NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000800020002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 16, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

Appre i regr-JWease 2000/05/12: CIA-RDPI9 827A O8 20002-6
DCI MAHON BRIEFING 3/17/67
(Numbered copies with Operational package(in File))
1 DCI
2 DDCI
3 Exec Dir
4 DDP thru
5 DDI
25X1A 6
25X1A
7-9 O/LegisC for memos
10 CS/Pres File
Unnumbered:
S/Pres File
DOCI
SDO
Ch & PA/PEA
Ch # PA/MEA
Ch E PA/EURA
Contributions:
vmp~
25X1A
D/Indochina
MEA/AfINigeria
MEA/South Asia
25X1A
25X1A
Secret
f p- 3_, 19
25X1A
25X1A
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DRAFT DCI CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
BRIEFING FOR MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE,
17 March 1967
C O N T E N T S
Page
North Vietnam
1
South Vietnam--Military
4
South Vietnam--Political
7
India
10
France
13
Nigeria
16
Venezuela
18
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16 March 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
%W~
1. The position of the North Vietnamese government
on the possibility of peace talks remains the
same--that Hanoi will talk with us only when we
have permanently stopped the air strikes, and
what they call "all other acts of war against
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."
A. The North Vietnamese officially keep refer-
ring to this offer, made by their Foreign
Minister in an interview of January 28, as
their current position on negotiations.
II. They are, however, leaving themselves room for
maneuver in both directions.
A. On the one hand, their propaganda still con-
tains enough references to the so-called
"Four Points" of April, 1965, to enable
them to toss these demands on 'the 'table as
soon as talks start, or even appear imminent.
B. On the other hand, one of their favorite
stalking horses, the Communist Australian
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reporter Wilfred Burchett, has indicated
that a new bombing pause, followed by a re-
quest to Hanoi for a reciprocal gesture,
might be enough to get the talks started,
without any guarantee of unconditional and
permanent cessation.
1. The trouble with giving any weight to
Burchett's remarks is that he sometimes
mixes his own ideas 'with what he has
been told in Hanoi. Also, the North Viet-
namese can use him for unofficial trial
balloons which do not commit them in any
way.
C. The difference between the Four Points and
the January 28 interview, of course, is that
in the new approach, the only precondition
for talks is an end to all attacks on North
Vietnam, while the earlier position required
the United States to recognize the Four
Points as a "basis for settlement" before
negotiations begin.
III. Perhaps the most interesting Hanoi statement in
recent weeks was made by Premier Pham 'Van Dong
on March 1. When a French reporter asked him
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whether Hanoi proposes that the United States
should neg tiate simultaneously but separately
with Hanoi and with the National Liberation Front,
the North Vietnamese Premier answered that this
was "up to the United States."
A. The answer was non-committal, but conveyed
the impression that Hanoi was not insisting
that the U.S. talk directly with the Libera-
tion Front--at least at the outset..
1. Hanoi might be prepared to open bi-
laterfal talks with U.S. representatives
in order to stop the air strikes, but
would then possibly insist that we have
to deal with the Liberation Front on
anything concerning South Vietnam.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
I. In the South, the Communists have recently in-
troduced a number of rockets to supplement
their mortar attacks on U.S. positions.
A. The significance is that some of these
rockets have a range greater than the
radius of the security perimeters we have
been maintaining around our installations.
B. Soviet-designed 140-millimeter barrage
rockets have been used twice against Da
Nang air base, first on February 27, and
again on March 15.
II. These rockets can be fired from a simple tube
fastened to a board.
A. The Communists used such improvised launchers
from firing positions about four miles south-
west of the base.
1. The Russians designed the weapon to be
fired from multiple launchers either
mounted on trucks, or towed on a light
trailer.
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B. The rocket itself is three feet long, 5-1/2
inches in diameter, and can carry a load
of about 28 pounds of high explosive a
maximum of 9,750 yards. That's more than
five and a quarter miles.
III. A captured porter has described the preparations
for the first attack.
A. Porters carried the 134 rockets from storage
caves down to a river, where waiting boat
crews took the porters and their loads to
a point near the firing position.
1. The rockets weigh 70 pounds each--almost
100 pounds with the warhead. Each one
was carried slung from a pole between
two porters.
2. At the scene of the action, individual
holes had been scraped in the ground
to give the launching tubes the proper
elevation.
B. Actually, only 51 rockets hit the :Da Nang
base. Others hit a nearby village, killing
32 civilians and destroying or damaging 200
homes.
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1. Rockets which failed to fire were dumped
in the river. We recovered some of these,
and found they had both Chinese and
Russian markings.
C. The first attack cost us 11 killed, 27
wounded, and 18 aircraft damaged. The
second resulted in 18 Americans injured, a
fuel pipeline fire, serious damage to one
aircraft, and 1,ght damage to 8:ix others.
IV. The rockets come in faster than morter shells,
and this complicates the problem of effective
return fire.
