NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A001800060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1969
• Content Type: BRIEF

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6 July 1969
DDCI BRIEFING FOR
7 July NSC MEETING
bat areas in the south.
indicators of North Vietnamese intentions for
the near term is the rate at which North Viet-
namese manpower is started down the infiltra-
tion pipeline from North Vietnam toward the cam;
~ne of the better intelligence
A. Our continuing study of all of the available
evidence rat there h s been an almost
n
complete stand-down in the dispatch of re-
placement groups since late March.
B. When the North Vietnamese are engaged in
substantial infiltration, we can. detect bat-
talion-sized groups of replacements as they
enter the pipeline.
1. No such groups were detected in April,
only two were observed in May, and there
has been no evidence of any regular in-
filtration groups since then.
C. Enemy main force strength has been maintained
this year at about the same level as the end
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of 1968, although Communist losses in the
first half of the year have been roughly
comparable to the high casualty rate of
1968. This is because many of the 80,000
to 100,000 men placed into the infiltration
pipeline in late 1968 and early 1969 are
only now reaching the combat areas in South
Vietnam, generally affsetting current enemy
losses.
D. Our evidence on the stand-down since March,
however, means that the arrival of North
Vietnamese replacements will dry up some
time around mid-summer.
1. It follows that if the enemy remains in
the field and continues to take the level
of casualties he has suffered so far this
year, his main force strength will decline
rapidly during the third quarter of 1969.
(~. I should add that your intelligence community
has looked closely and carefully for any in-
dication that the North Vietnamese have some-
how masked a continuing flow of infiltration
from our collection procedures, and we find
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no solid evidence that Hanoi is engaged in
deception or suppression of the evidence we
have obtained in the past.)
There are a variety of passible explanations for
the infiltration stand-down.
A. We do not believe that aMmaower squeeze is
by itself an adequate explanation. Qur esti-
mate of Communist casualties last year is
considerably in excess of the annual class
of 18-year-old draft eligibles, but Hanoi
still has a large manpower pool from which
it can draw more troops if necessary.
B. There are some other explanations which are
more substantial, but they are not wholly
satisfactory because they are based on the.
premise that the Communists-are making their
present moves almost exclusively for mili-
tary purposes.
1. For example, the stand-down could reflect
a tactical decision to switch to a much
lower level of activity--possibly ~,imited
~NaW+.wr,Hk'~YeF~kNkYb-^?';'.?'ei .a+~!'?4+M~"`T...~tt~~
to shelling, sapper attacks, and querrilla
harassment--in order to conserve manpower
for a protracted war.
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2e We believe that the Hanoi Politburo prob-
ably considers, however, that to return
indefinitely to a much lower level of
combat would be t.o admit defeat, and to
abandon any hope of obtaining major con-
cessions from the United States at an
early date .
3. Similarly, Hanoi could intend tcz~.change
~.~..-...:~..~..: , ~z x~ -
the focus of ~.,~.._~~,~,,~,Q,~,__ undertak,
some basic _e~ployme~.t . Instead of
past infiltration methods, the North
Vietnamese could deploy additional di-
visions across the DMZ into I Corps, and
then move the divisions which are now in
I Carp fa her,~aouth,
4. At present, however, indications of Com-
munist intentions in the DMZ area are
mixed, and do not present a clear pattern
which would support the hypothesis I have
just outlined.
III. Looking at such political evidence and other in-
telligence
along
with the infiltration stand-down, we believe that
the most likely interpretation is that the Hanoi
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Politburo has decided on a period dur~nc~~which
they will emphasize the "t_allc"....,phase f~their
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over-all "fight-talk.-.fight." strategy, instead of
the fighting.
A. We believe that some time this summer, the
Communists will enter a?pe.riod of:__roduced
militar activity, that, will be far?lonc~ed _ for
some months.
M M ~. ~ ~,~-_~ ...~~,~,
1. Hanoi ma calculate that a hiatus_n,of-~
fensive activity ,could yield both mil,i--
Lary and political advantacs . Camn~u-
nist military units would have a period
of rest, while Hanoi's negotiators ~.n
Paris could try to obtain allied polit-
ical concessions and a reduction in al-
lied military operations.
2. There was a prolonged military lull of
this type in 1968. Between August and
late November, there was little infiltra-
tion, and more than half of the enemy
main force units were pulled back into
out-of-country sanctuaries.
3. At the same time, the Paris talks moved
into the stages that eventually produced
the bombing halt.
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B, The Communists would still retain the option
of mounting another round of offensive ac-
tivity early next year, if the extended lull
did not produce either movement in Paris or
reduced allied activity in South Vietnam.
1. They could start troops down the pipe-
line as late as September or October,
and be ready for another offensive in
early 1970.
C. As an alternative, the Communists might try
to turn the lull into a more permanent
scaling-down of the combat level, by insti-
gating a call for a cease-fire.
1. Hanoi would prefer a cease-fire to follow
agreement on political issues, and it
would certainly prefer--to avoid any
os-~extsible sign of weakness--that the
call should be made by a third power,
rather than by the Communists.
