MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000600110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
State Dept. review completed
Secret
No. 0448/75
March 20, 1975
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Mozambique: FRELIMO Pardons "Traitors"
Malagasy Republic: Still Unsettled . . . . . . . 2
Ghana-UK: Warming Relations . . . . . . . . . . 4
Dahomey: Radicals Hand Down Death Sentences . . 5
Zaire: A Look at Mobutu's Foreign Policy . . . . 6
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Mozambique
PRELIMO Pardons "Traitors"
The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
publicly ridiculed and then pardoned 240 "traitors"
during a mass rally on March 16 at its main camp
in southern Tanzania. The US embassy in Dar es
Salaam, which received an eye-witness account of the
event, reports that it painted a disconcerting
picture of the type of government the Front will
establish when it takes over in Mozambique upon
independence in June.
During the seven-hour rally, former members
of the Front and members of opposition groups read
confessions of moral turpitude and political crimes
they committed during the insurggency against the
Portuguese. Some confessed to working with the
Portuguese secret police; others said they had
been in the pay of US and Israeli secret agents.
All confessed to being traitors to the Front.
On signal, a crowd of Front officials and
hacks called for the execution of the traitors.
Although Front President Samora Machel pardoned
them with a great show of magnanimity, some sort
of penance will probably be required.
The embassy in Dar es Salaam is concerned over
what effect the rally may have on future discussions
between US and Front officials on US aid. A main
feature of the rally were charges by Paul Gumane,
the former president of a defunct liberation group,
that several US embassy officials advised and
financed him in an anti-Front sabotage campaign.
In addition, Machel, in a rally speech, reportedly
scoffed at western offers of assistance to Mozambique.
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Malagasy Republic
The 18-member military directory that took
control of the Malagasy Republic on February 11
is preoccupied with matters of national and personal
security, according to the US embassy. In addition,
there are signs that the unity of the ruling group
is beginning to crack. Coming trials of police
rebels and some old-line politicians could lead to
more trouble on Madagascar.
The military group has imposed very tight
security since the assassination in early February
of Colonel Ratsimandrava after only six days as
head of government and the subsequent clash between
government forces and a police unit that sheltered
the assassins. The military remains highly visible,
a curfew is in force, and gatherings of more than
10 people are prohibited. Tight controls on the
movement of people on the island and internationally
are in effect. The Malagasy news media are heavily
censored and most foreign publications have been
barred. Even diplomatic and private international
communications have been subjected to censorship.
Members of the ruling military group fear for their
personal safety, as well as the outbreak of communal
violence on the island.
The tight security measures have prevented
overt antigovernment activity or public demonstra-
tions, but have also contributed to the spread of
wild rumors, added to shortages of consumer goods
and the existing economic distress, and generally
produced a climate of apprehension and frustration.
Brigadier General Galles Andriamahazo, head
of the ruling military group, is beginning to voice
criticism in private of the 18-member directory.
In a conversation with the US ambassador last week,
Andriamahazo reflected some frustration with the
group, which was hastily thrown together just after
the assassination of Ratsimandrava with a view to
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achieving ethnic balance and with little regard
for whether those chosen had any talent for gov-
ernment administration. Andriamahazo, who is
reputedly friendly to the US, also alluded to
problems he is having with radical directory
members led by Commander Didier Ratsiraka, a
former foreign minister who was the architect of
Madagascar's policy of militant nonalignment.
Andriamahazo and Ratsiraka are apparently now
locked in a struggle for control of Malagasy foreign
policy.
Directory members are apprehensive over public
reaction to the trials growing out of the assassina-
tion; they will begin on March 21 and will be pro-
longed. According to a Malagasy newspaper, the
total number of persons to go before a military
tribunal might reach 300. The Malagasy radio
reported that the persons charged include police
and military dissidents, plus Andre Resampa,
secretary-general of the Socialist Party, and
Philibert Tsiranana, who was the country's presi-
dent from independence in 1960 until he was forced
out of office in 1972. A trial of Tsiranana, still
highly regarded by many coastal tribesmen, could
cause problems for the government.
