SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (AS OF 0830 A.M. EDT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000200140001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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I I
(As of 0830 a.m. EDT)
Saigon
Buddhist leaders in Saigon apparently have con-
vinced their more militant followers to accept for the
time being the government's pledge to expand the Di-
rectorate (National Leadership Committee) by 6 June.
Thich Ho Giac apparently addressed some 2,000 persons
at the Buddhist Institute today urging them to give the
Directorate until Monday to add ten civilian members to
it, according to press reports. Signs of opposition to
Ho Giac's statement of acceptance were noted, however,
Some members of the Buddhist Monks and Nuns Association
reportedly condemned the move and indicated more suicides
as a protest. During a funeral procession for two im-
molated Buddhists led by Tam Chau today, marchers re-
portedly beat a plainclothes security agent but did not
demonstrate.
In the opinion of General Khang, one of the more mil-
itant Directorate members, the Buddhists are suffering
from a "severe" power struggle and are losing popular
support.
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General Nhuan, the 1st Division commander, moved
back into Hue along with several disparate military ele-
ments of the 1st Division who are supposedly loyal to
the government. According to the Consular officer, how-
ever, the loyalty of these troops would probably be to
the struggle forces in the event of a showdown. The
situation is similar to that of a few days ago when Colonel
Khoa moved a supposedly loyal battalion of the 3rd Regi-
ment into the city to guard US installations only to
have them capitulate in front of the struggle students
who burned the Consulate building. The Consular of-
ficer fears renewed violence in Hue and feels that the
situation will continue to deteriorate given government
vacillation.
Thich Tri Quang's only reaction so far to the Bud-
dhist-government compromise was in the form of a message
to President Johnson. Quang said the attack on Thich
Thien Minh was organized by the Ky-Thieu regime. He
made no mention of the meetings in Saigon between Bud-
dhist Institute leaders and government officials.
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(Information as of 1:30 AM EDT)
1. The cautious compromise worked out between govern-
ment and Buddhist leaders should quiet the crisis
atmosphere in Saigon for at least the next few days.
A. Buddhist leaders in Saigon have generally
restrained excessive reactions by their fol-
lowers to the attack on militant bonze Thien
Minh on 1 June.
B. They have also cautioned their followers to
avoid excessive agitation against the regime
until it is clear how the agreement on expan-
sion of the "war cabinet" leadership bodies will
be carried out.
II. The Buddhists apparently agreed to dampen their
agitation in return for implementation of recently
announced government plans to expand the present
National Leadership Committee (NLC).
A. Ten civilian representatives--presumably in-
cluding spokesmen for the Buddhists--are to be
added before 6 June.
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B. The chairman of the NLC, General Thieu, will
apparently resign as agreed by the members at
yesterday's meeting.
C. The enlarged NLC will "make an effort" to set
up a "civilian and armed forces council" prior
to 19 June to "assist" the Central Executive
Committee, chaired by Ky.
1. It is not clear whether references by gov-
ernment leaders to the "National Leadership
Committee" are synonymous with Buddhist
references to the "Directorate."
III. It appears that the accord to enlarge the NLC was
agreed upon without too much reaction from the Direc-
t+Orate generals.
A. It is possible that they feel their positions
as daily executors of Directorate policy will not
be significantly threatened.
IV. Some agitation may occur during the celebration of
Buddha's birthday on 3 June.
A. There are indications that some Buddhist groups
hope to conduct the observances with dignity and
without political overtones.
B. There is other cvidence that efforts are being
made, possibly with some Buddhist connivance, to
organize strikes and demonstrations on 3 June.
VIET-2
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V. In Hue, meanwhile, progovernment troop units
moved in today without any resistance.
A. Government sources said the radio station
and key points of the city have been secured
without a shot 'being fired so far.
B. It is not clear, however, whether the troops
will obey orders to prevent further violence
by the dissident forces or participate in any
effort to disarm or overpower the rebels.
