DDI BRIEFING FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A002000070002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 89
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 4, 1969
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
BRIEFING PAPERS
Philippines
Nationalist China
Thailand
Nepal
fghanistan
Malaysia
Singapore
Indonesia
Australia
New Zealand
Vietnam
K*2000070002-7
Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia
I I
Indonesia's Foreign Debt
MAPS (in back cover)
Two maps of each country except Vietnam
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
I. For the Philippines, the long-run domestic prob-
lem is the unwillingness of the ruling elite to
accept changes necessary to improve the lot of
the common man.
A. The country's agriculture economy, with. its
strong feudalistic overtones, is not attuned
to the needs of a rapidly growing and landless
peasant population.
B. Economic growth is barely ahead of population
growth. Economic advances are skimmed off by
those who control the economy; the real wages
of workers continue to slip.
C. The government has been unwilling to impose
controls necessary to redress a current
serious foreign exchange imbalance.
D. President Marcos, although given an apparent
mandate through his election to an unprecedented
second term, has neither the will nor the power
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to force necessary reforms.
E. A free-wheeling political system has until
now provided an outlet for public discontent.
The electorate is becoming increasingly dis-
inclined, however, to be put off by empty
political promises.
F. Meanwhile official corruption and lawlessness
are prominent and continuing hallmarks of
Philippine society.
II. Internal security threats are still minimal.
A. The Huks, although influential in rural
central Luzon and growing slightly in num-
bers, have been contained militarily.
B. The urban left is small and faction-ridden.
Its articulate voicing of popular grievances,
however, has spurred increasing public ques-
tioning of the political system. ICI
III. Redefinition of the relationship with the US is
the Philippines' major foreign policy goal.
A. The Filipinos have long professed a desire to
be internationally accepted as a fully inde-
pendent state, out of the US shadow, but they
were taken aback by President Nixon's
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statement in Manila last July that the era
of "special relationship" was coming to an
end. Manila now appears prepared, however,
to show greater self-reliance.
B. Renegotiation of US military base rights is
the Philippines' most immediate aim.
1. The Filipinos want a more specific
acknowledgement of their sovereignty
over the bases, particularly in gaining
broader jurisdiction over offenses by US
servicemen.
2. Filipinos privately recognize the security
and economic benefits of the bases, and
almost certainly will not press for their
removal.
3. Manila is still forming a negotiating
position, and has indicated it will not be
ready for these talks until mid-1970.
C. In economic relations, the Philippines seeks
an extension of US tariff preferences after
expiration of the Laurel-Langley agreement in
1974, but it has not shown any willingness
to continue the reciprocal privileges to US
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i -j-s Fft (V q -T I o N R t_
IV. Manila seems anxious to refurbish its __ l
its historic aloofness from the Communist
world is outmoded.
B. Fear of Communist China remains strong, and
there will be no lowering of Manila's guard
against Peking.
reputation, tarnished by its dispute with Malaysia
over Sabah.
A. Manila's noisy challenging of Malaysian
sovereignty over Sabah in 1968 belied its
protestations of a commitment to regionalism,
and nearly scuttled the nascent As_sciation
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
B. Since early 1969, however, the Philippine
claim has been muted, and Manila now indicates
that the matter will be pursued in low key
at the ASEAN meeting in mid-December.
V. Marcos' second term may bring about the cautious
opening of relations with the USSR and Eastern
Europe.
A. A feeling is growing in the Philippines that
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businesses in the Philippines.
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4 December 1969
DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
I. With extensive US support, the Republic of China
(Taiwan and the off-shore islands) has become po-
litically stable, economically viable and militarily
strong over the past 20 years.
A. In theory a constitutional republic, it is
really a one-man, one-party government which
provides efficient although sometimes arbitrary
rule.
1. Power is centered in President Chiang
Kai-shek and his elder son, Vice-Premier
Chiang Ching-kuo, and the "mainlanders"--
about 14 percent of the population--
monopolize the government, the military
security establishment, and the Kuomintang
Party.
