CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000800050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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4 April 1967
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE BRIEFING
1000 THURS 6 APRIL 1967
CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
I. Tangible Cuban support for revolutionary activity
in Latin America over the past two years has been
at a lower level than during the peak period from
1961 to 1963, but this does not reflect any weak-
ening of Fidel Castro's determination to spread
his revolution.
A. Castro agreed, at an extraordinary meeting of
Latin American Communist parties held in Havana
in November, 1964, that he would stop supporting
would-be insurgent groups not under the control
of the orthodox pro-Moscow Communists.
1. He has continued, however, to give moral,
material, and financial support and train-
ing to such groups in Venezuela, Colombia,
and Guatemala, his three priority targets
at present, and he made it clear in a speech
last month that he does not feel bound by
the 1964 agreement.
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B. On March 13th, he repeated his persistent
thesis that violent revolution is necessary
to bring about any meaningful political and
social change in Latin America.
1. He accused the orthodox Communist parties
which do not support dissident insurgent
groups--in Venezuela and Colombia, for
example--of cowardice and betrayal.
2. Castro appeared particularly irked that
a Soviet delegation has been attempting
to improve relations and expand trade in
some of the countries--Colombia in partic-
ular--where he hopes to develop revolutions.
In specific reference to the Soviet Union,
he complained that members of the Communist
camp who deal with oligarchies in countries
where insurgents are active are betraying
the revolutionaries.
C. Castro's statements continue to reflect his
intense disillusionment with the urban-based
pro-Moscow Communist parties and to portend
even greater emphasis on the predominance of
the rural guerrilla movements. These fre-
quently operate independently of the regular
parties.
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1. In his March 13th speech, Castro stated:
"If, in any nation, those who call them-
selves Communists do not know how to ful-
fill their duty, we will support those
who--even though they do not call them-
selves Communists--behave like real Com-
munists in the struggle."
2. This was a crystal-clear renunciation of
the November 1964 agreement. Castro was
saying that wherever the orthodox Commu-
nist parties will not seek the violent
road of revolution to seize power, he will
ignore the party leaders and work with
militant extremists who are ready to fight.
II. In those Latin American countries where there is
no significant insurgency under way, the Cubans
have been concentrating for the past two years on
developing a support mechanism while they wait
for a suitable opportunity and adequate assets.
A. The Cubans continue to provide some ideolog-
ical and guerrilla warfare training to mili-
tants from several Latin American countries.
Accurate figures are not available, but at
least 2,500 Latin Americans have received
such training in Cuba since 1961.
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1. This is by no means a maximum figure for
the guerrilla potential. Many of these
trainees in turn trained others when they
returned to their home countries. Others,
however, probably became disillusioned
with the difficulties of initiating armed
revolution, and left the field to more
willing martyrs.
2. In the last year or so, moreover, we have
received fewer and fewer reports of Cuban
efforts to fund Latin American revolution-
ary groups, and fewer Latin Americans ap-
pear to be traveling to Cuba for training.
3. On the other hand, Havana has demonstrated 25X1C
an improved capability to
This
ability has not yet been translated into
a noticeably more successful subversive
effort, partly because the Latin American
governments have become increasingly vig-
ilant and aware of the danger.
B. The Cubans have been able to bring about inter-
national cooperation of national movements and
parties in some areas. This has helped to create
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or strengthen infrastructures upon which
future revolutionary activities can be
built, by making it easier to channel funds,
transport agents and leaders, transmit com-
munications, and obtain false documents.
1. Two groups providing such support to the
Venezuelan movements were uncovered in
Colombia in 1966, and one of the Colombian
movements has chosen the Venezuelan border
region as its area of guerrilla operations.
Thus it can support Venezuelans moving
either way across the border and also is
in position to cross to Venezuela.
2. The Salvadoran Party has provided Salva-
doran documentation to Guatemalans for
travel to Bloc countries, and has also
provided sanctuary for Guatemalans and
Hondurans.
III. Castro's fervent appeals to Latin American extrem-
ists to carry out armed struggles in their coun-
tries betray a certain amount of frustration over
his program's lack of success, and the lack of
enthusiasm it engenders among the pro-Moscow Com-
munists in Latin America.
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A. Several important Communist Party leaders
were quick to criticize Castro's revolution-
ary strategy after his pointed attack on the
Moscow-oriented parties in his speech on July
26th, 1966. At that time, he called them
"pseudo-revolutionaries," who lacked the
courage to follow the path of armed struggle.
B. Despite the fiery declarations of the January
1966 Tri-Continent Conference in Havana, and
the subsequent general call for insurgency
in Latin America, no measurable continent-
wide response has been noted. In fact, in-
surgent movements have lost rather than gained
ground during the last year or two, although
pro-Castro insurgents in Colombia and Bolivia
have very recently shown signs of new life.
