REQUEST FOR SPEAKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A001100030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1967
• Content Type: MF

Approved For R
29 August 1967
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT: Request for Speaker
request to us is for a CIA person to
discuss Intelligence in general and "how Intelligence fits
into the framework of the U. S. operations in various parts
of the world." The seminars will be lively, there will be
a great deal of give and take, and questions asked. All
persons at this seminar are cleared by DOD for Secret and
Top Secret.
244-7300, extension 287.
has-asked that we let her know if we can
accommodate her in time for her to present her schedule at a
meeting on the afternoon of August 30. She can be reached on
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STATINTL
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A4 0
hvN
Please return to
esentation Staff.
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We. do not make policy; we are an instrument of
the policy of our government, and we are bound by it,
just as the Armed Forces are.
And we do not carry on operations except at the
behest of, and with the approval of, the duly consti-
tuted leaders of our government.
Let me dispose first of the charge that the Central
Intelligence Agency is under no controls.
The CIA was created by the National Security Act
of 1947, which gave the Agency five functions:
1) To advise the National Security Council--and of
course the President--on intelligence matters relating
to national security;
2) To co-ordinate all foreign. intelligence activities
of our government;
3) To produce and disseminate finished national
intelligence within the government;
4) To provide what we call "services of common concern"--
functions which serve several, or perhaps all, of the
elements in. the government, but can best be undertaken
centrally; and finally;,
5) To perform such other services as the National
Security Council may direct.
In. the "Cold War" which has existed for even
longer than. there has been a CIA, we face an enemy
adept at conspiracy and subversion., with worldwide
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clandestine assets, skilled agents, and no compunc-
tions about undermining or overthrowing any government
which resists the spread of Communism.
There are apt to be occasions when it will be
important for the United States, in order to counter
these Communist efforts, to have its own capability
to respond by covert or clandestine operations.
This is not necessarily because the United States
would be ashamed of either the objectives or the
methods. It is primarily because it sometimes takes
clandestine methods to beat clandestine methods--just
as a killer submarine is one of the best weapons to
use against another submarine.
This is the'shadowy, twilight zone of government
operations that Congress had in mind when it directed
the CIA to perform "such other services" as the
National Security Council might direct.
Our critics would have you believe that ever since
-Congress gave CIA this authority in. 1947, we have done
as we pleased, without regard to official policies or
objectives of the United States government, and some-
times in diametric opposition to those policies.
Whenever the CIA carries out a covert operation
overseas, it is with the prior approval of an. Executive
Committee of the National Security Council. This com-
mittee has had various names and various incarnations
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through the years, but essentially it is chaired by
the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, representing the President. He meets once a
week--or more often if necessary--with the Director of
Central Intelligence and represen.tatives,of the Secre-
taries of State and Defense--normally the Under Secre-
taries or Deputy Under Secretaries of those two de-
partments.
Each and every operation which the Agency is going
to conduct overseas, whether it is political, psycho-
logical, economic, or even. paramilitary, is presented
to this committee. It either wins the approval of the
committee, or it does not take place.
When. covert operations are approved in advance
by representatives of the President, the Secretary of
STATINTL State, and the Secretary of Defense, it is obvious that
these operations are not going to be contrary to--or
,-outside of--the guidelines established by United States
Government policy.
STATINTL
military theater of operations, our people in effect
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become a service component under the control of the
Theater Commander. S 1 & I RG 1,0,
Our undertakings must also have the approval
of the Bureau of the Budget. Specific individuals
of that Bureau have been given full clearance to in-
quire into all of the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency in detail----and believe me, they
make full use of that authority.
In. addition to such prior approvals, there are
other elements of the executive branch which have the
same full clearance to monitor our continuing opera-
tions, and conduct post-mortems on those which have
been completed.
Some of these have been ad hoc groups--the Clark
Committee and the Doolittle Committee, for instance;
Hoover Commission task forces; and several special
investigating bodies for specific purposes.
On a permanent basis, all of the intelligence
operations of the US Government are under the contin-
uing scrutiny of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. This Board was formed in January, 1956,
under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killian of M.I.T.,
and is now headed by one of our prominent fellow towns-
men, Mr. Clark Clifford. It is a very knowledgeable
assemblage of distinguished private citizens appointed
by and reporting to the President. It meets for
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two or three days every six weeks to examine--in
depth and in detail--the work and the progress of
the entire US intelligence program.
The present Board render Mr. Clifford includes
--former high government officials such as Ambassador
Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Mr.
