EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000100280001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 13, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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East Asia
Secret
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January 13, 1975
No. 0056/75
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Indonesia-USSR: Warming Trend
Foreign Minister Adam Malik's successful visit
to Moscow in late December produced no surprises
but did provide further evidence that Moscow-
Jakarta relations are improving. An Indonesian dip-
lomat described them as moving from "correct but
cool" to "correct and cordial." The trip capped
a year of steadily increasing contacts between the
two governments. A long-delayed trade agreement,
which the Soviets had sought for several years,
was signed in March. Jakarta has now agreed to
let the Soviets begin construction of their large
new embassy building, first agreed to by Sukarno
but in limbo since 1965. Exchanges of official
visitors also increased markedly in 1974, even
though Jakarta remains cool to Soviet desires for
cultural exchanges and other nonofficial visits.
During Malik's trip, he signed a general
economic and technical cooperation agreement with
Moscow. The agreement does not specify the amount
of credits the Soviets will provide nor the proj-
ects to be assisted; details will be negotiated
later. Indonesia is interested in projects that
will not require large numbers of Soviet technicians,
whom Jakarta views as potential subversives. Mos-
cow, however, favors some sort of large showy proj-
ect that would provide maximum publicity for its
new friendliness with Jakarta. Agreement was also
reached for a visit to Indonesia during 1975 by
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Seeking better ties with the Soviet Union is
part of a general Indonesian effort to improve re-
lations with European Communist states--a con-
scious policy decision made in 1973 to end almost
eight years of frosty relations caused by the ag-
gressively anti-Communist outlook of Suharto and
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his military colleagues. During his recent travels,
for example, Malik also visited East Germany and
Hungary, where he signed trade agreements. Earlier
in the year, Jakarta signed agreements with Yugo-
slavia, Romania, and Poland. In addition to the
trade pacts, Indonesia has discussed the prospects
for economic and technical assistance from these
states.
The warming trend is thus partly a return
to Jakarta's traditional nonaligned foreign policy
that prevailed until 1965. But the decision also stems
from Indonesia's perception of a changing world situ-
ation. Jakarta's leaders have noted the more moderate
foreign policy of the Soviet Union in its relations
with Western states. They also see a need to balance
growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. In prac-
tical terms, moreover, they want to explore new
sources of credit in the expectation that Indonesia's
existing aid donors will begin reducing their com-
mitments. More solvent financially as a result of
the recent dramatic price increases in oil and
other export products, Indonesia can now accept
Soviet credit terms, which are stiffer than
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The Thai Student Movement--A Current Assessment
The Thai student movement,, on the ascendancy
throughout 1972 and into late 1913, gained instant
worldwide notoriety with. the fall. of. the Thanom
military regime in October 1973? At that time, stu-
dent power and influence was at its zenith and many
Thai observers believed that the once apolitical
students represented a new and important addition
to the Thai political equation. This assessment
proved generally accurate during much of 1974. Prime
Minister Sanya Thammasak, appointed to head an interim
government and unsure of his public mandate, turned
often to the student leadership in the early months of
his administration before making important policy de-
cisions. Today, student leaders are largely ignored
by the government, reflecting the precipitous decline
in public support for the student movement in general.
There can be little doubt that the university-
based National Student Center of Thailand, which pro-
vided the crucial organizational backbone to the stu-
dent movement in its formative years, has fallen on
hard times. The group's executive committee, which
once provided the leadership that brought thousands
into the streets, is so rent with ideological and
factional rivalries that it has been unable to choose
a secretary general since Last August, Moreover,
although on-again/off-again elections to choose a
secretary general are now set for January 12, no
candidates are as yet registered for the contest.,
Equally humiliating to the once proud organization
was the discovery last month that the chief of its
financial department had embezzled some $28,000. The
revelation received headline treatment in the Bangkok
press, which has become increasingly critical of the
student movement.
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The reason for the decline in student influ-
ence goes much deeper than financial scandals and
internecine struggles within the National Student
Center. Simply put, the students lost widespread
public sympathy for their cause once it became ap-
parent that they could offer no meaningful alterna-
tive to the old political order they helped bring
down. The Thai people had looked to the university
students and their academic mentors to provide some
direction in a country shorn of political leadership;
instead, they got more student, demonstrations, some
of them turning violent and others serving to keep
Bangkok in a state of tension during much of 1974.
Student activists, such as Thirayut Bunmi and Seksan
Prasertkun, found it easier and more fulfilling emo-
tionally to organize new street demonstrations than
to work with the new Sanya government to ensure an
orderly transition to civilian rule.
