BACKGROUND ON SIX SUBJECTS SUGGESTED BY ACTING DDI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000900150001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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7 August 1967
This book contains relatively recent background
on the six subjects suggested by Acting DDI for the
Senatorial dinner 9 August. An up-to-date briefing
on each subject will be inserted at. opening of bus-
iness Wednesday, 9 August.
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8 August 1965
DDI BRIEFING NOTES
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER
I. Haiti has been in the news this summer with a
government and army purge, a couple of invasion
rumors, and a security forces alert, but the
over-all picture in brief is this: the political
and economic situations are deplorable, and there
is very little prospect that either will improve
in the near future.
A. Haiti is run by what can only be described
as a ruthless dictatorship.
B. Its economy is stagnant. Per capita income--
about $70--is one of the lowest in the world.
Literacy is only about 10 percent. Public
health standards and services are minimal.
C. Even the insiders in the political and military
power structure are apprehensive as a result
of recent reshufflings, arrests, trials, and
executions.
II. In most countries, and in many dictatorships, these
conditions would be more than enough to touch off
a coup or a revolution.
A. In Haiti, however, things have never been much
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better, so the missing ingredient is that
conditions have not become sufficiently
intolerable to make any group of Haitians
undertake the extreme personal risks involved
in any attempt to overthrow the regime.
B. President Duvalier's control at present
appears to be as strong as ever.
1. Would-be conspirators have been cowed
by the ruthlessness"Papa Doc" showed
in dealing with suspected dissidents
early in June, when he executed 19
army officers for plotting.
3. Duvalier's principal control forces are
his goon squads called the Ton-Ton-Macoutes--
Creole for "Boogeyman."
4. But the recent purges have even shaken up
the leadership of these strong-arm gangs.
C. Duvalier's suspicions reach even into his own
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household. An ambitious son-in-law, Max Dominique,
has been on shaky ground since June. In July, he_
left for Spain as Ambassador-designate,.
1. No sooner was he out of the country than
Duvalier charged him with conspirac and
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ordered him to return in 30 days or face
trial in absentia. Dominique prudently
resigned and stayed in Spain.
2. This maneuvering is typical of Papa Doc.
He obviously wanted to be rid of Dominique,
but didn't want to execute his daughter's
husband, or bring on the embarrassment of
a son-in-law taking asylum in one of the
local embassies, so he maneuvered him into
exile.
III. The recent curfew and alert were ordered in response
to another of the recurrent rumors, sometimes with
some basis in fact, that a group of exiles were
mounting an invasion.
A. Actually the non-Communist Haitian exile groups
have little capability __for mounting any
substantial operations against Duvalier at the
present time.
B. Communists, with Soviet and Cuban help, have
some capability for infiltrating agitators,
but once inside the country, the agitators
would find little room for action in the
politically oppressive atmosphere.
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the day when Duvalier passes or is pushed
IV. The situation in Haiti
is inherently fragile, but
only because President Duvalier--in contrast to the
impression he seeks to convey with his use of
Voodoo--is a mortal man.
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8` August 1967
DDI BRIEFING NOTES
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER
In Panama, an increasing groundswell of opposition
the new canal treaties may cause President
Robles to defer ratification until after the
Panamanian presidential election next May.
A. His original intention had been to stage
a quick, intensive, promotional campaign
for the proposed treaties and then push
ratification through a special session of
the assembly--before the regular opening
date of October first, and before the issue
could become intertwined with the election
campaign.
B. Robles has been forced to reconsider this
schedule by mounting criticism from cabinet
members; from the Foreign Relations Council;
from political parties not only of the oppo-
sition, but within the government coalition;
and from a clique of key National Guard
officers.
C. The Foreign Relations Council--an informal
advisory group appointed by the president--
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IS ins~sf/~.1 on
time for extended discussion,
and an opportunity to negotiate changes.
1. Foreign Minister Eleta told the U.S.
Ambassador that the Council has already
come up with 28 proposed revisions for
the treaty drafts.
S`H
2. Objections center on U.S. domination of
the joint canal administration, the proposed
judicial system in the canal area, and what
are referred to as certain "excessive" powers
of the joint administration to make con-
cessions to the U.S.armed forces.
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D. The chief negotiator for Panama, de la Rosa, has
indicated that he is still displeased with some
aspects of the treaties as they are now written.
