NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000500020006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 23, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 November 1966
25X1C NORTH VIETNAM
25X1C
I. There is evidence that the domestic situation in North
Vjetnam has deteriorated somewhat over the past two
months, partly because of the damage to the DRV trans-
portation system as a result of US air strikes, and
Is? because of a poor harvest this fall.
A. It seems likely, moreover, that the DRV leaders
must realize that military developments in South
Vietnam are not going well for them.
1. On balance, however, our evidence indicates
that things are not so bad as to warrant a
belief that Hanoi is ready to lower its de-
mands in order to get a negotiated settle-
ment of the war.
B. Reports
state
that the people seem to be getting enough food,
although it is rationed.
1. Morale remains fairly high.
2. Road and rail trartic continues to move de-
spite the intensive air strikes.
3. Supplies of POL appear to be arriving regu-
larly.
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4. In short, although life is difficult in North
Vietnam, it is not desperate and there is no
sign that the regime must now move to end
the war.
TI. There have been recent assurances from Eastern Euro-
pean sources that a cessation of US air strikes will
create favorable conditions for Hanoi to begin ne-
gollations. These assurances may be at least in part
L Ill resatt of an ovorly pvsniiu i u L readinq of riw
effects on Hanoi of the bombing and the lack of sig-
nificant military success in the South.
A. The sophisticated weapons Hanoi has added to its
air defense arsenal have thus far proved to be
relatively ineffective.
I. The DRV 's in-country jet fighter force con-
of about 15 MIG-21s and 55 MTC-15/17s.
2. An additional 45 MIG-15/17s are kept in re-
serve at Chinese airfields and are drawn
upon for replacements when North Vietnamese
Fighters are downed.
3. Thus far, over 30 North Vietnamese jets have
been shot down by US fighters.
4. The US has lost eleven aircraft in these en-
gagements.
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B. The Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles are
not proving to be as effective as conventional
ground fire.
1. Only about 3 percent of the missiles fired
thus far have downed manned US aircraft.
2. The percentage against unmanned drones is
much higher.
3. The SAMs are effective, however, in forc-
ing US pilots to fly at much lower altitudes
than they would normally, thus rendering
them more vulnerable to ground fire.
infiltration Into South Vietnam
III. It is estimated that total infiltration for 1966 will
run between 65,000 to 95,000 men; roughly three times
that of 1965.
A. MACV's figures for the first 10 months of 1966
in all categories (confirmed, probable and pos-
sible) now total some 4,000 men. The total of
Confirmed and probable infiltration is ..a4sizent.
4810 thus far.
1. The average monthly infiltration in these two
categories for the first eight months of
1966--which has not been a constant figure--
is about 6,000 men.
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2. An additional average of 2,400 men per month
are carried in the possible category.
B. Very few new North Vietnamese units have been
identiFied in South Vietnam in recent months.
Ths may be due, in great measure, to the log
between the time a unit arrives and the time
sufficient information is available to accept
it in the order of battle.
1. Nevertheless, we believe that some new NVA
units have been arriving in South Vietnam,
mostly in the northern provinces of Quang
Tri and Thua Mien.
2. Other infiltration groups--containing re-
placements and cadre personnel--are prob-
ably still using the standard infiltration
route through the Laos panhandle and into
the central highlands area of South Vietnam.
3. It has not been possible to determine the
percentage of men in units as opposed to
replacements.
South Vietnamese Military Situation
TV. The Allied strategy of simultaneous and wide-rang-
ing search-and-destroy/spoiling operations against
major Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army troop concen-
trarions and base areas has been largely responsible
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for preventing Communist main force units from assum-
ing an effective multibattalion offensive posture in
the I, II, and III Corps areas of South Vietnam dur-
ing most of 1966. In the IV Corps, ARVN forces have
generally contained the Viet Cong main force threat,
confining enemy actions largely to the small-scale
harassment of isolated, lightly-defended GVN para-
military positions and lines of communication.
A. In I Corps, US Marine Operations HASTINGS
(7 July-3 August) and the ongoing PRAIRIE have
disrupted the North Vietnamese Army buildup
which began in May 1966 in the northern Quang
Tri Province/DMZ area.
1. More than 2,100 NVA troops have been killed
in these operations.
2. However, at least two NVA divisions--the
324 "B" and the 341st--remain in this area
and continue to consolidate a major base of
operations within and south of the formerly
neutral buffer zone.
3. The near-term objective of this Communist
buildup is probably to inflict the maximum
possible attrition on allied forces in dif-
ficult terrain through a semi-conventional
style of warfare.
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B. In the central highlands of II Corps, Cambodian
border surveillance Operation PAUL REVERE has de-
layed or disrupted anticipated major offensive
action by the 1st NVA Division (formerly the 630th
Division) against government positions in Pleiku
and Kontum provinces.
1. Twenty-two hundred enemy troops have been
killed since multibattalion US infantry forces
began this campaign in early May.
Communi IL tiro, t. in IN, !;out_li-cent..rn I port
of coastal Binh Dinh Province has also been sig-
nificantly reduced by the highly successful re-
cent allied Operation IRVING. Fifteen allied bat-
talions led by the US 1st Air Cavalry Division,
participated in IRVING (1-24 October), which
cost the Communists losses of 2,000 killed,
1,765 caprurod, nnd 5,700 !wspect detained.
1. IRVING seriously disrupted the local Viet
Cong infrastructure in at least two districts
of the province.
2. The operation also forced major elements of
the 3rd NVA Division (formerly the 610th Divi-
sion) to disperse to more secure areas.
