VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000800100002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 4, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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4 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. In Vietnam, the enemy build-up along the Demili-
tarized Zone, which we have been watching for
several months, was first dramatized April 6th
and 7th by the major Communist raids in and
around Quang Tri city and Hue, the capitals of
South Vietnams two northernmost provinces.
A. More recently, on 27 and 28 April, enemy
forces staged a series of very heavy mortar,
rocket, and artillery attacks against US
Marine positions just south of the DMZ in
northern Quang Tri Province, and against the
marine coastal enclave at Phu Bai in Thua
Thien Province.
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F. Since the beginning of 1967, the Communists
have extended a feeder road--Route 922--from
the Laos panhandle into the A Shau Valley of
western Thua Thien Province, giving them
their first motorable through road from the
North, all the way down the Laotian panhandle,
and into the South.
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firmed a considerable build-up and ex-
tensive stockpiling in the A Shau Valley,
and in base areas near Route 922 in Laos.
have
indicated that the Communists plan a major "summer"
campaign in the Quang Tri - Thua Thien areas; one
officer has reported plans for regimental and even
division-sized actions.
talk of plans to seize the two provinces.
A. A threat to such towns as Quang Tri and Hue
cannot be ruled out, but the Communists are
more likely to undertake actions designed to
protect their infiltration routes through Laos
and the western DMZ area, and to keep allied
forces spread out. They want to maintain
favorable conditions for attacking isolated
U.S. units, and for preventing the government's
Revolutionary Development activities.
1. The Communists have stepped up their ef-
forts to harass and kill the pacification
teams. The effort is nationwide, but
more than half of the 200-plus attacks
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VIETNAM: Insert after Page 37, as III,
B, The Communists are maintaining a replacement
and convalescent group on Cambodian territory,
according to documents captured in March and
April during Operation JUNCTION CITY, the
spoiling operation into War Zone "C" along the
Cambodian border west of Saigon.
1. This group, known. as 93-525," amounts to
about 7,500 men, and is subordinate to the
Central Office for South Vietnam.
2. The Viet Cong Ninth Division, composed of
the North Vietnamese 101st and the Viet Cong
271st and 272nd Regiments, lost: more than
2,000 killed during JUNCTION CITY, and pulled
back into Cambodia.
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three regiments
made up their losses from the "B-525" Replace-
ment Depot, and are now back in War Zone "C."
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since the first of January have taken
place in the northern First Corps area.
III. The Communist threat in First Corps amounts to
about 56,000 enemy regulars, including the NVA
units in and just above the DMZ. It is to meet
this threat that MACV recently moved about two
U.S. Army brigades, with their supporting artil-
lery, from the Second and Third Corps areas into
the southern part of First Corps. They will re-
lieve Marine garrisons there for commitment to
the northernmost provinces.
A. There are no firm indications of impending
major enemy offensives elsewhere in South
Vietnamy but the Communist forces still have
a potential to make trouble, particularly in
the highlands.
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Political Developments
IV. Now that the new South Vietnamese constitution
has been promulgated, political attention is
on the coming national elections in September.
A. Five civilians have already declared them-
selves in the presidential race, but the
big question--that of a military candidate--
remains unresolved.
the military leadership
so far is waiting for Premier Ky and
Chief of State Thieu to settle between
themselves which one will run for
president.
2. Each man is maneuvering for enough back-
ing to make his rival bow out gracefully.
Each appears reluctant at present to
force a showdown by asking the military
hierarchy to decide.
B. If the military can settle on one candidate--
and they insist that they will--his chances
ofrwinning the election appear fairly strong.
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1. The draft election law gives the pres-
idency to the man with the most votes,
without reference to a majority or a
run-off.
2. The army is the only effective national
organization, and the government's re-
sources at local levels far outweigh
those of any civilian group.
3. Only two of the civilian candidates--
assembly chairman Phan Khac Suu and former
premier Tran Van Huong--seem to have any
real chance, but both are appealing largely
to the delta areas and thus could cancel
each other out.
C. It remains possible that the military might
attempt to rig the election if the field of
candidates narrows and the race appears close.