2. National elections, to be held in mid-
December for the first time since the
1948 election on the mainland, will be
tightly controlled and will probably yield
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an unqualified Kuomintang victory.
B. There is no organized opposition, although the
native Taiwanese resent their under-representa-
tion in the government.
1. The regime has given highest priority to
maintenance of internal security, and
martial law still prevails throughout
the country.
2. The homogeneity of the population has been
a major cause of stability, but economic
prosperity has also contributed.
II. The country, over the past decade, has made note-
worthy economic progress, and has one of the fast-
est growing and most prosperous economies in Asia.
A. Official US grant economic aid, except for
PL-480, ended in 1965, but growth continues
despite the burden of heavy defense outlays.
B. The large military establishment of approxi-
mately 550,000 men is slowly being reduced
to realistic size--in line with US urgings.
1. Reductions in manpower and phasing out of
obsolete equipment are under way, but
the government wants US aid in the form
of more sophisticated military hardware,
CHI-2
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especially aircraft and naval vessels.
III. Relations with the US have been generally coopera-
tive and harmonious, but the government remains
extremely sensitive to the possibility of a US
policy shift that could adversely affect its
security or its claim to be the legal government
of all China.
A. Taipei. has strongly supported continued US
presence in Asia, and is greatly concerned
over the implications of any US withdrawal.
B. The country's immediate diplomatic concern
centers on offsetting losses sustained in
its international position.
1. Taipei has always been unwilling to accept
any " two China's" solution; its stated
policy is to break relations with any
nation that recognizes Peking.
2. Recent movements toward recognition of
Peking by Canada and Italy, and the gradual
increase in support for admission of Peking
to the UN, are causing concern.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
Foreign Policy
I. Bangkok's number one problem is what to do about
its future security.
A. Thailand has long based its foreign policy
on a close alliance with the US as the best
way to deter conventional military attack
and foreign inspired insurgency.
1. It has followed the US lead throughout
the course of the Vietnam war, providing
air bases and an infantry division to help
the US prosecute the war.
B. Thai leaders have become increasingly appre-
hensive over what they view as a deteriorating
willingness by the US to achieve a satisfactory
solution in South Vietnam.
2. They welcome the periodic assurances from
US government leaders that the US will
adhere to its commitments in Southeast
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Asia, but feel it is only a matter of time
before Washington is forced to accede to
US congressional and public opinion pres-
sures to reduce its role.
C. Bangkok's relations with the US have suffered
over the war issue.
1. Thai leaders are chagrined at becoming
the target of US war critics, and feel
the US Government could do more to
legitimize the Thai role.
2. They are not likely, however, to reduce
their participation in the war without
US concurrence.
D. Bangkok has no ready alternative to its de-
pendence on the US.
1. The Thais continue to champion regional
economic and political cooperation, backed
by Western economic and strategic power,
as the preferred solution.
2. They fully realize, however, the practical
limitations of ASEAN and other regional
groupings.
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3. Should the US greatly reduce its presence
in Southeast Asia, Thai leaders will be
more inclined toward some accommodation
with the Communist powers.
Insurgency
II. Communist insurgency in underdeveloped and
isolated areas of the country is Bangkok's most
pressing internal problem.
A. The primary target area of the insurgents
is in the northeast, where insurgent opera-
tions center on guerrilla propaganda and
terrorism at the village level, with occa-
sional clashes with government security
forces.
1. Bangkok has developed a comprehensive
counterinsurgency program, heavily sup-
ported by US aid, which has kept the
insurgents in the northeast off balance.
B. In the north and north-central provinces,
the Communists have improved their tribal
guerrilla organization and tripled their
numbers in the last year, to about 1,600.
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1. Bangkok has virtually ceded some mountain-
ous areas near the Laotian border to the
guerrillas, and is concentrating on low-
land security.
C. The Communists also may be making their first
serious effort to develop support in the low-
lands.
1. The Communists here may run into more
determined government security efforts,
as well as widespread disapproval of Com-
munist support for the unpopular nonethnic
Thai tribesmen.