De la Rosa thinks that time will work in favor
of Panama
II. Most of the pro-government deputies in the assembly
have indicated that they would prefer to postpone
the ratification debate until the regular session
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in October, or even until after the elections, to
allow more time to study the drafts.
A. Robles will probably be reluctant to take his
chances on a ratification vote during the supercharged
pre-election atmosphere that will mark the regular
assembly session.
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III. The perennial opposition presidential candidate,
Arnulfo Arias, left the country for a European trip
about the time that the proposed treaties became
available for discussion.//e- s~7s 1 */ 14 ~e U,S,
XC'surt/~ ~rtp ho "".e.
A. There was speculation that he did not want
to risk a possible losing fight against the
treaties. So far, his public stand has been
that regardless of the treaty provisions, he
was cheated out of the last election, and
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that consequently any treaties negotiated
with the Robles regime are illegal.
B. Arias may feel that the governing coalition,
with an election in sight, will break apart
more easily without his unifying presence.
C. Another recent report is that the Panamenistas,
the party of Arias, want Robles to commit
himself thoroughly to the treaties, by
signing them or by submitting them for
ratification, before they launch their attack.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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8 August 1967
DDI BRIEFING NOTES
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER
If terms like "the Soviet bloc,." or"Russia and
her satellites" are losing some of their validity
in intelligence reporting today, a prime example
is Rumania, which has placed its national interests
ahead of solidarity with its Communist allies.
A. The Rumanian Communist Party has been edging
toward its own brand of "national Communism"
throughout the 1960's, and formally proclaimed
this independent course in April, 1964, wit
the publication of what amounted to a
ideclaration of independence.
B. The 1964 declaration was the most forthright
and thoroughly reasoned rejection of Soviet
political and economic supremacy ever made by an
ostensible supporter of the Soviet Union.
II. Since 1964, the Rumanian party and state leaderships
have reaffirmed this independent course fre_quen,tly--
most recently in last month's session of parliament--
and in the process have broadened the domestic base
of popular support.
III. The roots of Rumvanian alienation from Moscow run
across the board. They are not only political and
economic, but historical in character.
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CONFIDENTIAL
A. Traditionally a highly nationalistic
Latin nation, Rumania has an anti-
pathy towards Russia dating back many
B. Moscow's blatant economic exploitation
of Rumania--through the Soviet-Rumanian
joint stock companies (until their
abolition in 1954) and. oppressive war
reparations--stalemated Bucharest's
efforts to achieve economic progress.
C. Until 1952, Moscow's "men" politically
dominated the Rumanian party.
D. Soviet efforts to achieve close economic
and political control impinged on
Rumania's concept of national sovereignty
and equality.
IV. Rumania's nationalist leadership stresses inde-
pendence of action in foreign and interparty affairs and
pragmatic interpretation of Communist doctrine.
A. This drive for independence has,
of course, had. its greatest impact
on relations with the USSR.
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1. The regime has resisted Soviet-
sponsored supranational planning
in the Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance (CEMA), has called the
Warsaw Pact and all military alliances
"anachronistic," and has adopted
a "neutral" stance in the Sino-
last April.
Soviet dispute.
Rumania boycotted the Karlovy
Vary Communist parties meeting
The regime refused to sign
June declaration in Moscow which
condemned Israeli "aggression."
It failed to attend the subsequent
meeting in Budapest, and did not
go along with the Soviet Union at
the recent United Nations meeting.
B. Rumania has expanded its politico-economic
ties with the West, particularly Western
Europe
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CONFIDENTIAL
1. In 1966, approximately 40 percent
of-Rumania 's,foreign trade was
with the Free World (as opposed
to about 20o in 1955, 33% in 1964)
2. Rumania is the only Eastern
European country which has granted
full diplomatic recognition to
West Germany (January- 1967)
3. Rumanian-US relations have markedly
improved since the first of this
year, Vietnam notwithstanding,
and Maurer is the only Eastern
European Communist Premier to
talk with a U.S. President.
V. Rumania's independent course has already had a
significant effect in the Communist world. It has:
A. weakened Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe.
B. blocked economic integration within
CEMA which from Moscow's point of view
is a device to maintain Soviet econaiic-
political control of Eastern Europe
C. hindered Soviet efforts to make the
Warsaw Pact into an instrument of
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greater political control over Eastern
European countries.
