DCI BRIEFING FOR NSC MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A002000090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 16, 1969
• Content Type: BRIEF

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16 December 1969
DCI BRIEFINGS FOR
NSC MEETINGS
I. SOUTHERN AFRICA (Cf. NSSM-39)
Page Time
General Summary 1 5:00
Republic of South Africa 5 4:45
Rhodesia 11 4:00
Portuguese Africa 16 8:30
Angola ............ p.20
Mozambique .......... 22
Portuguese Guinea...24
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22-1/4 minutes
II. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AND INDIA (Cf. NSSM-26)
The Military Balance 1 2:30
India--Recent Sources 3 1:45
Pakistan--Recent Sources 5 2:45
Present Indian-Pakistani Relations 7 2:15
Relations with the United States 10 4:00
13-1/4 minutes
Briefing boards:
Map, Southern Africa
Chart, Relative Indian/Pakistani strengths in
selected military elements.
Map, South Asia
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15 December 1969
DCI BRIEFING FOR
17 DECEMBER NSC MEETING
SOUTHERN AFRICA
I. Mr. President, the in Southern Africa
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for the 1970-s--noso much a question of .Euro-?
pean colonialism against native nationalism, as
a struggle by four million white Africans to
maintain their rule over 30 million black Africans.
A. Portugal, with its holdings in Angola and
Mczambique, is still a classic
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colonial power.
B. The Portuguese, -however, are sustained in
their determination to remain in Africa by
the example of the whites who hold power
over South Africa and Rhodesia.
C. These are the whites who are described as
"Europeans" in the population statistics,
historical label. The Dutch
and the French Huguenots had begun settling
in southern Africa more than 300 years ago.
By the early 19th century, their descendants
and the British had taken the land from the
Hottentots, and from the Zulus and the other
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Bantus. This was long before Cecil Rhodes
and Paul Kruger made it a question of who
would have the empire.
1. The whites in Angola and Mozambique also
have ancient roots in Africa-.-the first
Portuguese settlers came to Angola a year
before Christopher Columbus set sail, and
Mozambique was colonized in 1505.
2. In Angola and Mozambique, however, blacks
and whites alike are citizens of Portugal,
their capital is Lisbon, and the territory
is defended by troops from the European
metropole.
3,. The whites in Rhodesia and South Africa
have no thought of retiring to Devon or
Amsterdam; they have no ties other than
heritage to the Empire and the Commonwealth.
They are Africans--as I said, white Africans.
II. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and
Mozambique all have strong white governments, de-
termined to stay in power.
A. They are aware of their common interests, and
of theirs ostracism by most of the rest
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B. As a result, they have stepped up their co-
operation with each other, and they are in-
creasingly firm in their belief that they can
defy world opinion and get away with it.
III. This self-confidence is warranted for the present,
and there is little prospect that anything will
happen to change it in the foreseeable future.
A. Certainly no black African country is strong
enough to challenge them outright.
1. The international action which the black
Africans have been able to obtain in the
United Nations has not beer3 effective.
2. South Africa is virtually self-sufficient,
and can sustain Rhodesiaganst 46* U.N.
action. The Portuguese territories are
oriented toward the Motherland, and thus
relatively immune to international trade
sanctions.
3. The black African countries have been un-
able to win over the major powers for
broader or more intensive sanctions.
4. Within Africa, the geography of trade
gives the white African countries the
upper hand over their native neighbors.
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B. The black populations are quiescent, and in-
surgent movements based abroad have been in-
effective.
l. Liberation groups in Zambia and Tanzania
have been trying to launch operations
against Rhodesia and South Africa, but
the security forces are so efficient that
no groups have been able to carry on sus-
tained guerrilla activities.
2. There is limited insurgency in the Portu-
guese territories, but it has made little
headway over the past two years. The
guerrillas face determined and effective
countermeasures,/'hey are plagued by in-
ternal dissent,/and they have not been able
to arouse any significant proportion of the
black population.
IV. The Soviets and the Chinese Communists, of course,
are trying to capitalize on the issue of white mi-
nority government in Africa, raising the propaganda
issues of imperialism, colonialism, and racism.
A. The Soviets have given about one million dollars
a year in aid to the various insurgent groups,
and have provided advanced guerrilla training.
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B. The Chinese are running a somewhat smaller pro-
dram, _ they are getting ready to build a
railroad from Tanzania to Zambia which may cost
at much as $400 million, and which is designed
to free Zambia from its dependence on transport
routes through white southern Africa.
C. The Communist effort in Africa is, after all, a
second-priority project. Over the past 15 years,
Africa has received only 15 percent of all Com-
munist economic aid to 1ftw underdeveloped countries,
while 70 percent has one to the Middle East and
South Asia. As for Moscow's military aid to free
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world recipients, Africa has had to share some
five percent of the total with Latin America--
about half of it has gone to Egypt and Indonesia,
with another 45 percent to Algeria, Syria, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and India.
D. In short, there is no effective challenge at pres-
ent'-domestic or foreign-a-to white minority rule
in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.
SOUTH AFRICA
Hal( I. of the 30 million blacksand the bulk of the
four million whites who rule theme-are in the Republic
of South Africa.
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Ao The total 1969 population is estimated at
19,634,000. That breaks down, in round
figures, into:
19 percent whites, or about 3,730,000;
68 percent blacks, or about 13,350,000;
10 percent of mixed blood /officially des-
ignated as "Coloureds" -/~-or about 1,960,000;
and
3 percent Asians--mainly Indians--about 590,000.
B. The Territory of Southwest Africa adds another
609,000 people--81 percent black, only 14 percent
white, and 5 percent Coloureds.
II. The Re;oublic of South Africa is
has the strongest and most secure of the white
regimes.
A. The official policy of Apartheid has made South
Africa an international whipping boy for years.
As a result, it has developed its economy with
an eye to self-sufficiency. Today, with the
single exception of oil, South Africa has all
the-natural resources and the industrial plant
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it needs to go it alone.
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B. Moreover, the South Africans in recent years
have come to realize that they have a number
of bargaining counters they can use to induce
other countries to deal with the regime on an
"as is" basis.
1. Their minerals'-gold, uranium and diamonds
are in demand in international markets.