The public, moreover, failed to perceive any
distinction between the activism of university stu-
dents and the lawlessness of various youth gangs,
including vocational students. Thus, the public and
press looked upon university-sponsored demonstrations
--such as those protesting the visit of Prime Minister
Tanaka, the US military presence, and the Sanya gov-
ernment's new constitution--as manifestations of a
broader breakdown in public order.
The leftward drift of the student leadership
also contributed significantly to the decline of the
movement. As the public became increasingly irritated
with the students' protests, their leaders became in-
creasingly radical in their political viewpoint. In
public rallies, student leaders attacked Thailand's
close relationship with the US, the military's role in
politics, and the conservative elite's stranglehold
over the power structure. In private, activists such
as Thirayut criticized the monarchy and called for the
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While the student movement is clearly in a
state of disarray, it is still capable of being a ma-
jor disruptive force. Former prime minister Thanom's
sudden return to Bangkok in late December, which a],-
most immediately sparked a large student demonstra-
tion, served as a reminder that certain highly emo-
tional issues can unite the various student factions
into a cohesive political force. Large numbers of
students are unlikely to take to the streets again
in the near future unless provoked by an army coup
d'etat or the return of the ousted military rulers,
but growing public intolerance of student dissidence
could lead to an early and perhaps bloody confrontation
between students and the government.
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The rioting in Rangoon last month was the most
glaring manifestation to date of deep public dis-
satisfaction with the Ne Win government. A surface
calm has now returned to the Burmese capital, but
antigovernment sentiment is still high.
The trouble started as a protest by students
and Buddhist monks over the government's shoddy
funeral arrangements; for former UN secretary gen-
eral U Thant, but it quickly mushroomed into a more
general antigovernment campaign. The government
was able to quell the riots with tough measures, in-
cluding the imposition of martial law and the jail-
ing of several thousand demonstrators. It has done
little to alleviate the root causes of the discon-
tent, however, and it faces the prospect of fur-
ther, more widespread unrest in the coming months.
A Military Government
One focus of growing discontent has been the
domination of the army in general, and of President
Ne Win in particular, over the government and the
country. Since he took control in a bloodless coup
in 1962, Ne Win has ruled with a heavy hand. He
has virtually eliminated any serious challenge to
his position by jailing many of his opponents and
keeping a close watch on potential troublemakers.
Ne Win makes most of the important decisions him-
self and delegates power only to a handful of top
assistants--all former army colleagues.
Early last year, the country got its first
constitution since Ile Win came to power. Although
this ostensibly gave the regime a more civilian
cast, army control remains firm, and little has
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really changed. Some civilians at the middle and
lower levels of the government have become more
frustrated than ever over their lack of influence.
Economic Woes
At the heart of recent public discontent, how-
ever, is Burma's declining economy. Ne Win's doc-
trinaire brand of socialism has not worked well,
and economic mismanagement has been chronic. The
country, once the world's leading exporter of rice,
has seen such exports decline steadily in recent
years together with its foreign exchange earnings.
This has forced the government to reduce imports
of both capital and consumer goods.
The rice situation could become more critical
in the coming months. Part of the crop now being
harvested was lost during heavy floods last summer.
Despite the loss, however, the government intends
to export some rice to earn badly needed foreign
exchange. This may mean that supplies will total
barely enough to meet domestic needs and that lo-
cal shortages may occur in some areas.
Burma's long-standing insurgency problem has
not figured in recent public protests, but the
various ethnic and other insurgent groups operating
around the country's periphery continue to drain
resources and to tie down much of the army. While
none of the rebel forces, including the Burmese
Communists in the northeast who are the government's
main preoccupation, poses an immediate threat to
Ne Win's rule, collectively they continue to divert
its attention from other serious domestic problems.
Disaffected Groups
Most of those arrested during the disturbances
last month were students, who are now among the more
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active opponents of the regime. Long disenchanted
with Ne Win's autocratic rule, Burma's students un-
doubtedly have been influenced by student political
activism in Thailand and other neighboring countries,
but they are not well organized or situated to be-
come the catalyst for a serious challenge to the
regime.
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The demonstrations last month also marked the
first significant political action by Buddhist
monks since the mid-1960s. Burma's monks, with a
tradition of political activism, were not happy
when Ne Win overthrew U Nu in 1962 and withdrew of-
ficial recognitio=n of Buddhism as the state re-
ligion. Many young activist monks subsequently re-
ceived stiff prison terms for opposition activities.
In a country that is predominantly Buddhist and
where monks still have enormous prestige, it may be
a sign of real trouble for the regime that monks
are again participating in antigovernment demon-
strations.
