NSC ACTIVITIES 13 - 17 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A002000030002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 13, 1969
• Content Type: LIST

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13 October 1969
0800 Hours
NSC Activities
13 - 17 October
NSC A meeting is scheduled for 1000 Wednesday,
15 October. It will discuss Latin American
policy and will be based on NSSM-15 and the
Rockefeller report. At this time, we have
no indication whether the Director will be
asked to brief. The revised summary paper
has not yet been received.
Review The Review Group is scheduled to meet at
Group 1400 on Thursday, 16 October on NSSM-39,
"Southern Africa. " The paper was received
several weeks ago and comments are in;
OCI is reviewing them for timeliness.
Other The Under Secretaries Committee is scheduled
to meet on Tuesday, 14 October at 1600 on
peaceful nuclear explosions and a limited
test ban. DDP.[A~ias the papers and
DD/S&T comments.
NSC REVIEW COMPLETED
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DCI BRIE:?ING FOR
15 OCT NSC MEETING
I. Mr. :?resident, in any discussion of the threat
to internal security in Latin America, it is well
to start with the question: "Which threat?"
A. Our immediate pre-occupation in recent years
has been with the efforts of Fidel Castro to
export his Cuban revolution to the rest of
Central and South America.
B. Before Castro came to power in Cuba, however,
there were active Communist parties in Latin
America which looked to Moscow for leadership,
and which still do.
C. In addition to the Communist forces respon-
sive to Soviet or Cuban leadership, there is
an extensive array of internal factors--
varying from country to country--which challenge
in the hemisphere.
:L. These internal factors include nationalism,
economic dilemmas, inequities in the social
fabric, population growth and its by-product
of discontented urban masses, populism, and
the inflammable issue of resentment of the
-United States.
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2. Your intelligence community is increasingly
of the opinion that over the long run, the
internal factors constitute a greater threat
to Latin American internal security and
political stability than does the subversive
potential of Soviet and Cuban assets.
II. Fidel Castro--in the two years since the death of
Che Guevara in Bolivia--has de-emphasized the export
of violent revolution.
A. He has not renounced the policy, and he still
provides moderate support in the form of funds,
:raining and propaganda to insurgents in.Guate-
mala, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia.
1. The Cubans have become much more selective
in their aid to insurgents, however, and
will now provide substantial assistance
only to those revolutionaries who show
strong potential for achieving success.
2. It is interesting to note that Castro--
in the three dozen speeches he has made
since Guevara's death, has discussed
revolution in Latin America only three times--
twice in early eulogies for Guevara, and
once in announcing publication of his diary.
Revolution in Latin America used to be a
stock subject in Castro's speeches.
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C. The present de-emphasis is in part a result of
Castro's disillusionment with Latin American
would-be guerrillas, and in part undoubtedly
a response to Soviet pressures.
1. It also reflects Castro's normal pre-occupation--
now that there is no longer a Guevara at his
elbow to urge outside adventures--with domestic
problems.
2. Castro at present is committed to the ambitious
and very probably impossible goal of bringing in
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a ten-million-ton sugar crop in 1970. At
least until the end of the harvest, he is
not likely to take a significant part in
any new guerrilla initiatives, or try any
substantial increase in support for existing
groups . vks~ i-r4~'
III. The Soviets at present are nurturing normal and
expanding relations with Latin American governments.
In concert with orthodox pro-Soviet Communist par-
ties in the various countries, the espouse the
"Via Pacifica," or peaceful, parliamentary road
to power.
A. This is not to say that the Soviet Union is
necessarily opposed to revolution. Moscow's
current view is that non-violent methods of
subversion should be stressed, with violence
to be used only when the circumstances require
or warrant it.
1. We have strong evidence, for example, that
Moscow and Havana have agreed that violent
revolution will be necessary in Haiti. At
present, I might note, they fall somewhat
short of the necessary assets to try it in
Haiti .
B. .I want to stress that the Communist view of a
so-called peaceful pathito power does not exclude
subversion.
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1. As my deputy, General Cushman, told you
July 9th, the Soviets over the past 10
years have raised the number of their diplo-
matic missions in Latin America from three
countries to nine--and in the process have
stationed nearly 300 officials in Latin
America.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency has been
able to identify more than half of these
officials as intelligence officers.
B. These Soviet agents work with any individuals or
groups that can serve Soviet purposes, but
primarily, of course, with the legal or under-
ground Communist Party in each country.