2. Their ports and their strategic location
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have become more important since the closure
of the Suez Canal.
C. The government of Prime Minister Johannes Vorster,
armed with this new feeling of self-sufficiency,
has been working quietly for better diplomatic
and economic relations with neighboring black
African states.
1,.. Formal relations have been established with
Malawi.
2. South Africa is giving economic and technical
assistance to Lesotho, one of the former Brit-
ish protectorates in southern Africa which
have recently been given independence.
3. Other black African countries? for instance,
Malagasy, Gabon and Ivory Coast mare also
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interested in relations and aid'but are
hesitant to risk criticism by their neigh-,
bors.
4. Many African countries- -zen
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_](have been trading secretly
or quietly with South Africa.
III. Within the country, the regime has not loosened
its strict Apartheid, or "separate development"
laws.
A. The government is being challenged by a new,
which
argues that the government is already doing
too much for the blacks. From now until the
elections next April, the government can be
expected to be rigid in its application of
Apartheid.
B. The blacks have made little headway toward
the B-ant, scans , or separate nations, which
are the ultimate goal of separate development.
1. They are needed in white urban areas as
the major semi-skilled and unskilled labor
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force. And they can make more money
there than they could farming in their
own tribal homelands.
2. The government has also done little 7L
for example, such as major financial in-
vestment in homeland industries-to make
return to the Bantustans more inviting.
C. For the foreseeable future, then, there will
be little change in South Africa's racial
system, and no possibility of ousting the
white government.
1. There are two insurgent groups based in
Tanzania seeking to liberate South Africa.
Their membership within the country is un-
known, probably minimal,//and relatively
invisible, because it is inactive. Both
groups combined have less than 400 members
outside the country.
D. South Africa's defense and security forces have
some 57,000 on duty, and another 82,000 in the
active reserve. The air force has 422 pilots,
197 jets, and 358 other aircraft; the navy is
led by one destroyer and two destroyer escorts.
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1. South Africa produces most of the small
arms, mortars and ammunition it requires.
It assembles armored cars from French
components, and has begun assembling
Macchi jet trainers supplied by Italy.
In 1966, France passed the United Kingdom
as the principal source of military hardware
imports.
2. 300 South African police have been sta-
tioned in Rhodesia to help local security
forces
9 and a few helicopters have been
furnished on loan.
3. No South African forces are stationed in
Angola or Mozambique, but South Africans
cooperate with Portuguese officials, and
have supplied some ammunition.
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I. Rhodesia has a population of just over 5
million, with 230,000 whites and 4.8 million
blac.cs. The issue of majority African rule
has dictated events in Rhodesia over the
past 10 years.
A. London in the early 1960s began working
toward broadened voting rights which
would have led eventually to majority
rule. To forestall this, Prime Minister
.an Smith in November 1965 issued a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence,
and for white Rhodesians, the initials
U.D.I. have the same ring today that
1.776 has in this country.
B. 'Smith's political party, the Rhodesian
Front, came to power in 1962, and is
now unchallenged.
1. The African nationalist groups which
were its main opponents have been
outlawed since 1964, and now operate
mainly from exile in Zambia.
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2. They are weak, badly split, and
have little indigenous support.
Active insurgents number only about
700, and the rural black population
inside Rhodesia is passive. The
tribal chiefs cooperate with the
Smith government in Salisbury._
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:3. The nationalists have been inactive
since a series of unsuccessful
guerrilla incursions in 1967 and
1968. They plan to try infiltration
of small units soon, but the Rhodesian
security forces are capable of handling
any new attempts.
C. The Rhodesian Front is again expected to win
most, if not all, of the 50 white parlia-
mentary seats in new general elections some
time in early 1970. There is no real
political opposition to the Smith regime.
1. Tobacco farmers /once one of the most
powerful pressure groups in Rhodesia-/
recently criticized the Smith regime
for reducing tobacco production quotas.
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They have been hurt by the U.N.
sanctions, and the government is
trying to reduce the necessary
subsidies by gradually cutting
back on production.
2. Railway workers are also bitter
because the government threatened
to jail union leaders if they struck
for higher pay.
3. There is, however, no strong party
which could turn this dissatisfaction
against the Rhodesian Front.
II. Rhodesia's new constitution has recently been
signed into law, and will go into effect at the
time of the new elections.
A. It institutionalizes the existing white
rule, and will transform Rhodesia into an
independent republic without any further
formal declaration.
1. This reflects Ian Smith's confidence
that Rhodesia no longer needs a
settlement with London, or its old
Commonwealth ties, to ride out
economic sanctions and diplomatic
isolation.
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2. We do not expect any immediate
recognition of the new Rhodesian
state, even by South Africa or
Portugal. Smith hopes, however,
that western governments which
still have missions in Salisbury
will leave them there when the new
constitution takes effect. He
could interpret this as de facto
recognition.
III. One of the main reasons for Smith's confidence
4) is the health of the economy.
A. Exports dipped sharply immediately after
U.D.I., and have not regained their 1965
levels, but with the help of South Africa
and Portugal, Rhodesia has gradually
increased both exports and imports since
1967.
1. Only the tobacco industry is still
suffering significantly, and with
the passage of time sanctions are
likely to become less and less
effective.
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2,. Gross domestic product may well have
increased by 7 percent in 1969, and
Rhodesia is well endowed with natural
resources.
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PORTUGUESE AFRICA
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I. Portugal--in its treatment of its African
possessions--is as defiant of world opinion
as is the Republic of South Africa.
A. Lisbon maintains that these territories
are overseas provinces of Portugal, and
an integral part of the nation. Hence,
any action by other nations or in the
U.N. constitutes an interference in
Portugal's internal affairs.
B. T:aere is little prospect, in actual
fact, that Lisbon will loosen its
p=resent controls, let alone move toward
majority rule in Angola, Mozambique,
and the other overseas territories.
1? At present, even minor policy
recommendations by the white-
dominated territorial adminis-
trations must have Lisbon's
approval.
2. Premier Caetano early in 1969
suggested a move toward greater
autonomy, but dropped the proposal
in the face of a strong reaction by
powerful old guard elements.