The initial field reports on the second at-
tack, however, indicate that the Marines
were delivering counterbattery fire after
the Communists had launched only 20 rockets.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
SOUTH VIETNAM--POLITICAL
I. The Constituent Assembly in South Vietnam is
ostensibly engaged in putting the finishing
touches on the new draft constitution before
submitting it formally to the military regime
to meet the March 27 deadline.
A. Behind,?the scenes, assembly and government
leaders are engaged in hard bargaining over
some of the controversial issues, trying
to avoid a formal public dispute later on.
II. The Ky regime is unhappy with the balance be-
tween executive and legislative power, but the
main point of contention centers on who does
what, from now until national elections are
held.
A. The assembly, which was popularly elected
last September, wants to assume the constitu-
tional legislative powers until a national
assembly is elected in six months or so. This
would give the present assembly a strong voice
in regulating and conducting these elections.
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B. The military leaders, on the other hand,
want to retain both the legislative and
executive authority they now hold, perhaps
allowing some assemblymen an advisory role
until elections.
1. A private compromise is possible, and
would be another helpful step toward
eliminating the mistrust between civilians
and the military, which has been a chronic
cause of past political instability.
2. Otherwise, government leaders may later
formally veto the provisions to which
they object. The assembly in turn can
override the veto by a two-thirds majority
vote.
III. The assembly must present its draft constitution
to the government by March 27. The government
in turn must promulgate the constitution by early
May.
A. There is a general consensus that the election
of a president will be held in about six,
months, probably in September.
B. National assembly elections may be held about
a month later.
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IV. The constitution itself provides for a popularly
elected president, who may be re-elected once,
and for a national legislature with an upper
and lower house.
A. A judiciary headed,by an indirectly selected
supreme court forms the third branch of the
government.
B. By and large, legislative and executive powers
are fairly well balanced, and generally follow
our own system.
C. The constitution also recognizes the principle
of elected province chiefs, although they will
continue to be appointed during the next four
years.
D. On the local scene, elections of hamlet chiefs
and village councils will start next month
and continue thru June.
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16 March 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
INDIA
1. In India, Mrs. Gandhi's new government has been
cut back to a thin majority in the national
parliament, and lost control of eight of the 17
states. The recent elections handed the ruling
Congress Party a severe setback, and it still
faces the same problems: food shortages, in-
flation, economic stagnation, Kashmir, and China.
A. Since independence, Congress had never held
less than 70 percent of the seats in the
lower house of parliament. it controlled
16 state governments, with the 17th--Kerala--
under direct federal rule.
1. Now it is down to 55 percent in the lower
house, and opposition coalitions have
excluded the Congress Party from six
state governments.
2. Election casualties included the able
Minister of Agriculture, Subramaniam; Party
President Kamaraj; and the party bosses
in Bombay and Calcutta.
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3. Mrs. Gandhi may be able to bring Subramaniam
back into the government on the powerful
Planning Commission, or as Ambassador to
the United States.
II. Mrs. Gandhi has brought her one-time rival for
the premiership, Morarji Desai, into the cabinet
as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister.
This will strengthen the cabinet if he and Mrs.
Gandhi are able to work together.
A. Y. B. Chavan is still Home Minister. He faces
new headaches in dealing with opposition
state governments on such matters as food
collection and distribution, finances, and
economic development.
B. The opposition is fragmented at the national
level, and the Communists remain somewhat
hobbled by the split into separate Moscow
and Peking parties. At the state level,
however, the opposition parties are success-
fully ganging up on the Congress Party.
C. A Communist-dominated coalition is firmly in
control in Kerala, and non-Communist coali-
tions have put together solid major ties in
two-other major states. Three states have
shaky opposition coalitions.
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D. In a seventh state, Congress is trying to
pick up enough independents to form a govern-
ment. In an eighth, Congress put such a
coalition together briefly, but it was toppled
by protest demonstrations, and the state has
been put under direct New Delhi rule.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
1. The Gaullist majority in the French National
Assembly was reduced to one in the March 12
election, but this reverse is unlikely to
cause any great changes in De Gaulle's foreign
and domestic policies.
A. The government probably will pick up ad-
ditional support from unaffiliated conserva-
tive deputies, several of whom owe their
election to Gaullist withdrawals after the
first round.
B. This majority probably will not be as re-
sponsive to De Gaulle as the previous one,
however, because the number of hard-line
Gaullists has been reduced by about 40.
1. The government may thus have to do a
little more bargaining in its own camp.
II. The most spectacular gains were registered by
the Communist Party,
A. The Communists have 73 seats, which amounts
to a 75 percent increase in representation.
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1. The actual Communist vote in the run-
off was 21.4 percent, almost exactly
the same showing they made in the 1962
elections.
2. The increase in Communist seats resulted
from a deal with the non-Communist Federa'
tion of the Left to concentrate on the
strongest candidate of the left in each
district in the run-off.
B. The Communists and the Federation will find
it difficult to continue this electoral unity
in the Assombly.