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D. Tn TIT Corps, operation ATTLEBORO, involving the
largest allied lasL lelc( ever fielded during
the Vietnam War (17 US and 2 ARVN battalions)
presented the first serious challenge to
previously uncontested Communist control of War
Zone "C" in northern Tay Ninh Province.
Uvl CL_r _
1. 1:Since its initiation or04 October ATTLE-
BOROhasAinflicted losses of 1,100 killed on
prohahle major elements of lfw 9Ih viel CM1g
Light Infantry Division and 101st NVA Regi-
ment.
2. In addition, allied troops (have( capture vast
amounts of foodstuffs and war materiels, in-
efudLnq an estimated 4.1/-x, million pounds of
rice.
3. While most of the action in ATTLEBOOasf
been centered on the southern fringes of War
Zone "C", the operationlhasnonetheless caused
serious command and control problems for
COSVN--the political and military headquarters
for Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam.
V. The pattern of Communist military activity in the past
few months suggests that the allied spoiling opera-
tLons have forced a signifcant revision in the
enemy's strategy.
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A. He is no longer seeking with masses of manpower
to overwhelm strategic allied outposts like
Plei Me, which he was hitting last fall.
1_ The last such attack, on the special forces
camp at A Shau in northwestern South Vietnam,
took place in F.elearu-a*.y.
2. The purpose of such attacks was partly to
spark the deployment of a large allied reac-
tion force which was a prime target for ambush
3. The Communists found, however, that given the
growing allied ability to react with overwhelming
air and ground firepower, the price they paid
in casualties was too much to bear.
B. Now the enemy main forces seem to be generally on
Lho defen5ivo.
1. Occasionally they have been noted mustering
for what looked like an upcoming attack,
but the subsequent allied reaction in each
case appears to have disrupted their plans.
C. In the central highlands they seem to be engaged
In some extent in a strategy of maneuver.
1. Enemy units continue to move around guardedly,
apparently hoping to draw the allies into
short, localized engagements in which the
odds are heavily with the Communists.
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2. In the past couple of weeks, they have had
SOMO success:
several company-sized or smaller
US elements have been hit hard.
3. In each case, however, the Communists have
payed a stiff price in casualties.
4. They have 'however', been successful in cutting
the overall attrition rate on their units in
the highlands.
VT. Meanwhile, the enemy has begun to put a much greater
propaganda emphasis on the guerrilla side of the
war.
A. Each day brings new admonitions on the value of
hit and run raid and terrorist type actions
against the allies, both as a means of tying
the friendly forces and of sustaining the Com-
munist grass-roots position in the countryside.
1. So far, the statistics reflect little change
in guerrilla-type actions, but they could well
rise in the coming months.
C. Tn the last analysis, the Communists are most in-
terested in maintaining their hold over large
portions of the rural populace.
They may he hoping to accomplish this largely
by guerrilla actions while their main forces
threaten larger-scale attacks in order to
keep the bulk of allied units tied up and
unable to concentrate on pacification.
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South Vietnamese Politics
VII. Political activity is on the increase in South Viet-
nam, largely because there is now an established
process and timetable for the evolution to a con-
stitutional government.
A. The political interests of various groups, both
in and out of power, are being sharpened by this
evolution, especially by the prospect of national
elections next year.
B. As yet, however, true national parties, alliances,
or coalitions are not in sight, and traditional
Vietnamese "watching and waiting" continues to
play a reasonably significant role in the politi-
cal scene.
C. The Constituent Assembly, elected in September,
is thus far the major manifestation of the politi-
cal evolution.
1. The Assembly has undergone an initial period
of formulaTion, eloctdd is officern, and now
must draft a constitution by late March.
2. Extreme regional and anti-military interests
have been fairly well contained so far in the
Assembly, which, in its actions, has taken
generally moderate and responsible stance.
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3. At the same time, a solid majority of the
delegates object to the government's current
veto power over the Assembly's draft con-
stitution, and to the limited jurisdiction
of the Assembly.
4. These delegates have presented their sug-
gestions for Assembly-government relations
to the military leaders, who will probably
try to go part way in satisfying the Assembly.
:;ince the Assembly also desires to avoid
an all-out confrontation with the govern-
ment, a compromise on these issues will prob-
ably result.
H. The evolution process has also given rise to some
regional frictions and to civilian-military dif-
lerences.
T. The recent cabinet dispute between Premier Ky
and a handful of southern ministers was largely
a reflection of these problems.
2. Southern (Cochin Chinese) civilian ministers
objected to the degree of real government
power exercised by military officers, espe-
cially those of northern (Tonkinese) origin.
1. The Southerners also fear that next year's
elections may be adversely influenced by the
current imbalance of power.
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oszworked
out for the present, the general issues of
regional distrust and mutual suspicion be-
tween civilians and the military lie just
beneath the surface.
E. Despite such friction, the military establish-
ment maintains firm control of the government.
1. Despite current regional feelings Premier
Ky and Chief of State Thieu have felt confi-
dent enough to remove a powerful southern
corps commander because of widespread rumors
of corruption.
2. Nevertheless, they were more or less bound to
replace hlm with another southerner, and
to compromise further by offering him a cabi-
net post.
P. In the larger perspective of the constitutional gov-
ernment, the military leaders have apparently not
yet decided how to exercise their power, which
has been the backbone of the Vietnamese political
structure since 1963.
1. They could attempt to form a military-based
national party and compete in national presi-
dential elections, or secure constitutional
provisions which allow for a military voice,
or both.
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2. The decision made by the military in this
respect and the means used to implement it
will undoubtedly go a long way towards deter-
mining the success or failure of the evolution
process.
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