D. Communist guerrillas in the mid-southern
peninsular provinces--numbering about 400--
are challenging the government's presence
for the first time.
1. Bangkok is a long way from developing the
necessary programs to deal with a sus-
tained guerrilla effort in the south.
Political
III. There has been considerable talk in government
circles that the Thai leadership may be thinking
of making some important governmental shifts.
A. The key move being talked about is the
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replacement of Prime Minister Thanom Kitti-
kachorn.
1. He presumably would be succeeded by
deputy Prime Minister Praphat. The
transition would be orderly, and with
the Prime Minister's acquiescence.
B. Such speculation underlines the delicate
nature of the factional balance which has
supported the Thanom government over the
years, but which could be upset by those
who feel the time for change has come.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
I. Nepal's main foreign policy problems are with its
neighbors--Communist China and India--not the US.
A. The Nepalese are interested in the United
States mainly as one means of offsetting
Chinese and Indian influence.
B. There is some concern in Nepal that we will
back India against Nepal because India is a
more important country. The Nepalese have
been assured that this is not so.
C. The government is also concerned about Vietnam,
Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet problems, primarily
because it thinks Nepal might be caught in any
major escalation of these problems.
II. The Indians--and the British before them--have
been the dominant foreign influence in Nepal, and
the Nepalese are now trying to assert their inde-
pendence.
A. They want to end the Indian military mission
in Kathmandu and the Indian-manned observation
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posts on the Nepal-Tibet border.
B. There is little Nepal can do about Indian
economic influence, since New Delhi is now the
largest aid donor to Nepal and about 90 percent
of Nepal's trade is with India.
C. King Mahendra may think the Indians are backing
his political enemies. Some non-Communist oppo-
sition leaders do live in India, but as far as
we know the Indians are not supporting them.
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IV. The Nepalese apparently have decided that the only
answer to the Chinese threat is to try to get
along with Peking.
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A. Kathmandu has tried to avoid offending China,
but is by no means under Chinese influence.
B. There is some Chinese subversive activity in
Nepal, but so far it is not a danger to the
government.
V. King Mahendra appears firmly in control of the
country.
A. He exercises autocratic control over the
legislative system--a series of assemblies
called panchayats--and the cabinet is a
rubber stamp.
B. There is no effective opposition, even though
there is some dissatisfaction with the King's
tight rule.
VI. Nepal is one of the poorest and least developed
countries in Asia, but is self-sufficient in food.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
I. King Zahir--the predominant political force in
Afghanistan--remains committed to his "experiment
in democracy," although the past two years have
been rocky ones under the new system.
A. Economic stagnation plagues the country, and
needed development programs have become bogged
down in the inexperienced, slow-moving parlia-
ment.
B. The government's uncertain, ineffective re-
action to student and incipient labor unrest
has, generated some skepticism about the
"experiment" among educated Afghans.
C. The country nevertheless has maintained a
surprising degree of stability despite these
evident strains of modernization.
II. The second parliamentary elections under the 1964
constitution were successfully carried out in
August and September 1969.
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A. The new parliament may be even more conserva-
tive and less favorable to reform legislation
than the last. Provincial landlords, village
and religious elders predominate in the Lower
House.
B. Many educated candidates and incumbents were
defeated, and the acknowledged pro-Communists
lost seats.
C. The new legislature's performance will ulti-
mately depend as much upon executive leadership
and royal guidance as upon its own members'
initiative.
III. Nur Ahmad Etemadi, reappointed Prime Minister,
won a vote of confidence from parliament last
week.
A. Etemadi was indecisive and undynamic in his
previous two-year Prime Ministership, and is
not likely to exert forceful or imaginative
leadership.
B. There was. an unexpectedly large turnover in
his new cabinet, and there are many youthful
and Western-educated freshman members. Some
of the best economic experts are gone.
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IV. In foreign affairs, Afghanistan continues to
maintain its independence through a nonaligned
and neutral stance, although Soviet influence
and presence in the country are predominant.
A. Afghanistan would have to back the Soviet
position if forced to choose sides on a
question like Vietnam, but it has so far
avoided involvement.