1. Even if they do cooperate, they will have
difficulty challenging the government ef-
fectively.
2. There are virtually no major issues on
which the center, the Federation, and the
Communists could reach sufficient agree-
ment to censure the government, or
to.defeat a government bill.
III. A cabinet reshuffle is not likely to occur
before the opening of parliament on April
third.
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1. The actual Communist vote in the run-
off was 21.4 percent, almost exactly
the same showing they made in the 1962
elections.
2. The increase in Communist seats resulted
from a deal with the non-Communist Federa
tion of the Left to concentrate on the
strongest candidate of the left in each
district in the run-off.
B. The Communists and the Federation will find
it difficult to continue this electoral unity
in the Assembly.
1. Even if they do cooperate, they will have
difficulty challenging the government ef-
fectively.
2. There are virtually no major issues on
which the center, the Federation, and the
Communists could xeach suffici.en~ agree-
ment to defeat or censure the government.
III. There will probably be a cabinet reshuffle, but
it will not occur before the opening of parlia-
ment,on 3 April.
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A. De Gaulle might decide to replace or reas-
sign those ministers who failed to win As-
sembly seats, such as Foreign Minister Maurice
Couve de Murville or Armed Forces Minister
Pierre Messmer.
B. Under the French constitution, however, a
minister is not obliged to win a seat in
Parliament.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
I. In Nigeria, deep tribal and regional antagonism
has ripped apart an artificial federation of
four regions and 250 tribes.
A. Unless a modus vivendi can be achieved in the
next few weeks between the Northern-dominated
:federal government and the Eastern. region,
stronghold of the Ibo tribe, the fragmentation
of Nj.geria--probably accompanied by civil
war--now seems unavoidable.
1. Eastern, governor Ojukwu is basically un-
willing to depart from his advocacy of a
loose confederal structure, but negotia-
tions are still possible if Lt. Col. Gowon,
head of the federal military government,
will agree to implement agreements reached
in January by the ruling Supreme Military
Council. Gowon is reluctant because these
agreements in fact assure a weak central
government and considerable regional autonomy.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
2. Gowon is planning economic sanctions
against Ojukwu, and is determined to
prevent Eastern secession, by force if
necessary. An easy military victory
over the East, however, is not likely, as
the East has improved its military capa-
bilities.
B. In Nigeria's Western region, the Yoruba tribe
is growing increasingly restive under Northern
"occupation." Western leaders have apparently
reached an understanding with Ojukwu to make
common cause against the North.
C. Any incident could touch off renewed tribal
violence.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE
I. In Venezuela, pro-Castro guerrillas have in-
tensified insurgency in the countryside, and
terrorism in the capital.
A. There is no immediate threat to government
stability, but if the guerrillas are not
controlled, the long-term danger cannot be
discounted.
II. The Venezuelan government holds Fidel Castro
responsible, and is considering protests in the
United Nations and the Organization of American
States against Cuban encouragement of subversion
in Venezuela.
A. Cuba has been helping insurgents in Venezuela
with propaganda, funds, and training.
1. In 1966, Cuba helped the Venezuelan in-
surgents to infiltrate at least one band
of about 40 heavily-armed guerrillas from
Cuba into Venezuela.
B. Communist terrorists recently kidnaped and
murdered the brother of the Venezuelan Foreign
Minister.
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1. Venezuelan revolutionaries in Havana
then announced that the murder was an act
of "revolutionary justice."
C. This incident was the immediate cause for the
re-imposition of emergency controls in Venezuela,
and the consideration of complaints against
Castro in international forums.
1. The government is also concerned, how-
ever, over the rural insurgency, which in
the past six months has reached the highest
levels since 1963.
2. There have been eight guerrilla attacks
in the past three weeks, including one
attack on a company of reg4i r army troops.
a. In the west, guerrillas are active in
the states of Falcon, Lara, Yaracuy,
and Portuguesa.
b. In the east, they operate in the
Bachiller Mountains southeast of
Caracas.
3. Army operations have achieved some success
in these two areas, but the guerrilla at-
tacks continue to increase in size and
frequency..
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III. Castro in his March 13 speech denied any re-
sponsibility for the murder of the Venezuelan
foreign minister's brother, and called it a
tactical error by the revolutionaries, but at
the same time he praised the guerrillas and im-
plied he would continue to back them.
A. Castro seems to have turned his back on his
agreement with Moscow to work only through
orthodox Communist parties in Latin America.
1. He called the regular Communists in
Venezuela "cowards" and "opportunists,"
and praised the militants of the FALN
and the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left--the M.I.R,--who are following in-
surgent leader Douglas Bravo.
2. Castro also took an unmistakeable swipe
at the -Kr.emlin by criticizing those na-
tions which, as he put it, seek to develop
or maintain good diplomatic and commercial
relations with "the oligarchic govern-
ments" of Latin America. He specifically
cited a Soviet delegation now in Colombia.
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