LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 8, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
rr
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Latin American Trends
SOURCED
Secret
January 8, 1975
No. 0491/75
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
Background Use OnZy/C'ontrolZed Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 17. 11652, exemption category:
56 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
SECRET
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
January 8, 1975
Latin America Seeks a Strategy . . . . . . . 1
Argentina: Looking Far Ahead? . . . . . . . . 4
Colombia: Guerrillas and the
State of the Left . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ecuador: Oiling the Military
Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A Restrained Anniversary in Havana . . . . . . 9
Cuba Restructures Its Industrial.
Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Dominican Republic: Balaguer.
Moves The Pawns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Panama Surfaces Canal Treaty
Advisory Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Costa Rica: Figueres Holds On . . . . . . . . 15
-i- TT
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 IPe3P7?9T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 gRAVM7pT00865A000100160002-3
Latin America Seeks a Strategy
Latin American governments and opinion makers,
alternately angered and confounded by US policy
toward the rest of the hemisphere, are groping for
an effective strategy through which to pursue their
interests.
Two schools of thought currently dominate Latin
thinking about the US. One sees a basically adver-
sary situation as inescapable. The other regards a
:broad consonance of purpose between the US and the
rest of the Americas as natural and essential. Both
views have strong roots in traditional aspects of
hemispheric relations.
The confrontational view, hallowed by a long
history of US intervention in Latin America, is now
popularized by the surge of political and economic
assertiveness by countries weak in terms of arms
and development. The worldwide cooperative efforts
.by the have-nots and especially the spectacular
emergence of the oil producers have had a profound
effect. in Latin America. In broadest terms, govern-
:ment integrity now has its definition in a careful
identification of national goals and working toward
them boldly. Risking the wrath of the superpowers
is perhaps a logical evolution of the machismo cult
that pervades Latin American motivation and behavior.
This school encompasses much of the rhetoric,
action, and reaction that has flowed from Latin
America recently: Mexico's assiduous flirtation
with the third world; the quick responses of highly
nationalistic governments such as those in Ecuador
and Peru when they sense pressure or betrayal by the
US; the rivalries for leadership of regional movements
January 8, 1975
-1-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17: CIA-RJ9pA000100160002-3
designed to combat "imperialism" in all its guises;
the current threat by Venezuela and Ecuador to
place the US in a hemispheric court to face charges
of economic aggression.
These governments are both exhilarated by and
insecure with their own bravura. They voraciously
consume information. and propaganda about how the
US protects its own interests and are quick to focus
on stories of undercover agents or statements of
when the US would use arms, considering them immediate
and serious threats. The sense of strength in unity
and the feeling that a special era is dawning for the
underprivileged nations sustain these governments
and draw them together to challenge the rich countries,
especially the US.
The second school is not so vociferous but is
profoundly concerned at what it views as a growing
coolness by the US toward hemispheric neighbors.
Governments such as those in Colombia, Chile, Brazil,
and most of the small countries in Central and South
America are most comfortable with a spirit of accom-
modation and cooperation between them and the US.
Many of them are puzzled by such developments as the
"hands off" role played by the US in the most recent
meeting of OAS foreign ministers and its reluctance
to supply arms, trading privileges, or other favors
that they see as essential to their national well-
being. They are torn between the pressure to maintain
"Latin unity" in facing the US and the desire to be
able to count on the US as their ally. They avidly
want either the "new dialogue" or some special bi-
lateral relationship with the US, and they see both
jeopardized by the growing frictions between the US
and the hemisphere as a whole. Speaking for Colombia,
but probably representative of a view held by numerous
countries in the hemisphere, two prominent politicians
January 8, 1975
-2-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 8#J qPT00865A000100160002-3
have told the US Ambassador in Bogota of their anx-
ieties and perplexities over current trends. They
described the rebuff felt by countries wanting to
be political kin with the US, and one advised that
some "great act or political gesture" on the part
of the US is required to revitalize the inter-
American system.