2. It is a matter of record, however, that
virtually every substantial reduction
in Communist military activity has been
followed by suggestions--in third coun-
tries and even from elements in this
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country--that the time is ripe for a
cease-fire.
3. As for the timing of political conces-
sions ensuring the viability of the Com-
munist apparatus in the south, if the
Communists saw no prospect of getting
such a deal before the cease-fire, they
would certainly arrange for the cease-
fire proposal to constitute a package
deal with some political gambit.
4. This "cease--fire plus" would be calcu-
lated to offer an end to the fighting
which the United States would find po-
litically difficult to reject, combined
with a political "plus" which the Gov-
ernment of South Vietnam would find very
difficult to accept.
TV. We have examined the political developments of
recent months along with the infiltration stand-
down and other current military developments,
and they point back to the period from February
21--when Politburo member Le Duc Tho arrived in
Hanoi from Paris--and April 28, when he left
again.
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A. At some time during that period, t$ere were
North Vietnamese strategy sessions which
produced the decisions to cut back infil-
tration, to issue the. 10-point program at-
tributed to the National Liberation ~'ro~nt
in early May,. and to announce the so-called
"Provisional Revolutionary Government" in
early June.
B. Taken together, these developments lead us
to conclude that North Vietnam is doing.
something more than simply digging in for
the long haul, and as I said earlier, we
believe that the mast l~.kely explanation
is that H~.noi has decided to d~-emphasise
the fighting in favor of negotiati}~g.
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E. There has been a controversy over whether
North Vietnamese resources should be expended
in the first instance to take control of
South Vietnam by force, or to develop a stable
and strong North Vietnam.
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the Hanoi Politburo is advocating ~ cut-and-rur~
policy toward the war in the south,, or that the
North Vietnamese will be forced to scale down their
we do not suggest that anyone within 25X1
war effort significantly in the foreseeable future,
or that they may be ready to compromise what we
have considered to be their minimum demands--the
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complete withdrawal of allied forces, and a work-
able political status for the Communists in South
Vietnam.
A. They-have, in fact, been giving their people
in South Vietnam briefsngs and directives
which reflect high expectations in Hanoi that
within a reasonably short time-frame, the
United States will be forced by domestic
sentiment to move in directions favorable
to Communist goals in South Vietnam.
B. Against this background, we believe that the
leadership in Hanoi has opted for a substan-
tial reduction in military pressure for the
short term, in the expectation that this can
be made to yield both military and political
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C. There are good intelligence indicators that before
the fighting is damped down, Hanoi plans at least
one more surge, or high point, of combat. The flurry
of the past week-end may be the beginning of this
surge.
1. We expect it to include a major attempt to
penetrate some urban center such as Tay Ninh
in northwestern III Corps, and an effort to
increase terrorism in .S~igon.
2. Furthermore, even if the Communists thereafter
do cut back the level of combat activity, the
recent speech by General Giap--along with other
intelligence--suggests that there will be an
increased emphasis on small-unit terrorism and
on classic guerrilla operations during any
period of military lull.
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fro. the mechanics of the North Vietnamese
infil ration system is that Hanoi does not
expect ?ts forces in South Vietnam to re-
quire sub tantial replacements during the
third quart r of 1969, and that a resumption
of infiltrati n in the fourth quarter would
permit the Comm nists to resume a higher
level of combat e rly in 1970 if Hanoi does
not achieve the pro ress it may expect over
the next several mont
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7 July 1969
BACKSTOP FOR
7 July NSC MEETING
I. There is a dispute in the intelligence community 25X1
over the relative roles of Cambodia and Laos in
the re-supply of Communist forces in South Vietnam.
II. It is agreed that Cambodia is an important source
of supplies--particularly food--for the Viet Cong.
A. We also know that some arms and ammunition
arriving at the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville
are transshipped to VC and NVA forces in the
III and IV Corps areas of South Vietnam.
1. We do not know if these transshipments in
Cambodia .result from a formal agreement
on the part of Sihanouk with Peking and Hanoi,
or reflect diversion from Cambodian army storks.
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B. We do know that the volume of traffic moving into
Laos and available for movement into South Vietnam
is more than adequate to cover all of the enemy's
requirements for external supplies that come from
North Vietnam.
C. Evidence is limited on the actual forwarding of
arms and ammunition southward from the tri-border
area toward III Corps, but we know that the
trail network is being used, is ~.dequate to handle
the volume required, and is constantly being
improved.
CAMB/LAOS -2-
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~r++ ~.~/
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7 July 1969
BACKSTOP FOR
7 JULY NSC MEETING
COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
I. North Vietnam over the past 15 years has received
more than $4.1 billion in military and economic
aid from other Communist countries--primarily from
the Soviet Union and Communist China.
A. Economic aid has totaled more than $2.2 billion,
with just over $1 billion coming from the
Soviet Union. Peking has provided $760 million
in economic aid, and the East Europeans
$435 million.
B. Military aid--most of it in the past four years--
has amounted to almost $2 billion, calculated in
what we call Soviet foreign trade prices. (In
other words, these are the prices the Soviet Union
charges nations like Egypt or India for military
equipment; expressed in terms of what the same
material would cost to produce in the United States,
the figure would be slightly higher.)