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V. Meanwhile, the local elections for village and
hamlet offices, which began in early April and
will run into early June, have been proceeding
fairly well.
A. Despite considerable voter apathy and some
reluctance by candidates to risk Viet Cong
retaliation, voter turn-out in areas where
elections were held averaged 77 percent for
the five Sundays of voting for 984 village
councils. Voting for some 4,500 hamlet chiefs
will begin on 14 May. Communist disruptions
so far have been limited.
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North Vietnam
VI. North Vietnamese officials have not withdrawn
their offer to consider talks with the U.S:..in
exchange for a permanent cessation of the air
strikes, but they have indicated clearly that
this concession is as far as they are prepared
to go at the present time.
A. The Hanoi leaders have resumed their emphasis
on the importance of the "Four Points" as
the only basis for a settlement of the war.
On at least two occasions they have gone out
of their way to underscore. this attitude.
1. On March 21st, Hanoi released the
February exchange of secret letters
between President Johnson and Ho Chi
Minh on possibilities for ending the
war, in which the North Vietnamese
President reverted to the tough and
unyielding language of earlier DRV
statements on conditions for peace.
2. The next week, Hanoi bluntly: rejected
UN Secretary General U Thant's mid-
March proposals on negotiations.
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VII. Peking is the only DRV ally who has not approved
of Hanoi's recent offer to talk in exchange for
a cessation of the bombings.
A. The Chinese have greeted both the original
offer by the DRV foreign minister and the
Ho-Johnson correspondence with stony silence.
B. In private, Chinese Premier Chou ]gin-lai is
reported to have claimed that when the DRV
premier, Pham Van Dong, told Peking of the
DRV change of position, Chou advised against
it and warned the Vietnamese that, it would
only stiffen the US position.
VIII. The most interesting recent North Vietnamese
development in the past month is the trip Pham
Van Dong made to Moscow in late March and early
April.
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4 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. The Chinese Cultural Revolution is regaining its
frenzy after a brief lull. On the surface, there
is a renewed and perhaps final drive to destroy
the titular Chief of State, Liu Shao-chi. Behind
this facade, the extremist elements around Mao
Tse-tung and Lin Piao appear to be locked in
struggle with more moderate forces led by Premier
Chou En-lai.
A. Mao, Lin and Chou maintain the appearance
of unity in public; Chou remains the chief
spokesman for the regime. Lin has again
appeared in public after an absence of
almost five months. We believe that their
alliance is at best very shaky and uneasy.
II. After the Cultural Revolution had brought the
country to the brink of chaos in January,
order and discipline were restored in most
areas largely as a result of efforts by
Chou En-lai.
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A. Chou's most important role in that period
was to reassure the army, and to make it a
more responsive instrument of control.
He did this by dampening a purge which had
been launched in the army, and by issuing
a series of policies moderating the Cultural
Revolution.
III. His actions were grudgingly supported by Mao and
Lin at the time. But they were hotly debated,
and in some cases reversed
A. A major effort seems to be under way to
remove military commanders, both in Peking
and the provinces, who were vigorous in
implementing the directives Chou pushed
through, even when that meant arresting
unruly Red Guards.
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IV. Vicious Red Guard poster attacks are now being
aimed at Chou's proteges in the government, and
at top military men who are being he:Ld responsible
for letting the Cultural Revolution subside in
February. A common thread running through the
charges against these men is that they resisted
extremist policies desired by Mao and Lin.
A. The military men under attack--Yeh Chien-ying
(YEH JYAN-YING) and Hsu Hsiang-chien (SHOO
SITYANG-CHYAN-)--had worked very closely with
Mao and Lin until recently. Both are
politburo members and vice chairmen of the
powerful Military Affairs Committee. Hsu
(SHOO) was named head of the special army
purge group formed on 11 January.
1. Now, however, they are accused of opposing
Lin Piaol
and of saying
that Lin was not fit to be Mao's successor.
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B. In recent weeks a main target of Red Guard
posters and demonstrations has been Chou's
protege, Foreign Minister Chen Yi.