The overall handling of the trials poses a
twofold danger for the directory. If the persons
on trial receive stiff sentences, the coastal people
may engage in anti-regime activity; if they receive
light sentences, students in Tananarive, most of
whom come from highland tribes, and other discon-
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Ghana-U.K
Warming Relations
Ghana's relations with Britain, traditionally
Accra's major aid donor and biggest creditor, have
been warming since Colonel Acheampong's junta con-
cluded an agreement last year to reschedule the
large medium-term debt incurred under former Pre-
sident Nkrumah. The latest evidence of this warm-
ing trend was the recent good will tour of the first
British ministerial-level official to visit Ghana
since Acheampong's military regime took power three
years ago. Shortly before the official's arrival--
timed to coincide with the 18th anniversary of Ghana's
independence from Britain---London announced an
interest-free development loan to Ghana of $23 mil-
lion.
Accra's relations with the UK and other Western
countries began cooling in February 1972 when Acheam-
pong repudiated a portion of Ghana's debt and uni-
laterally altered the repayment schedule of the re-
maining debt. The UK and other creditor governments
responded by imposing a moratorium on new aid pending
a satisfactory settlement of the debt issue.
One of the remaining irritants in Ghanaian-UK
relations is the short-term debt inherited from the
government of former Prime Minister Busia whom
Acheampong overthrew. Acheampong has promised the
UK full payment, but this has been delayed by Ghana's
present foreign exchange shortage. Also, no final
agreement has been reached for compensating the largely
British-owned timber and mining firms in which the
Acheampong government has taken 55 percent control.
Busia, who was in London for medical treatment
when Acheampong took over, continues to live in exile
in Oxford and to plot ineffectually against the junta.
The junta is deeply suspicious of Busia, but his pre-
sence in Britain has never caused serious problems,
between Accra and London.
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Dahomey
A kangaroo court controlled by President
Kerekou and his radical cohorl'-s recently sentenced
to death Captain Assogba, former President Zinsou,
and five others allegedly involved in Assogba's
attempt last January to oust Kerekou and install a
more moderate regime. Four of the seven defendants,
including Zinsou, were condemned in absentia.
Public attempts in Cotonou to protest the sentences
have been quashed by Kerekou's supporters.
The executions may be carried out soon unless
Kerekou gives in to Nigerian diplomatic pressure to
commute the death sentences. The Nigerians have
some leverage with the Cotonou government as a
result of their recent promise to Kerekou of a
badly needed loan for various development projects.
Kerekou's moderate opponents within Dahomey's
factionalized military regime appear cowed and
leaderless at this stage in the intensified power
struggle touched off by Assogba's takeover bid.
There were some indications a few weeks ago that
Kerekou might be replaced by a more moderate tri-
urrverate, but the radical leader seems to be still
firmly in place.
The outlook now is for more harsh measures
by Kerekou and the radical faction who seek to con-
solidate and press forward with their avowed
"revolution." If the executions are carried out,
they would be the first since independence, and
they might prompt the families and tribes of the
victims to retaliate with reprisals of their own.
Executions might also stimulate the moderates
finally to coalesce against Kerekou.
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Look at Mobutu's Foreign Policy
Over the past several years President Mobutu
Sese Seko has made rapid strides in bringing Zaire
into the mainstream of African affairs. When
Mobutu took power in 1965, Zaire was regarded
as a pariah on the African continent because of
the turmoil that followed independence in 1960.
in the world context, the country was widely
viewed as a ward of the UN, Belgium, and the US.
Ton years later, Zaire has achieved a major
voice in African forums, and the 44-year-old Mobutu
is clearly seeking to become Afri.ca's leading
statesman. He is pursuing this goal in large part
by deliberately distancing himself from both
Belgium and the US while fostering close relations
with China, North Korea, and the Arab world. He
is also developing close relations with France and
West Germany. So far, Mobutu's new pattern of
foreign relations has not included the Soviet
Union; relations with Moscow continue to be no
.more than correct, and occasionally subject to
heavy strains.
The Chinese Connection
When China was admitted to the UN in 1971,
Mobutu recognized that, among countries in Africa,
Zaire stood virtually alone with the white minority
government of South Africa in not recognizing
Peking. Mobutu finally established diplomatic
ties with China. in the fall of 1972. Since then
he has visited Peking twice, most recently in
December 1974.