B. Nevertheless, the Afghans state privately
that a continued US presence is essential to
the balance of power in South and Southeast
Asia.
V. Afghanistan has no significant outstanding prob-
lems with the United States, but does hope that
US economic and token military assistance will
continue. The Afghans might solicit US views
on a South Asian regional transit arrangement,
their relations with Pakistan, and the plans of
the new Afghan Government.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
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MALAYSIA
I. Malaysia's highly unpredictable and delicate
balance of its Malayan and Chinese communities
still poses a potentially disastrous threat to
internal stability and to the Malay-led govern-
ment in Kuala Lumpur.
A. The government has been led since the May
1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur by a National
Operations Council--or NOC--headed by the
deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak.
B. Razak and the NOC have been heavy-handed in
dealing both with extremist Malays--the
so-called "ultras" who feel that their privi-
leged position is being threatened--and with
Malaysian Chinese. The Chinese bore the brunt
of the May violence.
C. The NOC's rule by fiat has also caused grum-
bling in Sarawak and Sabah, where Malays con-
stitute only small proportions of the popula-
tions. Elections in both states were postponed,
and no new polling dates have been set.
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D. The virtual expulsion of both Chinese and
Indians from positions of influence within
the government makes further outbreaks of
racial violence even more likely in West
Malaysia. The only Chinese attached to
the government are probably looked on by
their own community as "Uncle Toms."
II. Apart from the tinderbox local situation in
West Malaysia, the country is also coping with
a modest resurgence of Communist activity.
A. The militant arm of the Communist Party of
Malaya -- known as the Communist Terrorist
Organization, or CTO -- is trying to make a
comeback into Malaysia. For more than eight
year it has remained generally dormant in
the jungles of southern Thailand.
B. The CTO's have provoked exchanges with Ma-
laysian security forces in areas close to
the Thai border several times in recent
months, and are trying to re-establish sup-
port among both Chinese and Malays in the
northern states of West Malaysia.
C. Malaysia has beefed up its military and para-
military forces to cope with the problem, and
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CTO forces have usually come off a bad
second in their encounters with the Malay-
sian authorities.
III. Malaysia's foreign policy is still directed to-
ward the West, although there has been increased
interest in developing some economic ties with
Communist countries.
A. Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta have established
fairly good working relations since the ad-
vent of the Suharto government. Official
discussions have even included the possibility
of mutual defense.
B. Relations with Singapore are still wary. Some
Malaysian spokesmen claim to be afraid that
Singapore's growing defense mechanism could
be aimed north, particularly if any serious
anti-Chinese pogroms should take place. This,
however, would be highly unlikely.
C. Kuala Lumpur and Manila are still at odds
over the Sabah dispute. They plan to discuss
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the question of sovereignty over the area
this month, but Malaysia's conditions seem
certain to be. unacceptable to the Philip-
pine government. This issue will probably
hang fire for some time to come.
IV. Malaysia's economic situation is stable and
booming, thanks largely to its efficient pro-
duction of tin and rubber.
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SINGAPORE
I. Singapore, under the leadership of Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew, is both stable and prosperous.
A. Lee, a socialist who in his early political
days was closely associated with Communist
elements in the then-colonial state, has been
fierce in his measures to keep Communism under
control in his country. He has continued to
make use of internal security regulations
which the British originated to arrest and
detain any Communists or Communist sympathizers
he thinks might be dangerous.
B. The pro-Communist Barisan Socialis Party--
Singapore's leading opposition to the govern-
ment's People's Action Party--is weak. Any
potential the Barisan might have had for mean-
ingful anti-government activity--little at
best--has been further dissipated by recent
dissension within its own ranks.
II. Singapore's external orientation is directed toward
the West, although it has established diplomatic,
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consular, and trade relations with a number of
Communist countries.
A. Singapore has built up its own defense forces
from scratch, and its army now numbers only
about 6,000. It hopes to be able to base its
future defense policies on the nascent five-
power alliance involving Singapore, Malaysia,
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK.
