THE SITUATION IN CUBA AND THE SOVIET PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000300030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1966
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DDI BRIEFING NOTES
THE SITUATION INC
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AND TEE SOVIET PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND
I. Fidel Castroes recent fulminations appOr to result
from deepening personal frustrations over the regime's
continuing inability to surmount basic economic and
administrative problems.
A. The administrative purge of a number of medium-
level officials in the ministries of foreign af-
fairs, foreign trade, and CUBANA airlines was
designed to restore dynamism to Castro's regime
and to revive revolutionary enthusiasm. It may
have had the opposite effects however.
1. The March 7 to March 11 trial of Kmjor Rolando
Cubela? sentenced for plotting to assassinate
Castro, probably had the same goal as well as
the aim of deterring other wcu14 hotter's.
2. Armed Forces Vice Minister Amelia an was dis-
missed on March 17.
DIA review(s)
completed.
he had long been in disfavor with the
regime. Several top military commands have
been routinely reshuffled since the first of
the year; the principals involved were not
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cashiered and retain t air Fr as po-
litical bureau members of Castro's Communist
Party.
In his speech on March 13 at Haim= University.,
Castro hurled new lusting at Pskino4and'charged
that the Chinese leaders, in their old age, have
confused Harxism-Leninism with fascism. The at-
tack was essentially a reiteration of Castro's
earlier statements and came exactly one year atter
his first criticism of China.
1. For the first time Castro has denounced 0-
ident Hduardo Frei of Chile and his Christian
Democratic Party.
a. He said that in Chile "the only way to
win the revolUtionary struggle will be by
armed struggle," and he denounced Frei as
a coward, a liar, and a reactionary. Ha-
vana radio has begun beaming a special
propaganda program to Chile attacking Frei
and his government.
? In early May, Castro renewed old charges
of "softness" against President Tito and
.the "so-called League of Yugoslav Communists."
c. These attacks reflect the same militancy
Cuba displayed at the January Tri-Continent
Conference and indicate that Castro is
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? losing interest in coexistence and cm*
promise in the hemisphere.
C. The state of alert declared througpout Cuba on
May 27 was ostensibly a Cuban reaction to A18 moves,
the most outstanding of which was the killing of a
Cuban soldier by a sentry at the Guantanamo Naval
Base on May 21. That Castro believed the US was
planning to attack is questionable, but there is
little doubt he was concerned over recent Cuban
exile threats and alleged assassination operations.
However, Castro probably artificially escalated the
crisis to divert public attention from pressing
economic difficulties.
1. The soldier was shot and killed by the US
sentry after penetrating the Guantanamo bass
-perimeter during a reconnaissance of a newly
laid minefield. At least three other penetra-
tions of the base perimeter occurred between
May 21 and May 31--at the direction of tkik
Cuban Government. Additional incidents are
possible and would provide the Castro regime
with further "justification" to demand greater
sacrifices of the people.
2. The alert also probably was intended to test
the efficiency of the Cuban defensive system,
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provide realistic training for armed forces
personnel, flush out "counterrevolutionaries"
unfortunate enough to misjudge the reasons
for the alert, and make the USSR reaffirm its
support for the Castro regime.
II. Despite Castroes deepening frustrations, his position in
Cuba remains pre-eminent.
A, The large and efficient military and security forces
under Raul Castro are strong and loyal to the regime.
We think they are more than adequate as a defense
against insurrection or invasion--barring substantial
US assistance,
S. The 50,000 members of the Cuban Communist Party are
drawn from an elite core of Castro's most militant
supporters. They form the regime's inner bureaucracy.
1. Last October Castro announced the formation of a
political bureau, a secretariat, and five standing
coonntotts within a 100-man central committee.
2. The party controls provincial and local affairs,
education and indoctrination, and the mass
organizations.
3, About one fifth of the party members and two thirds
of the central committee members are from the Cu-
ban armed forces.
C. Factionalism in the regime appears to be at its 10w.
est level since Castro came to power.
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Nearly the entire top civilian and ell tary
leadership is included in the central committee.
a. About 20 prominent "old" Communists have
gained added stature through membership.
b. There are no adherents of w!, economics
policies of Che Guevara on the central com-
mittee
D. Despite these factors contributing to the regime's
stability, there is no doubt that the over-all political
climate in Cuba has shifted somewhat in the past year.