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C. Governors are appointed by Lisbon, and
1-.old most of the power that is not exercised
by the home government. Theoretically,
blacks in Angola and Mozambique have the
franchise, and could outvote the relative
handful of whites in balloting for the
Portuguese legislature and the provincial
representative assemblies.
1. In point of fact, however, the electoral
law is so complex that even many whites
in Portuguese Africa fail to vote, and
the blacks who wish to do so face an
array of qualifications including literacy,
property, and other tests.
2. Caetano says participation will be extended
to black Africans "who totally accept Portu-
guese culture"--a phrase which could mean
that the African tribesman will have to
pray, marry, and even think like a European
Portuguese before he can vote.
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3. The Lisbon government has implemented
educational and economic reforms which
will improve the welfare of blacks,
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II. Lisbon, in maintaining its hold over the Af-
rican territories, so far has not been.-pushed
beyond diplomatic efforts to obtain understand-
ing for Portuguese sovereignty, and informal
cooperation with the other white regimes of
southern Africa.
? A. The Portuguese are probably opposed to a
permanent security pact with their White
African neighbors except as a last resort.
B. Lisbon, independent-minded and fearful of
South African political domination, has
even tried to keep direct assistance to a
minimum,
C. Portugal is not known to have diverted any
NATO-committed forces, or MAP-restricted
weapons supplied by the United States, to
the defense of its African territories.
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1, Lisbon resents U.S. prohibitions on
the use of such material, but has been
able to manufacture--or purchase else-
where--equipment restricted by the
United States.
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Angola
II. Angola's 270,000 whites make up about five per-
cent of the population, a a the---am Another
75,000mulattoes. From almost five million
blacks, two nationalist organizations have re-
cruited some 12 to 14,000 members. About half
of these are active guerrillas, and no more than
3 to 4,000 of them are operating inside Angola
at any one time.
A. The Portuguese government, using 60,000 troops
and some 33,000 local defense militiamen and
auxiliaries, has confined guerrilla, operations
to a harassment level.
1. Areas where the guerrillas have been able
to operate are poor in resources, and
they must rely on bases outside Angola
for arms and equipment.
2. There are guerrilla bases in Zambia and
Congo-Kinshasa, but these countries have
to depend on Portuguese Africa for trans-
portation facilities. As a result,
they have restrained the guerrillas when-
ever Portugal has put on the pressure.
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l ep&.oacc or
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3. On several occasions when there has been
a surge of sabotage or terrorism, the
Portuguese have announced that railroads
on which Zambia and the Congo depend would
have to be shut down for repairs. The
African governments have quickly under-
stood the hint.
B. The first Angolan nationalist organization in
the field was the GRAE of Holden Roberto, but
starting in 1960, Communist countries and
radical black Africans began building up the
rival; Marxist-oriented MPLA.
1. Roberto's organization staged most of the
insurgency in Angola until 1965. At that
time, the Portuguese managed to contain
his operations, and simultaneously his sup-
port from outside sources was drastically
cut back in favor of the MPLA.
2. The long-standing rivalry of GRAE and MPLA
has wasted the limited resources of the
guerrillas and weakened their overall ef-
fectiveness.
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Mozambique
in Mozambique, the 100,000 whites make
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up less than 1.5 percent of the estimated
7,500,000 population.
A. The principal nationalist organization,
known as FRELIMO, has 8 to 10,000
members, but less than a third of them
manage to operate inside Mozambique at
any one time.
1. Tanzania provides a hospitable base,
but a Portuguese defensive belt of
fortified villages confines the
guerrillas to sparsely populated
and economically unimportant areas
along the northern border.
2. FRELIMO is trying to penetrate more
rewarding areas of Mozambique by
way of Zambia and Malawi, but the
host governments depend on the white
regimes of Southern Africa for
transportation routes.
3. There are 40,000 Portuguese troops and
almost 10,000 auxiliaries in Mozambique.
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B. FRELIMO's efforts to push :sleeper into the
country are plagued by logistical problems
by the apathy and tribal rivalries of the
Mozambique blacks,/ /and by a measure of
factionalism among the nationalists.
1. FRELIMO's original leader, Eduardo
Mondlane, was assassinated last
February. He was replaced briefly
by a triumvirate, until the chief of
the guerrilla forces, Moises Samora
Machel, eased out one of the members
and took over control.
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Portuguese Guinea
IV. Finally, I want to mention Portuguese Guinea
briefly, although it is not a part of what we
generally consider white Southern Africa.
Portuguese Guinea provides a sharp contrast,
because here l the black insurgents
1?l O.Q of fl E. adV a 1y, aoe_.
A. The total population is only 530,000, and
the whites and mulattoes combined/ exclu-
sive of Portuguese troops--make up less
than one percent.
B. The major insurgent group is the African
Party for the Independence of Portuguese
Guinea and Cape Verde, or PAIGC.
1. This group has bases in Guinea and
Senegal, and it also controls exten-
sive territory within
Portuguese Guinea, especially
along the southeastern border,
2. It gets arms, funds, and training from
Communist countries--mainly the Soviet
Union. It also has military support from
radical African states, and financial
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support from the Organization of Afri-
can Unity.
C. The Portuguese Governor is using 16 battalions
against the insurgents--some 27,000 troops in
all--but 5,000 of these have been recruited
among the natives.
1. At present, he is trying to apply a pro-
gram of resettlement in fortified ham-
lets.
2. The prospects are for a prolonged insur-
gency, and the balance is now swinging
in favor of the PAIGC.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 December 1969
Political Stability in Italy
Each of the three governments since the national
parliamentary elections of May 1968 has faced wide-
spread dissatisfaction and insistent speculation
that its tenure would be short. This results from
of the ce r-1 f arties which have gov-
erned Italy since 1962 to receive a strong and clear
endorsement in the 1968 e tinnEach of the po-
litical ;parties has since been seeking a more attrac-
tive s a_'.nce, and the various factions within the par-
ties have at the same time been vying for position.