Frank Pace, jr., former Secretary of the Army and
Director of the Budget; Mr. Gordon Gray, who was
President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs;
--former military men, General Maxwell Taylor and
Admiral John Sides;
--men from the academic world like Professor William
Langer of Harvard; and
--prominent leaders in business and technology, such
as Dr. William 0. Baker of Bell Telephone Laboratories;
Dr. Edwin Land, head of Polaroid; and Mr. Augustus
Long, former board chairman of Texaco.
Between regular meetings, these men also serve on
subcommittees to carry on continuing investigations
of our successes and failures in intelligence.
We are not only under effective control by the
Executive Branch---whatever you may have read to the
contrary, we are also under the continuing scrutiny
of the Legislative Branch.
Ever since CIA was first established, the
Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized
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by the President, and in fact instructed, to make
complete disclosure of CIA activities to special
subcommittees in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
The Congress has created very select subcommittees
of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and
Senate to hear these reports. Incidentally, another
prominent St. Louisan, Senator Symington, is a member
of the special subcommittee in the Senate.
Also, as you may have surmised from my reference
to the Bureau of the Budget, our operations sometimes
require some money. Our headquarters are in. Langley,
Virginia, not at Fort Knox, and our appropriations
have to come from Congress, like those of all govern-
ment agencies.
We do not want to hand out free information
to the opposition, so our funds are lumped in--we
hope in.con.spicuously--with appropriations for other
.agencies, They are discussed in full, however, with
special subcommittes of Senate and House Appropriations.
These officials are also authorized complete access
to all of our operations. After they have scrutinized
and passed on our requirements, they then see to it
that my salary is not inadvertently eliminated by
somebody who may believe he is only reducing the Federal
Government's consumption of paper clips or carpeting.
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Some of the confusion over CIA's relations with
Congress arises from the fact that these special
subcommittees, and only ties:;--about 25 legislators
in l:--have been cleared by the President to ingiire
in detail into all of our activities and operations.
We will, of course, brief any congressional
coirmi.ttee having a jurisdictional interest on our
substantive intelligence from all over t e world. In
1965, for instance, there we-.e about 20 such comm,4tt?-
hearings--and some of them raj -,as long as three fil;.
days. We also brief individual. congressmen frequ'nt. y
at their request.
Lut discussion of CIA ~e. J.v it ies , methods, and
sources is another matter. It involves the lives c{
people who work with us, ands the efficacy of -)ur
methods. National Security Council directives specify
that these matters will be d scussed only with thc:
special subcommittees desi:';:ttc_ for these purposes.
This is not arbitrary or ;aucratic; it is simp:L.y
recognition that the risk inadvertent disclosure
rises with the number of pec le who have access
sensitive information of thi type.
Where disclosure i, aul orized, it is complekc.
In 1965, for instance, in aerlition to those 20 hears lgs
on substantive intelligence, the Director or his
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aides met a total of 34 times with the special sub-
committees to keep them informed on the operations
of Central Intelligence.
So much, then, for the charge that CIA is under
no controls and that nobody in Washington is told
what CIA is doing.
As for the charge that CIA makes policy, let me
reiterate that intelligence is one of the ingredients
of policy-making, but does not formulate it. We support
the people who actually make the decisions. Our role is
to supply the information, the evaluation, and the esti-
mates which they need to arrive at an informed decision.
Intelligence, you know, is really an everyday
business, not confined to governments. When Mother
listens to the weather forecast and then makes Junior
wear his rubbers or galoshes to school, she is using
an intelligence estimate to arrive at a policy de-
cision.
The Cardinals and Charlie Winner may think that
they are going over the scouting reports in prepara-
tion for next Sunday's game at Dallas. In. our
language, they are examining current intelligence
on the capabilities and intentions of the enemy, in
order to formulate contingency plans for the outbreak
of hostilities.
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Now, the weather bureau will talk in terms of
the likelihood--the probability--of rain or snow. It
leaves the decision on rubbers or galoshes up to
Mother.
Similarly, that scouting report will deal with
possible weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the Dallas
Cowboys, and warn about the nature of their principal
threats. The decision. on how the Cardinals are going
to cash in on the information is left up to the coach.
It is the same in government, and intelligence.
It is fashionable, when. we speak of our national
strategy, to refer to "options," or "alternatives."
This is the "in" way of saying that you should never
paint yourself into a corner. It means that whenever
the President is called upon to make a policy decision,
he must always have two or more realistic choices.
The role of intelligence is to provide the Presi-
dent and his advisers with factual, and above all
objective,. information. This is the information which
in the first place determines whether the options are,
in fact, realistic, and then enables the policymaker
to compare his options and make an informed choice.