Last spring another group that has been polit-
ically inactive--urban workers--staged a series of
strikes over high prices and low rice rations. Un-
like the disturbances last month, which were largely
confined to Rangoon, the strikes began at factories
outside the capital and spread to Rangoon, culmina-
ting last June in violent demonstrations which were
put down at a cost of more than 20 dead.
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Like other discontented groups, labor has not
been well organized, and its protests have been
stifled by armed force and widespread arrests. Al-
though there has been no recurrence of violence,
scattered strikes have persisted, and the workers
clearly remain unhappy over the government's slow-
ness a.n making good its promises of increased eco-
nomic benefits.
Dissatisfaction with the regime is also evident
in rural areas. Peasants are supposed to sell all
of their rice to the government at the official
price, but they can get a much higher price on the
black market. Dwindling rice exports and the need
for foreign exchange caused the government to get
tough last year and arrest many farmers in an un-
successful effort to meet its quotas. The govern-
ment is now offering some additional incentives to
the farmers. With another tight situation in pros-
pect this year, however, the regime may well con-
tinue tough tactics at the risk of increasing the
bitterness among peasants.
Army Still Loyal
Despite the array of disaffected civilian
groups, Ne Win's position appears secure as long as
the army stands firm behind him. During both the
labor violence last June and the riots last month,
there was qo sign of any opposition among the com-
manders as troops put down the disturbances. If
economic conditions continue to deteriorate and
protests become more widespread, however, the loy-
alty of the officer corps would be put to a severe
test. It is possible that at some point some com-
manders may become fed up and move against the
regime.
If Ne Win should come to believe he can no
longer rely on solid military support, he might de-
cide to step aside. Now 63 years old, the President
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has a long history of serious health problems.
Despite the. prospect of further antigovernment
agitation, the absence of any apparent civilian al-
ternative to Ne Win and the army's loyalty thus far
suggest that the: President has a reasonable chance
of surviving for another year or so. He may be
forced to make some changes, however, to appease
his critics. One way would be to give civilian
groups a greater voice in the government, possibly
through the new, and thus far rubber-stamp, People's
Assembly. Another way would be to encourage some
private enterprise, a step some officials have been
arguing for as a means to overcome economic, problems.
Whether or not Ne Win remains in power, the
army probably will continue to play a dominant role.
There are already some signs of rivalry and jockey-
ing for position among Ne Win's key army subordi-
nates who, while personally loyal, would clearly
like to succeed him.
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Malacca Strait Oil Spill Reopens Controversies
The oil spill on January 7 by a 238,000-ton
Japanese supertanker, which ran aground near Sin-
gapore in the Malacca Strait, is likely to have
far-reaching political and economic repercussions--
particularly in Japan and at Geneva where the UN-
sponsored Law of the Sea conference reconvenes this
March. Although the spill of some 3,000 tons of oil
is under control, the accident provides invaluable
ammunition for long-standing complaints by Indonesia
and Malaysia that today's cumbersome supertankers
cannot safely navigate the confined channels of the
Malacca-Singapore Straits,, Indonesia has publicly
called for an immediate meeting of the straits states
to discuss new traffic safety measures.
The issue pits the views of Indonesia and
Malaysia against those of the major maritime powers.
Indonesia and Malaysia insist that the Malacca-
Singapore Straits do not legally constitute an in-
ternational waterway, and that ships should there-
fore sail through in accordance with the principle
of innocent passage--which permits only ships not
considered prejudicial to the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal state to pass freely through
territorial seas. The US, the USSR, Japan, and other
maritime powers contend that passage through all
straits traditionally considered international--even
though technically within the claimed territorial sea
of a coastal state--should continue to be free from
coastal-state controls. Singapore, with an economy
that depends on the free flow of ships through the
waterway, has also favored a policy of unimpeded transit.
At last year's Law of the Sea Conference at
Caracas, Indonesia and Malaysia leaned heavily on
the pollution issue to justify their "nationalization"
policy. While arguments between the maritime powers
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and the straits states over transit in international
straits grew less heated in the course of the con-
ference, the Malacca oil spill is certain to toughen
the stand of the straits states at the coming Geneva
meeting.
The growing fear of accidents in the Malaca-
Singapore Straits, as a result of the increasing
supertanker traffic on the Middle East to Japan
run, prompted Indonesia and Malaysia to announce in
1972 that the passageway was no longer to be used
by tankers exceeding 200,000 tons; such vessels were
directed to use the longer but safer route through
the Lombok and Makasar Straits--east of Bali,
Kalimantan, and the Philippines. Nevertheless,
supertankers up to 250,000 tons have continued to
use the Malacca-Singapore passage, despite the
directive and despite the dangers of its tortuous
channels. The reason is purely economic. The
route is nearly 1,300 nautical miles and at least
three days shorter than the Lombok-Makasar passage.