1. Some "struggle" troops obtained supplies
of heavy caliber automatic weapons during
the violence in the city on 1 June.
VI. Only light contact with the Viet Cong has been
reported during thepast several days.
A. Border surveillance patrols are continuing in
allied Operation PAUL REVERE, a major sweep
operation in western Pleiku Province.
B. All other operations involving US personnel
continue without significant contact with the
enemy.
VII. There are continuing indications that the Com-
munists are moving substantial numbers-of reinforce-
ments into northwestern Pleiku Province.
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Fiwr Nw~
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U V.LNrI"V1V111111
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(Information as of 0 AM EDT)
in Paragraph V below
I. Only fragmentary returns from yesterday's elec-
tion are available. Vote totals have been
coming in slowly and it may not be possible to
discern any clear trend until late today.
A. With an estimated 50 percent of the expected
Santo Domingo vote of 240,000 reported:
1. Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate
Juan Bosch appears to be leading with
about 59.4 percent of the vote.
2. Reformist Party candidate Balaguer has
38.8 percent of the vote.
3. Bonnelly trails with only 2.2 percent.
B. In 1962, Bosch captured 78 percent of the
capital's vote, and without a similar margin
will have difficulty overcoming the lead
Balaguer is likely to develop elsewhere.
Scattered returns from the interior show
Balaguer doing extremely well.
II. No significant instances of fraud or violence
marred the election, which foreign observers
lauded as "exemplary."
CONFIDENTIAL
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A. Provisional President Garcia Godoy and the
OAS commission have issued statements
praising the conduct of the electorate.
B. None of the political factions has levied
charges of voting irregularities--which may
help pave the way to popular acceptance of
the outcome.
III. Favorable weather aided in promoting a good-
sized turnout--estimated at 1.2 million, or 65
to 70 percent of the eligible voters.
IV. The turnout and the relatively large number of
women who cast ballots are thought to favor
Balaguer's chances.
V. As of 0900 AM EDT unofficial returns show
Balaguer with 168,366 votes while Bosch is
trailing with 122,078 The two Santo Domingo
morning papers indicate that a Balaguer sweep
may be in the making.
CONFIDENTIAL
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*W01 L3 l'J%/I( I7J I 1qW
OCI No. 1309/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
2 June 1966
Dominican Election Situation Report No. 12
(As of 5:45 AM EDT)
1. Radio Santo Domingo's tabulation of the vote
count has fallen considerably behind tallies reported
by the press services. At 0230 local time, Reuters
credited Balaguer with 154,110 to 133,498 for Bosch
in the total national vote.
2. Radio Santo Domingo's tabulation, which provides
a breakdown by polling place, shows Bosch carrying the
National District by 57.5 percent--a drop of 20 per-
centage points below his 1962 margin. Bosch's share of
the National District vote has declined slowly but
steadily during the night.
3. Scattered returns from outside the capital
indicate that Balaguer is doing extremely well; even in
areas where Bosch is leading, the PRD candidate's total
is down markedly from four years ago.
4. According to the press, an unidentified high
official of Bosch's party has said that if the PRD wins,
it will do so b a narrow margin.
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l.A V1 Vl' i LL1 N 1 .I1L
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
I. Only fragmentary returns from yesterday's elec-
tion are available. Vote totals have been
coming in slowly and it may not be possible to
discern any clear trend until late today.
A. With an estimated 20 percent of the expected
Santo Domingo vote of 240,000 reported:
1. Dominican Revolutionary Party candidate
Juan Bosch appears to be leading with
about 60 percent of the vote.
2. Reformist Party candidate Balaguer has
37 percent of the vote.
3. Bonnelly trails with only 2.1 percent.
B. In 1962, Bosch captured 78 percent of the
capital's vote, and without a similar margin
may have difficulty overcoming the lead
Balaguer is likely to develop elsewhere.
II. No significant instances of fraud or violence
marred the election, which foreign observers
lauded as "exemplary."