The two viewpoints are likely to continue to
divide Latin Americans at least on certain broad
issues, though Latins of both schools of thought
will continue to seek common ground on which to
work together. Movement--perhaps further apart but
possibly toward unity--seems likely to occur in the
next several months as the still nagging Cuba issue,
the controversial foreign ministers meeting set for
March, and the OAS general assembly are pondered.
Both groups are anxious about the US response to
their needs in view of the seeming decline of the
dialogue that appeared so promising only a year ago.
(CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
January 8, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : &(-12DP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA- dy 5A000100160002-3
one: RR W
Argentina: Looking Far Ahead?
"President Maria Estela de Peron will not seek
reelection in 1977." This announcement last week,
by a high government official, was calculated to
divert public attention from Argentina's deepening
economic problems toward elections that are still
more than two years away.
Such tactics are commonplace in a country where
voting has long been considered the panacea for
national ills. Early in this century the Radical
Party rose to power on the sole platform issue of
making the vote compulsory for all men over eighteen.
The last military government,, headed by Alejandro
Lanusse, openly admitted its inability to cope with
economic woes of stagnation and rampant inflation,
but retained a measure of popular support by promising
a return to free elections.
In reality, however, there are no likely parlia-
mentary solutions to the major issues that divide
Argentines. The internecine battles in the streets
of Buenos Aires serve as a constant reminder of the
incapacity of successive governments, both military
and Peronist, to solve chronic political and economic
difficulties. Although the combatants--terrorist
and counterterrorist---are few in number, their con-
tinuing presence is the major preoccupation of this
government.
Now, younger officers within the military are?
voicing increasing concern that the promises of the
most recent election will not. be fulfilled. The
weekly magazine Panorama, a publication generally well
informed on military matters, recently took note of
this dissatisfaction. According to the respected
January 8, 1975
cc
-4- T
PM
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : Cl~
0865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 :ftffftT00865A000100160002-3
columnist Jorge Lozano, lieutenants and captains re-
call the overwhelming vote for change communicated
in the Peronist victories of March and September 1973
and are observing that major transformations have
not occurred. Lozano avoids analytical judgments,
but paints instead a picture of disappointment and
frustration over extremist violence and legislative
inattention to social pressures. He states that
there is no talk of a golpe, but notes that junior
army officers, many of whom have been victims of the
terrorists, are becoming highly criticial of this
government. He concludes that: "no one is calling
for a moralistic revolution, but it is wise to take
heed of underlying shifts of sentiment. A captain
is not a youth believing in Utopia. He is about 40
years old, earning a salary similar to a junior
executive in a bank. He shares the intellectual
preoccupations of his contemporaries, and has to
support a family. Above all he is an Argentine, not
a man from another planet, nor an agent from Paris
or the CIA." (CONFIDENTIAL)
January 8, 1975
-5-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 s~IT9T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIAAel f T-GOE65A000100160002-3
Colombia: Guerrillas and the State of the Left
Leftist guerrillas may be preparing to launch
an armed campaign against government forces while
President Lopez is 'preoccupied with the nation's
economic problems.
the Rev lutionary Armed Forces
o o o is held a rare nationwide strategy
meeting recently and concluded that Lopez' decline
in popularity since taking office in August was an
invitation to guerrilla action.
The FARC has not engaged in widespread activity
for more than four :years, largely because of the
conservative, old-line leadership of its nominal
parent organization, the legal pro-Moscow Colombian
Communist Party. During the 1960s the party worked
out a very effective--and very unofficial--arrange-
ment by which it kept the FARRC under control and the
government left both groups more or less alone. The
FARC capitalized on this prolonged period of tran-
quility to train its militants and build arms caches.
As a result, it is the largest and potentially most
effective guerrilla organization in Colombia.
Circumstances affecting the FARC have changed
significantly over the past year, making plausible
a renewal of activity by the group. The pro-Havana
National Liberation Army (ELN), with which the FARC
had long-standing ideological and territorial dif-
ferences, was decimated by the government in a
months-long campaign. ending in late 1973. Since
then, some FARC leaders have recommended filling the
void, particularly since the military pressure was
off and there was a feeling that the armed forces
were weary of chasing guerrillas and would be reluctant
January 8, 1975
25X1A
~fi~~F- 6 -
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIAO 3 T865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : ?V4fR" T00865A000100160002-3
to resume such activity. The conservative Communist
Party leadership prevailed, arguing that Communist
participation in the April 1974 general election
would be destroyed by FARC militancy.
