GHANA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A003200100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1966
• Content Type: CH

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1410 V
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November 1966
OCI No. 2184/66
COPY N2 339
Current Intelligence Country Handbook
GHANA
M
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Eucludad from automatic
downgrading and
deduraification
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Current Intelligence Country Handbooks are designed to give the
reader ready access to the salient facts about a country and its main
current problems. They are not intended to provide comprehensive
basic intelligence on a country or to speak with the authority of
coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the
best available to the Office of Current Intelligence as of the date at
the top of the page.
This material contains information affecting the national defense
of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and '794, the transmission or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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November 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
The governing National Liberation Council (NLC) of eight army
and police officers is headed by Lt. General Joseph Ankrah, who had
been retired earlier by Nkrumah, and includes Major General E. K.
Kotoka and Police Inspector General John llarlley. Kotoka and
Harlley were the two prime movers of the coup which overthrew
President Nkrumah on 24 February 1966 while he was in Peking.
Although so10711 fferences and frictions have developed-mostly in-
volving Colonel A. A. Afrifa, the sole representative of the
import an s ribe-the NLC members have on the whole worked
fairly well together. A number of functional committees staffed by
able civilian specialists provide the politically inexperienced NLC
members with needed guidance and expertise. Civil servants direct a
reduced number of ministries under the general supervision of a
designated NLC member. A number of commissions are investigat-
ing the Nkrumah regime's corruption.
The coup against Nkrumah was organized by pro-Western army
and police leaders who considered themselves threatened with being
relegated to a role subordinate to the Soviet-trained Presidential
Guard. The takeover and immediate release of some 1,000 political
detainees were well received by the populace who were weary of
Nkrumah's repressive policies and the country's growing economic
problems. The new regime immediately dissolved the radical Conven-
tion Peoples Party (CPP) and other organizational props of Nkrumah's
rule. It also drastically reduced the large Soviet and Chinese pres-
ence to 18-man embassies and expelled hundreds of Communist tech-
nicians.
According to General Ankrah, the NLC intends to stay in power
for 2-3 years before relinquishing control to a civilian government.
But former opposition leaders who have returned from exile abroad
are anxious to accelerate that change and come to power. Chief
among these is Professor K. A. Busia, Ashanti-based leader of the
former United Party, a loose grouping of ineffectual opposition
parties which was formally outlawed by Nkrumah in 1964. Despite
the present ban on political party activity, Busia has sought broader
support via "lectures" and meetings. His insistence, with press sup-
port, induced the NLC in June 1966 to form a Political Committee of
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM November 1966
23 prominent citizens to advise it. Busia, the vice chairman, seems in
a position to dominate the committee and use it as leverage for further
concessions from the NLC. Another potential power seeker is pro-
Western K. A. Gbedemah, former finance minister and one of the origi-
nal CPP leaders whom Nkruraah purged in 1961.
Within a week of the February 1966 coup Nkrumah took up resi-
dence in Conakry, Guinea, where he was still based as of the following
October. For a while he received vigorous moral and propaganda
support from Guinean President Sekou Toure, but this diminished
when it began to have an adverse effect on Toure's internal position.
There have been indications that Nkrumah and his Guinean allies are
plotting covert activities aimed at causing trouble for the new regime
in Accra and preparing the way for an eventual comeback attempt.
In the African context, the Ghanaian armed forces and police are
well equipped and large enough to handle internal security. But due
to Nkrumah's canceling of various Western training programs and to
accelerated Ghanaianization, most of the army and navy officers have
had little effective training. Neither the navy nor the air force-the
latter having only half its aircraft flyable-has combat capability.
Corruption in the police ranks reportedly persists.
Ghana's resources include minerals such as gold, diamonds, bauxite
and manganese, but its economy is largely dependent on cocoa, which
forms 60 percent of the exports. A bumper cocoa crop in 1965 offset
the adverse effects of the falling world market price, but huge imports
for Nkrumah's forced-pace development program brought the 1965
trade deficit to $132 million, compared to that of $20 million in 1964.