1. Singapore is afraid, however, that the
alliance will prove fragile. The UK is
determined to withdraw militarily by 1971,
and Australia and New Zealand do not ap-
pear to be adequate substitutes.
B. Singapore is also wary that Malaysia and In-
donesia might join in a squeeze move against
the island state. Any such move would pre-
sumably consist primarily of some sort of
economic moves to reduce the heavy Malaysian
and Indonesian reliance on Singapore's en-
trepot role.
III. Singapore's bustling entrepot economy gives it
one of the highest per capita incomes in South-
east Asia.
A. A recent development and expansion program
of local industry has effectively reduced
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unemployment, and Singapore is now relaxing
previously stringent foreign employment and
immigration regulations.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
I. The Suharto government in Indonesia has three
major domestic policies: the continuation of
the economic recovery program, the continued
suppression of Communism; and the development
of some form of representative government which
ensures stability but at the same time accords
adequate participation to the country's non-
Communist political elements.
II. With the guidance of the International Monetary
Fund and foreign financial assistance, Indonesia
has largely stabilized its currency. A Five-
Year Economic Development program was launched
last April.
A. The program emphasizes agriculture (with a
goal of food self-sufficiency in the 1970s)
and infrastructure.
B. Indonesia's economic program depends heavily
on the continued infusion of foreign assistance.
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1. This is being supplied chiefly by a group
of Western nations and international or-
ganizations which have pledged a total
of approximately one billion US dollars
since 1967. Only about half of this has
been utilized.
2. These donor nations have also annually
postponed payments on debts that Indonesia;'
negotiated during the Sukarno period.
3. Indonesia, however, is unable to meet
even these rescheduled payments, so a
new and longer-term rescheduling is now
being considered which would permit re-
payment over a 30-year period.
C. Indonesia's largest single creditor is the
Soviet Union; these debts too were contracted
during the Sukarno era.
1. Indonesia has made no payments under a
rescheduling negotiated in 1966. Instead
Djakarta has suggested that the USSR
should also reschedule again, this time
along lines now being considered by the
Western nations.
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2. Some such arrangement seems likely to
be worked out, but it will take time.
III. The army successfully crushed a Communist coup in
1965 and a resurgent effort in 1.968, and continues
a tight intelligence-security effort against
party remnants.
A. The Communists are split into two ineffective
factions, both of which are pro-Peking in the
sense that they see the ultimate need for
armed struggle. The larger faction, however,
urges current rebuilding, while the smaller
demands an immediate military effort.
B. The government plans in 1970 to release those
Communist prisoners--some held since 1965--who
had little status in the movement. The more
indoctrinated Communists are being resettled
in agricultural colonies, either in "closed
villages" or on remote islands. The hard
core--some 5,000--will remain in prison and
eventually are to be brought to trial.
IV. Civilian elements have been accorded a signifi-
cant role in the Indonesian Government, but ulti-
mate control remains in army hands.
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A. The army sees the need to perpetuate its
political role, certainly until economic re-
covery has been achieved.
B. Under present plans, elections are to be
held in 1971, but enabling legislation is
still incomplete.
1. Approximately three-fourths of the par-
liamentary seats and two-thirds of those
in Congress (Congress makes policy and
Parliament legislates) are to be elected.
The government--presumably the president--
will appoint the remainder.
V. Although Indonesia follows a nonaligned foreign
policy, its post-Sukarno international relations
have been weighted toward the West, from which
it receives critically needed financial assistance.
A. Largely because of Indonesia's strongly anti-
Communist domestic stance, relations with the
USSR and Eastern Europe have been correct but
cool in the post-Sukarno era, and ties with
China were suspended in 1967.
VI. Other than negotiating aid, Indonesia's principal
international interest is that of developing
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regional influence in Southeast Asia.
A. With the largest population in Southeast
Asia, Indonesia sees itself as the potential
area leader, particularly as Western forces
either withdraw or reduce their presence.
B. The principal potential vehicle for this
influence is the five-member Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), estab-
lished in 1967; other members are Thailand,
Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore.