An air of uncertainty is prevalent in Havana which?if
not checked--could lead to further disenchantment.
III. Castro recognizes that he has no alternative to continued
large-scale aid from the Soviet Union. As a result, he
has continued to move closer to Moscow, and has cooled
toward the Chinese.
A. The ?eter 1065 visit of Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko to Cuba and Raul Castro's six-week visit to
the USSR and Eastern Europe in Ottober and November
were probably generally aimed at reviewing Soviet-Cuban
relations.
B. Castro probably no longer views all of Latin America
as on the brink of revolution. He now limits clandes-
tine Cuban support and concentrates it where revolu-
tionaries are most active. Nevertheless, Cuban
propaganda on behalf of armed revolution since the
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January Trii.Continent Conference has reached a level
of intensity not seen since 1963.
1. Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombiaare Castro's
three principal targets.
2. In addition. Cuba has sent military personnel to
help insurgents in the Congo, and to train other
African revolutionaries in Brazzaville.
V. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the former minister of industries,
and the regime's foremost revolutionary, left the Cuban
political scene in the spring of 1965. Bo may also have
left Cuba.
A. Guevara may be carrying out the pledge attributed to
him by Castro to assist other revolutionary movements.
B. Guevara's eclipse stemmed from differences with Castro
over basic questions relating to the development of
the Cuban economy, and to the attitude Cuba should
take toward revolutionary activity elsewhere in the
hemisphere.
V. Cuba's economic performance remains spotty, and the long-
range outlook is uncertain.
A. The 1965 sugar harvest of about 6 million tone
sur-
passed the yearly harvest of the pre-Castro yearsi
1. This demonstrated the effectiveness of wide eco-
nomic and administrative reforms applied during
1965.
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The 1900 harvest probably will be 05.ig1itly under 4.5
million tons--2 million tons short of the goal. Severe
drought iota been blamed by Castro for this shortfall.
2. The outlook for future sugar earnings i$ clouded
by continuing harvesting and mi11i problems, and
by uncertain world sugar prices.
2. General economic mismanagement continues, although
some improvement has been made.
. Shortages in certain food and consumer goods prob-
ably will become worse in 1900, but Castro can con-
tinue to rely on large-scale Soviet assistance.
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VI. The Cuban military situation has maimed it
for the last couple of years.
A. There are over 100,000 men on active duty
with the Cuban armed forces and about 83,000
in the ready. reserves. The numberm,And level
of ability of the reserves will increase over
the years because of the system of three year
obligatory military service which was instituted
in December. 1963. Last week, the Cubans
launched a year-long program designed to up-
grade the combat readiness of the reserves.
B. The Cubans are increasing their proficiency
in using their sophisticated air defense system,
but they could not cope with a raid by many
aircraft using advanced evasive and decoy
techniques.
C. There are presently 23 surface-.to-air missile
sites grouped around major target preftm on the
island; most are located in the western third
of Cuba to protect Havana and its key military
installations.
D. Cuba also has 4 cruise missile sites and 12 KOMAR
cruise missile boats; the missiles for both
systems have a limited range of 40 nautical
millet or less, however.
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In addition. the
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we a full ormalt4!
and eelf?-propolled suns, 3IIG fighteret asttimitismidt
guns, and other arms from Russia and other Cossunist
countries.
VII. The Soviet presence Le Cuba is limited to a few thousand
military technicians and economic specialists.
A. Since the last slimier militant withdrawals in the summer
of 1904, the level of Soviet military manpower in Cuba
ban remained fairly constant. Current strength is es-
,
timated at between 1.000 and 2.000 men. a major redia
tion from the approximately 22,500 Soviets in Cuba in
October 1962. The Soviet military element in Cuba in
essentially a Military Aid and Advisory Group, concerned
primarily with training and technical support for Cuban
forces.
. A few shipments of Russian military goods are sent each
year. to Cuba; these are largely replacement parts and
ammuniticm. Sam, CS the replacements are new surface-
to.air missiles (SAMS). The shelf life u. aueut six
years for the present missiles is expiring. Sow ob-
servers confuse the new SAMS with strategic missiles.
