LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000400060002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 19, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
r
9 O
13
Latin American Trends
Secret
February 19, 1975
No. 0497/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5E3 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTEN'T'S
February 19, 1975
Mexico-Chile: "War Crimes"
Tribunal Against Chile . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Argentina: Industrial
Absenteeism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The :Bahamas: Cabinet Clash . . . . . . . . . 5
Panama: Torrijos Backs Down . . . . . . . . . 7
Panama-Peru: Two Views of
Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ANNEX
Dependence on Aide Hurts Argentine President
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Mexico-Chile: "War Crimes" Tribunal Against Chile
President Luis Echeverria and other senior
administration officials are taking an active role
in the session of the "Commission Investigating the
Crimes of the Chilean Military Junta" in Mexico
this week. The organization, based in Finland, has
previously held meetings in Helsinki and Copenhagen.
Foreign Secretary Emilio Rabasa and the secre-
tary general of the ruling Institutional Revolution-
ary Party, Jesus Reyes Heroles, personally welcomed
some of the principal delegates at the airport, and
Echeverria gave the opening address. The President
said that his presence was affirmation of Mexico's
total support for "revolutionary nationalism" and
self-determination of peoples. He also used the op-
portunity to attack the US indirectly and take credit
for the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties recent-
ly adopted by the UN.
Several former luminaries of the Allende regime
are taking part in the sessions. Former foreign
minister Clodomiro Almeyda, who has been living in
exile in Romania since his recent release from a
Chilean jail, announced that he was accepting
Echeverria's invitation to remain in Mexico. He
will join 700 or 800 of his compatriots already
living in exile there. Foreign Secretary Rabasa
announced that Mexico agreed in principle to take
an additional 151 prisoners who were on the list of
200 the,Chilean government offered to free last
December. He said the remaining 49 had chosen to
stay in Chile even though it meant remaining in jail.
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Echeverria apparently believes he can get some
mileage out of the conference without sacrificing
much. Although the claim that Mexico is marching
in a "revolutionary" path has lost most of its
original meaning, he like his predecessors never
misses an opportunity to reinforce this image.
The President may also feel his actions help rein-
force his "third world" leadership claims. Mexico
broke diplomatic: ties with Chile last November, so
providing a platform for the anti-Chilean propaganda
is unlikely to have any direct effect on their al-
ready bad relations. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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Argentina: Industrial Absenteeism
Top government officials are worried about soar-
ing absenteeism among workers. Since the return of
Peronism, workers have responded to higher wages,
increased leave benefits, and full employment by
staying off the job in droves. According to Secre-
tary of Commerce Jose Alloatti, the absentee rate
has jumped from around seven percent in 1973 to ap-
proximately 30 percent at present.
While inflation has caused industrial produc-
tion costs to double, absenteeism has resulted in a
70-percent decline in productivity at several fac-
tories. Alloatti recently warned that such a trend
could "ruin the republic."
Government leaders themselves, however, must
shoulder much of the blame for the present situation.
The labor law enacted last September protects workers
from dismissal and gives them extensive legal advan-
tages over management. For example, workers who take
unauthorized leave are entitled to "sick pay" if they
submit a medical certificate upon return to work.
Since many unions have their own doctors and clinics,
such certificates can be obtained easily.
Official favoritism is further reflected in the
2.4 percent jobless rate announced last month. This
more than fulfills the requirements of full employ-
ment, which is defined at 97 percent. It also means
that a number of "marginal" individuals hold jobs
whose productive usefulness is in question.
High absenteeism is a common phenomenon in many
industrialized societies where job fatigue and work
boredom have become important disincentives once a
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satisfactory wage level has been attained. In Italy,
for example, absenteeism increasingly became a prob-
lem after extensive benefits were granted workers by
national legislation in 1969.
High absenteeism and low productivity will be
one of the major roadblocks to current efforts to
stabilize the Arccentine economy. A sudden recession
could force Mrs. Peron to choose between backing her
economic advisers and retaining the support of labor
leaders who are the backbone of Peronism. There al-
ready are signs of pressure within the government to
take a tougher line with the unions. Economy Minister
Gomez Morales ha; publicly expressed the desire to
"trim the fat" from the public enterprises that employ
thousands of workers. Alloatti went even further when
he recently accused some labor leaders of fomenting
absenteeism against the national interest and specifi-
cally attacked automotive workers in one plant for
"industrial sabotage." (CONFIDENTIAL)
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February 19, 1975
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The Bahamas: Cabinet Clash
Prime Minister Lynden Pindling has stated in
writing his intention to resign over a dispute with
his Attorney General,
Despite having committed himself on paper, however,
he may renege on his decision. His comment that he
would wait until the visit of Queen Elizabeth II is
over on February 22 before stepping down suggests
that he is interested in a cooling off period during
which the dispute can be settled and his resignation
"reconsidered."