1. Indonesia has been the most active member
in trying to keep the organization alive;
ASEAN's activities are currently limited
to marginal economic and cultural matters.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
I. The Liberal-Country coalition government under
Prime Minister John Gorton, which was narrowly
re-elected in October, can look forward to repeated
challenges from the opposition Labor Party when
parliament reconvenes in February or March.
A. With a parliamentary majority of only seven
votes, Gorton, who is personally unpopular
with. both his party and the public, may not
last long.
B. He will probably hang on, however, until after
the Senate elections in late 1970.
II. The Australian economy is booming, largely due to
exploitation and export of minerals. The Japanese
have taken a large share of this new output.
A. US investment is playing a large role in the
expansion of the Australian economy, and
Australians--although aware of the need for
foreign capital--are concerned over this
American control of a substantial segment
AUS-1
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of their resources and business.
1. The government has suggested some controls
over foreign investment, but nothing is
definitely in the works at this time.
B. Australia is also concerned over its unfavor-
able trade balance with the US, and has dif-
ficulty accepting US restrictions on the import
of some of Australia's more important products,
especially meat and wool.
III. Australia views its alliance with the US--based
on the ANZUS treaty and the SEATO treaty of 1954--
as the keystone of its security structure and
foreign policy. Aside from the American alliance,
it is also committed to playing a significant role
in Southeast Asia.
A. Australia has ground, naval, and air forces
totalling 8,000 men in South Vietnam, chiefly
in response to a US request phrased in terms
of SEATO responsibility.
1. Gorton publicly approved President Nixon's
3 November speech on Vietnam, and said
that Australian troop recall would be phased
into American withdrawal as the latter be-
comes possible.
AUS-2
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2. The government has enjoyed strong but
gradually diminishing support on its Viet-
nam position; in September a poll indicated
that over 50 percent of Australians favored
withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.
cto?
B. Australia has positioned * troops in the
Malaysia-Singapore area, and is committed to
maintain a presence there after the British
withdrawal at the end of 1971. The country
is one of the Five-Power Commonwealth group
which has undertaken to oversee Malaysian-
Singapore defense.
C. Australia has long been active in economic
and cultural assistance programs in Southeast
Asia.
1. Its principal contribution (other than
to the Territory of Papua - New Guinea,
which Australia administers) is to Indo-
nesia, Australia's nearest and largest
neighbor.
IV. The opposition Labor Party, like the government,
strongly subscribes to the American alliance and
to sustaining a significant economic role in Asia.
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A. It would, however, withdraw troops from Vietnam
and reduce the military commitment in Malaysia-
Singapore.
B. It would also sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, which the Liberal-Country coalition so
far has refused to do.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE PRESIDENT
NEW ZEALAND
002070002-7
4 December 1969
I. The National Party government under Prime Min-
ister Keith Holyoake was narrowly re-elected in
November to another three-year term.
II. New Zealand's principal interest is continued
economic recovery from a low in 1966, when a
large balance of payments deficit developed and
the government had to impose austerity measures.
A. The balance of payments is now favorable,
but recovery has not reached the point where
controls can be relaxed.
B. Moreover, New Zealand still faces the prob-
lem of finding markets for its major ex-
ports--wool and meat.
C. In addition to trying to expand overseas
sales for traditional products, the govern-
ment is pressing for increased diversifica-
tion of the economy.
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1. This effort includes manufacture of
new products, further processing of
exports, and exploration for oil.
D. New Zealand remains gravely concerned
over the possible loss of its special
treatment in the UK market should the
United Kingdom enter the Common Market.
III. New Zealand has consistently supported US
foreign policy in East Asia, and the American
alliance--based on ANZUS and SEATO--retains a
broad base of public and bipartisan support.
A. New Zealand has a combat contingent in
South Vietnam of 550 men, composed of an
artillery battery and two infantry com-
panies.
1. Holyoake publicly approved President
Nixon's 3 November speech on Vietnam
and pledged continued support.