D. given a positive impetus to the spread
of polycentrism--pragmatic Communism--
elsewhere in the Communist world,
especially in Eastern Europe
c}`
VI. Rumania's brand of national Communism can serve
as an object lesson for other socialist countries.
A. Bucharest has shown that it is possible
to gain independence under unfavorable
geographic conditions through deft
maneuvering, courageous diplomacy, and
skillful timing.
B. Moscow's response thus far has been in-
sufficiently strong to alter this
independent course.
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8 August 1967
DDI BRIEFING NOTES FOR
SENATORIAL DINNER
Algeria's present role as one of the most radical
of the Arab governments,with President Boumediene
insisting on a jihad or holy war against Israel,
offers nothing. that is completely new.
A. In the recent past, Algeria has had its
moderate moments under Boumediene, and it
has stressed its bid for African leadership
when relations with other Arabs turned sour.
B. But Algeria was radical, revolutionary,
Arab-oriented, pro-Soviet, and anti-U.S.
under Ben Bella, before Boumediene overthrew
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him in .
1. And if any of these facets have been
muted since then, it has been largely
tactical, transient, and temporary.
2. Boumediene's initial moderate course
may have been dictated in part by
coolness and suspicion on the part of
Ben Bella's friends. By early this year,
he and his country were back in the main-
stream of extremism.
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II. Houari Boumedie e, by training a school-teacher,
is president of e Algerian Revolutionary Council--
the group of 24 or 25 men, with an army majority,
which establishes A\gerian policy.
A. He is President ~f the council of ministers,
which administers he country.
B. He is also commandet of all military forces,
and minister of defense.
III. Boumediene made his way to power through the army,
and it is both the principal source, and the prime
beneficiary, of his strength.
A. So far, whatever the political or economic
problems, Boumediene has done his utmost to
see to it that the army's needs and desires
are satisfied.
B. The only political party, the National
Liberation Front, is not a particularly
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effective instrument. It was still in the
process of post-independence re-organization
when Boumediene's coup called for still further
reorganization.
C. Labor and student groups are potential opposition,
but both enjoy privileged positions, after the
army. Organized labor is particularly privileged
in a country where nearly half the labor force
is unemployed.
D. There is considerab\te opposition, but it is
uncoordinated, fragmmented, leaderless, and as a
result inactive. Many of the politicians who
were prominent before independence appear to
be marking time, hoping that when some other
force ousts Boumediene,';they will be called to
power by popular acclamation.
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Boumediene
number of French-trained officers who
have had long experience in the French
Army.
3. Security and stability are not such that
you could rule out the elimination of
Boumediene, but there does not appear to
be anybody else available at present who
can challenge his authority, rally equivalent
backing, or--more to the point--who is
willing to take over Boumediene's respon-
sibilities.
IV. Since the Arab-Israeli war, the posture of Boumediene
and his regime occasioned speculation that he is__
bidding to take over Nasir's mantle of Arab leadership--
Uncompromising, inflexible, determined to--c rrv on
the war against the Infidel alone if necessary.
A. Actually, before the fighting started Boumediene's
inclination was to avoid involvement, although he
was persuaded to pledge token forces and some
equipment. ct didze)l h7 d ryt~c?rs
1. He sent Nasir some fighters, and some tanks,
which the Soviets are replacing, and there
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are still apparently some Algerian troops
within gunshot of the Israelis along the
Suez Canal, but the actual Algerian par-
ticipation on the battlefield never quite
caught up with their propaganda.
B. Boumediene might aspire to Arab leadership
now despite his use of the "cult of personality"
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charge to overthrow Ben Bella, but it seems
highly unlikely that the Middle Eastern Arabs
would respond
1. The Soviets do not t appearto have ,given
Boumediene any encouragement to bid for
leadership.
3. On the basis of past performance1__Algeria
has not demonstrated that it could take
and hold the leadership of even the less
advanced radical regimes of Africa.