CONFIDENTIAL
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y 4+ 4/1V111 IJ.L 1V l l !'1L N"OF
A. Provisional President Garcia Godoy and the
OAS commission have issued statements
praising the conduct of the electorate.
B. None of the political factions has levied
charges of voting irregularities--which may
help pave the way to popular acceptance of
the outcome.
III. Favorable weather aided in promoting a good-
sized turnout--estimated at 1.2 million, or 65
to 70 percent of the eligible voters.
IV. The turnout and the relatively large number of
women who cast ballots are throught to favor
Balaguer's chances.
CONFIDENTIAL
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%%09 ~ftw
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v GONFI DENTI AL
COMMUNIST CHINA -- DEVELOPMENTS IN
LEADERSHIP STRUMP-
(since last rid ing on 26May)
1. A shake=up of Mao Tse-tung's inner circle of ad-
visers definitely appears to be taking place.
A. Last week we told you that we had been de-
tecting signs that a behind-the-scenes power
struggle was under way.
B. Mao Tse-tung's personal position still seems
to be secure. His grip probably was loosened
for a time during his recent 52 month absence
from public view, but he appeared to be healthy
and alert in movies taken in early May.
C. This is what we now think about the status
of his five top advisers:
1. Peng Chen, sixth in the power structure,
has probably been the victim of a power
play engineered by his old rival Teng
Hsiao-ping. He is still out of-eight
and a Rumanian official in Peking told
a British diplomat on 26 May that Peng
has lost his positions.
CONFIDENTIAL
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v Wi\111 DL IVTI AL ,.0
2. Teng is the powerful general secretary.
Peng's removal would strengthen his po-
sition and likely weaken that of Liu
Shao-chi who has been number two in the
party since at least 1945. It is even
possible that the highly militant and
vigorous Teng has supplanted the color-
less Liu as Mao's chosen successor.
3. The flexible Chou En-lai--China's Mikoyan
--appears thus far to have managed to
stay aloof from the fray. He is a useful
technician and as such has a good chance
to survive.
4. Contrary to Western press speculation,
Defense Minister Lin Piao probably is
not a contender for power. His name is
often used to reinforce Mao's authority,
but he has been chronically ill for
nearly 30 years. Lin seemed to be ex-
tremely frail in recent movies taken
with Mao Tse-tung. He probably does
not aspire to the top job.
II. The Chinese Communists still haven't named any
important victims.
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v,,,r G'VJV 111 DI11'1V 1 'l Alm;
A. This indicates that the shake"}ip .is still un-
folding.
B. The Rumanian official I mentioned earlier
also said that Lo Jui-ching had been removed
as army chief of staff two months or so ago.
Lo, a top security man as well as chief of
the army, is one of a group of key officials
who have been out of public view for many
months and who may have been casualties of
the struggle. Others on the list are the
head of the central committee's propaganda
department and the commander of the Peking
Military Region, who is Yang Yung.
C. On 26 May a deputy director of the Central
Committee Propaganda Department was accused
of backing an "antiparty" play produced in
Shanghai. Certain other "muddleheaded" high
officials were also said to have supported
the play.
D. A new nationwide campaign has been develop-
ing this past week against unnamed high of-
ficials who have ridiculed the practical
value of Mao Tse-tung's political tracts.
CONFIDENTIAL
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v UULV 1+1 DI 1V !'l A1":
1. One of the most widely publicized cases
involves a.Shanghai melon peddler who
wrote an article in 1965 explaining how
Mao's works had helped him sell. his
melons before they rotted. This article
was republished on 14 May by Liberation
Army Journal, which as we pointed?oout
last week has been spearheading the at-
tack on "antiparty" officials.
2. The melon peddler on 25 May then pub-
lished a statement demanding the unmask-
ing of a high official who, he said, had
ridiculed his article.
3. A similar incident involving a ping pong
player who claims he was greatly benefited
by Mao's thinking has been widely publi-
cized.