1. An outgrowth of the Tri-Continent Confer-
ence--the Latin American Solidarity Organ-
ization--is to hold its first meeting in
Havana in late July. The efficacy of the
strategy of violent revolution in Latin
America will certainly be one of the main
themes.
2. It will also give the Cubans an excellent
chance to offer more training, propaganda
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guidelines, and possibly funds to the
leaders of various groups of the ex-
treme left who will be attending the
conference.
C. For the past year, inflammatory propaganda
has constituted Cuba's most consistent sup-
port for insurgency in the hemisphere. The
emphasis has shifted somewhat from the
strident calls for immediate armed action
in the early days of the Castro regime.
1. The current emphasis is more on laying
a solid foundation for future revolution-
ary action, attempting to unite feuding
factions of the extreme left, and extol-
ing those revolutionaries who are willing
to take up the fight, regardless of
whether they are bonafide Communists.
2. Havana now is broadcasting about 175 hours
a week to Latin America, primarily in
Spanish and Portuguese. There is also,
however, propaganda in French, Creole
for Haiti, Guarani for Paraguay, and
Quechua for Bolivia. The Quechua sched-
ule for Bolivia was increased from 1 1/2
hours per week to seven on March 31st.
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D. The extent of guerrilla activity in Latin
American countries is directly related, of
course, to hqw dissatisfied the people of a
given country may be over social injustices
and the lack of economic opportunity, and
what chance there appears to be for reform.
1. Cuban propaganda takes the line that the
ruling oligarchies have defeated and will
continue to defeat all attempts to change
existing conditions by legal, parliamentary
methods.
2. Therefore, Havana Radio argues, the so-
called "via pacifica" or peaceful path of
reform sought by many of the Qrthodox
Communist parties is ineffective, and the
only course is armed struggle.
IV. I propose at this point to examine Cuban goals
and activities in the individual Latin American
target countries, beginning with Central America.
Here, of course, Panama--because of the U. S.
presence and the importance to us of the Canal--
must be high on the list of Castro's long-range
targets, but when he examines his assets in pro-
portion to the possibilities for success, the
priority goes to Guatemala.
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A. Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance
to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups
for more than three years. Initially Yon
Sosa's leftist-extremist 13th of November
organization was the main recipient of this
aid.
1. After the November 1964 Conference of
Latin American Communists in Havana,
however, Cuba channeled its aid ex-
clusively to the fighting arm of the
Guatemala Communist Party, the Rebel
Armed Forces, or FAR.
2. at
least 15 guerrilla trainees arrived in
Guatemala from Cuba in mid-1966, and that
60 men were to go from Guatemala to Cuba
for similar training early last August.
3. Recently, there has been a resumption of
an old argument between the leaders of
the orthodox Guatemalan Communist Party,
and the leaders of the Rebel Armed Forces,
who are more militant and more responsive
to Castro influence. The FAR leaders
have been complaining that the regular
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Party machinery is not pushing terrorism
in urban areas, and has failed to relieve
military pressure on the guerrillas. The
FAR also complains that the central com-
mittee has too many old-guard members who
lack militancy, and wants them replaced
with Castro-oriented activists.
4. Although both groups have been weakened
by dissension and army operations against
them, they continue to be effective in
harassing the government; the FAR, at
least can count on continued Cuban train-
ing and financial assistance.
B. Cuba has been providing occasional guerrilla
training for revolutionaries from the other
Central American countries, but appears to
be unwilling to give them funds or other
active support until they initiate armed
action.
C. Mexico remains a special case. Cuban subver-
sive activities in Mexico consist largely of
support and liaison actions directed against
other countries--the most recent example be-
ing the smuggling of arms to Guatemala by a
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Cuban diplomat based in Mexico. Castro has
avoided revolutionary activity against Mexico
itself, in order to preserve it as a commer-
cial, travel, and diplomatic outlet for Cuba,
as well as an outpost for subversion in
neighboring countries.
V. Despite Cuba's proximity to Central America, it
is in South America that Castro has made his most
significant headway in influencing subversive
groups. Since 1960, dissident groups responsive
to Castro influence have been active at various
times in Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela,
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. None of these groups
has come close to overthrowing a government, but
those in Venezuela and Colombia have been able to
harass the incumbent regimes.
VI. Cuba actively supports Communist insurgency in
Venezuela, which heads Castro's list of Latin
American targets for subversion.
A. The Cuban propaganda effort remained high in
1966, but the extent of assistance in the
form of money and training seems to be limited
to supplies for the dissident Armed Forces of
National Liberation, or FALN, at odds with
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the regular Communist Party and led by Douglas
Bravo. men
and supplies arrived in Venezuela from Cuba in
July 1966.
B. Castro's support for the Bravo group brought
strong protests from the Moscow-line Communist
Party of Venezuela in late 1966, and his re-
cent attack on the party for failing to launch
a guerrilla offensive has brought the Caracas
party leaders close to a break with the Cuban
party.