2. The government's position on Vietnam
rests not so much upon recognition of
a threat to New Zealand as on a feel-
ing that New Zealand must stand by the
US, its principal ally and protector.
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B. In view of this support for the US, Ameri-
can restrictions on imports of New Zealand's
principal products are widely resented and
pose a political problem for Prime Minister
Holyoake.
IV. Despite continued broad support for the Ameri-
can alliance, there are signs of vague dissat-
isfaction with it.
A. New Zealanders, lonely and dependent in their
far corner of the Pacific, are slightly but
increasingly resentful that the US has not
taken on the role of economic protector--
as the UK did--as well as that of military
defender.
B. During the last two years a small but notice-
able neutralist feeling has appeared, re-
flecting stirrings of student unrest and dis-
sent on the Vietnam war.
V. New Zealand has followed Australia's lead in
playing a role in Southeast Asia.
aoQ
A. It maintains an -man military contingent
in the Malaysia-Singapore area, has 21 combat
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engineers in Thailand, and administers a
small economic and cultural assistance
program to various nations in the area.
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DDI BRIEFING FOR
THE VICE-PRESIDENT
VA00200070002-7
Hanoi Leadership
I. Ho Chi. Minh's..death three months ago has not had
a discernible impact on Communist strategy or
tactics in the war.
A. Hanoi appears to have kept the lid on the
morale and management problems that Ho's.
passing must have posed for the new regime..
1. The potential for trouble among his suc-
cessors is still great, but there are no
real suggestions. that the regime has been
hamstrung by leadership rivalries.
B.. The men now in charge in Hanoi are fired
with. the same determination to extend Com-
munist control over all of Vietnam that
drove Ho on for so many years.
1. But the prevailing view in Hanoi seems
to. be that the struggle must be pursued
in ways which hold down the expenditure
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of North Vietnamese manpower, and which
do not set back indefinitely economic. con-
struction and the building of an orthodox
Marxist regime in North Vietnam.
2. Trouble could crop up if the demands of
the war in the. South get in the way. of the
goal of "building socialism" in the North,
as, they have in the. past.
Military Strategy in the South
II. In South Vietnam, Hanoi's strategy for the war
still consists of trying to frustrate allied pro-
grams and to maintain a credible Communist threat
until the Communists are given or have seized a
solid position of power.
A. In the. years when the US was steadily in-
creasing its commitments to the war, Commu-
nist tactics were designed largely to. demon-
strate that an allied victory was not feasi-
ble in any period of time acceptable to the
United States.
B. But now that the US. is bent on Vietnamizi.ng
the war--in effect on continuing the struggle
with less reliance on US combat forces--Hanoi
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is. confronted with. a need for new.choices of
tactics.
1. The Communists. must calculate that the
growing strength and effectiveness of the
GVN and its armed forces., coupled with.
strains and losses in Communist ranks,
make it possible ..th.at. under the Vietnam-
ization program, the. Communists. could be
fought and contained indefinitely.
C. It seems to us that Hanoi has two broad op-
tions: to take the risks of a prolonged re-
duction in its own military efforts in the
hope that this would speed the departure of
US troops; or to accept the costs and strains
of trying to demonstrate. militarily that Viet-
namization will not work.
1. Reduced Communist military activity.b
tween June and early November this year
suggested that Hanoi was hoping to induce
the US to accelerate American troop with-
drawals, and perhaps to cut back on al-
lied operations against the Communists
as well.
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2. Now, however, there are increasing indi-
cations that the Communists are trying a
forceful challenge to the Vietnamization
program, and that their military and po-
litical actions in the months ahead will
be focused on this objective.
D. The increase in North Vietnam's infiltration
activity since late October is one of the
best indications that Hanoi has no intention
of simply letting the fighting in South Viet-
nam fade away.
1. Infiltration clearly is on the rise, al-
though it is too early to be certain how
high it may go or how long a higher rate
may be maintained.
2. It is only prudent to assume, however,
that increased infiltration now means
that the Communists are planning for
heavier fighting in the early months of
19 70 .