Such deficits, along with costly prestige projects, brought Ghana close
to bankruptcy, and the new regime inherited a debt of over a billion
dollars. It acted early to cut back on expenditures. The number of
foreign posts was sharply reduced, unprofitable airline; routes elimi-
nated, and some of the expensive 55 state-owned enterprises are to he
sold to private bidders. By such measures, the regime regained some
of Ghana's financial prestige abroad.
The strain on the budget for FY 1967, introduced in July 1966, was
eased by a 12-month IMF standby loan of $36.4 million and by a 3-
month suspension of payments on medium-term supplier credits. The
budget follows IMF recommendations. Although determined to keep
expenditures in tight rein, the NLC has nonetheless, committed itself
to a welfare state policy, avowedly through cooperation between the
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November 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
public and private sectors. To deal with growing urban unemploy-
ment stemming from the new retrenchment measures-a problem with
potential political repercussions-the NLC plans diversion of labor to
agricultural projects. The NLC envisions a two-year consolidation
period for Ghana's development program ending in June 1968, after
which new medium-range development plans will be considered.
Meanwhile, the government hopes the recently completed Volta
dam, heavily financed by the US and the UK, and the smelter complex
under construction will foster new industry. An International Trade
Fair is to be held in Accra early in 1967.
3. International Relations
The National Liberation Council professes to follow a course of
"true" non-alignment in contrast to Nkrumah's pro-Communist variant.
In fact, Ghana's leadership is now decidedly pro-Western, and espe-
cially pro-US, in orientation. The US, Canada, and West Germany
have all earned credit for their early economic assistance following
the coup. Ghana has also requested some US military assistance.
Ostensibly as part of its economic retrenchment, the present regime
has cut back Ghana's representation in Communist countries to Mos-
cow, Peking, Prague, and Belgrade, and relations with Peking have
been near the breaking point since the coup. Albania, North Vietnam,
and North Korea had all closed their Accra embassies by July 1966,
and the Cubans have subsequently been told to go. The NLC con-
tinues to suspect the USSR of conniving with African radicals in plot-
ting Nkrumah's return to power. Ghana and the GDR reciprocally
withdrew their trade missions after a bitter wrangle initiated by Accra's
detention of an East German intelligence agent employed by Nkrumah.
The NLC is also reducing the number of Ghanaian students in Com-
munist countries. All Soviet and Chinese aid technicians were ex-
pelled from Ghana immediately after the coup. However, by Sep-
tember 1966 the Ghanaians were actually seeking the return of some
Soviet specialists.
Under the new regime Ghana has moved from the radical to the
moderate grouping of African states. The shift has been particu-
larly welcomed by neighboring and other moderate states against
whom Nkrumah had trained subversives via his notorious Bureau of
African Affairs. The radical All-African Trade Union Federation,
which Nkrumah heavily subsidized and used for his own political pur-
poses, is now expected to shift its headquarters from Accra to a more
congenial environment.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Ghana - 3
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM November 1966
4. Subversion
A reservoir of poential subversives among the vast membership of
the former Convention Peoples Party and its ancillary groups could
exist both in and out of the present government. Many of the top-
level leaders of the former regime that were placed in protective
custody by the NLC are now free, and none has yet been tried on
criminal charges. The NLC has taken the calculated risk of relying
in many cases on untested loyalties by retaining numerous Nkrumah-
era officials.
It appears unlikely that Nkrumah can manipulate such diverse ele-
ments for a return to power, but they might be used by some other
disgruntled persons in Ghana who may aspire to power. Moreover,
the differences within the NLC; itself could he exploited by subversive
elements.
The military and the students are two categories that would espe-
cially bear a close watch by the regime, as they include a considerable
number of former bloc trainees.. Students now being compelled by the
NLC to end their studies in the bloc may hold this against the regime.
Few if any of the bloc-trained army officers appear to have been dis-
missed from service. Moreover, the personnel of the two Soviet-in-
structed former Presidential Guard units have been distributed among
the regular army battalions as a precautionary measure, yet these could
form battalion nuclei in an uprising. Lastly, there were indications
in mid-1966 of a continuous undercurrent of discontent among junior
army officers and the enlisted men over lack of promotion and pay
raises.
