MOZAMBIQUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A003200130001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1966
• Content Type: CH

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 Approved For Release 2002/01/15 FOREIGN DISSEM3200130001-6
OCI No. 1674/66
Copy N2 334
Current Intelligence Country Handbook
MOZAMBIQUE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP i
Eocludrd from auiomotlc
downgrading and
declonlficotion
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Current Intelligence Country Handbooks are designed to give the
reader ready access to the salient facts about a country and its main
current problems. They are not intended to provide comprehensive
basic intelligence on a country or to speak with the authority of
coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the
best available as of the date at the top of the page.
This material contains information affecting the national defense
of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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June 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique is an Overseas Province of Portugal, tightly admin-
istered by Lisbon. Portugal has consistently refused to consider
independence for Mozambique. Native nationalists have resorted to
armed insurgency but currently pose no serious threat to Portuguese
control of the province. Improved insurgent organization and more
sophisticated guerrilla tactics, which cover larger and larger areas of
the north and northwest, however, portend greater difficulties for
continuing Portuguese hegemony.
The highest administrative authority is the Governor-General, but
all important decisions are made or approved in Lisbon. The
Governor-General is assisted by a partially elected consultative Legis-
lative Council and by an advisory Economic and Social Council com-
posed of representatives of the major interest groups. Appointive
officials at the district and local levels are also assisted by legislative
bodies. Anyone may vote if he meets the rather stiff requirements,
but very few Africans are eligible.
All overt political activity is sponsored and regulated by the govern-
ment. It consists almost exclusively of voting for a single slate of
officially approved candidates for consultative bodies. Administrative
officials and the secret police have effectively,
suppressed actual or suspected attempts to organize po r ica opposi-
tion in Mozambique.
African nationalists are based in neighboring countries, principally
Tanzania. They have virtually no political organization in Mozam-
bique and very little support from the tribally oriented and politically
ignorant indigenous Africans.
The government hopes to forestall widespread discontent through
a program of social reforms. It is expanding educational and medical
facilities throughout the province. It has eliminated two of the most
widely criticized aspects of Portuguese rule-enforced contract labor
and the legal distinction between what the Portuguese called assimi-
lated and unassimilated Africans. The Portuguese have also attempted
to make social and legal distinctions on the basis of cultural and eco-
nomic attainment rather than race. Mulattoes are completely accepted
in white society.
25X6
25X6
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The European population of the province is relatively cosmopolitan,
reflecting centuries of contacts with Arab and Asian traders. It has
a tradition of political opposition to Lisbon and a sizable minority
favors an autonomous multi-racial regime within a continuing Portu-
guese sphere of influence. The lack of any organization, however,
has relegated the active opposition to an inconsequential political force.
The white population as a whole is largely unconcerned with political
developments as a result of political dominance by the Metropole and
confidence in Portuguese military control.
The armed forces of about 40,000 are capable of dealing with any
foreseeable insurgent threat. Foreign-based guerrilla operations have
been successful only in sparsely inhabited areas of the province and
have free movement only in the absence of Portuguese forces.
2. Economic
The Mozambique economy is based essentially on agriculture, which
supplies two-thirds of the gross domestic product and employs over
80 percent of the labor force. Although subsistence farming pre-
dominates in the agricultural sector, other economic sectors have been
so poorly developed that agriculture still accounts for virtually all
of the province's exports.
The economic development of Mozambique has been relatively slow.
Portugal's essentially mercantilist relationship with Mozambique is an
important reason. Lisbon gears most Mozambique economic activity
to benefit metropolitan Portugal rather than the province itself. The
province provides a market for Portuguese goods and is a source of
raw materials and much-needed foreign exchange. Additional factors
inhibiting economic growth are limited Portuguese resources, the prov-
ince's unfavorable financial position, a serious shortage of skilled labor,
the red tape involved in a highly centralized economy, and the con-
servatism of the government and Portuguese businessmen. Portugal
has recently increased development expenditures, is slowly changing its
policy of discouraging foreign investment in Mozambique, and is
interested in the exploitation of Mozambique's substantial but un-
determined quantities of mineral resources, particularly natural gas and
coal. Lisbon's policy changes have not, however, shown significant
results.