Attorney General Paul Adderley, who doubles as
Minister of Foreign Affairs, reportedly forced the
confrontation during a cabinet meeting late last
month. Adderley wanted to investigate the recent
death of a prisoner at the hands of the police, and
an incident in which 80 pounds of hashish disappeared
from police custody last July. Pindling opposed the
investigations but was not supported by the majority
of the cabinet. Over the opposition of Deputy Prime
Minister Hanna, Pindling then threatened to resign
and later followed up with a letter reaffirming his
intention.
Pindling probably hoped to force the cabinet to
abandon its support for Adderley, and he may have no
intention of following through. Nevertheless, the
dispute will leave a distasteful residue that bodes
no good for future cooperation between the two princi-
pals. It underscores some fundamental differences
between Pindling, the crafty politician, and Adderley,
the lofty, righteous intellectual, who himself
threatened to resign in a previous clash with the
prime minister. A resignation by Pindling would
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precipitate a new round of elections, but the situa-
tion is not likely to reach that extreme. If a res-
ignation is to come from the incident, it will prob-
ably be Adderley's, not Pindling's.
The opposition Free National Movement is attempt-
ing to take advantage of the conflict within Pindling's
Progressive Liberal Party by calling for a vote of "no
confidence" in the prime minister, according to a press
report. The motion will be debated soon after the
House of Assembly convenes on February 19. There is
little chance, however, that Pinding's representatives
would put their own political careers on the line by
supporting the opposition's motion, and the "no confi-
dence" vote seem.:; destined for certain defeat.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
February 19, 1975
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Panama: Torrijos Backs Down
Although the political parties are dormant
under the Torrijos regime, this does not mean that
interest, groups have no channels for getting their
messages to the government. Many Panamanians have
found that the most effective channel is straight
to Torrijos himself.
When a recent law placed a 5-percent tax on
winnings in the national lottery, ticket vendors
demanded to be allowed to present their case to
Torrijos. When they argued that the lottery con-
tributes $20 million a year to the national treasury
and provides 4,500 jobs, Torrijos not only agreed to
drop the tax, but he increased their commissions and
instituted new prizes that should attract more cus-
tomers for the lottery.
The pro-government press is playing up the case
as an example of the regime's responsiveness to in-
formal "popular consultation." As long as Torrijos
believes this mechanism is working, he is likely to
pay little heed to the voices calling for a return
to the traditional political system. (UNCLASSIFED)
February 19, 1975
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Panama-Peru: Two Views of Violence
Panamanian newspapers have given very different
interpretations of the causes for the recent disturb-
ances in Peru. Writing in the newspaper Matutino,
columnist Ricardo Lin.ce placed the responsibility on
"reactionary forces"---the CIA, the oligarchy, and
multinational companies---that allegedly were deter-
mined to halt the Velasco government's plans for
revolutionary reforms. Lince saw in the Peruvian
events a cause for deep concern in Panama, where
the same forces---joined by the proponents of the
status quo on the canal issue--are said to be waging
a psychological war that requires all elements of the
society to guard against a treacherous surprise at-
tack. This line was picked up by Critica, which saw
the Peruvian violence as the second link in a chain of
events that began with the overthrow of Salvador
Allende and might culminate in a threat to the Torrijos
regime.
Estrella die Panama, on the other hand, placed the
blame squarely on the Velasco government. Its editor-
ial claimed that the Peruvian regime had been forced
to use violence and lies to hide its "stupidity, in-
competence, and growing unpopularity." Estrella cited
the suppression of freedom of the press as one of the
clearest signs of the Velasco government's weakness.
The different lenses through which the journals
view the situation in Peru are largely symptomatic of
their varying relationships with the Torrijos regime.
Matutino and Critica are heavily influenced by the
government. They reflect the administration's view
of the Velasco regime as a "revolutionary brother."
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Following the downfall of Allende, Torrijos felt that
there were only two kindred regimes left in the
hemisphere--those of Cuba and Peru. He will give the
Velasco government all the verbal support he can.
Estrella de Panama is a different case. Al-
though subject to censorship, it generally takes a
line independent of the government. For this reason
the Velasco regime's takeover of the independent press
in Peru struck very close to home. Some of the criti-
cism of the government in distant Lima may also have
been obliquely directed at the authorities in Panama
City. (CONFIDENTIAL)
February 19, 1975
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ANNEX
Dependence on Aide Hurts Argentine President
The dependence of Argentine President Maria
Estela Peron on the shadowy Jose Lopez Rega as her
principal political mentor has become a major vul-
nerability. In the six months since Juan Peron's
death, Lopez Rega has emerged as the de facto
strongman of the regime, and his personality and
power have alienated the Argentine military and the
country's other power brokers.
As minister of social welfare since Juan Peron
returned to the presidency in October 1973, Lopez
Rega has controlled over 20 percent of the national
budget.
As secretary to the presidency, Lopez Rega has
the authority to coordinate all of the President's
official activities and has access to all the infor-
mation she gets from any public official. He formal-
ly assumed this job only last month, but the appoint-
ment merely legitimized a role he was already filling.
As the government's unofficial coordinator for
the fight against leftist terrorists, Lopez Rega is
widely believed to be the mastermind behind the
"death squads" that are trying to terrorize the ter-
rorists.