1. The foreign minister has been criticized
before, but never this harshly. He is
now accused of being a "counter-
revolutionary revisionist" who has
opposed Lin Piao and followed the line
of the disgraced chief of state, Liu
Shao-chi.
2. Chen Yi continues to perform ceremonial
duties, but he is clearly in serious
trouble.
C. So far, Chou has not come to the defense of
his proteges during the new wave of attacks.
With his usual flexibility, he is adjusting
to the latest political winds, with his
own status uppermost in his mind.
1. Chou is still running the day-to-day work
of the regime. This could be by default,
however, and not necessarily a reflection
of his political power; he is the only one
of the ruling triumvirate who is physically
strong enough to put in a full day's work.
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2. He does not have many people left to help
him. Last August, 25 men were installed
in the politburo; today, only seven of
them are still active and in apparent
good standing--Mao, Lin, Chou, one
propagandist, two security chiefs, and
one economic planner.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
GREECE
I. Greece appears to be quiet following the military
coup which seized power on April 21st.,
A. The second echelon officers who masterminded
the coup are at present firmly in control of
key posts in the government.
B. Some political figures who were taken into
custody at the outset have been released,
but many left-of-center and far-left leaders
are still being held.
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II. There is little indication that the new government
has well-thought-out plans for the future. So
far, the leaders have announced little more than
the intention to prevent the civil strife which
they predicted was imminent, and to purge corrupt
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politicians before permitting a return to consti-
tutional government.
A. The chief figures in the coup group are mili-
tary men with little experience in politics or
nonmilitary fields.
B. It is not yet clear that they will either
seek or find the expertise necessary to tackle
Greece's serious economic and social problems.
C. It is certain, however, that the elections
scheduled for May 28th have been postponed,
with no indication of when a new attempt at
forming a parliamentary government. will be
made.
D. The new government has announced its con-
tinued adherence to NATO, and a desire for
continued close relations with the U.S.
Its pronouncements, however, have a highly
nationalistic flavor. The new government
seems to have some mistrust of the U.S.,
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
YEMEN
I. The present crisis in our relations with Yemen
center on a completely fraudulent charge that
two American AID employees--accused by the
Yemenis of being CIA personnel--fired bazookas
at an ammunition dump in an effort to blow up
the city of Taiz.
A. Four bazooka rounds were, in fact, fired at
a camp of the Egyptian 85th Parachute Bat-
talion, not far from the U.S. residential
compound outside Taiz. At least two men were
killed. The Egyptians and Yemenis say dogs,
followed a scent from the scene of the firing
to the U.S. compound, and that bazooka rounds
were found in the compound.
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1. Sabotage of this kind is attempted
frequently in Yemen by various groups
of dissidents, and the U.S. is often
publicly accused of complicity in
subversion.
D. This time, it appears that the Egyptians
and Yemenis
genuinely believe
that we are engaged in sabotage and this
time have been caught.
1. The Yemeni Government has ordered the
AID mission out, and all American
personnel have been evacuated except
the two men who have been detained and
nine diplomatic personnel.
2. Americans being evacuated were harassed
on departure, and Yemeni officials
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commandeered some of their possessions.
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AID equipment has
been commandeered.
3. The two AID employees have not been formally
indicted. They are being well-treated,
and Embassy personnel have unrestricted access.
II. The riots which hit the US Embassy the day after
the attack appear to have been incited deliberately,
but we have no proof of this, and Cairo authorities
seem to have had no foreknowledge. Given the
atmosphere in Yemen, anti-US riots are not difficult
to raise.
A. Four days after the attack, the Egyptians began
to realize they would gain a propaganda victory
regardless of whether they ultimately could
prove the involvement of AID officials. Top
Egyptian authorities began controlling the
handling of the investigation.
B. Cairo takes the line, however, that the
quarrel is between Yemen and the U.S., with
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Egypt as the aggrieved third party, which
is nevertheless helping the U.S., by seeking
release of the prisoners.
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4 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
ISRAEL-SYRIA
I. The Israeli-Syrian border remains tense in the
wake of the incident of 7 April, when-six Syrian
MIG-21s were apparently downed by Israeli Mirage
fighters during a six-hour battle involving
ground and air forces.