Because of its underdevelopment, Mozambique has perennially
suffered from a large trade imbalance. For many years this deficit was
more than compensated for by remittances from about 300,000 workers
2 - Mozambique
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employed in other South African countries, principally South Africa
and Rhodesia, from white southern African tourists, and from the
transit trade between provincial ocean ports and landlocked countries
in the west. In recent years, however, Mozambique has encountered
severe exchange difficulties chiefly caused by increasing trade deficits
and government expenses, higher loan obligations, and recent Portu-
guese legislation which has resulted in large transfers of funds from
the province to the Metropole.
Over a third of Mozambique's trade is with Portugal, but South
Africa, Great Britain, and to a lesser extent West Germany, India, and
the United States are also important. Its principal exports are raw
cotton, cashew nuts (virtually the entire Indian trade), sugar and tea.
The emphasis in imports is on heavy manufactured goods and textiles.
3. International Relations
Because Mozambique is an Overseas Province, its foreign relations
are conducted by the Portuguese Government. Portugal's refusal to
grant self-determination to Mozambique has caused virulent attacks
by other African governments, condemnatory resolutions in the United
Nations, and strained relations with the US and several other NATO
allies.
Most independent African governments place high priority on the
independence of Mozambique. Many of them, particularly militants
such as Tanzania, Algeria, Egypt, and until recently Ghana, have given
overt political and material support to exile nationalist organizations.
One of the major nationalist groups is based in Tanzania, and Mozam-
bique's relations with the government of that state have been tense.
Exiles also have had offices in neighboring Zambia and Malawi. Both
these countries, however, depend on access routes across Mozambique
territory, and they have tended to be more interested in keeping an eye
on the nationalists than in assisting anti-Portuguese insurgency. Portu-
gal encourages them to remain effectively neutral to Pan-African sup-
port of independence movements by not demanding that they cease
recognition of the nationalist groups and by expanding Portuguese
transit capacity to allow the two countries to increase their own trade.
Portuguese relations with the conservative Malawians have been par-
ticularly cordial, and the two governments have cooperated in con-
trolling armed insurgency directed against either of them.
Portugal's relations with the white-dominated governments of the
Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia are close, despite differences
in social aspects of their racial policies which are embarrassing to the
Portuguese. Lisbon has recently established closer economic rela-
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Mozambique - 3
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tions, and should African pressures become genuinely onenacing, the
three governments might consider formalizing and broadening ad hoc
mutual security arrangements. The Portuguese are said to be con-
cerned that intimate economic ties could lead to South African eco-
nomic domination in southern Africa. The Portuguese also prudently
temper their relations with Salisbury lest Portugal be too closely iden-
tified with the white Rhodesians' independence efforts. In such an
event, international opposition to the rebel government could extend
to encompass Mozambique.
4. Subversion
The most important nationalist group attempting to oust the Portu-
guese from Mozambique is Eduardo Mondlane's Mozambique Libera-
tion Front (Frelimo), with headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Frelimo began directing raids into Mozambique in September 1964
and has steadily expanded its operations south. Frelimo has claimed
that 3,000 guerrillas are fighting the Portuguese. Although many of
them are poorly trained and armed, Frelimo forces have shown in-
creasingly sophisticated organization, skill, and weaponry. Neverthe-
less, they have carefully avoided testing themselves in pitched battles
with government units. Composed almost exclusively of northern tribal
groups, they generally have free movement only in the absence of
Portuguese troops in sparsely settled and economically unimportant
northern areas. Advance into areas which are populated by other
tribes or which the Portuguese are more determined to defend has been
difficult. Frelimo's resources have come mostly from abroad. Al-
though Mondlane was educated in the US and is a moderate, he
accepts aid from sources of all ideologies. Tanzania, and, to a pro-
gressively lesser extent, Algeria and Egypt, have provided training
bases. Arms and funds have come from several sources, generally
channelled through the Tanzanian government and OW groups or
embassies in Dar es Salaam. Communist aid has been mostly in the
form of arms.
Frelimo's pre-eminence in the independence struggle has been in-
effectively challenged by Paulo Gumane and Hlomulo Cwambe, who
in 1965 joined forces to form the Mozambique Revohitionary Com-
mittee (Coremo), based in Lusaka, Zambia. Although most of their
ill-used training and funds have come from radical African and Com-
munist countries, Mondlane's rivals are probably more opportunistic
than leftist. With very few followers, the two have been responsible
for very little of the anti-Portuguese guerrilla war.
4 - Mozambique
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Chronology of Key Events
1498 First Portuguese land in Mozambique.
1951 (June) Portugal declares Mozambique to be an Overseas
Province.
1962 (June) Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) formed;
Eduardo Mondlanc elected President.