Depths of the shipping lane where the accident oc-
curred are only in the 75 to 80-foot range and widths
are no more than a few miles. Such dimensions pro-
vide little leeway for 200,000- to 250,000-ton ves-
sels, which may draw nearly 70 feet when fully loaded
and require three miles to come to an emergency stop
from full speed ahead. other supertankers have already
scraped bottom in the straits and a 1972 accident
dumped 1,000 tons of oil into the waterway.
Although Japan will issue official apologies to
the three straits states and assure payment for all
damages incurred by the spill, from now on both
Indonesia and Malaysia almost certainly will make
more of an issue of their edict prohibiting transit
by tankers in the 200,000-ton-plus class. Continued
disregard of the edict by Japan will damage its rela-
tions with Indonesia and Malaysia. Compliance by
Japan--which gets about 80 percent of its oil via
tankers from the Middle East--will add tens of mil-
lions of dollars yearly to its already massive oil
bill.
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Japan - South Korea: A Turn for the Better
The advent of the Miki government in Japan
appears to have improved the outlook for Tokyo's
relations with Seoul. Any concrete gains, however,
are unlikely to develop quickly because of persis-
tent resentment and suspicion stemming from a series
of incidents beginning in mid-1973 with the kidnap-
ing of Korean opposition leader Kim Tae-chung from
Japan and culminating a year later in the anti-
Japanese riots in Seoul that followed the attempted
assassination of President Pak by a Korean from
Japan.
Some Positive Elements
Statements by Kiichi Miyazawa, Japan's new
foreign minister, have been a major element in
improving the atmosphere. Miyazawa recently cautioned
in the Diet against "premature" ties with North Korea,
and commented at a press conference that Japan should
stop pressing the Seoul government "too much" on the
Kim Tae-chung case. Seoul is pleased with Miyazawa's
selection as foreign minister. He seems much friendlier
to South Korea than either his predecessor Kimura or
the working levels of the Japanese Foreign Office,
and, in the Korean view, his economic background
gives him better perspective on the importance of Japan's
ties with Seoul.
Seoul has other important supporters at high
levels in the new Miki government--Deputy Prime Minister
Fukuda, ruling party executive board chief Nadao, and
party vice president Shiina. As foreign minister, Shiina
played a key role in the normalization of Japan's re-
lationship with South Korea in 1965; he now has an im-
portant voice in the government because of his pivotal
role in securing the prime ministry for Miki. In fact,
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Kimura may have been dropped by Miki as foreign
minister mainly because of Shiina's displeasure
with Kimura's handling of the Korean problem.
Miki's own attitude on Korean affairs is
not clear. He may well be interested in improved
ties with Seoul's rivals in North Korea; he had
always been one of Peking's biggest boosters in
Tokyo. Miki's relatively weak political position,
however, would in any case prevent him from going
against the wishes of such important conservative
supporters as Shiina and Fukudaw
Seoul, for its part, has become more reasonable
in its statements on bilateral issues, obviously
taking a wait-and-see attitude toward Miki and his
new government. Even at this early date, however,
the South Korean ambassador in Tokyo is claiming
that Miki is an enthusiastic supporter of improved
relations with Seoul.
Some Continuing Frictions
There are, nonetheless, some factors inhibiting
any effort by the two sides to move more boldly to
restore their formerly close relationship.
For one, the South Korean government is unhappy
over the publicized deactivation of the headquarters
for Tokyo's investigation of Mun Se-kwang, the man
who tried to assassinate Pak. Seoul recently gave
the Japanese a note verbale asking that the inves-
tigation officially continue.
There is also the issue of proposed Japanese
export-import credits to Pyongyang. In deference
to Seoul's views, the Miki government will probably
try to avoid any new commitments, but it may well
feel compelled to implement two deals--for a towel
plant and a bolt-and-nut factory--approved under
the Tanaka regime.
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At this point, each side seems to be waiting
for a clear gesture from the other--to satisfy
domestic political needs as well as requirements
of "facer" Tokyo, for example, would like the South
Koreans to reduce the sentences of two Japanese
students arrested in Seoul last year for violating
President Pak's emergency decrees. This should not
be difficult, and Seoul will. probably move shortly
to grant clemency in these cases.
The South Koreans seem principally concerned
with holding a long-postponed ministerial-level
meeting with the Japanese on economic aid. Usually
held every year, the meeting has come to be viewed
in Seoul as the symbol of Japan"s friendly interest
in South. Korea. This time, Seoul has asked for about
$205 million in aid. It. will probably get about
$120 million, disbursed over several years, though
there are indications that, this time around, aid
terms will be somewhat harsher and the Japanese
somewhat more demanding in setting aid criteria.
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