4. Referring to these incidents, Liberation
Army Daily promised "to fight to the bit-
ter end against anyone that -strikes at
Mao's thinking regardless of how powerful
he may be, how high his position is, how
famous, or how strong a backer he has."
E. On 27 May "antiparty" charges were leveled
for the first time against a provincial
-4-
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limpoi UVJV 1+1 J)J JV 1 'l Alawo'
official. This was a Vice governorof Shantung
Province, who was also director of the cul-
tural department of the provincial party com-
mittee. He was accused of working hand in
glove with the group of conspirators in the
Peking city apparatus whom;.we told you about
last'.week. The charges against this man
probably will lead to attacks on higher of-
ficials in Shantung and perhaps other prov-
inces.
III. We.-still feel strongly that factions in the lead-
ership have been disputing with one another.
A. This is indicated by the conflicting positions
taken by various party newspapers over several
of the crucial issues.
1. The initiative in launching the attacks
has been consistently taken by Liberation
Army Journal, not the Peoples Daily and
Red Flag, normally the two most authorita-
tive journals in China.
2. In fact Peoples Daily and Red Flag have
at times directly opposed the army paper.
A major charge implicating Peking Mayor
Peng Chen has been that the journals of
his municipal party committee refused to
CONFIDENTIAL
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vw UUINIfI V ,A 111ilwrr
accept a dictum laid down by Liberation,
Army Journal on 29 November 1965 that
a certain play was a quote big poison-
ous weed unquote.
3. Although the parallel has not yet been
publicly drawn, we have checked and
found that Peoples Daily and Red Flag
also took the incorrect line of the
Peking city journals. Our check also
reveals that neither Peoples Daily nor
Red Flag got around to labeling the
play a poisonous weed untillApril.
B. What the confusing record of these news-
papers indicates to us is that Mao Tse-tung
has been standing above the struggle while
the acting party leader has been under at-
tack by someone who controls the Liberation
Army Journal.
1. During Mao's absence the acting party
leader would be Liu Shao-chi.
2. Teng Hsiao-ping could control the army
paper, which is not actually published
by the army but by the army's General
Political Department. This is directly
CONFIDENTIAL
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G'UNV 141 IJLi'1V 1 i AL
subordinate to the party secretariat
headed by Teng.
C. Since April Peoples Daily and Red Flag have
both fallen in line with the army paper,
a sign that Mao is again exercising a unify-
ing influence.
1. The Liberation'-Army" Journal.continuer;
to spearhead some attacks, however, sug-
gesting that its backers still have ob-
jectives they haven't yet reached.
CONFIDENTIAL
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ADDITION TO DCI
BRIEFING NOTES OF
12 MAY 196,6
I. The three-day Indonesia Malaysia talks held in
Bangkok from 30 May to 1 June appear to have
made considerable progress toward ending con-
frontation but have left some ends dangling,
and further talks will be necessary.
A. Indonesian military operations, although
greatly reduced for the past year, appar-
ently will end only when final agreement
is reached.
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;, ,S'JL ( 4 KL' l
12 May 1966
DCI BRIEFING NOTES
INDONESIA
1. The new Indonesian Government is embarking on a
moderate course in both domestic and international
affairs.
A. Indonesia's three major leaders now are General
Suharto, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and the
Sultan of Jogjakarta, who directs economic
matters.
1. They are giving top priority to solving
domestic problems. This means, first of
all, trying to put Indonesia's long misused
economy on a more rational basis.
2. Malik and the Sultan have stated publicly
that they will accept aid from any country.
The US is sending 50,000 tons of rice--a frac-
tion of Indonesia's need--in the near future.
3. Malik has announced that Indonesia will return
to its former neutral path in international
affairs, and has expressed an intention to
return Indonesia to the United Nations.
II. Sukarno is still president and prime minister, but
his de facto power is slight.