The Communists fared poorly in the election,
however, failing to live up even to their own modest
expectations. Moreover, the President's economic
programs and the congressional role in them have pro-
voked policy splits within the leftist coalition of
which the Communists have formed the core. The crown-
ing blow came just this month when the coalition
ejected its former presidential candidate in another
policy crisis.
In this atmosphere, restraints on the FARC must
be at a low ebb. The group is well trained and well
armed., and appears to see an opportunity to act. it
could easily become as onerous a challenge to govern-
ment forces as was the ELN at its height. In that
event, it would be far more difficult to eradicate,
however. The ELN was structured around a permanent
cadre of activists and a vulnerable urban supply net-
work. The FARC consists of farmers and shopkeepers
who can mobilize with speed and in secrecy--and just
as effectively disappear into their normal lives
following an operation. Many members of the military
dread the prospect of contending with such a force.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
January 8, 1975
-7-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-,F, j t1 65A000100160002-3
Phone: 1 3-6228
Ecuador: Oiling the Military Machine
The Ecuadorean Government is interested in using
some of its oil revenues to acquire new military equip-
ment. An army purchasing team has spent this week
examining artillery and anti--aircraft weapons in the
US and will leave this weekend for Europe and Israel.
Long years of pre-petroleum poverty have left
the country's armed :Forces with antiquated and often
non-functioning equipment. In addition, the govern-
ment's interest in military modernization reflects
generalized tensions in western South America, in par-
ticular between Peru and Chile. The present weapons
team is doing serious shopping, and decisions regard-
ing purchases are expected to follow its return to
Quito at the end of February.
The government is likely to opt for non-US equip-
ment. Military officers have made no secret of their
impatience with the US system of arms sales, entailing
long delays in delivery and public disclosure of the
materiel acquired. Added to this is President
Rodriguez' complaint that. the trade bill recently
signed into law by President Ford discriminates against
Ecuador. All of this apparently disinclines Rodriguez
to purchase US weaponry. The army team is thought to
be shopping in this country only to acquire a yardstick
by which to appraise European and Israeli equipment.
The team consists of Brig. Gen. Gustavo Vasconez,
army chief of staff; Lt. Col. Anibal Orbe, army secre-
tary general; Lt. Col.. Mario Moscoso, army intelligence
staff chief; and Capt. Jaime Torres, chief army design
engineer. Beginning next week, the team will visit
Great Britain, Sweden, West Germany, France, Switzerland,
Italy, and Israel. A quick shopping trip to the USSR
may also be added to the itinerary. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
[- 8-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17: ClAil y 0865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 "ZPT00865A000100160002-3
25X1A
A Restrained Anniversary in Havana
The failure of any top Cuban official to honor
the January 2 holiday with a major address this year
is unusual but not unprecedented. The date marks
the entrance of Castro's forces into Havana in 1959
and 'is one of the two principal holidays on the Cuban
revolutionary calendar.
There is no apparent explanation for the silence
in Havana. Castro is in good health and has appeared
in public on several recent occasions. The lack of
any large-scale public commemoration in Havana this
year is puzzling because Cuba has just finished an
exceptionally successful year.
In earlier years, the celebration on January 2
usually included an impressive military parade fol-
lowed by a lengthy address by Fidel in Revolutionary
Square in Havana. After 1968 the military parade was
dropped, but January 2 continued to be celebrated as
a national holiday. Because of the push for a 10-
million-ton sugar harvest, the anniversary was not
commemorated in 1970, but a speech delivered by Castro
in a cane field was taped and broadcast on national
radio and television. The 1971 anniversary found
Castro in the middle of a period of self-doubt causing
him to by-pass the annual occasion. Neither was the
event marked in 1972, but a major address Fidel had
made on December 31 to the Congress of Owners of Small
Farms was published in the press on January 3.