1964 (September) Frelimo initiated guerrilla warfare with raids
into northern Mozambique.
Selected Factual Data
LAND (U)
292,000 sq. mi.; 30% arable, I% cultivated; 56% woodland and
forest; 14 %%> wasteland and inland water
PEOPLE (Confidential)
Population: 7 million; males 15-49, 1,651,000; 835,000 fit for military
service
Ethnic Divisions: 97.51/c native Africans, 2.5% Europeans and
Asians
Religion: primarily animist, 10-15% Roman Catholics, a few Protes-
tants, and Muslims
Language: Portuguese official; many tribal dialects
Literacy: 2 %
Labor force (1960 est.); 44,000 non-African wage earners, 850,000
African wage earners, most unskilled; unemployment serious prob-
lem; most native Africans provide unskilled labor or remain in
agricultural sector; thousands of native workers migrate to Re-
public of South Africa and the Rhodesias to work in mines
Organized labor: approximately 26,000 non-Africans registered in
labor syndicates which are administrative arms of the government
GOVERNMENT (Confidential)
Capital: Lourenco Marques
Regional breakdown: provinces divided into districts administered
by district governors; municipalities governed by appointed official
Type: overseas province of Portugal, strictly controlled by Portu-
guese government
Branches: governor-general appointed by Lisbon is chief executive
officer for internal administration; he also has certain legislative
powers which he exercises with a legislative council; all action in
province may be vetoed by Minister of Overseas in Lisbon; judi-
ciary is constitutionally independent
Government leader: Governor-General Augusto da Costa Almeida
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Mozambique - 5
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Suffrage: extremely limited; based principally on ability to read or
write Portuguese and payment of certain taxes
Political parties and leaders: National Union, Gongalo Mesquitela;
no legal opposition political parties; the National Liberation Front,
led by Eduardo Mondlane, operates primarily from Tanzania
ECONOMY (U)
Agriculture: chief cash crops-lint cotton, cane sugar, cashew nuts,
copra, sisal; other crops--corn, wheat, peanuts, potatoes, beans,
sorghum, cassava
Major industries: processing of agricultural products, cement pro-
duction, oil refining, beverage manufacturing, prim nary metal ex-
tracting, textile products
Electric power: 182,000 kw. capacity (1962) ; 240 Million kw-hr pro-
duced (1962)
Exports: $108 million (1964;; lint cotton, sugar, cash,,w nuts, copra,
tea, sisal
Imports: $157 million (1964); machinery, textiles, vehicles, iron and
steel products, wines, petroleum products
Trade: Portugal major partner; also South Africa, India, U.K.
Aid: Portugal supplies approx. US$20 million aid a year; no other
foreign assistance
Exchange rate: 28.75 escudos = US$1 (official)
Fiscal year: calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS (Confidential)
Railroads: 1,719 mi., 1,631 mi. 3'6" gage, 88 mi. 2' 5112" gage
Highways: 14,290 mi.; 560 mi. paved, 995 mi. crushed stone and
gravel, 4,350 mi. earth, 8,385 mi. track
Inland waterways: Lake Nyasa, 60 mi. of Limpopo [liver
Pipelines: crude oil, 174 mi.
Ports: 2 principal (Beira, Lourenco Marques), 9 minor
Civil air: 9 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 240 total, 201 usable; 9 with permanent-sup face runways;
2 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 19 with runways ],000-7,999 ft.;
5 seaplane stations
DEFENSE FORCES (Secret)
Defense is responsibility of Portugal
Personnel: army 29,000, navy 1,300 (540 afloat), air force 3,350
Major ground units: 21 battalions
Ships: 2 escorts, 6 patrol, 1 auxiliary, 7 amphibious craft
Aircraft: 74 (non-jet), including 20 transports and 54 other aircraft
6 - Mozambique
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Military budget: for fiscal year ending 31 Dec. 1966, $19,265,000;
about 14% of total budget
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are
NIS Area 58 (Mozambique)
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions
Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches
Sec 23 Weather and Climate
Sec 24
Sec 25
Sec 30
Sec 31
Sec 32
Sec 33
Sec 35
Sec 38
Topography
Urban Areas
Introduction-Transportation and Telecommunications
Railway
Highway
Inland Waterway
Ports and Naval Facilities
Telecommunications
Gazetteer
NIS Area 8 (Portugal)
Sec 52 Structure of the Government
Map
The best available general reference map is: Ministerio do Ultramar;
Carta de Mocambique; 1:2,000,000; 1959
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Mozambique - 7
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