It is Lopez Rega's strong personal influence
over the inexperienced and insecure President, how-
ever, that gives him his greatest source of power.
Mrs. Peron relies on Lopez Rega as a political strat-
egist, personal: confidant, and for psychological sup-
port. She seems swayed by his mysticism; he claims
to be in communication with the spirit of Juan Peron
and makes no attempt to hide his involvement in the
occult.
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Lopez Rega serves as a kind of political light-
ning rod, drawing criticism to himself for adminis-
trative failures that might otherwise be blamed on
the President.
Path to Power
Jose Lopez had a checkered career before he met
Juan Peron. He was a police corporal, a nightclub
bouncer and singer, a small-time publisher. He wrote
several books on astrology. He ingratiated himself
with Juan Peron in Madrid in the mid-1960s and became
the exiled leader's private secretary and bodyguard.
It is unlikely that Juan Peron, during this
period, ever turned to his secretary for advice on
important matters, but Lopez Rega did manage some of
Peron's business interests and was the leg man on
some of Peron's political and financial dealings.
On Peron's return to power in October 1973, the loyal
servant was rewarded with a cabinet job.
Mrs. Peron and Lopez Rega have been close friends
for more than a decade and partners in a wide variety
of business ventures. They are reported to be joint
inheritors of Juan Peron's sizable estate.
Now 58, Lopez Rega is not a particularly adept
administrator. Indeed, his performance as minister
of social. welfare has been mediocre. He is, however,
adept at blackmail and at intimidating his opponents;
he has steadily strengthened his position by arranging
the appointment of sycophants and allies to high gov-
ernment positions.
He publicly scorns popular references to him as
El Brujo (the sorcerer), but probably finds his
reputation as a mystic useful in intimidating and
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confusing his enemies. Whether he takes his pseudo-
scientific interests seriously, they give him a
sinister air and inspire widespread fear.
Murky Atmosphere
It may be that no one person governs Argentina
today. The inner workings of Mrs. Peron's administra-
tion are cloaked from view. From somewhere within,
executive decrees and ministerial pronouncements
emerge, and an inert Peronist-controlled legislature
promptly ratifies them. The return of Peronism by
popular mandate in 1973 has proved to be little more
than the replacement of a military cabal by bureau-
cratic authoritarianism.
This murky, unstructured atmosphere is made to
order for Lopez Rega. He has appealed to ultra-
nationalistic, anti-Marxist, and anti-Semitic forces
within Argentina. He has encouraged Mrs. Peron to
take a political stance to the right of her late
husband--a shift that has cut off communication with
the moderate Peronist left and seriously damaged any
chances for unifying the movement.
In the process, he has made many powerful enemies.
In Argentina's hidebound, highly stratified society,
he is regarded as an interloper by the leaders of all
major pressure groups. Instead of attempting to mol-
lify these crit.cs, Lopez Rega antagonizes them, for
example, by appearing at Mrs. Peron's side whenever
she makes a forrLal appearance.
One of those Lopez Rega has alienated is Ricardo
Balbin, the leader of the moderate opposition Radical
Party. Juan Peron had started a dialogue with Balbin,
but Mrs. Peron has let it languish. Believing that
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Lopez Rega is chiefly responsible, Balbin has de-
nounced recent government actions and criticized the
extent of Lopez Rega's power.
Protests have come from military commanders, who
distrust the ties Lopez Rega is said to have made with
the minister of defense and the chief of the federal
police. Although the commanders share with Lopez Rega
a fear of the left and a goal of defeating leftist
terrorists, the commanders think that he seeks to ag-
grandize his power at their expense.
Lopez Rega's earlier alliances with a number of
other cabinet ministers and a key Peronist labor
leader have cooled. He even has enemies in extreme
right-wing circles.
An Unwanted Problem
Despite the wide range of this opposition, it is
unlikely that any group or coalition will move deci-
sively to depose him. They will try to contain and
undercut him, but none seems willing to force the issue
with the highly emotional President, who might resign
and leave them all with an unwanted succession problem.
This reluctance will probably last until the tide is
turned in the struggle against terrorism.
Once terrorism ceases to be the major preoccupa-
tion, the armed forces could find ready support among
political and labor groups to present Mrs. Peron with
an ultimatum on Lopez Rega. Even if they did, it is
doubtful that she would give him up.
Lopez Rega's role as a major actor probably will
have a short run in Argentine politics, but he could
be the catalyst that will bring the military back into
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politics. Army generals have already begun to take
independent policy actions in internal security.
U.S. observers on the scene admit the possi-
bility that a military-labor alliance will eventual-
ly take power and impose a neo-fascist dictatorship.
Evidence of growing political frustration and col-
lusion between these groups supports this prediction.
While effective counter-insurgency operations have
prevented a dramatic upsurge in leftist violence, be-
hind the scenes maneuvering among those opposed to
Lopez Rega has increased. This restlessness will
almost certainly intensify between now and the na-
tional elections scheduled. for 1977. (SECRET/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
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