Ita1v's fundamental political Problem is that
no goyer:lment in the postwar period has been able
to accomplish needed reforms without years of par-
liamenta:ry and political manuver. Relatively lit-
tle public criticism is now directed against fi-
nancial policy, which has contributed to increased
material welfare of the population, or against for-
eign policy, which has been friendly to the United
States. In areas particularly affecting such vocal
pressure groups as students and labor, successive
governments have shown concern and made some moves.
They have been unable, however, to get quick legisla-
tive action even on reforms to which opposition was
minimal. For example, almost no progress has been
made toward reform, of the outdated judicial system
and the bureaucratic government administration, and
great public impatience is evident.
This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.
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The Interim Government of Mariano Rumor
1. Since last summer when efforts to form a
majority government failed, Prime Minister Mariano
Rumor has headed a minority Christian Democratic
government. It was intended to last only until re-
gional and local elections could give a new reading
on popular attitudes toward the various political
parties., These elections are now expected to take
place next March or April.
2. Meanwhile, speculation has increased, par-
ticular-'-y in recent weeks, over the possibility of
an earlier change of government. Several reports
mention January 1970 as the time a change might oc-
cur. This development could come about if key po-
litical leaders--such as Foreign Minister Moro and
Senate President Fanfani of the Christian Democrats
and President Saragat, a right-wing Socialist--were
to agree: behind the scenes on a successor government.
Decisions reached at such a top-level meeting would
be closely held, and thus surprise is possible. We
believe that these and most political leaders still
? prefer t:o wait for spring election results, but they
might fuel forced to make a change earlier because
of concern over recent threats to public order such
as the explosions in Milan and Rome on 12 December.
The police are inclined to attribute these explo-
sions, which took a large toll in death, injuries,
and property damage, to extremists of the left. The
center-left political parties have voiced support
for the government in the wake of the latest terror-
ist incidents. Prime Minister Rumor has cited the
pressures of the political situation as making it
impossible for him to visit the United States in
January.
Labor Unrest
3. The atmosphere of instability around the
-Rumor gcvernment this fall has been fostered by the
coincidence that labor contracts affecting half the
industrial force were due for renewal in the last
six months of 1969. Labor has engaged in brief but
frequent strikes to improve its bargaining position
for the new contracts. In addition, a 24-hour gen-
eral strike for better housing was held on 19 No-
vember. It was peaceful in most cities, but tension
?
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rose sharply throughout the country when one police-
man was killed and others were injured during demon-
strations in Milan.
4. Some of the biggest unions have now signed
contracts. The contract for one million metalworkers
in private enterprise (including FIAT) is still un-
,der negotiation, however, and the three major labor
federations have called on their followers for a
four-hour sympathy strike on 19 December.
The Communist Factor
5. Another factor in the uncertainty surround-
ing the Rumor government has been the continuing
discussion over the possibility of an evolving role
for the Communist Party in Italian political life.
Such speculation was at the root of a Socialist
,Party split last July. Debate on the subject was
intensified late last summer when veteran Communist
leader Amendola suggested that the time was ripe
for the Italian Communist Party to enter the govern-
ment. The idea of a coalition some day between Com-
munists and non-Communists in Italy has been bruited
about for years. But most serious left-wing poli-
ticians have not gone further in public statements
than to discuss the possibility of accepting parlia-
mentary cooperation from the Communists, who hold
more than one fourth of the seats in the Chamber of
Deputies. Amendola's suggestion frightened Italian
leaders and was rejected by politicians of all
stripes, including most prominent Communists.
6. More recently a sharpening disagreement
within the Communist Party has highlighted the pre-
ference of one important faction for following Soviet
directives and of another for revolutionary action.
Both positions are repellent to most Italian leaders,
and discussion of the advantages of working more
closely with the Communists has thus been curtailed
for the time being.
The Economy
7. Italy's economic situation, which is char-
acterized by extraordinary economic growth, lends
elements of both weakness and strength to the politi-
cal scene. Rapid industralization has intensified
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,urbanization with all its concomitant problems. A
threat of inflation and the likelihood of continued
capital flight also offer possible grounds for attacks
on the government, A growth in GNP estimated at a
minimum of five percent for 1969, however, with a
population increase below one percent, has resulted
in greater prosperity at almost all levels. Wage in-
creases gained from this fall's labor negotiations
are estimated at ten percent annually for the next
several years. Substantial social security pension
increases, government employee raises, and low in-
dustrial inventories give promise of rising domestic
consumption and production.
ing Communist votes to pass reform measures in Parlia-
ment, but we would not expect that either would in-
troduce radical change in the government's direction.
Prospects
8. Italy is likely in any case to have a new
government sometime _i the first half of 1970. The
chances seem somewhat better than even that it will
be made up of the four parties of the center-left:
the Christian Democratic, the-two Socialist parties,
and the small Republican Party. The men most often
mentioned as probable prime ministers are Senate
President Fates nfaanni and Foreign Minister Moro. Both
have been prime minister before, and both iope to be
elected to the Italian presidency by Parliament in
1971. Either would probably be somewhat more in-
clined than Prime Minister Rumor to consider accept-
9. Less likely is a coalition of the Christian
Other eoa 'l-Io)'S Democrats with the right-wing Socialists, the Repub-
are m e1 l licans and the conservative, business-oriented Liber-
os b -'tIYals, or a Christian Democratic coalition with left-
,PKe( 4 . wing Socialists. Although each of these groupings
1-none- 11 would make up a mathematical majority in Parliament,
- .I' ' Ce cLer-'-eff neither would have a sufficient margin for stable
f(5.__ /I/auri government. Hence, consideration would probably be
'GLUM ~e given to moving up the national elections, which
v,, would normally take place in the spring of 1973, be-
fore attempting such coalitions. The possibility of
S~n-c 14 3 skedo rescheduling, however, is likely to lead to renewed
efforts to find a practical working coalition that
would avert early national elections, which deputies
and senators of all parties regard with repugnance.