SECRET
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SECRET
A. He continues to maneuver to regain at least
the appearance of political initiative. His
assets have been so greatly reduced, however,
that at most he should only be able to ob-
struct the government's new policies tem-
porarily.
B. Some of General Suharto's advisers are sug-
gesting that he depose or exile Sukarno;
Suharto, aware of Sukarno's continuing popu-
larity in parts of the nation, apparently
prefers to do neither.
III. While relations with the West have improved, re-
lations with Communist China are at an all-time
low.
A. Anti-Chinese activity has mounted throughout
Indonesia.
1. Overseas Chinese schools have been closed,
and many Chinese businesses have been con-
fiscated by anti-Communist Moslem groups.
2. In mid-April, in the most extreme of many
attacks on official Chinese installations,
the Communist Chinese Embassy in Djakarta
was sacked.
INDO-2
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B. The new Djakarta regime, by its failure to curb
this activity, appears to be pushing relations
with Peking to the breaking point. Neither Peking
nor Djakarta appear willing to initiate a formal
break, however. Continuing propaganda warfare
between Peking and Djakarta is likely to become
more and more abusive.
C. Foreign Minister Malik and other leaders have
expressed a desire to end Indonesia's
confrontation with Malaysia, but there are no
firm indications that the new government is ready
to accept the present composition of the Malaysian
federation.
1. Confrontation, therefore, is likely to con-
tinue on a political level, while its military
aspect, already at a low level, gradually
diminishes.
2. Djakarta's announcement that it will soon
recognize Singapore is viewed primarily as an
effort to bolster the Indonesian economy by
resuming the once-lucrative trade with Singa-
pore. At the same time, Djakarta's overture
to Singapore has already served to widen the
breach between Malaysia and Singapore--an
extra dividend for Indonesia.
SECRET
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SECRET
3. Talks in Bangkok on 30 April and 1 May
between the Indonesian and Philippine
foreign ministers produced an understand-
ing that the Philippines will recognize
Malaysia in early June and that Indonesia
will recognize Singapore shortly there-
after.
4. Malik has told a Malaysian official that
Indonesia would like another survey of
public opinion in Malaysia's Borneo
territories as to whether people want to
remain under Malaysian administration.
.cFr"R F.T
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3!unJ I,
1. The plot which the Congolese army foiled on
30 May was less significant than President
Mobutu's reaction to it.
A. The four main plotters were all run-of-
the-mill civilian politicians. None had
any particular political power, none had
shown any conspiratorial skills, and the
plot was never a real 'threat to Mobutu.
B. Mobutu nevertheless ordered their summary
trial and public execution.
1. This is in line with other indications
of a growing authoritarianism as Mobutu
wrestles with the problem of making his
authority felt throughout the country.
II. In breaking up the plot, the top ranks of the
army once again proved their loyalty to Mobutu,
but at the same time they demonstrated the degree
to which Mobutu must cultivate that loyalty in
order to stay in power.
SECRET
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N"W S. JC'K.I'1, -14610,
A. Mobutu and his officers will probably remain
interdependent for some time, with neither
willing nor able to challenge the other.
B. The officer corps will probably assume an
ever-larger role in Congolese political life
and will reinforce Mobutu's own authoritarian
tendencies.
III. Some members of the Belgian
Embassy in Leopoldville apparently were involved
to a minor degree with the plotters, although no
foreign embassy gave the plot any active support.
A. The Belgian involvement will aggravate Mobutu's
current animosity toward Belgium.
B. His attitude may be reflected in a harder Con-
golese line in the current economic talks with
Belgium, now recessed after two weeks of in-
conclusive negotiations.
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I. Fidel Castro's recent actions appear to result
from deepening personal frustrations over the
regime's continuing inability to surmount basic
economic and administrative problems.
A. The administrative purge of a number of
medium-level officials in the ministries of
foreign affairs, foreign trade, and CUBANA
airlines was designed to restore dynamism
to Castro's regime and to revive revolution-
ary enthusiasm. It may have had the opposite
effect, however.