1. Of the $1 billion 910 million total, the Soviet
Union has provided $1 billion, 435 million.
China has provided $470 million in military aid,
and there has been a token contribution amounting
to about $5 million from East Europe.
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C. The peak year in terms of the value of aid
provided was 1967, when North Vietnam received
more than $1 billion in assistance---$650
million in military aid, and $380 million for
economic .purposes.
D. Military aid dropped sharply in 1968 because
deliveries were cut back as the U.5. bombing
program was restricted in March and then halted
in October. In contrast to 'the $650 million in
1967, North Vietnam got $395 million in military
materiel in 1968.
1. Economic aid rose from $380 million in 1967
to $480 million in 1968, largely because of
increases in food and petroleum shipments.
II. Military aid from the Soviet Union and from Communist
China tends to divide along lines reflecting the
respective capabilities of the donors.
A. The Russians have concentrated on the more sophis-
ticated and heavier equipment, such as air defense
equipment--particularly surface-to-air missiles--
tanks, and artillery.
B. The Chinese have been the main suppliers of ground
forces weapons and naval craft.
C. Both the Soviet Union and Communist China have
military personnel in North Vietnam.
1. The number of Chinese support troops--mainly
COMMTF. AT1~ -~-
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construction engineering units--is now
no more than 23,000. At its peak in
1968, when it included four Chinese
anti-aircraft divisions, the total was
about 50,000.
2. We estimate that there are about 2,000
Soviet military technicians in North Vietnam,
working on surface-to-air missile systems,
jet fighters, communications, and logistic
support.
A. We still have no evidence that any purely military
cargo has been shipped from the Soviet Union to
North Vietnam by sea.
1. The Soviets do, of course, ship into Haiphong
substantial quantities of material for both
civilian and military use--for example, trucks,
and P.O.L. supplies.
2. Under this heading, there have been at least
two shipments of explosives, and several shipments
of helicopters, including the big MI-6 HOOK
helicopters.
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B. For the past several months, the Soviets
have apparently been resisting Hanoi's
requests for a substantial increase in
P.O.L. shipments.
(Soviet shipments
continue at approximately tYie levels established
after bombing of northern North Vietnam stopped
in March of 1968.
(CHART of Communist aid attached)
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Estimated Com~uunist Aid to North Vietnam
1954-68
Million US $
19 ,~64
1~65~
166
~
~C~3
Total
Economic Aid
~0
g
l~0
2~
8~0
x+80
~, 235
Uss~
,
365
85
150
200
244
1,040
communist china
455
50
75
80
loo
760
East Europe
130
15
50
l00
140
435
Military Aid
140
2'~
~
~
~5
~ q1o
Uss~
70
210
360
505
290
1,435
Communist China
74
60
95
145
100
470
East Europe
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
~
5
Total Aid
1, 090
420
330
1, 034
8~
~5
41145
Uss~a
X35
295
510
705
,
534
2,475
Communist China
525
1].0
174
225
240
1,234
East Europe
130
15
50
144
145
440
cza,/oEf~
23 Juae 1968
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v SECRET ~?~
7 July 1969
BACKSTOP FOR
7 JULY NSC MEETING
I. By nearly all accounts, President Thieu returned
to Saigon from Midway feeling relatively optimistic
and pleased with the results of his talks with
President Nixon.
A. When it comes down to following up the June
talks by preparing new proposals designed to
move the Paris negotiations forward, however,
Thieu apparently fears that he will ultimately
be asked to make all the concessions while
the Communists stand pad. x
1. Thieu's basic concern continues to be that
there will be mounting public pressure in
the United States to accelerate the withdrawal
of U.S. combat forces and diminish support
for Thieu's government in Saigon.
2. His concern has been heightened, offsetting
his Midway optimism, by the Communist procla-
mation of a "provisional revolutionary
government," and by new speculation in the
United States over target dates for troops
withdrawals.
B. Thieu still hopes that his government can buy
SECRET
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.r 5~;c:x~;~l~
more time--by military gains and by political
and social progress--to strengthen itself for
post-war competition with the Communists.
1. He is apparently prepared to see up to
50,000 U.S. troops replaced by the end of
1969, but he hopes to stretch out the
schedule for withdrawal as much as possible,
and meanwhile to avoid committing himself to
any political concessions which would give
the Communists a strong position in
South Vietnam after hostilities cease.
II. Thieu's concern is not limited to the Communist challenge.
He is beset by domestic rivals waiting to exploit any
mis-steps on his part for their own ends, and eager for
any indications that U.S. support for Thieu is weakening.
A. Thieu probably does not fear coup plotting at the
present time, but he has not hesitated in the past
to take protective steps against such a threat.
B. He remains wary of giving rivals of any political
description a chance to undermine him, and this
has hampered his efforts to permit the establishment
of a "loyal opposition" in South Vietnam.
SVN POLITICAL -2-
SECRET
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TOP SECRET
~~
TOP SECRET
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