If the organization which gathers the information
becomes an advocate of one particular option.-one pro-
posed course of action--then the intelligence which
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it provides is necessarily suspect. It is no longer
acceptable per se as objective.. Whether or not the
depth of partisan advocacy consciously or unconsciously
builds a self-serving bias into the intelligence re-
porting, the decision makers must take this possibility
into account.
That is the reason why CIA is not engaged in
policy formulation, would not want to be, and would
not be allowed to be.
Information is our business--the collection, analysis
and evaluation of information; as accurate, and as com-
prehensive, and above all as objective as possible.
If we become advocates of policy, we lose,our
credibility, which is our most useful asset in serving
the government.
If the policy makers permit us to take part in
policy formulation, they must start by discounting
the objectivity of the intelligence we furnish them. Any
advocate of an alternative course of action can provide
information to support his proposals, but because he is
an advocate, the information becomes a prejudiced argu-
ment, not an objective appreciation of the facts and
the probable consequences.
By the National Security Act of 1947, the Director
of Central Intelligence is the principal intelligence
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adviser of the President. He reports to the National
Security Council, which in effect means that he re-
ports to the President. He is not behc,lden to any
other department of the Government. Eien in the
National Security Council, he is an adviser, not a
member.
In. the minds of the Congress, this was the only
sensible way to establish the CIA and 'the position of
Director. It is the only arrangement which wives the
President, who must make the ultimate decisions, an
adviser and a source of information completely
divorced from the competing and sometimes parochial
views of the advocates of alternate choices.
This principle does not require the checks and
balances that I have listed which monitor the covert
operations of the CIA, because it is a principle
which has been welcomed and implemented by every
man. who has held the office of Director of Central
Intelligence.
This has been attested to in public by every
President, and by officers at the cabinet level who
would be the first to complain. if it were not so.
There is one concept which operates as a control
mechanism in this respect, and that is the concept of
the intelligence community.
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You may never have read of the intelligence
community--it doesn't fit into a headline as easily
as CIA, and it doesn't have the same juicy appeal to
the information media. If there were no intelligence
community, however, the CIA might never have been
created to coordinate its work.
Obviously, the function. of intelligence in. the
United States Government did not begin with the Office
of Strategic Services in World War II. Intelligence
is one of the oldest professions, dating back at least
to Noah and the airborne reconnaissance mission. he
launched from the Ark. In. our own country, George
Washington found spies to be not only necessary but
exceptionally useful during the Revolutionary War.
Down through the years, there have been. intelli-
gence components in the Navy, the Army, the Department
of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation., even
in. such comparatively prosaic offices as the Department
of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce.
These intelligence agencies, however, existed
primarily to serve the needs of their particular de-
partments. As a result, there has been 4 natural
tendency for their interests and their competencies
to be somewhat parochial. Some departmental intelli-
gence was developed by diplomats or economists who
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might be unfamiliar with weapons. Other departmental
intelligence may have come from military attaches who
were more conversant with order of battle or with
weapons systems than they were with the political or
economic developments. But this spec.alization was
not the main weakness.
The significant failing of such an apparatus lay
in the possibility that one of the intelligence com-
ponents might --by unilateral decision--consider a
given piece of information too marginal, too unimportant,
to be passed along to the decision makers, or even.
laterally to the other intelligence components.
One of the lessons we learned from Pearl Harbor
was that information must not only be exchanged and
coordinated among all of these disparate intelligence
elements; there must also be a clear responsibility
for bringing that intelligence to the attention of all
of the men in our government who need to know it.
As a result,, the men who make the decisions for
our national government today want what we call
national intelligence. This is the agreed synthesis
of all the intelligence available to the government
from all possible sources, analyzed against all of
expertise and all of the background information we
can bring to bear.
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The National Security Act of 1947, which created
the Central Intelligence Agency, did not put the State
Department, or the armed services, or the commercial
and agricultural attaches, out of the intelligence
business. Instead, it rounded up all of the intelli-
gence assets available to the government, and estab-
lished the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate
the work of this intelligence community.
Mr. Helms has the title of Director of Central
Intelligence, not only Director of-the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. He is the principal intelligence officer
of the Government, and when he reports to the President,
or the National Security Council, he is delivering the
intelligence developed by all of the assets of the CIA,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, Navy, Army and Air
Force intelligence, and the intelligence components
of the Department of State, the FBI, and the Atomic
Energy Commission.
This is what we mean. by the intelligence com-
munity. When finished national intelligence goes for-
ward, it is the agreed and considered evaluation by
all of these components--or at least if there has been
disagreement, the dissenting views are set forth in
footnotes for the guidance of the policymaker.