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8 August 1967
DDI BRIEFING NOTES
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER
I. Relations between Algeria and Morocco are
dominated by two elements of friction: Moroccan
territorial claims to the potentially rich mineral
Algeria; and Algeria's massive build-up o
weapons since 1953, when Moroccan forces
the Algerian army in a brief border war.
elements are, of course, simply opposite
the same issue.
f Soviet
outfought
The two
sides of
A. Morocco has pursued its territorial claims
in the United Nations and in the Organization
of African Unity, but the Algerians justify
their military build-up on the fear that Morocco
will ultimately attempt to seize the disputed
territory by force.
1. The Algerians assert--and are inclined to
believe--that Morocco and Tunisia have secret
alliances with the United States. Their line
is that U.S. policy is to destroy all
Socialist regimes.
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2. Therefore, the Algerians argue, they must
have enough military force to deter an attack
on Algeria by Morocco and Tunisia with the
support of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.
B. The Moroccans for their part fear that the
Algerians will attack them,: either to put an
end to Morocco's territorial claims, or as a
deliberate move by Boumediene to divert Algerian
attention from domestic difficulties.
1. The Moroccans are looking for modern arms,
particularly aircraft and armor, to offset
the Algerian build-up.
C. The disparity is huge.
1. Most of Algeria's modern armaments come from
the Soviet Union. Morocco would prefer ar
from Free World sources, but has apparently
been offered weapons by the Soviet Union.
II. Neither side appears to have made preparations for
imminent attack along the border, despite the tension.
A. There is little mil__,i aryl build-u oneither
B. Both have built new roads, however, which would
be useful for military purposes.
1. The Algerians have taken over military
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facilities vacated by the French at Bechar
early this summer, and have built several
airfields to support border action.
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I Caciiz~
A7 jANT1C Tangier
Casablanca
Mostagane
Orarf-.
~--
capital
Railroad
The metropolitan regions and departe-
ments of Northern Algeria take their
names from their administrative centers
ALGERIA
International
boundary
Region boundary
Departement
boundary
QQ National capital
Oran Region capital
O Departement
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8 August 1967
DDI BRIEFING NOTES
FOR SENATORIAL DINNER
I. In Korea this summer, armed harassment and agent
infiltration by the North against South Korea is
an all-time high.
A. The Communist activity so far does not suggest
an intention to open a diversionary "second
front" for the Vietnamese war at this time.
B. It is, however, apparently intended to show _
support for Hanoi, and discourage the deploy-
ment of additional R.O.K. troops to South
Vietnam, while expanding subversion and
aggravating political tensions in South Korea.
II. The armed incursions across the Dem j-t.arized.Line
by North Koreans showed a sharp r ,se.last___O_c_tober,
snow and the lack of foliage made cover and
concealment difficult.
A. With the first good spring weather, the North
Korean forays rose sharply again.
B. By early August, there had been more than 280
incidents between United Nations Command troops
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and the North Koreans--280 so far in 1967,
compared to 44 all last year, 55 in 1965, and
32 in 1964.
1. In this year's incidents, the North Koreans
have lost about 61 killed, the South Koreans
27, and the U.S. six.
C. Some of the increase in incidents reported may be
attributable to increased patrolling along the DMZ
and greater alertness by the U.S. and South Korean
troops.
1. Nevertheless, South Korean leaders are showing
considerable concern over improving their
capabilities to cope with infiltration, as a
result of the Communist aggressiveness.
III. The North Koreans have also stepped up the infiltration
of heavily armed agent teams into the interior of
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South Korea by sea.
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IV. The shift to more militant tactics probably comes
from an assessment in Pyongyang that the effort to
subvert South Korea--a priority objective since the
war ended--has been failing.
A. The North Koreans may also be apprehensive
over the stronger U.S. presence in Asia.
B. Pyongyang would expect that as long as the
harassment is kept below the level which could
provoke major retaliation, aggressive tactics
will keep the South Koreans and U.S. forces
there off balance; test our military capabilities
and reactions; aggravate political instability
in the South; and possibly disrupt economic
progress.
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1. North Korea's Gross National Product has
increased by only 4 to 5 percent annually
in recent years, compared to an 8 to 12
percent growth in the South. Border incidents
could be useful to explain the need for-
belt-tightening at home, and evoke greater
effort in defense industries.
V. The South Koreans are adding a vigorous reaction to
the advantages of a population which is basically
unsympathetic to Communism, and a popular consensus
that life in the South is getting better and better.