Another break from tradition occurred in 1973
when a somber and subdued Fidel read his speech a day
late in a television studio rather than speaking
extemporaneously in Revolutionary Square. The devia-
tion, however, appeared to be intended as a signal that
January 8, 1975
-9-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05117: CIA-FkTQf65A000100160002-3
a just-concluded series of economic agreements with
the Soviet Union had been accompanied by a consider-
able loss of independence. Last year Raul Castro
delivered the keynote address and a military parade
was again held--the first since 1968.
Also missing so far is the announcement of a
slogan for the year. Castro has frequently used the
January 2 speech to reveal the slogan which indicated
the focus of attention of the regime for the year
just begun. Despite the omission, it seems clear
that 1975 will be the "Year of the First Party
Congress." Propaganda guidelines approved by the
party's Political Bureau last month concentrated
almost entirely on the congress, now slated for the
latter part of 1975, and imply that the meeting will
be the most important national political event since
the party adopted its present structure in late 1965.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
January 8, 1975
-1.0-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17: CIA ZR1'0'0865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17: ? R T00865A000100160002-3
Cuba Restructures Its Industrial Sector
The complete restructuring of the government's
basic industry sector appears to be motivated by
organizational rather than political considerations.
The top leadership of the sector seems to have re-
mained intact.
The sector is now organized as follows:
---the ministry of the chemical industry, headed
by Antonio Esquivel Yedra (formerly the head
of the ministry of basic industry);
---the ministry of the iron and steel machinery
industry, headed by Lester Rodriguez Infante
(formerly the director of the automotive
technical service center, a sub-ministerial
post) ;
---the ministry of the electrical industry,
headed by Luis Beltran Hernandez (formerly
vice minister-director of the consolidated
electrical enterprise);
--the ministry of mining and geology (formerly
the ministry of mining, fuels, and metallurgy),
headed by Manuel Cespedes Fernandez (formerly
head of the ministry of mining, fuels, and
metallurgy).
The Cuban Petroleum Institute, formerly a semi-
autonomous sub-ministerial office, has been incorpo-
rated into the ministry of the chemical industry and
its chief, Luis Karakadze Berrayarza, will bear the
title of vice minister of petroleum.
January 8, 1975
-11-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA,.pe965A000100160002-3
. FY
The changes constitute promotions to the rank
of minister for Rodriguez Infante and Beltran
Hernandez, who hold the two newly created portfolios.
Although no announcement has been made yet, the post
of vice prime minister for the basic industries sector
presumably is still held by Joel Domenech Benitez.
Neither has there been any announcement about the
disposition of the :Former chief of the chemical in-
dustry, Manuel Andres Malmierca Peoli, who was dis-
laced by Esquivel Yedra. Malmierca was a member of
the pre-Castro Communist party and is a brother of
Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, for more than a quarter of
a century the secretary general of the pre-Castro
Communist party and now a member of the party Secre-
tariat and Central Committee. (SECRET)
January 8, 1975
c,~(-12-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-`RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : j1 7f'T00865A000100160002-3
Dominican Republic: Bala uer Moves The Pawns
President Joaquin Balaguer began the New Year
by announcing the reinstatement of an important
government official and by giving one opposition
party a token role in the administration. Return-
ed to grace was Foreign Secretary Victor Gomez
:Berges, whose suspension from his post in November
had generated a wave of speculation but few facts.
Balaguer may have intended the suspension as
punishment for Gomez Berges' alleged failure to
carry out his instructions at the meeting of foreign
ministers in Quito. On a more personal level, the
sanction may have been a manifestation of Balaguer's
penchant for pulling the rug out from under politi-
cians whom he considers excessively ambitious. Gomez
Berges' candidacy for the post of secretary-general
of the OAS was not Balaguer's idea, and his chances
have certainly been hurt by the suspension. The
military's dislike of Gomez Berges may also have
been a factor in his temporary eclipse, which might
become permanent if he makes another misstep.
