MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000800050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

or e~ease 2001/08/O~:/CIA-RDP79T00865A000800050001-9
A
'i'? IS 12 39 PH '75
5VI~~ MOVE
Confidential
No Foreign Discern
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Confidential
84
No. 0657/75
April 17, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
g 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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 91 Approved or R ease 2000NFIDENTIAL $65A0008000 500 -
5X /23
t'J ?C o3
MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division. Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
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0,0 Angola: Little Progress in Preparing for
;;?Elections.(,. 7, f 1,7~=NGF/ ~r,/~7#fN~~t,~
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ANNEX (C) ~~
?,? The Arabs: Looking Beyond the July
"Flashpoint". . . . . . . . . . .
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CONFIDENTIAL
Angola
Little Progress in Preparing for Elections
The three liberation groups that share power
in Angola's transitional government have made little
progress in preparing for the national elections
scheduled to be held before the end of October in
accordance with the independence agreement between
the groups and the Portuguese. There is still time
for the groups to catch up on their work, but unless
they begin to show more movement, elections could
be postponed indefinitely.
In order to meet the requirements for elections,
a central commission, composed of representatives of
the three liberation groups, is meeting daily to
draft a national fundamental law which will serve
as an interim constitution. All three groups have
their own drafts of the law, however, and they are
not likely to reach agreement in the near future.
According to the US consul in Luanda, one of the
major points of disagreement is nationalization of
foreign-owned properties. The Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola is pushing for a provision
that will allow expropriation without compensation
of properties belonging to "enemies of the state."
Such a law would amount to a license to steal, and
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and
the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola are opposed.
The central commission must also draft an
electoral law which will provide for popular election
of a constituent assembly and selection of a presi-
dent, but here too it may run into trouble. Major
sticking points are likely to be citizenship and
suffrage. The National Front would like to get
several hundred thousand refugees in Zaire on the
rolls, but the Popular Movement will probably seek
to keep them off through restrictions on absentee
balloting or stiff residency requirements.
(Continued)
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The independence agreement does not provide for
a postponement of elections, and all three groups
are publicly claiming they want elections to be held.
They are signing up supporters, but their activities
are hampered by lack of funds and equipment. The
US consul suspects that the Popular Movement, which
is probably having the most difficult time setting
up its campaign, would like to see the elections
postponed or a formula accepted whereby delegates
to the constituent assembly would be appointed by
the groups rather than popularly elected. The Popular
Movement would like to discuss these issues at a
summit meeting of the three groups, but so far it has
had no response from its two rivals.
A protracted deadlock in selecting the country's
leadership increases the chances that one of the
groups, or an alliance of two of them, might attempt
to seize power by force. Such an action could result
in either a relatively quick coup d'etat or a pro-
longed civil war. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 17, 1975
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Pakistan-Afghanistan
War of Words
Afghan-Pakistani exchanges of unfriendly
propaganda have grown increasingly shrill and
vituperative in recent weeks. Although neither
side apparently wants. the situation to reach the
point of actual hostilities, a miscalculation or
overreaction is always possible.
Relations have been poor since mid-1973,
when Mohammad Daoud, a former Afghan prime minister,
regained power in Kabul and revived a longstanding
border dispute with Pakistan. The hostile rhetoric
began to grow even more intense two months ago after
Islamabad accused the Afghans of complicity in the,
murder of Prime Minister Bhutto's chief political
lieutenant in a Pakistani province in the disputed
border area.
Daoud has been counselled in the past by the
Soviets and the Indians to avoid open conflict with
Pakistan, which is militarily much stronger than
Afghanistan. He will probably receive similar advice
from another influential neighbor, the Shah of Iran,
when he visits Tehran at the end of this month. Bhutto,
for his part, knows hostilities with Afghanistan could
interrupt his consolidation of power at home.
Despite the interest of both Afghanistan and
Pakistan in avoiding major trouble, there is a danger
that heightened emotions on both sides could lead to
further problems. In the early 1960s, during Daoud's
earlier tenure as Afghanistan's leader, friction over
the border issue led to a closing of the Pakistani-
Afghan frontier and for a time threatened to degenerate
into outright hostilities. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apr 17, 1975
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CONFIDE,'JTIAL
ANNEX
The Arabs: Looking Beyond the
JuZy "FZashpoint"
The following essay, which generally reflects
the views of Middle East-Africa Division analysts,
is offered as a reminder that Egypt and Syria will
be weighing a number of political, economic, and
military factors that might militate against their
resuming hostilities around the time of the expiry
of the UN observer forces mandate in Sinai in late
July.
The Arab initiative in launching the October
1973 war has cast a long.shadow not only over the
Arab-Israeli confrontation., but also.over the per-
ception of Arab motivations by US intelligence
analysts. In particular, our perception of sub-
sequent traumas, such as the Syrian maneuvering
over the renewal of the UNDOF mandate in November
1974 and the recent suspension of. step-by-step
diplomacy, has been clouded by a..centra.l., basic
assumption: That Egypt and Syria--in the absence
of progress in negotiations--will again decide that
only renewed military action can pressure Israel to
make significant further withdrawals from the occupied
territories. Most recently, the intelligence com-
munity generally has concluded that unless there is
diplomatic progress by mid-summer 1975, Egypt and
Syria will either initiate some form of military
action against Israel or indulge themselves in some
form of military posturing sufficient to precipitate
an Israeli pre-emptive strike.against one or both of
them. Granting the volatility of the current situ-
ation and the admittedly high potential for irration-
ality to prevail, this essay points out that there are
certain other factors in the political/military equation
that suggest that Arab-initiated military action is not
necessarily inevitable by mid-summer even in the absence
of significant diplomatic progress.