So far, only modest assistance has material-
ized from China., although the publicity Mobutu has
given it has made the aid seem formidable. China
granted Zaire a. $100 million credit during Mobutu's
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first visit to Peking, but apparently very little
of the credit has yet been drawn. Credits com-
mitted thus far have been earmarked to support a
Chinese-staffed hospital in Kinshasa and to provide
for the purchase of $10 million worth of consumer
goods. In addition, some 150 Chinese technicians
are presently in Zaire.
A gift of Chinese military equipment, including
30 tanks, some artillery pieces and small arms and
ammunition, is expected to arrive in Kinshasa in
the near future. Mobutu was also instrumental in
getting Chinese equipment and instructors for the
National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the
Angolan nationalist group he has long sponsored.
The front is now one of the three nationalist
groups comprising the transitional government in
Angola.
At this point, Mobutu appears more anxious to
use China to enhance his nonaligned credentials
and as a model for national development rather
than as a major source of economic assistance. He
is highly impressed by Peking's success in mobiliz-
ing the Chinese population for the attainment of
political and economic goals. Since 1971, Mobutu
has been actively calling for a massive effort to
upgrade the national consciousness and motivate
Zairians to work for national self-sufficiency,
particularly in agriculture. He is counting
heavily on the Chinese agricultural technicians
now in Zaire to serve as examples for Zairians to
follow.
Links With Pyongyang
Mobutu's relations with North Korea have only
recently begun to pick up steam even though Zaire
established diplomatic relations with the Kim Il-
sung regime in December 1972. Mobutu skipped
Pyongyang when he made his first trip to China,
but he went to North Korea in December 1974. The
North Koreans agreed to sell Zaire a variety of
light arms and artillery equipment sufficient for
12,000-13,000 men and to provide a 112-man military
advisory team.
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Zaire still has diplomatic ties with South
Korea. Although relations have cooled consider-
ably in recent years, Mobutu probably views
Seoul's presence in Kinshasa as useful evidence of
his commitment to nonalignment.
Looking Toward 'Mecca
Mobutu' s tics with the Arab world have been
less profitable than the Zairian president thought
when he broke relations with Israel two days
before the outbreak of the 1973 Middle East war.
He has had little success, for example, in his
efforts to obtain concessionary oil prices and
financial assistance from the Arabs. He has
worked out a $50 million loan from Abu Dhabi, but
the money has not. yet been made available owing in
part to bureaucratic confusion in Kinshasa. He is
currently sending out economic feelers to Iran.
Despite his disillusionment with the Arabs,
Mobutu will continue to foster good relations with
them. There is little chance that he will re-
establish formal ties with Tel Aviv. Arab influence
in the Organization of African Unity and Mobutu's
commitment to Afro-Arab solidarity--one of his
major policies--would make it difficult for him to
resume ties, despite widespread private admiration
in Zaire for Israel's tenacity and the legacy of a
once-impressive Israeli paratroop training program
that included Mobutu himself.
Relations with the West
Mobutu's relations with the West, particularly
Belgium and the US, are dictated largely by a
desire to assert his country's economic and politi-
cal independence. He realizes that Zaire's
economy, almost totally dependent on income from
copper exports, is closely tied to western eco-
nomic conditions. At the same time, however, he
believes the economic development programs sponsored
in Zaire by Western countries have a neocolonial
tinge, and he would like to diversify his sources
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of assistance in order to keep any one country
from having too large a stake in Zaire's economy.
The sharp drop in copper prices during the
past year and the simultaneous sharp rise in
production costs because of the "energy crisis,"
coupled with heavy government spending, have led
to a severe foreign exchange crisis limiting
imports and debt servicing. The slump has brought
on an erosion of creditor confidence in Zaire,
particularly among US and Belgian banks. The
International Monetary Fund is currently studying
Zaire's economic plight and is likely to recommend
stringent controls that Mobutu may find unpalatable.
Mobutu appar-
ently is considering alternate ways to meet the
financial bind, based largely on exploiting improved
ties with France and West Germany. France, parti-
cularly, is anxious to nourish the relationship
and. reportedly is helping Zaire arrange a $240
million petrodollar loan
Mobutu is apparenL-ly hopetul that the __ea- will be
nailed down by early April and that the loan will
help restore investor confidence.