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to 16 December Dissem, NSC Briefings on Southern Africa
and South Asia
DCI STATINTL
0/DDCI
O/DCI STATINTL
D/NE
DDI
O/DDI STATINTL
DOCI
D/OSR--3
CD/EUR
CD/MEA
MEA/Africa--5, African portions
MEA/South Asia--2, South Asian portions
CD/FEE
STATINTL
"
is
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0
NSC BRIEFING NOTICE
STATINTL
CD & PO/RO European Division FYI: O/DCI
CD & PO/RO MEA Division O/DDCI
STATINTL D/MEA O/DDI
D/MEA STATINTL DOCI
DOSR STATINTL
OBGI Graphics
1. There are at present requirements for the DCI
for three NSC briefing texts, any one or all of which
may be needed for the next NSC meeting the morning of
17 December:
a) Southern Africa(with NSSM-39 on agenda)
b) Military Aid Policy for South Asia(NSSM-26)
c) The Italian Political Situation.
2. The White House NSC staff obviously hopes that
the President's request for an Italian political brie-
fing can be met in memorandum form, because Kissinger's
? intention is to deal with both NSSMs on 17 December; if
not, they will try to arrange another NSC meeting for
2Z. or 23 December. As things now stand, however, DCI
will need to see all three briefing texts by oob Tuesday
16th at latest.
3. Deadline: This means I must have your drafts by
noon Monday, 15 December, at latest--and if any of them,
or any part of them, can be left with SDO before 7 p.m.
Sunday, it will make Monday and Tuesday a bit more sur-
vivable for everybody. Please let me know when I can
expect contributions.
4. Graphics: For NSC use, we will need 30X40"
briefing boards; these need not be ready before close
of business Tuesday, but should be started through the
Graphics shop before the week-end. For Southern Africa,
one locator map should do, showing Africa up to about
Mombasa-Brazzaville latitude, with political boundaries,
principal areas of insurgency, and major transport features
such as railways existing and proposed, pipelines, and
enough towns or regions so DCI can talk about Zambian
copper, Katangan exports, etc. For South Asia, a general
locator map with such features as Kashmir, ChiCom road-
building activities, Rann of Kutch, Indus & Ganges water-
ways. Also one or several charts on relative Pak/Indian
? military strength in organization and equipment. For Italy,
Parliamentary pie chart (or a series of them if shift in
voting trends is significant to the text) and a board with
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? enlarged mug shots of four or six principal characters.
5. Content: The definitive agenda for the NSC
meeting normally is not set until after the briefing
texts have to be ready, but DCI is usually called on
to brie:' for 10 to 15 minutes (one doublespaced page
in our standard NSC format is usually just about one
minute, and he sometimes will go longer if he feels
that important material would otherwise have to be
omitted,) As for what's to be covered, I can only
suggest that in most cases the best approach is to
start out with a summary statement of the background,
nature, and immediate status of the problem, and then
proceed to fill in the details in a standard current
intelligence approach; e.g., the Habiru came into
Palestine out of the Arabian desert 3,300 years ago,
the Arabs followed them 600 years later, and from a
common ethnic, geographic and linguistic background
they have now hated each other's guts for 2,700 years;
this cannot easily be unraveled in one generation etc
etc etc.
b) South Asia--NSSM-26 gives you a pretty good
idea of what the topic is: should we resume shipment of
C~)R 4ss~oCk~ lethal hardware to Pakistan, or back away from both India
and Pakistan? DCI will presumably want to talk about
likelihood of solution or conflict, deterioration
ote~.l,.c,w' kJL_ rels with Pak and oh-r- D .,. -,.~ ,. ,..a of US
T 1L_-7_
a) Southern Africa--pretty much a general
current intelligence briefing with some emphasis
on insurgency in the White Redoubt, the effectiveness
of sanctions, the extent of Soviet and ChiCom involve-
ment with the insurgents/nationalists, dependence of
New African govts on White Africa for trade, transpor-
tation etc.
VKIII IDA, Jwe should offer him a page or so on
tTc,w'Si Uf VS' S
draft the proposed memorandum, and I'll extract a briefing
from your draft, with or without State's chop--but keep me
informed on where the sticking points are in getting their
agreement.
STATINTL
?
STATINTL
STATINTL
AAA- c) Italy: I think best bet is for you to
X-7610, Red 9380, BZ-4
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MEMORANDUM FOR: r~ !. '4'S5I 1
Maps provided to NSC staff on 4 Dec 69.
&dey apparently will be incorporated in briefing
books for NSC principals.
(DAME)
F
I D AUGN 54 101 WH ICH RELACES FORM
BEMUSED. 10.101
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REPUBLI
antyre
Matadi"-1
Vila
x-+-.Serpa Pinto
SOUTH-WEST
AFRICA ~Tsumeb
\Mandate-Rep of Maun
South Africali 1
Ubundi
DEMOCRATIC
i' THE CONGO Kindu
S~eJ Port-Francqui
_Lake
Victoria
Dodoma
TANZANIA i
Songea
Coalfield..
_..
/Lake
Nyasa
Vila Cabral
~Ur under
construction
Nacala
SOUTH
A TLANTIC
OCEAN .
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
1815 3-67
SOUTHERN AFRICA
TRANSPORT ROUTES AND
SELECTED MINERALS
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Southern Africa:
CABINDA,
Kinshasa
WALVIS BAY ,j
IREP. OF S. AFRICA)F
Areas of Insurgency
AFRICA
Windhoek
is
Luke
Ruku:a
*1alisburyi
Dares Salaam
Lake
Nya-
RHODESIA
(U.K.)
MOZAMBIQUE
1 PORT.)
L6urenco Marques
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SECRET/ SENSITIVE
0800 Hours
15 December 1969
NSC ACTIVITIES
15 - 19 December 1969
NSC The NSC is scheduled to meet on Wednesday,
17 December, at 1000 hours to consider NSSM-39,
US Policy Toward Southern Africa. The Director
will be asked to brief and a briefing is being prepared.
Note: The NSC Staff is trying to schedule a meeting
for either 22 or 23 December to deal with NSSM-26,
US Military Supply Policy in South Asia. Failing in
this, the Staff will make one more attempt to put
this on Wednesday's agenda. A "just-in-case"
briefing is being prepared for the Director.
Review The Review Group is scheduled to meet at 1400 hours
Group to consider two related NSSM's--31, US Policy Toward
Malaysia and Singapore and 61, A Review of US Indonesian
Pol c. Both papers are on board and comments are
being prepared.
Other There are no other meetings known to be scheduled.
