BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000400130003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 30, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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30 September 1966
BRIEFING NOTES FOR DCI
THAILAND
I. The Communists in Thailand are determined to
step up the pace of their subversion, although
it is clear that their capabilities are still
limited.
A. The Communist insurgents have been increas-
ing propaganda activities in the northeast,
They have not, however, been able to
follow up a series of well planned
and executed attacks which they made
in the northeast in June.
2. Although the rainy season is partially
responsible, it is clear that the in-
surgents are still on the defensive
-and have the capability of mounting only
occasional attacks,
B. we are beginning to develop a better under-
standing of the Thai insurgent movement, par-
ticu~:arly its weaknesses,
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the Communists seem to
be laboring under some severe handicaps. One
of the most important is that they have not
been notably successful in winning signifi-
cant support among the villagers, although
they have tried to capitalize on latent eco-
nomic discontent and local grievances. As
a consequence, they have been forced to rely
heavily on strong-arm methods which in turn
further exacerbate relations with villag-
ers.
2? A dearth of dedicated cadres has limited
the movement's ability to go into new
areas and to expand activities in areas
already:,under loose Communist. controlm
3. North Vietnam may be supplying cadres to
help out with such things as weapons train-
ing, but thus far there is no firm evidence
on this.
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II. Meanwhile, the military leadership in Bangkok is
moving ahead with its counterinsurgency effort,
after a slow and somewhat misdirected start.
A. Several organizational changes have been
made over the past year to get the counter-
insurgency operation on a professional foot-
ing.
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1. The majority of these changes have been
aimed at getting better coordination be-
tween conflicting police, military, and
civilian authorities
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30 September 1966
BRIEFING NOTE
FOR DCI
LAOS
2. A new crisis has arisen in Premier
Souvanna's perennially troubled rela-
tions with his National Assembly.
A. This crisis was triggered by Sou-
vanna's refusal in mid-summer to
grant the assembly's request for
additional appointments to the
cabinet.
B. On September 16 the assembly re-
jected the government's proposed bud-
get.
C. Souvanna wants to use the present im-
passe as an excuse for dissglving the
assembly.
1. The King has reluctantly given
Souvanna approval to dismiss the
assembly if necessary.
2. The King's council is pressing for
a compromise solution which would
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allow the assembly to sit until
recess--October 11--and remain re-
cessed until the spring elections.
2. Another proposal being considered
would have a special assembly com-
mittee session called to pass the
budget.
D. Although Souvanna on September 27
reaffirmed his intention to dissolve
the assembly, a compromise solution is
likely.
II. Souvanna's firm stand against the assembly
pressure has been backed by the army, which
plays a major role in Laotian politics.
III. The military situation has remained basically
stable since the beginning of the rainy sea-
son in May.
A. Friendly guerrilla forces made some
limited advances in northern Laos during
the rainy season and regained a small
number of hilltop positions lost earlier
to the Communists.
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1. This see-sawing of positions has been a fea-
ture of the Laos scene for years--the Commu-
nists advancing during the dry season and
then losing ground during the rains.
2. In large part, the poor Communist performance
during the monsoon is due to the difficulty
in resupply from North Vietnam over washed-
out roads.
3. Because of the difficulty in resupply, large
numbers of North Vietnamese troops which form
the major portion of the effective Communist
combat force in Laos, are annually withdrawn
into North Vietnam during the rainy season.
B. There is no evidence that the Communists contem-
plate a substantially higher level of military
action in the upcoming dry season (October-April)
than in past years but
already beginning to come in about the return of
North Vietnamese troops to northern Laos,
1. The numbers reported thus far, six to ten
battalions, are in keeping with past levels
of North Vietnamese troop strength in north-
ern Laos.
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a few Chinese Communist troops have
been entering north Laos.
1. The Chinese Communists have for years been
supplying certain Laotian Communist and left-
ist neutralist forces in northern Laos with
ammunition, arms and other supplies.
2. It is likely that the Chinese reported re-
cently in Laos are transporting such supplies.
3. There is no evidence that Chinese Communist
troops are being stationed in Laos or that
they will be used in a combat role in that
country.
2. A recently captured Communist document in
South Vietnam reuealed that the party central
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committee early this year made support of
Laotian operations with supplies and with men
one of the major tasks of North Vietnam's
chief military headquarters in southern
North Vietnam.
goad clearing operations
by North Vietnainesell work gangs and bull-
dozers in mid-September.