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I should add that except for the representa-
tives of CIA, the members of this community come
from departments and agencies which have a legiti-
mate role in. policy formulation. When they act as
the intelligence community, however, they are under
strict injunction to come up with an objective and
impartial appreciation of the intelligence picture,
the interpretation of its significance, and the
estimate of possible future developments.
The intelligence community includes enough of
these non-CIA elements so that,..in any disagreement,
it is virtually certain. to have representatives from
agencies on opposite sides of the fence. This in
turn provides the safety mechanism that I mentioned.
With the opposing sides represented, it is incon-
ceivable that there would not be a vociferous and
audible complain.t if the finished national intelli-
gence were not completely objective. It is a viable
dialogue that provides the same sorts of checks and
balances that our own "Dialogue of Democracy" does,
to borrow a phrase from Emmet Hughes.
Finally, if I may, I want to devote a few moments
to the types of people who work for the CIA.
The fact of the matter is that James Bond and his
colleagues of the spy movies and novels never worked there.
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A commentary in the London Economist last
month, discussing the British intelligence service,
makes my point pretty well with this summary:
"Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking
collection and analysis of fact, the exercise of
judgment, and clear and quick presentation. It is
not simply what serious journalists would always
produce if they had time; it is something more
rigorous, continuous, and above all operational--
that is to say, related to something that somebody
wants to do or may be forced to do."
Our appetite for information is catholic and
enormous. Our basic background information on for-
eign. countries, compiled in what we call the National
Intelligence Surveys, already adds up to more than
10 times the size of the Encyclopedia Britannica.
Much of this is hardly secret, covering such
prosaic matters as economic statistics, legal codes,
sociological conditions, and transport facilities.
The information has to be on hand against the con-
tingency that Country X, seemingly remote and of
little current concern to our national security, may
some day erupt onto our list of critical situations.
Against that day, we must have not only the informa-
tion, but the experienced and knowledgeable experts
to interpret and apply it.
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Take French Somaliland. After the recent riots
there, President De Gaulle announced that French
Somaliland should have the right to decide between
remaining under French rule, or becoming independent.
Is this of no concern to us? Ethiopia and the Republic
of Somalia have each announced that if France sets its
Somalis free, either Ethiopia will seize the area to
keep it out of Somali hands, or vice versa. Now,
the United States has a very close relationship with
Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union trains, equips, and
advises the Somali armed forces. If there is, then,
even the remotest possibility of a direct confrontation
in this area between the United States and the Soviet
Union, it behooves us to know today, not at some time
in the future, such matters as harbor facilities in
Djibouti, the terrain in the hinterland, the capacity of
the railroad, and the composition of the population.
The result is that the CIA employee is a much
more academic man than the public realizes. We may
have a few men with the debonair aplomb Of Napoleon
Solo, but we have more than 800 senior professionals
with 20 years or more of intelligence background.
Three quarters of our officers speak at least one
foreign language. About 15 percent have graduate
degrees. Six out of every 10 of the analysts who have
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direct responsibility at headquarters for analysis
of a foreign. area had lived, worked, or traveled
abroad in that area even before they came to CIA.
When you combine all of the years required for
graduate study, foreign experience, and then add 10
to 15 years of intelligence work, it adds up to an
impressive depth of knowledge, competence, and ex-
pertise at the service of our government.
We could easily and adequately staff the faculty
of a university with our experts, and in. a way, we do.
Many of those who leave us join university faculties,
and others take leaves of absence to teach, and renew
their contacts with the academic world. Your previous
speaker here, Dr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, is one of these.
Ile is now professor of Political Science at Brown.
I have discussed with you how the Central Intel-
ligence Agency serves the government, how it is con-
trolled, and briefly, what manner of man works there.
I have left to the end one final question: "Why?"
For the answer, let me cite a couple of outside
witnesses:
Secretary of State Rusk last December told a public
meeting of the White House Conference on International
Cooperation:
"I would emphasize to you that CIA is not
engaged in activities not known to the senior policy
officers of the Government. But you should also
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discussion, there is a tough struggle going on in the
back alleys all over the world. It is a tough one,
it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is
not a field which can be left entirely to the other
side. And so, once in a while, some disagreeable
things happen, and I can. tell you that there is a
good deal of gallantry and a high degree of competence
in. those who have to help us deal with that part of the
struggle for freedom.."
In. April, 1965, President Johnson. put it this way:
"We have committed our lives, our property, our re-
sources and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace
of other men, indeed, to the freedom and peace of all
mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would
disgrace all the sacrifices Americans have made, if
we were not every hour of every day vigilant against
every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we
have the Central Intelligence Agency."
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