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
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UNCLASSIFIED
FORM NO. 237 the previous editions
1-67 G I
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFIC... ION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
OCI
2
3
STATINTL
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
STATINTL
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
ODDI/
12/15/69
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(40)
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a
DCI BRIEFING FOR
17 DECEMBER NSC MEETING
to
to
I. Mr. President, the showdown in southern Africa
for the 1970s is not so much a question of Euro-
pean colonialism against native nationalism, as
a struggle by four million white Africans to
maintain their rule over 30 million black Africans.
A. Portugal, with its holdings in Angola and
Mozambique, is still a classic colonial
power.
B. The Portuguese, however, are sustained in
their determination to remain in Africa by
the example of the whites who hold power
over South Africa and Rhodesia.
C. These are the whites who are described as
"Europeans" in the population statistics---
.out that is only a historical label. The
:Dutch, the French Huguenots, and the British
had begun settling southern Africa more than
300 years ago. By the early 19th century,
their descendants had taken the land from
-:he Hottentots, and from the Zulus and the
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other Bantus--long before Cecil Rhodes
and Paul Kruger made it a question of
empire.
1. The whites in Angola and Mozambique also
have ancient roots in Africa--the first
Portuguese settlers came to Angola a year
before Christopher Columbus set sail, and
Mozambique was colonized in 1505.
2. In Angola and Mozambique, however, blacks
and whites alike are citizens of Portugal,
their capital is Lisbon, and the territory
is defended by troops from the European
metropole.
3. The whites in Rhodesia and South Africa
have no thought of retiring to Devon or
Amsterdam; they have no ties, other than
heritage, to the Empire and the Commonwealth.
They are Africans--as I said, white Africans.
II. The :Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and
Mozambique all have strong white governments,
determined to stay in power.
A. They are aware of their common interests, and
of their mutual ostracism by most of the rest
of the world.
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B. As a result, they have stepped up their co-
operation with each other, and they are in-
creasingly firm in their belief that they can
defy world opinion and get away with it.
III. This self-confidence is warranted for the present,
and there is little prospect that anything will
happen to change it in the foreseeable future.
A. Certainly no black African country is strong
enough to challenge them outright.
1. The international action which the black
Africans have been able to obtain in the
United Nations has not beer3 effective.
2. South Africa is virtually self-sufficient,
and can sustain Rhodesia against the U.N.
action. The Portuguese territories are
oriented toward the Motherland, and thus
relatively immune to international trade
sanctions.
3. The black African countries have been un-
able to win over the major powers for
broader or more intensive sanctions.
4. Within Africa, the geography of trade
gives the white African countries the
upper hand over their native neighbors.
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B. The black populations are quiescent, and in-
surgent movements based abroad have been in-
effective.
1. Liberation groups in Zambia and Tanzania
have been trying to launch operations
against Rhodesia and South Africa, but
the security forces are so efficient that
no groups have been able to carry on sus-
tained guerrilla activities.
2. There is limited insurgency in the Portu-
guese territories, but it has made little
headway over the past two years. The
guerrillas face determined and effective
countermeasures, they are plagued by in-
ternal dissent, and they have not been able
to arouse any significant proportion of the
black population.
IV. The Soviets and the Chinese Communists, of course,
are t_^ying to capitalize on the issue of white mi-
nority government in Africa, raising the propaganda
issues of imperialism, colonialism, and racism.
A. The Soviets have given about one million dollars
a year in aid to the various insurgent groups,
and have provided advanced guerrilla training.
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I. of the 30 million blacks--and the bulk of the
four million whites who rule them--are in the Republic
of South Africa.
?
B. The Chinese are running a somewhat smaller pro-
gram, but they are getting ready to build a
railroad from Tanzania to Zambia which may cost
at much as $400 million, and which is designed
to free Zambia from its dependence on transport
routes through white southern Africa.
C. The Communist effort in Africa is, after all, a
second-priority project. Over the past 15 years,
Africa has received only 15 percent of all Com-
munist economic aid to the underdeveloped countries
while 70 percent has gone to the Middle East and
South Asia. As for Moscow's military aid to free
world recipients, Africa has had to share some
five percent of the total with Latin America--
about half of it has gone to Egypt and Indonesia,
with another 45 percent to Algeria, Syria, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and India.
D. In short, there is no effective challenge at pres-
ent--domestic or foreign--to white minority rule
in South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Mozambique.
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?
?
A. The total 1969 population is estimated at
19,634,000. That breaks down, in round
f=_gures, into:
19 percent whites, or about 3,730,000;
68 percent blacks, or about 13,350,000;
10 percent of mixed blood--officially des-
ignated as "Coloureds"--or about 1,960,000;
and
3 percent Asians--mainly Indians--about 590,000.
B. The Territory of Southwest Africa adds another
6C9,000 people--81 percent black, only 14 percent
write, and 5 percent Coloureds.
II. The Republic of South Africa is
~? the strongest and most secure of the white
regimes.
A. The official policy of Apartheid has made South
Africa an international whipping boy for years.
As a result, it has developed its economy with
an eye to self-sufficiency. Today, with the
single exception of oil, South Africa has all
the natural resources and the industrial plant
it needs to go it alone.
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B. Moreover, the South Africans in recent years
have come to realize that they have a number
of bargaining counters they can use to induce
o-'--her countries to deal with the regime on an
"as is" basis.
1. Their minerals--gold, uranium and diamonds--
are in demand in international markets.
2. Their ports and their strategic location
have become more important since the closure
of the Suez Canal.
C. The government of Prime Minister Johannes Vorster,
armed with this new feeling of self-sufficiency,
has been working quietly for better diplomatic
and economic relations with neighboring black
African states.
1? Formal relations have been established with
Malawi.
2. South Africa is giving economic and technical
assistance to Lesotho, one of the former Brit-
ish protectorates in southern Africa which
hal'8- recently been given independence.
3. Other black African countries--for instance,
Malagasy, Gabon and Ivory Coast--are also
V
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interested in relations and aid,but are
hesitant to risk criticism by their neigh-
bors.
4. Many African countries
have been trading secretly
or quietly with South Africa.
III. Within the country, the regime has not loosened
its strict Apartheid, or "separate development"
laws.