C. In the meantime, the increasing frequency of
rural guerrilla attacks--the most pronounced
since 1963--and the recent murder of the
Venezuelan foreign minister's brother have
prompted a strong reaction from the Venezuelan
government.
D. Castro remains unmoved by these protestations.
In his 13 March speech he praised the guerril-
las, implying that he would continue to give
them his full support.
VII. Colombia--which Castro-highlights along with
Venezuela as being in the forefront of those
countries "struggling against imperialism"--has
recently seen renewed guerrilla activity.
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A. During the past month, five incidents have
occurred, including an Army of National Lib-
eration (ELN) attack on a police post in
which five policemen were killed; and a Rev-
olutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
ambush of an army patrol in which fifteen
soldiers were killed.
B. Both the ELN and the FARC are strongly sup-
ported by Cuban propaganda, but the extent
of actual Cuban aid to them is not known.
We do know that an ELN leader returned to
Colombia from Cuba in September 1966 with
$10,000 in his pocket, and that in late 1964
another ELN leader brought back $25,000.
C. Recent reports indicate that, as in Venezuela,
the Communist Party of Colombia, or PCC, is
increasingly opposed to Castro's support for
guerrillas not under PCC control. PCC leaders
correctly reason that they are the ones who
suffer during government reprisals for guer-
rilla attacks. The recent large-scale roundup
of Communist Party leaders in Bogota bears
out their fears.
D. This development, coming in the wake of de-
teriorating relations between Cuba and the
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Communist Party of Venezuela and Castro's
recent attack on Moscow-oriented Communist
parties, emphasizes the growing controversy
within Latin American Communism as to whether
the movement should be directed by guerrillas
in the field, or by the regular parties.
VIII. In Peru, Cuba's relationship with leftist-extrem-
ist groups has been severely hampered by the gov-
ernment's crackdown following the initiation of
guerrilla activity in June, 1965. Today, in-
surgent leaders are either dead, in jail, or in
exile, and their organization is badly disrupted.
Some efforts are being made by the remnants to
reorganize, but funding and communication channels
have not been restored.
guerrillas are once again about to initiate
action in southern Peru, and that they expect
Cuban assistance. Internal bickering and suc-
cessful government counterinsurgency operations,
however, would seem to preclude an increase of
insurgent activity in Peru to the proportions
of the 1965 troubles.
IX. Recent reports have indicated direct Cuban involve-
ment in Bolivian dissident preparations for guerrilla
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activity. According to these reports, Bolivians
who have been in training in Cuba have returned
and are establishing their own training camps in
the Alto Beni and the Chapare regions of the coun-
try. We believe that as many as 100 Bolivians
have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba
since 1961.
A. Some internal dissension over the proper time
for launching the insurgency has developed.
At least some of the guerrillas have begun
operations. A government force was attacked
in eastern Bolivia on 23 March and suffered
several casualties.
X. Some prospective insurgents from the other South
American countries continue to receive guerrilla
training in Cuba, but have not been able to trans-
late this into active insurgency after returning
home.
A. There has been no recent activity directed
against the governments of Argentina, Para-
guay, or Uruguay, and the Chilean Communist
Party's firm adherence to "via Pacifica" or
the peaceful way to power has thwarted
Castro's aims there.
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B. In regard to Brazil, Castro has been in con-
tact with the exiled Leonel Brizola, the
former favored Castro operative who is a
brother-in-law of ex-President Goulart.
It is doubtful, however, that
Castro really counts on Brizola or any other
Brazilian to begin a determined antigovern-
ment campaign soon in Brazil.
C. Ecuador's long history of instability should
afford a fertile ground for a Castro-oriented
insurgent movement. The perpetual. disorganiza-
tion, lack of cohesiveness, and poor quality
of leadership among all Ecuadorean political
groups, however, also characterizes the lead-
ership among the various Ecuadorean revolu-
tionary groups. This has probably led the
Cubans to conclude that revolutionary pros-
pects in Ecuador are slight at best.
XI. In summary, Cuba has given ample notice that it
intends to continue its propaganda and some train-
ing and financial support to selected revolutionary
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movements. As long as exploitable situations
exist in the hemisphere, Cuba is on record as
being willing to contribute toward the estab-
lishment of "more Cubas" in Latin America.
A. It is also apparent, however, that. Havana
is unwilling to run the great risks involved
to provide significant military assistance
to antigovernment groups in Latin America.
B. The effect of the Communist parties' growing
opposition to Castro-influenced armed action
remains to be seen. Several of these parties
may follow the lead of the Venezuelan party
in openly denouncing Castro's revolutionary
meddling. At the very least, such a develop-
ment will speed up political fragmentation
which--on the leftist-extremist side--could
mean less control and discipline from above,
and more urban terrorism and rural violence.
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