4. These teams in mid-September also reported
the first substantial movement of truc]cs--
76 aver a ten-day period--though Mu Gia
southward since the rains began in May.
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30 September 1966
BRIEFING NOTES
FOR THE DCI
C O N T E N T S
CATEGORY ~C: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING
A. Vietnam
1. Quang Tri Province - DMZ Build-up
2. Buddhist Leadership Remains in Disarray
3. National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam
B. Communist China
1. Domestic Developments - Red Guard and Leadership
3. Communist China's Advanced Weapons Programs
C. USSR
Advanced Weapons Systems
3. The Soviet ICBM Force
D. Optional Items
1. Syria
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30 September 1966
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BRIEFING NOTES
FOR THE DCI
SOUTH VIETNAM
[M~lPy QUANG TRI, DMZ and Operation PRAIRIE]
QUANG TRI PROVINCE - DMZ BUILD-UP
I. There have been a number of indications in the
last month that North Vietnamese forces have
been engaged in an intensive logistics and troop
build-up for offensive operations in the northernmost
part of South Vietnam--Quang Tri Province,
A. This build-up has apparently been somewhat
slowed down and disrupted by US air and ground
operations.
For example, the US Marine operation--code-
named PRAIRIE--which has been under way in
Quang Tri Province since early August has re-
rnore tha-~ ~~---?"
ported killing enemy troops. US
air operations in this area have also slowed
down the logistic effort by causing numerous
secondary explosions and fires.
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B. Nevertheless:;-the enemy buildup is continu-
ing despite the relative success of US ef-
forts at spoiling any Communist plans for
an offensive.
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II. Enemy forces in the Quang Tri Province - Demili-
tarized Zone area include the estimated 9,000-
man 324th North Vietnamese Army division and
~____r---?----_.
several other recently infiltrated, as yet uni-
dentified regiments.
A. In addition, there are other forces on the
North Vietnamese side of the border which
could be committed to an offensive. These
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include the-341st Division
Moreover, there apparently is an extensive
logistics force supporting these troops in the
DMZ area.
The build-up is following classic. Communist
patterns also
II. In assessing the Communist build-up in northern
South Vietnam, it is unlikely that they intend
to launch a large offensive before the rainy sea-
son sets in around the end of October. Until
that time, US air and firepower superiority
should be able to successfully stave off any large
scale push.
A. It is important to remember, however, that the
Communists have gone for a cpnsiderable period
of time without
terry victory.
any sort of a significant mili-
the Communists are preparing
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for just such a needed victory in the I Corps
area--preferably to come before the US elec-
tions in early November.
1. Moreover, past Communist practice has
shown that they are not adverse to throw-
ing large numbers of troops into a battle
if they believe they can achieve a signifi-
cent objective. In the present circum-
stances, the buildup that has already
taken place--clearly the most significant
current event in the war--gives rise to
the possibility that they may "go for
broke" in northern South Vietnam to gain
that elusive victory so necessary to their
morale.
B. In any case, it is estimated that Communist
forces in Quang Tri Province still retain the
capability to launch a multi-regimental of-
fensive in the coming weeks. Such a push
could be aimed at the series of towns along
Route 9 in central Quang Tri Province.
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30 September 1966
SOUTH VIETNAM
BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE DCI
Buddhist Leadership Remains in Disarray
I. Despite South Vietnam's progress tpward
representative government, the continued
split among the leaders of the Buddhist
Institute is obscu.ri~ng that organization's
future role in the political process.
A. Although their boycott of the recent
constituent assembly election was
largely ineffectual, the militant
Buddhists are remaining-firm in their
opposition to the present government and
its policies, including the constitution
drafting process which is just getting
under way.
1. Thich Tri Quang, the leader of the
more radical and active Buddhists,
ended his three-month hunger fast
shortly after the election, but at the
same time, announced his continued
opposition to the government.
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2. Quang's opposition stems specifically
from the government's quelling of the
"struggle" movement which he inspired
in central Vietnam last spring, and
from his general aspiration for a
dominant political voice in the
country's affairs.
3. Although Quang has lost much of the
real political power he previously
enjoyed and is now no real threat to
the government, he and his activist
followers still have the potential
for future political strength.
B. Thich Tam Chau, a moderate Buddhist
leader and still formally head of the
Buddhist Institute, recently began efforts
to override the attitude of the militants
by rallying the more moderate Buddhists,
and then arriving at a settlement with the
government.