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C. There re some 2,800 to 3.000 Soviet economic
pecialista
in Cuba, participating to 0,wide
variety of activitiesraneingiWoo agopatanee
to Cube 'a sugarindustry to4etroleoa eaPloratiop.
, ,
It should belnoted that the Cubans are frequently 25)(1
reported'
to loos'
than,happy lath the patronizing at itude and
lackuluster performance of some of their Russian
advisors.
D. The US82 now accounts for about SO percent o
Cuba's foreign trade. This year, the U$SR will
continue to supply critical consumer goods, mg
In* Aup fuelsand industrial equipment and raw
It-probabli will Send about 700,000
tone of grain includinuSS million dollars
worth of Canadian wheat bought with *come
Soviet hard.currency reserves.
1. Cuba's cumulative debt ler Soviet trade
credits,alone now totals about MO milli
2. The VS82 also has supplied 41400 million
in ecoOomic development credits and several
hundred mlllton dollars North of militak*
equipment on credit.
3. We estimate it costs the 'Soviet Union
?Thr'? s
dollars a dayto keep the Castro regime
afloat
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B. Despite this heavy Russian investment and
the .Cubans marked dependence on their Soviet
providers, the geecewsliavana marriage to Tar
fiom satisfactory for both partners.
1. Citstroln May Day speech contained several
thinly...veiled anti-Russian barbs Cuban
Communist Party secretary Armando Mart's
speech at the Soviet party congress last
arch was notably out of tune with other
oDeschei because of its hard.line militancy;
it was not veil received by either the
Soviets or the East European Communists.
2. CSstre undoubtedly rehafeo under the
increasing proscriptions of the "advice"
from Moscow...advice which has become such
more insistent since the advent of the new
leadership in Moscow. The Suasion* are
? demanding a better performance on the Cuban
doosstls sees. sad greater COW% support
for Russian international policies than? -
formerly. At times, the nusotas4lams
intermits are far apart, particularly on
Questions involving "challenging" the US
and other "imperial iit" powers in Vietnam
and Latin America.
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F. From time to time, articles appear in the
press alleging that strategic Soviet missiles
are still in Cuba. Ws do not dinning Much
out of hand.
Cuba. I. mould like to examine in some detail on
article which app.ared in the C Gables
of Vlorida on 3 March to illustrate the
methods us um. to check out such item.
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Tho 0000looloo of the investigation was
,that all ,of the information on which the
article was based came from missile mad
Let publications, talks with unreliable
Cuban refugees, and the Interim Report
Pabllahed by the SubftCcomittee al the Senate
Oervioes Committee on ROY 9, 19034
od mrho Cuban Military Ruildup"..m
relating to the 1962 buildup which
led to the crisis that October,
In short* the article...and ail
? emiIar rtteles
misleading
information We maintain a continuing watch
over the possibility of strategic missile"'
in Cubit, ,utillaing all of our resources
o dateft.is full of outdated or
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6. A joint team of CIA and DIA Late g
experts meets once a month, and more
often if necessary. to assess the military
posture of Cubs with special attention to
the possibility that strategic weapons might
still be on the island.
a. The report for April specifically
concluded that: "Cuba's prevent
missile inventory is confined to
? defensive and tactical weapons .
There are no strategic weapons or
? foreign troop units in Cuba at this
time. While we recognise that some
? strategic weapons could be dellverately
concealed or clandestinely reintroduced
? on the Island, it is our judgement that ,
this has not taken place."
b. Our report for the month of may contained
nothing to alter the previous month's
conclusion; moreover, have seen nothing,
suspicious so tar in June pertaining
to strategic missiles in ,Cuba.
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have *lac) soticod numerous press articles
alleging tin' new Soviet-financed, suit i.
int
ln* Ztshtcl port;in nay," to ?
i44.esbosrin. op.ratioM. A
Lou tz'oa all ourees does not
ties at ftehlas
sr connot4 solely vith Castro's ambitious
plan to sake Cubs into a, or14 lander in flab
exports. n in ebvioul. boson. that Cubs
6
could use its large fishing fleet to support
? ubversive elements in neighboring Caribbean
ountries.
iailhviy, vs have no information to bear au
frequent allegations that Soviet submarines
are active in Cubes enters'.
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