1. The March 7 to March ll,trial of Major
Rolando Oubela, sentenced for plotting
to assassinate Castro, probably had the
same goal, as well as the aim of deter-
ring other would-be plotters.
2.= Armed Forces Vice Minister Ameijeiras was
dismissed on March 17.
he had long been in
disfavor with the regime. Several top
military commands have been routinely
CU-1
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reshuffled since the first of the year;
the principals involved were not cashiered
and retain their prominence as political
bureau members of Castro's Communist
Party.
B. In his speech on March 13 at Havana University,
Castro hurled new insults at Peking and charged
that the Chinese leaders, in their old age,
have confused Marxism-Leninism with fascism.
The attack was essentially a reiteration of
Castro's earlier statements and came exactly
one year after his first criticism of China.
1. For the first time Castro has denounced
President Eduardo Frei of Chile and his
Christian Democratic Party.
a. He said that in Chile "the only way
to win the revolutionary struggle
will be by armed struggle," and he
denounced Frei as a coward, a liar,
and a reactionary. Havana radio has
begun beaming a special:'~propaganda
program to Chile attacking Frei and
his government.
b. The attacks reflect the same mili-
tancy displayed at the January
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i%W 1J1:J unL 1 IMF,
Tri-Continent Conference and indicate
that Castro is losing interest in co-
existence and compromise in the hemi-
sphere.
C. The state of alert declared throughout Cuba
on May 27 was ostensibly a Cuban reaction to
US moves, the most outstanding of which was
the killing of a Cuban soldier by a sentry
at the Guantanamo Naval Base on May 21. In
reality, there are indications that Cuba in-
tended to provoke an incident with the US in
order to reinforce its "anti-imperialist"
posture and to divert the attention of the
people from current economic difficulties.
1. The soldier was shot and killed by the
US sentry after penetrating the base per-
imeter during a reconnaissance of a newly
laid minefield. Such penetrations of the
base perimeter have continued--presumably
at the direction of the Cuban Government.
Any additional incidents will further
heighten the already tense situation on
the island and provide the Castro regime
with additional "justification" to demand
greater sacrifices of the people.
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,~ C~ (,rlt L'1 l
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2. The alert also is probably intended to
test the efficiency of the Cuban defen-
sive system, provide realistic training
for armed forces personnel, and flush out
"counterrevolutionaries" unfortunate
enough to misjudge the reasons for the
alert.
II. Despite Castro's deepening frustrations, his po-
sition in Cuba remains pre-eminent.
A. The large and efficient military and security
forces under Raul Castro are strong and loyal
to the regime. We think they are more than
adequate as a defense against insurrection
or invasion--barring substantial US assistance.
B. The 55,000 members of the Cuban Communist Party
are drawn from an elite core of Castro's most
militant supporters. They form the regime's
inner bureaucracy.
1. Last October Castro announced the formation
of a political bureau, a secretariat, and
five standing committees within a 100-man
central committee.
2. The party controls provincial and local
affairs, education and indoctrination,
and the mass organizations.
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3. About one fifth of the party members and
two thirds of the central committee mem-
bers are from the Cuban armed forces.
C. Factionalism in the regime appears to be at
its lowest level since Castro came to power.
1. Nearly the entire top civilian and mili-
tary leadership is included in the central
committee.
a. About 20~prominent "old" Communists
have gained added stature thrdttgh
membership.
b. There are no adherents of the eco-
nomic policies of Che Guevara on the
central committee.
D. Despite these factors contributing to the re-
gime's stability, there is no doubt that the
over-all political climate in Cuba has shifted
somewhat in the past year. An air of uncer-
tainty is prevalent in Havana which--if not
checked--could lead to further disenchantment.
III. Castro recognizes that he has no alternative to
continued large-scale aid from the Soviet Union.
As a result, he has continued to move closer to
Moscow, and has cooled toward the Chinese.
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NvlA-F.AL-d I.