1. Chau is receiving the cooperation of
government leaders, who are willing to
make some concessions to the Buddhists
under his leadershipo In fact, many
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if not all of the Buddhist "struggle"
prisoners arrested during the spring
and early summer may soon be released
by the GVN to boost Chau's prestige.
2. However, Chau is having no success in
dealing with most of the other members
of the Buddhist Institute, some of
whom may question Chau's loyalties.
C, An extraordina~-congress
Unified Buddhist Associatsion--for which
the Institute acts as an executive arm--
is scheduled to be held in October, in
an effort to settle on a Buddhist policy
toward the government and to sort out the
leadership problems.
1. At present, Chau is working hard to
line up support for his position, but
it remains questionable whether he
would be able to prevail over Tri Quang
and his followers at such a congress.
D. Should the congress not be called or should
it fail to settle the Buddhists' leadership
and policy problems, a formal organiza=
tional split would seem to be quite possible.
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30 September 1966
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B1~~EFING NOTES FOR THE DCI
SOUTH VIETNAM
NATIONAL FRONT LIBERATION SOUTH VIETNAM
I. Hanoi's public denials of control and partici-
pation in the fighting in South Vietnam have
been undercut by captured documents and prison-
ers which have revealed that the top NFLSV head-
ers are well known North Vietnamese central com-
mittee members.
A.
provided confirmation that the man
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who runs .the entire Communist war effort. in
South Vietnam is North Vietnamese Politburo
member Nguyen Chi Thanh (NNGWEEN GHEE TAN).
1. Thanh is the secpnd ranking officer in
the entire North Vietnamese military
establishment, ranking next to Minister
of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap. Thanh left
North Vietnam to take over operations in
the South early in 1965.
2. His two principal deputies are also both
generals in the North Vietnamese Army
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and members of the Central Committee of
the North Vietnamese Communist Party.
3, Qne of them, the military deputy, is Tran
Van, Tra, who used to be deputy chief of
staff of the North Vietnamese Army. NOWT
under the alias of Tran Nam Trung, he
heads the mi~.itary component of the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation~of South
Vietnam.
4. Nguyen Chi Thanh's deputy for political
affairs is another North Vietnamese gen-
eral and central committee man, Tran Do.
5. Act~.ve Communist field commanders in South
Vietnam are also beginning to be identified
as North Vietnamese generals. In the im-
portant area just south of the DMZ, Mili-
tary Region V, the military commander is
reported to be North Vietnamese General
Nguyen Don.
B, Documents captured by US Marine forces in
this ~.rea have revealed high level North Viet-
namese Party Central Committee Directives de-
fining the responsibility of the southernmost
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North Vietnamese military headquarters, Mili-
tary Region IV'for operations in the South
Vietnam province of Quang Tri.
1. North Vietnamese armed forces garrisoned
in the area just north of the DMZ were
also assigned the responsibility of sup-
plying not only South Vietnam with "man-
power and resources," but also Laos.
2. These army units were designated as the
"mobile forces" for all three "theatres
of war"--North Vietnam, South Vietnam,
and Laos.
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30 September 1966
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BRIEFING NOTES
FOR DCI
COMMUNIST CHINA
Domestic Developments--Red Guards and Leadership
T. The internal political scene in Communist China
has been marked by turmoil and disarray for
many months now. All of the indications are
that the situation is still unstable, and there
may be further upheavals.
A. For the past six weeks, mobs of rampaging
teen-agers of the so-called Red Guard have
kept the country in a state of disorder.
1. They have been roaming the streets of
all major Chinese cities, harassing
suspected enemies of the regime and
occasionally beating them up.
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3. There have been a few reports of vio-
lence and bloodshed, but for the most
part-the Red Guards appear to be a
disciplined and well controlled organi-
zation.
4. In the past week or so, their harass-
ment has turned from the populace to
high officials within the regular party
machinery who oppose the current lead-
ership. The Red Guards have conducted
violent demonstrations against many city
and provincial party headquarters, and
have displayed wall posters attacking
many high officials by name.
B. These destructive antics have tended to
divert public attention #rom far more impor-
tant developments within the Peking leader-
ship. It appears to us that the top struc-
ture of the regime is undergoing a massive
shake-up, and that the Red Guards are being
used by the current leadership to consolidate
its power.