(Continued)
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Initially, there is another way of looking at
the suspension of indirect Egyptian-Israeli nego-
tiations in calculating the shorter term prospect
for a. war initiated by the Arabs.. .The. very collapse
of the latest negotiations has served some of Presi-
dent Sadat's purposes by calling world attention to
the reasonableness of.the Arab cause, by pointing up
the dangers of another war, and finally, by heighten-
ing US concern for finding a diplomatic alternative
to renewed conflict. Sada.t., indeed., has managed
adroitly to turn the setback of step-by-step diplomacy
into a political gain by securing .a position that
might loosely be called "moral ascendancy" over the
Israelis in the propaganda. context. In any case, the
US and other outside parties are running scared that
the situation may comedangerously.unstuck and this
in itself adds to the diplomatic-political capital
stock of Sadat, who.professes to believe in striving
for "limited objectives."
More importantly,. and with. longer range impli-
cations, any notion that both Egypt. and Syria may
impatiently conclude that renewed-military action
will achieve their political aims posits the question-
able assumptions that both Sadat and Syrian President
Asad will conclude that Israel will be forced, by war,
to be more conciliatory and that the US will be willing
to pressure Israel into making more concessions than
Washington did after the October War. Admittedly,
Arab perceptions of the potential. benefits of war could
outweigh the negative factors apparent to. Western
observers, and it is certainly possible. that Egypt and
Syria might conclude that a renewed. war would finally
lead the superpowers toward imposing. a..settlement on
the Middle East that will satisfy Arab demands. But
it seems equally possible that Sadat and, perhaps more
grudgingly, Asad may recognize that renewed conflict
in the absence of a basic change in US attitudes (e.g.
a willingness to sharply delimit: its. military aid to
Israel) not only risks making the Israelis even more
"intransigent" but also risks the destruction of the
Arab armed forces, and the loss of the Arab territorial
and political gains achieved since October 1973. Al-
though Syria has achieved less than. Egypt and both may
be impatient in general terms, the Syrians and the
Egyptians may equally perceive that renewed warfare is
Apr 17, 1975
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(Continued)
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CONFIDENTIAL
a gamble for which the political pay-off is by no
means clear.
Both Sadat and Asad,. although. from somewhat
different perspectives, acknowledge that the US
holds the key to persuading the Israelis to unlock
ultimately their hold on the occupied territories.
Therefore, so long as the US appears to be continu-
ing to attempt to gain something for the Arabs by
diplomatic means, the Arabs. might be willing to play
out their political-diplomatic string for a much
longer period than we have been generally willing
to assume.
It is also widely believed that Sadat's room
for maneuver may be increasingly circumscribed by
pressure from the Syrians and. thePalestinians, both
of whom have had less than complete.-faith that either
Sadat or the US will be.able or.wil.ling to satisfy
their demands by diplomacy. Briefly,, however, neither.
Syria nor the Palestinians are. likely to force hostilities
on their own or together without Egyptian concurrence;
although the political constraints that. either Syria or
the Palestinians can impose on the Egyptians are real,
it is possible to seriously overrate the military
implications of these constraints in the absence of
an Egyptian decision that there is absolutely no pro-
spect of pursuing a solution short. of renewing hostilities.
In any case, Egypt and Syria run various risks
in renewing hostilities which may .not stay their hand
for long but, at least,.. for quite-possibly . longer than
mid-summer 1975. If they initia.te.o.ffensive action to
achieve a break in the political stalemate, e.g., they
risk heightening Israeli "intransigence" and a sharp
defeat by Israel that could cost them the territorial
gains they have already achieved-in Sinai and on the
Golan. Some form of war of attrition may not occasion
further Arab territorial.losses, but it also risks
making Israel less conciliatory and reduces the chances
(Continued)
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that Tel Aviv could be persuaded.to accept US
assurances that it could guarantee an eventual,
viable peaceful settlement. Finally, if the
Arabs attempt to bleed Israel in some form of re-
peated warfare, the Arabs risk forcing the US into
the black and white dilemma .of supporting. Israel's
"survival" or letting the Israelis go down the drain.
Thus far, the more moderate Arabs do not appear to
believe either that the US is ready to abandon
Israel in extremis or that any amount of world pres-
sure would force the US into such a course.
Without further elaboration, it would seem use-
ful in our approach to the next "flashpoint" that we
not lose sight of the following factors which may make
the summer of '75 different than the autumn of '73 in
the calculations of the Arab principals:
--The various implications of the continuing US
commitment to seek a diplomatic settlement and
to preserve its improved position in the Arab
world.
--The prospect that renewed war would not result
in significant political gains for the Arabs, and
indeed, would risk the loss of both political
and territorial gains they have made to date.
--The persistence of serious divisions within
the Arab ranks that, at least, serve to mitigate
the political-diplomatic. constraints Syria or the
Palestinians can impose on Egypt.
--The Egyptians', and per.haps..to a lesser extent,
the-Syrians' desires. to get on with capital acquisi-
tion and economic development.
--The recognition by President Sadat, at least,
that.he still has some considerable propaganda
and political capital to expend.
Much of the foregoing is also based on assumptions
open to broad challenge but it is offered in the belief
that we should not, and cannot afford to, remain under
the shadow of October 1973 in our assessments of the
difficult period ahead. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Apr 17, 1975
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