The Negotiations
III. In the Paris talks, there are no signs that the
Communists are in any way ready to alter the
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inflexible approach they have maintained for.so
long.
A. We think we detect in Hanoi's reaction to Am-
bassador Lodge's resignation some concern that
the US. may be downgrading the talks.
1. The Communists. do not like this possi-
bility, not only because Paris provides
them with a highly. useful propaganda forum,
but because they still consider the talks
a serious venture.
B. We have long been puzzled as to why the Com-
munists have not played their diplomatic cards
with more subtlety, at least to the extent of
trying to draw us more deeply into negotia-
tions in the hope of driving a wedge between
Washington and Saigon.
1. The chances that they might do so now
by loosening up their approach in Paris
seem quite remote, however.
South. Vietnamese Politics
IV. On the political scene, there has been more open
protest and criticism of the government during
the past six weeks than during the whole pre-
ceding year.
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A. The agitation began in late. October, after
the government took the country by surprise
with a new austerity tax.
1. The tax was aimed at imported goods con-
sumed mostly by the well-to-do, but mer-
chants used the confusion to raise prices
across-the-board, hitting everybody.
2. Virtually all South Vietnamese, including
army officers and civil servants, bitterly
blamed the government. Political unrest
spread across the country overnight.
3. For the first time since October 1968,
coup rumors were considered plausible
and were widely circulated.
B. Many opposition elements who had been biding
their time have now moved into the open to
challenge the government.
1. First, deputies in the National Assembly
conducted an extremely hostile inquiry,
similar to those which had contributed
to the downfall of Prime Minister Huong
last August.
2. Then the ambitious and opportunistic
Senator Tran Van Don suggested a "Third
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Force" movement as an alternative .to.both
the government and the Communists..
3. Don apparently expected President Nixon
to qualify US support for the government
in his November 3rd speech, and he made
the suggestion with a view to offering
himself as a bridge between the allies
and Communists at some later date.
4. At the same time, General "Big" Minh al-
lowed himself to be associated with Don
in the public eye, and he challenged the
government to take a sounding to see if
it had public support.
5. Next, ethnic Cambodian monks staged a
five-day sit-in in front of the Presi-
dential Palace in Saigon to protest gov-
ernment handling of their minority in-
terests.
6. Last weekend the militant Buddhists defied
a government injunction and issued a po-
litical manifesto. condemning both sides
of the war alike.
C. These elements evidently have come out
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into the open because they sensed that the
government was on the defensive, and, most
important, they decided they could get away
with it.
D. The government is taking great care not to
overreact to these challenges.
1. President Thieu is a suspicious and fre-
quently nervous man, but to all outward
appearances he has kept his cool.
2. President Nixon's 3 November speech clearly
strengthened Thieu's confidence that he
could cope with any likely internal un-
rest.
E. Taken singly, none of these elements has
enough political clout to. threaten stability,.
and with the atmosphere tending to calm down,
it is highly unlikely that the various. dis-
sente.rs will be able to act in concert.
1. The My Lai massacre case, however, has
given government critics a new issue,
and the repercussion may become severe.
V. So far, Vietnamese military and political authori-
ties seem to be taking Vietnamization withdrawals
in stride.
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A. Th.ieu apparently feels that the better the
South . VietnameseArmy takes on new-responsi-
bilities, the more smoothly Vietnamization
will work, and the less pressure there will
be from Americans..doves for precipitate with-
drawal.
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~im'ikot
i
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BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Herdrat -
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0 50 100 Miles
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INDIA
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NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
ARE NOT NECESSARILY 'AUTHORITATIVE
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827AO02000070002-7
BATAN
ISLANDS
LUZON STRAIT
CPABUYAN
ISLANDS,
n
SEA
120
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al al
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Treaty limits of the Philippines
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MASBATE
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NEGROS Maasin
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(Indonesia)
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I PEI-KAN-T'ANG TAO
MA- SU TAO
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827AO02000070002-7
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827AO02000070002-7
Nakhon
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827A002000070002-7
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0 5 10 Miles
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110
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178':.
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29707 2-61 -
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827AO02000070002-7