The small Social Christian Revolutionary Party
received a reward from the President in the form
of the appointment of one member as ambassador to
the UN and others to second and third-level jobs
in the administration. Balaguer would like to have
some opposition representation in the government to
project an image of broad support, and now that one
party has fallen in line others may follow. However,
the leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party, the
largest opposition group, has said that it has al-
ready decided to reject any offer to join in the
government. Also unlikely to accept is the Dominican
Liberation Party, whose leader, former President Juan
Bosch,is on a journey to Mexico, Cuba, and Europe.
(CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK:GROUND USE ONLY)
January 8, 1975
-13-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIAQpN 65A000100160002-3
Panama Surfaces Canal Treaty Advisory Team
This week the Panamanian press acknowledged--
apparently for the first time--the existence. of an
official canal treaty advisory team. The infor-
mation was contained in an announcement of the ap-
pointment of University of Panama rector Romulo
Escobar Bethancourt. to the group.
In fact, the negotiating commission has been
operating for several months under the supervision
of Vice President Arturo Sucre, and Escobar
Bethancourt has been a member since about last
September. General Torrijos may have had at least
two reasons for wanting the public to know about
the commission now,. He has been under some criticism
for keeping the details about the negotiations within
a limited circle of close advisers, and he would
probably like to give an impression that a broader
range of views is being brought to bear.
The inclusion of Escobar Bethancourt, who has
a reputation as a leftist nationalist, could help
this effort. In addition, Torrijos apparently is
not pleased with the rector"s performance at the
university, and putting him on the negotiating com-
mission could. be a step toward easing him out of
his academic post. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
CONTROLLED DISSEM)
January 8, 1975
-14-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-F c99`14 5A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 SV&R 9T00865A000100160002-3
and now 68 years old, former president Jose "Don
Pepe" Figueres still looms large in the political
arena.
As head of the ruling National Liberation
Party, and with his hand-picked successor in the
presidency, Don Pepe's will is evident in two head-
line issues: relations with Cuba and the case of
Robert Vesco.
Nearly the entire legislative assembly and
representatives of several Costa Rican autonomous
organizations are guests of the Castro government
this week. President Daniel Oduber, Vice President
Solano Calderon, and Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio
have all hinted that this trip could foster the
resumption of commercial relations in the near future.
In fact, Oduber has often voiced his interest in
trade. He has also stated, however, that, his country
will not move on the diplomatic front until Castro
agrees to free all political prisoners. This policy
has been held by Figueres for over a decade.
In 1957, Don Pepe sent
a planeload of arms to
help Castro, then fighting
as a
guerrilla in Cuba.
Two years later,however, he
had
a bitter public
clash with Fidel in Havana
over
the "Communist turn"
of the revolution. To this
day,
Figueres is one of
Castro's bitterest critics in the hemisphere.
In the case of fugitive Robert Vesco, President
Oduber has refused to respond to the widespread and
angry public cry for the US financier's expulsion.
For over two years, the Vesco case has been carried
January 8, 1975
-1R5 -
Approved For Release 2001/05/17~tR-l DP99T00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : C7..1.0865A000100160002-3
by the San Jose media as a major story. During the
Figueres administration, two US extradition requests
were dismissed--ostensibly on legal technicalities.
The financial tie between President Figueres and
Vesco, however, was the underlying factor.
President Oduber's popularity has diminished
considerably since he began a four-year term six
months ago with a broad multi-partisan backing. This
decline is partly due to the traditional "end of the
honeymoon," but deepened by public speculation about
his ties to Figueres.
Thus, Oduber is now caught in a crossfire. Lest
his public support be increasingly eroded, he will
have to confront Don Pepe and set the government on
an independent and decisive course more consistent
with the mainstream of public opinion. Any move away
from his predecessor, however, will disturb the power-
ful pro-Figueres faction of the legislature, as well
as the Figueres-dominated National Liberation Party.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
January 8, 1975
-16-
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : MKf00865A000100160002-3
 Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A000100160002-3