A. The clash escalated after Syrian troops opened
fire on Israeli armored tractors working in
fields near a village on Lake Tiberias.
II. The Syrians have lost about half of their combat-
ready MIG-21s, and most of their qualified pilots
for these aircraft, so they are reluctant to at-
tempt any new action which might lead to new air
battles.
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A. They are braced for a possible renewal of
hostilities, however, and would obviously
like to retaliate, given the chance.
B. The Israelis have reinforced military
units in the disputed border area.
C. Efforts by United Nations officials to
damp down the tension have received
little cooperation from either side.
III. The main source of the tension is disagreement
over which country has the right to cultivate
the demilitarized zones, and neither country
is willing to compromise. This situation is
going to remain extremely unstable.
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4 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
INDIA
I. In India, the food crisis is going to become even
worse this summer, and it will remain acute at
least until the end of this year.
A. The second straight year of drought in some of
the major grain regions is going to reduce
this fall's harvest.
B. On top of that, the summer monsoons will make
roads impassable, creating serious distribution
problems for food imports.
1. Many of the areas hardest hit by food
shortages can be reached only by road.
II. The recent elections left the governing Congress Party
with majority governments in only eight of India's
17 states, and this is going to create additional
problems, particularly if the government-subsidized
food rations have to be cut further.
A. The collection, distribution, rationing, and
importation of food all require cooperation
between New Delhi and the state governments, and
this will be lacking if the strained political
relations don't improve.
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4 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
PANAMA NEGOTIATIONS
I. Negotiations with Panama for a new canal treaty
have entered a crucial stage. From here on in,
the Panamanians are bound to look at them as a
major issue in the campaign for their
presidential elections in May, 1968.
A. President Robles, in a speech on his
return from Punta del Este, said he was
elated over his meeting with President
Johnson, and hopeful that the canal talks
could be finished within the time frame
set by the Panamanians.
B. They want a draft treaty completed in
time to be ratified by a special assembly
session late this summer. Robles feels
that he needs at least six weeks before
the special session for an intensive
campaign to "sell" the merits of the
new agreement to the country.
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1. If ratification is held over until the
regular session opens on October 1,
pressures of the presidential campaign
will make it difficult to hold the
fragile government coalition of seven
parties together.
II. Opposition leader Arnulfo Arias and his mass-
based Panamenista Party have begun to step up
attacks on Robles' efforts to reach a canal
settlement with the U.S.
A. Arias persists in his claim that he was robbed
of the presidency in the 1964 election, and
that the Robles government is illegal.
B. Moreover, the Panamenista leader maintains
that since the present government does not
represent the country's majority, any
canal agreement it negotiates will be
opposed by the "people" regardless of its
contents.
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Arias has not
yet decided whether to run in the 968
election,., He is convinced that the govern-
ment coalition will rig the elections to
prevent his winning.
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D. Arias has indicated that he might abstain,
claiming fraud by the ruling elite, and
then move to overturn the government.
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4 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. The insurgent band operating in southeastern
Bolivia is composed of members of both the
pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist parties.
There is some evidence of Cuban direction and
support.
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II. The insurgents probably total no more than 60
men. No more than 15 engage government forces
at any one time. They have been in, the field
for about 6 months.
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A. They are well-armed, well-supplied, and
well-trained, and show excellent discipline
under fire.
III. The government's immediate plan is to encircle
the guerrillas in order to prevent their escape.
A. Selected troop units, now being given coun-
ter-insurgency training, will ultimately
be sent in to destroy the guerrillas, but
the necessary training and movement may
take months.
B. President Barrientos continues to press
the United States for additional military
equipment, particularly automatic weapons,
bombs, and support aircraft.
IV. President Barrientos reportedly does not be-
lieve his position and prestige have been weak-
ened as a result of the government's inability
to cope with the insurgency.
A. He is leaving counter-insurgency operations
to Armed Forces commander General Ovando
who will be the obvious scapegoat if condi-
tions deteriorate.
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