5. Ethnic Problems
The heterogenous nature of Ghana's population has played a sig-
nificant part in its politics. Over 50 ethnic groups-all of Sudanese
Negroid stock-are still delineated by language, religion, and tradition.
The tribes were eliminated as organized political forces, by the Nkru-
mah regime, but the NLC is seeking to restore some of the lost prestige
of the chiefs. Moreover, within the NLC and the armed forces tribal
considerations appear to be of greater importance that; previously, a
consideration which could eventually adversely affect the new regime's
stability.
The Ashanti and the Fanti are sub-groups of the large Akan tribal
group, they predominate in the central cocoa growing area and in the
coastal area between Accra and. Sekondi, respectively. The Ashantis
are represented by Colonel Afrifa; the Fanti by Brigadier Ocran. The
4 - Ghana SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Ewe tribal group of the eastern coastal area is well represented in the
senior officer ranks of the army and in NLC councils by Armed Forces
Commander Kotoka and vice chairman Ilarlley of the Ewe tribe. In
the north are the Moslemized Dagomba, Nankanse, and Dagaba as
well as the migrant Mossi from Upper Volta. The Mossi comprise the
largest single group in the lower police ranks, as well as a large part
of the army.
Chronology of Key Events
1482 Portuguese built Elmina Castle, first contact with Europeans.
1826 United Kingdom took over control of English private trading
company operating in Gold Coast.
1844 Fanti chiefs signed bond recognizing Queen Victoria's juris-
diction over them.
1949 Nkrumah forms Convention Peoples Party.
1952 Nkrumah chosen Prime Minister by Legislative Assembly.
1954 (April) New constitution gives Gold Coast nearly complete
self-government in internal affairs.
1957 (March) Gold Coast becomes independent state of Ghana.
1958 (July) Assembly passes Preventive Detention Act.
1960 (April) Republican constitution approved in plebiscite; Nkru-
mah chosen first president.
1961 (December) US agrees to extend major aid to Volta River
dam project.
1964 (January) Ghana officially becomes one party state.
1966 (February 24) Coup overthrows Nkrumah government; Na-
tional Liberation Council takes power.
LAND (U)
92,000 sq. mi.; 19% agricultural, 60% forest and brush, 21% other
PEOPLE (U)
Population: 8.1 million (est. 1 January 1967); males 15-49, 1,892,000;
950,000 fit for military service
Ethnic Divisions: 98%Negroid African (major tribes Fanti, Ashanti,
Ewe), 2% European and other
Religion: 66% animists, 20% Christian, 14% Muslim
Language: English official; African languages spoken include Akan
(44%), Mole-Dagbani (16%), Ewe (13%), and Ge-Adangbe (8 ?Jo )
Literacy: about 25% (in English)
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Ghana - 5
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Labor force: 2.8 million; 61% agriculture and fishing, 16.8%G indus-
try, 15.27o sales and clerical, 4.17c services, transportation and
communications, 2.97c professional; 1.57c. unemployed
Organized labor: 14% of labor force
GOVERNMENT (U)
Capital: Accra
Political subdivisions: 8 administrative regions and separate Greater
Accra Area; regions subdivided into 47 districts
Type: provisional military regime, established in Feb. 1966 follow-
ing overthrow of first president, Kwame Nkrumah, by army and
police officers
Branches: executive authority exercised by National Liberation
Council composed of 4 army and 4 police officers and supported
by special functional committees made up of senior civil servants;
former legislature dissolved; separate judiciary continuing intact
Government leader: Lt. General Joseph A. Ankrah, Chairman of the
NLC
Suffrage: universal over 21
Elections: last contested elections were referendum can constitutional
amendments in Jan. 1964 and presidential election of 1960; mili-
tary regime has promised to hold elections after new constitution
is prepared, but no indication yet when this will be
Political parties and leaders: all parties dissolved and political
activity proscribed by military regime
Communists: a small number of actual Communists and sympa-
thizers, totally without influence since Nkrumah's overthrow
Member of: UN, (UPU, ITU, WMO, IMCO, IMF. IBRD, ICAO,
