MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000100220001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 10, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00865A0001002200011op Secret
No Foreicn Dissem
'l2
Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Top Secret
SC No. 04350/75
January 10, 1975
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No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources; and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division. Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Morocco: Opposition Parties May Join
Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Ghana: Ewe Coup Plot Shelved . . . . . . . . . 6
India: Waiting for a Decision . . . . . . . . . 9
Jan 10, 1975
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Opposition Parties May Join Government
Over the past year, King Hassan has given several
indications that he is once again interested in
holding parliamentary elections. As a prelude to such
elections, the King will make his third try since 1971
to entice opposition political parties into a coali-
tion government.
In a press conference last September, Hassan
expressed his hope for an elected parliament in
Morocco by October 1975. He envisaged an interim
coalition cabinet, including opposition leaders, as
part, of the six to seven months of preparation re-
quired to establish election lists, laws, and districts.
Given this general timetable, King Hassan may
now be talking, either directly or through an inter-
mediary, with opposition party leaders about the for-
mation of a provisional government. Rumors circulated
in Rabat last month that a mini-cabinet shuffle would
occur around the first of the year and be followed
eventually by bringing various political leaders
into the government. Hassan might use the beginning
of the Muslim lunar year, January 13, to announce
cabinet changes. A likely target date for the forma-
tion of a coalition cabinet would be March 3, the
14th anniversary of Hassan's accession to the throne.
The crucial question is whether the opposition
parties are willing to join the government on the
King's terms. The frequency of party congresses and
gatherings this fall suggests that opposition leaders
are trying to revitalize their parties for another
round of dialogue with the palace. Although such
talks could again break down over conditions for
sharing power, the parties, which have been on the
sidelines for more than a decade, may be in such
straits that this time they will succumb to the lure
of holding office.
(Continued)
Jan 10, 1.975 1
TOP SECRET UMBRA
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For his part, King Hassan is in a strong posi-
tion vis-a-vis the opposition. In his campaign to
acquire Spanish Sahara,he has successfully played
on the strong irredentist sentiment shared by many
Moroccans, and thus created an atmosphere of national
unity. Given the strong support on this issue he
received from most political leaders, it would be
relatively easy for him to open a substantive dia-
logue with the parties. Should the present party
leaders prove unwilling to come to terms, the King
may try to attract younger, less prominent party
figures who might prove more amenable. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Jan 10, 1975
TOP SECRET UM
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Ghana
Ewe Coup Plot Shelved
The plans of a. group of dissident officers of
the Ewe tribe to overthrow Colonel Acheampong's
military regime apparently have been shelved
indefinitely. The plotters reportedly decided that
their activities are monitored too closely by
Acheampong's security services and that they cannot
count on the backing of any of the army's main troop
units which are all commanded by non-Ewe officers.
Moreover, the two senior Ewe officers on the ruling
military council seem to have dissociated themselves
from the plotting.
There are no indications, however, that the
main group of conspirators has disbanded. They
apparently still entertain hopes of eventually
organizing a successful coup. For now, the Ewe
dissidents seem to have little choice but to bide
their time while trying to :broaden their support in
the armed forces.
Meanwhile, Acheampong, who will mark his third
anniversary in power on January 1.3, may be consider-
ing some positive steps to curry favor with the Ewe
tribe. He lb said to be studying the possibility
of appointing an Ewe officer to command one of the
army's infantry battalions. The unit in question
is located far upcountry from the capital of Accra
and is not. strategically placed to pose a coup
threat.
Acheampong's political troubles are far from
over, however. He is still faced with criticism in
the officer corps for his erratic personal behavior
and his handling of Ghana's pressing economic prob-
lems. Acheampong is trying to improve his image, but
Ghana's worsening economic situation--like that of
many African countries--will probably continue to
deteriorate in 1975 because of the oil price squeeze
and inflation. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
DISSEM)
Jan 10, 1975 6
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India
Waiting for a Decision
Mrs. Gandhi apparently is still considering the
possibility of early parliamentary elections.
The recently concluded winter session of parlia-
ment was dominated by charges of corruption against
Prime Minister Gandhi's government. Throughout
December it seemed likely she would seek a renewed
mandate from the public and call general elections
in early spring, cutting short by one year the
maximum five year term. While refusing to commit
herself to a decision, Mrs. Gandhi has taken steps
to keep her options open. Units of her Congress
Party in the states are assessing electoral pros-
pects, holding strategy sessions, and collecting
campaign funds. Efforts to redraw constitutency
lines to reflect. population shifts in accord with
the 1971 census have been instensified.
Mrs. Gandhi's ambivalence toward the timing of
elections reflects the well-balanced pros and cons
of the situation. Factors favoring an early race
include:
-- A current wave of optimism about the 1975
crop prospects, due largely to early snowfalls
in the Himalayas that will be important in
irrigating the breadbasket states of north
India.
-- The oppositions' lack of cohesion and ina-
bility at this time to mount a credible chal-
lenge in more than a few states.
-- Indications of the re-emergence of factions
along right and left lines in the Congress Party
which, if allowed to grow, could affect party
unity by 1976.
(Continued)
Jan 10, 1975
TOP SECRET UMBRA
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-- The opportunity to ease the tense political
situation in Bihar by holding simultaneous
national and state elections there.
The above reasons are not compelling, however,
and Mrs. Gandhi may well prefer to ride out the full
five year term. She would thus be willing to take
the chance that:
-- The economic situation through 1975 will
not worsen, and might even improve, compared
to 1974 when India felt the double blow of the
oil crisis and mediocre crops.
-- The odds of retaining a parliamentary majority
in 1976 elections remain high, even thdtigh her
party might lose some seats.
-- The opposition. parties, which are far -
apart on ideological grounds, probably will not
be able to form an effective united front, even
though association with the revered reformer,
J. P. Narayan, economic discontent, and out-
right evidence of corruption in the government
provide them with an unusual opportunity to try
to undermine the Congress Party.
Adding to the dilemma over timing of the. next
election are widespread rumors that members of the
Congress Party were behind the unsolved murder last
week of railways minister L. N. Mishra. The govern-
ment was embarrassed by his involvement in an
import license scandal. To some observers, Mrs.
Gandhi's address at a memorial service for Mishra
on Tuesday sounded. like a typical campaign speech,
and the Congress Party whip in parliament told US
embassy officials in New Delhi that he was almost
sure she would call a "snap" election. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Jan 10, 1975 10
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