 7 to 5 years and in imposing
a limit of two consecutive terms on any individual.
The beleagured Turkish Cypriot leader
is reportedly being challenged by four opposition
groups who have been working together in the
constituent assembly to curb presidential
powers. He has also encountered opposition
within his own cabinet, forcing him to dismiss
one minister. Another minister, now in the
UK, is not expected to return to Cyprus.
April 17, 1975
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Denktash still enjoys Ankara's backing
which gives him control over the Turkish Cypriot
political and administrative machinery. The
prospects are, however, that he will face
increased political opposition and challenges
in the future now that the heretofore cohesive
Turkish Cypriot community is faced with a
greatly diminished threat from the Greek Cypriots.
This could lead Denktash to assume a
tougher stance in the intercommunal talks
in an effort to restore his popularity, although
Ankara still has the determining voice.
April 17, 1975
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Prospects for Demirel Government
The newly installed government of Prime Minister
Suleyman Demirel, which won a narrow vote of confi-
dence last Saturday, will have to perform a delicate
balancing act if it is to provide effective leadership.
Demirel must deal with serious strains that will in-
evitably develop within the governing coalition and
at the same time parry attacks from a determined op-
position.
In his first major speech since the parliamentary
vote of confidence, opposition leader Bulent Ecevit
charged corruption in the vote and warned that he
would require only eight honest men "without gambling
debts or weaknesses exploitable by big profiteers" to
bring down the government. The eight votes represent
the difference between the 218 votes cast against the
government last Saturday and the 226 needed to unseat
the government under the constitution.
Ecevit, however, probably does not want to be
blamed for plunging Turkey into another government
crisis and has claimed that his Republican Peoples'
Party will play a "moderate" opposition role. He
hopes that the government will make enough legislative
and policy mistakes to assure.a victory for his party
in the next election.
Demirel's Nationalist Front coalition partners,
who are united primarily by a desire to be in the
government and to avoid elections, are reportedly
already at odds with each other. One of the partners--
the Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party--is
noted for its uncooperative and obstructionist tac-
tics; it was instrumental in breaking up the previous
government in which it participated along with former
Prime Minister Ecevit's party.
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The Salvationists, who challenge Turkey's choice
of Western models for modernization, oppose foreign
private investment and tourism and advocate a vague,
utopian economic policy. Their holding of important
economic portfolios does not bode well for the economy.
Another vulnerability of the Demirel government
is its dependence on the small Pan-Turkish National
Action Party, a group even more extreme than the
Salvationists. Led by Alpaslan Turkes, this national
socialist party boasts of its right wing "commandos"
many of whom have been involved in recent clashes
between left and right wing students. Turkes' party,
which has only three seats in parliament, is over-
represented in the government with two posts, although
it does not head a ministry.
Both of the extreme right parties in the coali-
tion advocate a hard line on Cyprus and can be expected
to oppose giving up any of the territory now held by
the Turkish Cypriots. Both also oppose Turkey's mem-
bership in NATO and the EC. Although Demirel and his
foreign and defense ministers are experienced and
moderate figures, they may have the same trouble
Ecevit had in keeping the extremists in line.
Demirel appears determined to show the military,
which forced him to resign in 1971, that he is capa-
ble of effective rule and that it was wrong to unseat
him. Although the military still dislikes and mis-
trusts Demirel, it will probably maintain a "hands
off" policy unless there is a dramatic rise in civil
unrest or Demirel tries to take some form of revenge
against the armed forces.
The next months will be critical for the gov-
ernment. If it can survive until the summer when the
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students and parliament go into recess, it should
have a long breathing spell. In August Demirel
will be able to use the annual military promotions
and reassignments to try to build support within
the arm .
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Portuguese Military Leader Promises Elections
Will Be Held
Admiral Antonio Rosa Coutinho, rapidly
emerging as a dominant member of the 28-man
Revolutionary Council, promised on Tuesday
that elections will be held, but that the Armed
Forces Movement will not allow itself to be
a "prisoner of the results."
In an hour-long televised interview, Rosa
Coutinho tried to counter the widespread suspicions
that the Movement might cancel or delay the
elections at the last minute out of fear that
the results would show that the people do not
favor the Movement's policies. Coutinho said
that elections must be held, because to call
them off after the people had waited 50 years
for free elections "would be like taking a
toy away from a baby." He added, however,
that the elections will not affect the Movement's
decision to move toward socialism and stay
in power for at least the next three years.
Coutinho, a 49-year old-career navy officer
who served as head of the governing junta in
Angola until recently, has been appearing more
and more frequently as a Movement spokesman.
This week he was appointed executive director
of the Revolutionary Council, a potentially
powerful position that gives him the authority
to spend up to $400,000 without obtaining government
approval.
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I Coutinho's name is
requen y me i e the leading contender
to replace Prime Minister Goncalves should
he falter.
Admiral Coutinho is also rumored to be
in line to assume control of a reorganized
internal security apparatus, which will combine
several intelligence and police functions.
He is now in charge of the inquiry into
the March 11 coup attempt. The preliminary
results of the investigation are to be published
next week. Some civilians may be implicated,
and members of the moderate Socialist and Popular
Democratic parties fear that disclosures right
before elections will hurt them at the polls.
Coutinho created a stir last week by calling
for the establishment of a new political party--
described as a "civilian Armed Forces Movement"--
to which the Movement could gradually transfer
some of its powers. Coutinho openly admits
his distaste for Socialist Party leader Mario
Soares, who he sees as too conservative, but
even more strongly opposes the influence the
Communists now enjoy in the government. His
proposed new party would fall ideologically
somewhere between the Socialists and the Communists
25X1 and, in his view, eliminate the bickering and
fighting among parties that currentl plaques
political scene.
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