A. The government is being challenged by a new,
far-right political party ~~
hich
accrues that the government is already doing
too much for the blacks. From now until the
elections next April, the government can be
expected to be rigid in its application of
Apartheid.
B. The blacks have made little headway toward
the B-an.tustans, or separate nations, which
are the ultimate goal of separate development.
1. They are needed in white urban areas as
the major semi-skilled and unskilled labor
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force. And they can make more money
there than they could farming in their
own tribal homelands.
2. The government has also done little--
for example, such as major financial in-
vestment in homeland industries--to make
return to the Bantustans more inviting.
C. For the foreseeable future, then, there will
be little change in South Africa's racial
system, and no possibility of ousting the
white government.
1. There are two insurgent groups based in
Tanzania seeking to liberate South Africa.
Their membership within the country is un-
known, probably minimal, and relatively
invisible, because it is inactive. Both
groups combined have less than 400 members
outside the country.
D. South Africa's defense and security forces have
some 57,000 on duty, and another 82,000 in the
active reserve. The air force has 422 pilots,
197 jets, and 358 other aircraft; the navy is
led by one destroyer and two destroyer escorts.
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1. South Africa produces most of the small
arms, mortars and ammunition it requires.
It assembles armored cars from French
components, and has begun assembling
Macchi jet trainers supplied by Italy.
In 1966, France passed the United Kingdom
as the principal source of military hardware
imports.
2. 300 South African police have been sta-
tioned in Rhodesia to help local security
forces and a few helicopters have been
furnished on loan.
3. No South African forces are stationed in
Angola or Mozambique, but South Africans
cooperate with Portuguese officials, and
have supplied some ammunition.
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I. Rhodesia has a population of just over 5
million, with 230,000 whites and 4.8 million
blac:{s. The issue of majority African rule
has dictated events in Rhodesia over the
past 10 years.
A. :London in the early 1960s began working
-toward broadened voting rights which
would have led eventually to majority
rule. To forestall this, Prime Minister
Lan Smith in November 1965 issued a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence,
and for white Rhodesians, the initials
U.D.I. have the same ring today that
:L776 has in this country.
B. Smith's political party, the Rhodesian
Front, came to power in 1962, and is
now unchallenged.
L. The African nationalist groups which
were its main opponents have been
outlawed since 1964, and now operate
mainly from exile in Zambia.
?
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:Z. They are weak, badly split, and
have little indigenous support.
Active insurgents number only about
700, and the rural black population
inside Rhodesia is passive. The
tribal chiefs cooperate with the
Smith government in Salisbury.
3 . The nationalists have been inackive
1
since a series of unsuccessful
?
0
guerrilla incursions in 1967 and
1968. They plan to try infiltration
of small units soon, but the Rhodesian
security forces are capable of handling
any new attempts.
C. The Rhodesian Front is again expected to win
most, if not all, of the 50 white parlia-
mentary seats in new general elections some
time in early 1970. There is no real
political opposition to the Smith regime.
1. Tobacco farmers--once one of the most
powerful pressure groups in Rhodesia--
recently criticized the Smith regime
for reducing tobacco production quotas.
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They have been hurt by the U.N.
sanctions, and the government is
trying to reduce the necessary
subsidies by gradually cutting
back on production.
2. Railway workers are also bitter
because the government threatened
to jail union leaders if they struck
for higher pay.
3. There is, however, no strong party
which could turn this dissatisfaction
against the Rhodesian Front.
II. Rhodesia's new constitution has recently been
signed into law, and will go into effect at the
time of the new elections.
A. It institutionalizes the existing white
rule, and will transform Rhodesia into an
independent republic without any further
formal declaration.
1. This reflects Ian Smith's confidence
that Rhodesia no longer needs a
settlement with London, or its old
Commonwealth ties, to ride out
economic sanctions and diplomatic
isolation.
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2. We do not expect any immediate
recognition of the new Rhodesian
state, even by South Africa or
Portugal. Smith hopes, however,
that western governments which
still have missions in Salisbury
will leave them there when the new
constitution takes effect. He
could interpret this as de facto
recognition.
III. One of the main reasons for Smith's confidence
is the health of the economy.
A. Exports dipped sharply immediately after
U.D.I., and have not regained their 1965
levels, but with the help of South Africa
and Portugal, Rhodesia has gradually
increased both exports and imports since
1967.
Only the tobacco industry is still
suffering significantly, and with
the passage of time sanctions are
likely to become less and less
effective.
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2. Gross domestic product may well have
increased by 7 percent in 1969, and
Rhodesia is well endowed with natural
resources.
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I. Portugal--in its treatment of its African
possessions--is as defiant of world opinion
as is the Republic of South Africa.
A. Lisbon maintains that these territories
are overseas provinces of Portugal, and
an integral part of the nation. Hence,
any action by other nations or in the
U.N. constitutes an interference in
Portugal's internal affairs.
B. There is little prospect, in actual
fact, that Lisbon will loosen its
present controls, let alone move toward
majority rule in Angola, Mozambique,
and the other overseas territories.
1. At present, even minor policy
recommendations by the white-
dominated territorial adminis-
trations must have Lisbon's
approval.
2. Premier Caetano early in 1969
suggested a move toward greater
autonomy, but dropped the proposal
in the face of a strong reaction by
powerful old guard elements.
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c, Governors are appointed by Lisbon, and
hold most of the power that is not exercised
by the home government. Theoretically,
blacks in Angola and Mozambique have the
:=ranchise, and could outvote the relative
handful of whites in balloting for the
Portuguese legislature and the provincial
representative assemblies.
1. In point of fact, however, the electoral
law is so complex that even many whites
in Portuguese Africa fail to vote, and
the blacks who wish to do so face an
array of qualifications including literacy,
property, and other tests.
2. Caetano says participation will be extended
to black Africans "who totally accept Portu-
guese culture"--a phrase which could mean
that the African tribesman will have to
pray, marry, and even think like a European
Portuguese before he can vote.
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3. The Lisbon government has implemented
educational and economic reforms which
will improve the welfare of blacks,
II. Lisbon, in maintaining its hold over the Af-
rican territories, so far has not been-pushed
beyond diplomatic efforts to obtain understand-
ing for Portuguese sovereignty, and informal
cooperation with the other white regimes of
southern Africa.