1. The far left at present is badly fragmented.
In most Latin American countries, there are
two or three rival Communist factions--in
some cases, rival independent parties of
Communists taking their leads from Moscow,
Peking, and Havana.
2. Some of these factions have as few as 50 to
100 members, while in Brazil and Ecuador the
pro-Chinese faction numbers about 3,000 members
in each case.
3. The Communist
only in Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Guyana,
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but there is a Communist organization in
every Latin American country.
C. The Chinese Communists provided minor support--
particularly training--to small groups of Latin
American Communists and other militants several
years ago, but this aid has dwindled sharply
during the past year or two, and is now
insignificant.
1. The remaining Chinese support consists
largely of propaganda, and is confined
almost completely to splinter groups in
Bolivia, Chile,,,and Peru.
2. Peking is handicapped by the fact that its
official representation is limited to an
embassy in Cuba and a trade mission in Chile.
D. All of the groups of the extreme left, no matter
how sharp their rivalries or how divided their
loyalties, still constitute a channel through
which the Communists can seek to inflame and
exploit the vulnerabilities and causes of
-domestic discontent in each Latin American country.
1. The question that remains open is the extent
to which the Communists can take and keep
control over these forces of discontent.
IV. This brings me to the major question of the domestic
and not necessarily Communist challenge to internal
security in Latin America.
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A. Much of Latin America is experiencing growing
social unrest, generated by strong pressure
for change.
1. Student, labor, church and other groups
are becoming increasingly active proponents
of early and profound change.
2. The Latin American governments, however,
even in those cases where there is a
willingness to advance the Populist demands
for social and economic reform, remain
limited in their ability to find solutions
to the complex problems.
B. The demands for change are being expressed by
relatively small leadership and elite groups,
which must contend with the Communists and
other extremists for the right to speak for
the larger masses.
C. Their success in appealing to the landless
peasants and the unemployed or underemployed
urban populations will in large part determine
rust how violent change is going to be in Latin
America.
I. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish
between rival groups in their methods.
The extremists, the moderate opposition,
and government politicos alike are all
ready, for example, to use the long-standing
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ploy of criticizing the United States to
rally supporters.
2. If Castro has become disenchanted with the
immediate prospects for violent revolution,
however, it is because the Latin American
masses have not yet opted either for rural
insurgency or urban terrorism, and are not
prepared to support these methods.
D. Urban terrorism in Latin America has been on
the rise for the last year or so. Incidents
have a dramatic propaganda impact, but the
security forces in most countries appear able
so far to keep terrorism from becoming widespread.
1. In all cases, the total numbers involved in
the terrorism are relatively small, and the
ability of the security forces to cope depends
on keeping it that way. In 1940, there were
only five cities in Latin America with
populations over one million. By 1980, there
will be 26, filled with the young, poor,
dissatisfied and jobless.
E. As for the countryside, there are even greater
numbers of largely landless and in many cases
illiterate peasants, penned in hinterlands where
the government does not penetrate with schools,
markets, and sanitation or with public authority.
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1. In Peru several years ago, some of the
discontented descendants of the Incas
overran one of the Cerro de Pasco copper
mines using nothing but sticks, pitchforks,
and young teen-aged Indians throwing stones
with slings.
2. More orthodox guerrilla movements have been
formed from time to time in a number of
countries. They are active at present in
Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and Guate-
mala.
3. None of them has attracted any substantial
mass support or sympathy, and over the past
few years local security forces have developed
increased capability to deal with armed rural
insurgency, as evidenced in Bolivia and Peru.
.1. There seems to be little likelihood, therefore,
of a successful rural-based revolution in the
foreseeable future, although a well-organized
guerrilla movement might become a serious
threat in such politically fragile small countries
as Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
5. Again, the determining element would be which
leadership--the militant or the moderate--can
win the support of the population.
V. To summarize, Mr. President, there are strong forces
for change in Latin America that are going to become
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even more intense as problems and populations
multiply.
A. The existing governments so far appear unable--
if not unwilling--to solve the complex problems
Df meeting these demands.
B. Orthodox Communist forces will seek to exploit
existing discontent largely by parliamentary
or subversive bids for power, in preference to
violent revolution.
C. For the time being, circumstances, and the
influence of the Soviet Union, are restraining
Fidel Castro's past advocacy of guerrilla
warfare.
D. Meanwhile, within each country, there are
growing domestic elements--in the spectrum
between the governing regimes and the militant
extremists--who are seeking profound change
and have probably not yet determined whether
it can come by evolution, or only by revolution.
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