Mobutu has been encouraging increased West
German investment, which is modest at present. He
claims that by 1980 West Germany will be the
largest foreign investor in Zaire.
Belgium, which in 1965 still maintained a
firm grip on the Zairian economy through a complex
array of holding companies and subsidiaries, has
been the main target of Mobutu's efforts to assert
national control. Since late 1966, he has nation-
alized virtually all Belgian investments in Zaire
while compensating Belgian mining interests with
lucrative technical assistance and distribution
contracts. Mobutu has further diluted Belgian
involvement in the mining industry by awarding
concessions to Japanese interests and an American
led consortium.
Mobutu's relations with the US are a source
of frustration for him. He hasn't forgotten how
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vital US support was for him in the early years of
his regime, and he continues to offer profuse
expressions of his gratitude in private. Over the
years, however, he has come to regard himself as
Washington's unofficial adviser on African matters
and is dismayed when the US does not follow his
advice or sec events from his perspective.
Washington's failure to support anti-Portuguese
liberation groups prior to the coup in Portugal,
its refusal to supply Mobutu with modern military
hardware, and a belief that Washington gives low
priority to African affairs have brought Mobutu,
as he has become more self-confident, to the
conclusion that his aspirations for recognition as
a major African nationalist leader called for the
cultivation of a less pro-US reputation. This
conclusion will continue to be a determining
factor in his actions regarding the US.
Nevertheless, despite a desire to put distance
between himself and Washington, Mobutu is heavily
dependent on US financial interests to find a
solution to Zaire's severely faltering economy.
Private investment by US firms in Zaire now exceeds
$100 million in book value, and-US banks are
deeply involved in securing financial assistance
for numerous industrial projects.
Mobutu has never forgotten Soviet meddling in
Zaire in the troubled years immediately after
independence, and relations between the two countries
have remained cool despite occasional efforts by
both parties to seek accommodation. Last August,
for example, the Soviets sent a military delegation
to Kinshasa, reportedly to discuss the purchase
by Zaire of a Soviet air defense system. Mobutu
indicated at the time that he would
visit the soviet n on in December. In November,
however, Mobutu was asked by the Soviets for a
postponement, and he promptly cancelled the trip
altogether. Mobutu is now again keeping the
Soviets at arms-length and, given Moscow's limited
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interest in Zaire, relations are likely to remain
cool for the near future.
Southern Africa
Mobutu's major foreign policy concern in
southern Africa is to ensure that the government
that takes power in Angola at independence next
November is friendly to Zaire. Mobutu depends
heavily on rail and port facilities in Angola to
ship Zairian copper abroad and would be hard
pressed to find alternative transportation facili-
ties if a hostile Angolan regime sought to inter-
fere with Zairian exports. Angola's long border
with Zaire and the presence of former Zairian
secessionist elements in Angola are a security
worry for him.
Mobutu would also like access to the oil
produced in Cabinda,a province of Angola that is
separated from the rest of the territory by
Zaire's narrow corridor to the sea. Both Portugal
and all elements of the Angolan transitional
government regard Cabinda as an integral part of
Angola. Mobutu would prefer an independent Cabinda
with close ties to Zaire, and he reportedly intends
to push for Cabindan independence at the special
meeting of foreign ministers of the Organization
of African Unity in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania next
month. That organization, however, has consis-
tently upheld colonial boundaries and is likely to
support the traditional ties between Angola and
Cabinda.
At present, the Angolan nationalist groups
that are friendly to Mobutu hold the upper hand in
the transitional government. If these groups
succeed in establishing themselves as the dominant
political force after independence next November,
Mobutu may choose to soft-pedal his Cabinda policy,
at least for a time.
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Conclusions
Mobutu's foreign policy will continue to be
shaped in large part by domestic economic con-
siderations. He seems determined to broaden his
sources of foreign assistance as much as possible,
but unless he can. regain investor confidence,
foreign governments and private interests are
likely to become increasingly hesitant to provide
continued credit. In his present mood, Mobutu is
likely to translate this hesitancy into "economic
sabotage" and fight back with diplomatic attacks,
in which case the US would be a particularly
inviting target.
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