A. The Portuguese are probably opposed to a
permanent security pact with their White
African neighbors except as a last resort.
B. Lisbon, independent-minded and fearful of
South African political domination, has
even tried to keep direct assistance to a
minimum.
C. Portugal is not known to have diverted any
NATO-committed forces, or MAP-restricted
weapons supplied by the United States, to
tae defense of its African territories.
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1, Lisbon resents U.S, prohibitions on
the use of such material, but has been
able to manufacture--or purchase else-
where--equipment restricted by the
United States.
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Angola
II. Ango__a's 270,000 whites make up about five per-
cent of the population, and there are another
75,000 mulattoes. From almost five million
blacks, two nationalist organizations have re-
cruited some 12 to 14,000 members. About half
of these are active guerrillas, and no more than
3 to 4,000 of them are operating inside Angola
at any one time.
A. The Portuguese government, using 60,000 troops
and some 33,000 local defense militiamen and
auxiliaries, has confined guerrilla operations
to a harassment level.
1. Areas where the guerrillas have been able
to operate are poor in resources, and
they must rely on bases outside Angola
for arms and equipment.
2. There are guerrilla bases in Zambia and
Congo-Kinshasa, but these countries have
to depend on Portuguese Africa for trans-
portation facilities. As a result,
they have restrained the guerrillas when-
ever Portugal has put on the pressure.
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On several occasions when there has been
a surge of sabotage or terrorism, the
Portuguese have announced that railroads
on which Zambia and the Congo depend would
have to be shut down for repairs. The
African governments have quickly under-
stood the hint.
B. The first Angolan nationalist organization in
the field was the GRAE of Holden Roberto, but
starting in 1960, Communist countries and
radical black Africans began building up the
rival, Marxist-oriented MPLA.
1. Roberto's organization staged most of the
insurgency in Angola until 1965. At that
time, the Portuguese managed to contain
his operations, and simultaneously his sup-
port from outside sources was drastically
cut back in favor of the MPLA.
2. The long-standing rivalry of GRAE and MPLA
has wasted the limited resources of the
guerrillas and weakened their overall ef-
fectiveness.
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Mozambique
Mozambique, the 100,000 whites make
up less than 1.5 percent of the estimated
7,500,000 population.
A. The principal nationalist organization,
known as FRELIMO, has 8 to 10,000
members, but less than a third of them
manage to operate inside Mozambique at
any one time.
1. Tanzania provides a hospitable base,
but a Portuguese defensive belt of
fortified villages confines the
guerrillas to sparsely populated
and economically unimportant areas
along the northern border.
2. FRELIMO is trying to penetrate more
rewarding areas of Mozambique by
way of Zambia and Malawi, but the
host governments depend on the white
regimes of Southern Africa for
transportation routes.
3. There are 40,000 Portuguese troops and
almost 10,000 auxiliaries in Mozambique.
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B. FRELIMO's efforts to push deeper into the
country are plagued by logistical problems,
by the apathy and tribal rivalries of the
:Mozambique blacks, and by a measure of
factionalism among the nationalists.
1. FRELIMO's original leader, Eduardo
Mondlane, was assassinated last
February. He was replaced briefly
by a triumvirate, until the chief of
the guerrilla forces, Moises Samora
Machel, eased out one of the members
and took over control.
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Portuguese Guinea
IV. Finally, I want to mention Portuguese Guinea
brie:=ly, although it is not a part of what we
generally consider white Southern Africa.
Portuguese Guinea provides a sharp contrast,
because here the black insurgents
to-
be w-rrTTtrrg-, \MY A 0
A. Me total population is only 530,000, and
the whites and mulattoes combined--exclu-
sive of Portuguese troops--make up less
than one percent.
B. The major insurgent group is the African
Party for the Independence of Portuguese
Guinea and Cape Verde, or PAIGC.
1. This group has bases in Guinea and
Senegal, and it also controls exten-
sive territory
especially
along the southeastern border with Afri-
can Guinea.
2. It gets arms, funds, and training from
Communist countries--mainly the Soviet
Union. It also has military support from
radical African states, and financial
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support from the Organization of Afri-
can Unity.
C. The Portuguese Governor is using 16 battalions
against the insurgents--some 27,000 troops in
all--but 5,000 of these have been recruited
among the natives.
At present, he is trying to apply a pro-
gram of resettlement in fortified ham-
lets.
2. The prospects are for a prolonged insur-
gency, and the balance is now swinging
in favor of the PAIGC.
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17 DEq*BER NSC MEETING
I. Mr. President, the showdown in Southern Africa
for the 1970s is not so much a question of .Euro-?
pean colonialism against native nationalism, as
a struggle by four million white Africans to
maintain their rule over 30 million black Africans.
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A. Portugal, with its holdings in Angola and
Mozambique, c it R is still a classic
colonial power.
B. The Portuguese, however, are sustained in
th.eir determination to remain in Africa by
the example of the whites who hold power
over South Africa and Rhodesia.
C. These are the whites who are described as
"Europeans" in the population statistics,
but that is a historical label. They are
the descendants of the British, the Dutch,
and the French Huguenot* settlers who took
4L !,
southern Africa from the ~ ,A Zulus
other,
and the Bantus more than 100 years ago in
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the early 19th century--long before Cecil
Rhodes and Paul Kruger made it a question
of empire.
1. The whites in Angola and Mozambique also
have ancient roots in Africa--the first
Portuguese settlers came to Angola a year
before Christopher Columbus set sail, and
Mozambique was colonized in 1505.
2. In Angola and Mozambique, however, blacks
and whites alike are citizens of Portugal,
their capital is Lisbon, and the territory
is defended by troops from the European
metropole.
3. The whites in Rhodesia and South Africa
have no thought of retiring to Devon or
Amsterdam; they have no ties other than
heritage to the Empire and the Commonwealth.
They are Africans--as I said, white Africans.
II. The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and
Mozambique all have strong white governments, de-
termined to stay in power.
A. T:zey are aware of their common interests, and
of their mutual ostracism by most of the rest
of the world.
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