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(BRIEFING BOARD, CHICOM LEADERSHIP)
II. Massive demonstrations in Peking on August 18
and 31, and on September 15 Featured what ap-
pears to be a-new line-up of the party's top
policy=making .body, the Politburo.
p,, Mao Tse-tung still dominates the l~ader-
ship, but Defense Minister Lin Piao has
taken the place of Mao's long-time dep-
uty, Liu Shao-chi.
1, Liu has been the titular chief of
state. There has been na announcement
that he has lost that position, and he
is:.still a member of the politburo,
but he has been dropped ignominiously
from second to eighth place.
B. As for Mao himself, we are not sure just
how much control he still exercises over
day-to-daY events, or how long he will
last. He is 72 years bld,has a long
history of cardio-vascular trouble, and
was probably seriously ill last winter.
III. Mao's new deputy, Lin Piao, is not in much
better health.
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A. Lin is one of the youngest men in the
politburo at 59, but he has been ill for
much of the past 30 years,
TV. Mao, however, appears to have chosen Lin to
be his successor in spite of Lin's frailty.
We think this must reflect Mao's growing
mistrust of other elements of the leadership.
A. Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the recent changes has been the break-up
of the group of leaders which had been
running the party machinery for the past
decade.
1. Liu Shao-chi was the leading member
of that group.
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2. The general secretary of the party,
Teng Hsiao-ping, is another leading
member of that group. He his been
weakened, but not as much as Li~?.
3. A couple of months ago, in fact,
Teng appeared to have gained in the
shake-up. All that has changed.
Teng is still in the inner circle
of Mao?s advisers, but he has slipped
from third or fourth place to sixth
place in the power structure.
I}~ place of the party leaders, military
leaders close to Lin, and government fig-
ures like Chou En=tai, have risen in
importance.
U. For many years now, it had appeared to us
-that the leaders of the party machinery--men
like Liu Shao-chi--enjoyed Mao's full trust.
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A. They not only had a long record of personal
loyalty to Mao; their .radical approach was
also in accord with his.
B. This situation presents us with a puzzling
contradiction, especially in regard to
its policy implications:
1. Mao is apparently intent on pushing
through a radical program to reshape
Chinese society. Tt appears to be so
radical that the party rank and file
could not be trusted to carry it out.
The Red Guard had to be created.
2. There is, therefore, no satisfactory
explanation for Mao's willingness to
turn against his old comrades who
appeared to share his radical views.
3. The government administrators and
economic specialists who have been
retained or even promoted--men like
Chou En-lai, Chen Yun, and Li Fu-Chun--
are the relatively moderate members of
the politburo.
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4. Yet these moderates are now the men who
presumably will be helping Mao and Lin
Piao to implement the radical program.
VI. As I have said, the situation appears to be
highly unstable. The events of the past ten
months must have intensified the antagonisms
and mistrust among those leaders who have sur-
vived the purge.
A. The possibility has increased that when
Mao finally does go, the succession will
be disorderly, and marked by factional
struggles and bloody purges.
B. It is also far from clear whether or not
the new leaders are going to institute
any major changes in domestic or foreign
policy.
C. There has, however, been no change in the
basic hard-line nature of the men at the
top. As a result, we foresee no abrupt
change in Peking's policy of implacable
hostility toward the United States.
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90 September 1966
BRIEFING NOTES F(J!R DCI
COMMUNIST CHINA
Communist China's Advanced Weapons ProgxamS
I. Communist ~hina'is putting a high prgportion
of its scarce technical and industrial resources
into a major effort to develop an advanced
weapons program. At present ~ the Ch~.}~ese
could deliver a few low-yield nuc~.ear weapons
with their small med~.um bombed force. They
haven't achieved a missile strike capability
yet, but are working on an MRBM~a~~b1Y
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tack capability for about six years, but we
don't think they are yet ready to deploy a mis-
sile system?
t looks like an MRBM
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with a range of 700 to 1,000 miles. This
would let them hit almost all the important
targets in the Far East--including many US
bases--as well as some important targets
in the i1SSR. We now estimate-. that they
could begin deploying a few MRBMs in 1967
or 1968. By then they could have a low-
yield nuclear warhead for the missile.
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the Chin se are working on a mu
rocket, one capa~ile of~CBM ranges for space
We don't expect the first test flight
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B. If they start test-firing an ICBM by early
1968, they could have one operational by
1971 to 1973. It would take a couple of
until late 1967 or early 1968.
more years to dep~oy a significant number,
i
even if they do no t=, elect to use hardened
launch positions.