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Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900150001-2
 Mr. Johnson discusses
president Joht
gress;yest'erdayl
fora new canal
America 'to -link
and Pacific may develops c
or than the
gestcd in past st. LL
ea- o
picked up faster than foresee
in the earlier"'
Johnson noted.
Mr. Johnson
ment as he sent Congress the
cport'. of then
third annual r
lactic - P a c i f i
Cana
study group ?1 s asked for a
ar extension and $7?
two. e more un s to Comm
pleto its,_nvetitilns, for a
new sea-level canal.
The new canal would supple-
ment the present lock-style
Panama Canal built 80 feet
One
mission study, originally set at
$175 million, is behind ched?
. ule is that the Atomic Energy
Commission's program of
Plowshare nuclear excavation,
experiments was postponed
during negotiations on the nu-
clear non-proliferation treaty.,
Congress has^ appropriated
emnloved in three o _the foul
,by e ommission-across
the Darien re ion of Panama
near near ilcaragua- os a Ica,
and in extreme ort west o
ombia.
"route, near the present
Panama Canalcould be exca-
vated by conventional, earth-
moving means.
Cost estimates range from
$2.3 billion for the convention
lay ug Cana to 747 million
for HUM E7 excavaiozi on
s or es anama route-
In his statement to _ Con-
gress, the President empha-
sized the need to "proceed as'I
rapidly as possible" on the
study since ,it ti ill take u to
15eareaor leisation lan-
ni aind.eostr_ u,Tcion.
I Yesterday morning the Pres-
By Jean M, White.
Washington Post Staff writer
lson told Con -al for
that: the need income
A gr up Of
across Central gave th Presi
te Atlantic bronze
oon? oln do
ear X2000 sug Gaudens. The gift wa
es ed by Ill ois Gov
1 a if 1 c has tier, who is char
n President's Sp
estimates,. Mr:: ion on Civ
In. acce~
made is state- bust; Mr.
the count?,
encing
e : Interocean c ems. j
o S* - *j e did. ion
--.,
dent
as bee
rats sum-
douse.
was
turn to New Delhi\on Tuesda
2005/06/08 CIA-R P:79TO08 000900150001-2
10. per cent
o Ken
of the
that`
rams Urcres Controls
On S
u pep" owrs' Arms
Special to The Washington Post
GENEVA, Aug. 8-Rumania turing or acquiring nuclear
strongly .supported the non-
ali;ned' position on nuclear
nonproliferation today and
us fade a major advance W'
7i iefforts to li itself as
an independent voice
national affairs.
ii sociaating his country
from the broad policy line of
the other four Communist to
members in the 17-nation
Geneva Di armament Confer-
ence, the Rumanian delegate,
Dr. Nicolae Ecobesco, . set
these conditions for Rumania's
xunnort: oF_a treaty to stop the
spread of.nuclear weapons:
The nuclear powers must
commit themselves to halt the
production of nuclear weap-
ons, end underground testing
,r military urposes 1
eliminate existing nuclear
arsenals.
Un'e`sthese conditions area
met, the treaty, far from re-
ducing the risk of thermonu-
clear war, will indefinitely
perpetuate it, Ecobesco said.
In its present form, worked
out by Russia and the United
States, the draft treaty con-
tains no such commitments. It
seeks only to prevent nonnu-
clear countires from manufac-
51713th St. N.W. 0 393-3903
PARTY ROOMS
for Every Occasion
.. 25 to 125 persons
Cocktails ? Receptions
? Meetings ?
t.
moned to
George
Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900150001-2.,
weapons and places no condi-1
tions on the present nuclear l
powers..
Quoting a recent statement
of Rumanian Foreign Minister
Nicolae Ceauseco, Dr, Eco-
besco remarked that the idea
that the fate of humanity lies
exclusively in the hands of the
superpowers no longer corres-
uon with new c tnclitipns oi
.~y~91?zi3e.I7_tr.
The Rumanian statement in-
directly
e~n~ot~rag__ e_d 'Jest Ger-
man criticism of the propose
treaty based on the need for
the unhampered development
of a peaceful nuclear industry,
Children
Back To
School
Shortly?
Free Time
Means Time
to
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weeks we will
havc many open-
ings. Temporary
Flolp In Topi
lobs. Stenos --
Typists-Clerics.
White Gbllar'Girls
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