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C. An ICBM would be attractive to the Chinese to
threaten the US or the USSR. Most of their
other potential targets could be reached with
the MRBM.
V. The Chinese have also built one missile-carrying
submarine, a copy of the Soviet G-class. The
Soviet version carries three ballistic missiles
with a range of 350 miles. The Chinese submarine
is now operating, but we don't have any evidence
that they have developed a missile
The G-class is diesel-powered, must surface o
launch its missiles, and has a very limited capa-
bility to threaten the US because of the short
time it could remain off the West Coast.
VI. The Chinese are also preparing to produce jet
medium bombers, copies of the Soviet TU-16.
The first one won't roll out until 1968, and it
will take several years to deploy more than a
few of these aircraft. China's present bomber
force is limited to two TU-16s, a dozen aging
B-29 type aircraft, and about 270 IL-28 jet
light bombers. They could now have a few nuclear
weapons stockpiled for delivery by the medium
bombers.
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 25X1
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30 September 1966
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Advanced Defensive Systems
I. The continuing Soviet emphasis on defense is
seen in their vigorous program during the past
decade to develop an anti-ballistic-missile
system.
A. Along with the ABM development, they have
produced new air defense systems to
counter advanced aerodynamic vehicles.
Both types of systems are now being
deployed.
B. The Soviets have been working on an anti-
ballistic missile defense for Moscow for
several years. The system could achieve
initial operational capability within the
next year or two and full operation within
three or four years from now.
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30 September 1966
BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE DCI
THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE
(Chart on ICBM Force)
I. The strength of the Soviet ICBM force began
moving upward from its 1965 level of 224
operational launchers.
25X1 A.
believe that the ICBM force has 329
operational launchers-
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B. By mid-1968, it is expected that the
Soviets will have a force of 664 to 764
operational ICBM launchers.
II. The Soviet ICBM force is not only increasing rap-
idly in numbers,--but it is also changing quickly
from primarily soft and concentrated launch
sites into largely hardened and dispersed
silos.
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III. The SS-11 is a small missile roughly com~ara e
in size to the US Minuteman I.
low accuracy and small warhead
Its
relatively
make it useful mainly for attacking large,
soft targets such as cities.
,p,. The SS-9 is a large missile
Its
reater accuracy an arge
relatively g
payload make it more suitable for
attacking hardened targets.
25X1
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30 September 1966
BRIEFING NOTES F?R '1'TTE DCI
SYRIA
I. The radical Baathist military junta which seized
control of the Syrian Government last February
is still clinging to power.
A. The regime's radically leftist complexion and
violent anti-Western propaganda stance are
favorable to the interests of both the So-
viet Union and the domestic Syrian Communists.
Nevertheless, the Communist Party of Syria
has not achieved the freedom of action that
it apparently expected when the new regime
came to power.
B. The USSR has given the Syrians extensive
propaganda support. A major agreement was
signed in April to finance Syria's long-
standing Euphrates Dam ~.evelopment project.
The Soviets will exercise some caution, how-
ever, in becoming too deeply committed to
support of the uncertain regime.
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II. Serious personal,: ideological, and religious rival-
ries divide the present government.
A. The military leaders who dominate the scene
at the moment are members of the minority
Alawite sect. They have successfully purged
large numbers of Sunni Muslims, the majority
of the Syrian population, from influential
positions within the military establishment.
B. The Druze, another minority group, also played
a disproportionate role within the army until
the unsuccessful coup attempt in early Sep-
tember by Druze officers. Many of these of-
ficers have now fled to Jordan.
C. Another source of contention is whether or
not the Syrians will seek a renewal of close
rel~.tions with Nasir's Egypt.
IMAP, ISRAELI-SYRIAN BORDER]
III. Meanwhile, tension along the Israeli-Syrian border
remains high. The belligerent postures adopted
by both countries make future incidents, includ-
ing retaliatory raids by Israel, almost a cer-
tainty.
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A. Following a serious border clash on 15 Au-
gust, Syria stated that it would answer
Israeli retaliation by striking directly
into Israel rather than complaining to the
UN.
B. The Syrians resumed work on their Jordan
River diversion projects in August, and have
cleared some 45 kilometers of the 75-kilo-
meter diversion canal. The Israelis, how-
ever, are said to be relaxed about the pres-
ent work which is being carried out well
inside Syrian territory.
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