ILO, IAEA, FAO, UNESCO, WHO), OrganizaU ion of African
Unity (OAU), Commonwealth
ECONOMY (Secret-No Foreign Dissem)
GNP: US$1.9 billion (1964) at current prices, under $250 per capita
Agriculture: main crop-cocoa; other crops include root crops, corn,
peanuts, bananas; not self-sufficient, but can become so
Major industries: mining, processing, light manufacturing, fishing;
aluminum industry under development
Electric power: 271 mw capacity (1965), 514.4 million kw.-hr. pro-
duced (1964)
Exports: $319 million (1965); cocoa (59%), wood, diamonds, gold,
manganese, bauxite
Imports: $449 million (1965); textiles and other manufactured goods,
food, mineral fuels, machinery, chemicals, transport equipment
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November 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Trade: major partners: UK, EEC, US, and Japan; bloc accounted
for 10-15% of total (1964), $31 million exports to bloc, $50 million
imports from bloc
Aid: UK, US, Canada, Israel, West Germany, Japan, Yugoslavia,
international organizations; Communist economic $239 million
(extended), military $9 million (through mid-1966); US economic
$159.2 million (through 1964)
Exchange rate: 1 Cedi=US$1.17 (official)
Fiscal year: 1 July-30 June
COMMUNICATIONS (Confidential)
Railroads: 611 mi.-all 3'6" gage; 19 mi. double tracked; diesel loco-
motives gradually replacing steam engines; government owned
Highways: 20,629 mi.; 2,183 mi. bituminous surface, 3,598 mi. gravel,
3,408 mi. improved earth, 11,440 mi. unimproved earth
Inland waterways: 450 mi., most of which is limited to small craft
navigation
Freight carried: rail (1959-60)-225,040,300 ton-miles
Pipelines: refined products, 2 mi.
Ports: 2 principal (Tema and Takoradi), 1 naval base (under con-
struction), 4 minor
Merchant marine: 16 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 99,459 GRT,
130,700 DWT; all cargo
Civil air: 12 major transport aircraft
Airfields: 13 total, 12 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways;
1 with runway 8,000-11,999 ft.; 9 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.;
1 seaplane station
Telecommunications: telephone fair to good in urban areas; fairly
good telegraph and radiobroadcast services; one AM broadcast
station, TV broadcasting begun July 1965; 30,700 telephones
DEFENSE FORCES (Secret)
Personnel: army 14,600, navy 896 (plus 74 British officers and enlisted
men), air force 1,650 (plus 96 British officers and enlisted men and
2 Canadian officers), national police force 13,000
Major ground units: 2 brigades (6 infantry battalions, 2 armored
reconnaissance squadrons, and 1 paratroop battalion)
Ships: 2 corvettes, 2 seaward defense craft, 2 inshore minesweepers,
1 coastal minesweeper, 1 training craft, 1 repair and maintenance
craft
Aircraft: 67 (6 jet, 44 prop., 17 helicopter), including 64 in opera-
tional units (5 jet trainers, 11 prop. transports, 33 prop. utility air-
craft, 11 piston helicopters, 4 turbine helicopters)
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Ghana - 7
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM November 1966
Supply: dependent on external sources; most materic-l obtained from
Commonwealth countries, some Soviet equipment
Military budget: for fiscal year ending 30 Sept. 1965, $46,800,000;
less than 9%) of total budget
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are relevant:
NIS Area 50A (Ghana)
GENERAL SURVEY and the following specialized sections:
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions
Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches
Sec 24 Topography
Sec 25 Urban Areas
Sec 31 Railway
Sec 32 Highway
Sec 38 Telecommunications
Sec 41 Population
Sec 43 Religion, Education, & Public Information
Sec 44 Manpower
Sec 45 Health and Sanitation
Sec 50 Introduction-Political
Sec 51 The Constitutional System
Sec 52 Structure of the Government
Sec 53 Political Dynamics
Sec 54 Public Order and Safety
Sec 55 National Policies
Sec 57 Subversion
Sec 58 Propaganda
Sec 60 Introduction-Economic
Sec 61 Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry
Sec 62 Fuels and Power
Sec 63 Minerals and Metals
Sec 64 Manufacturing and Construction
Sec 65 Trade and Finance
Sec 91-94 Map and Chart Appraisal
NIS Area 50 (West Africa)
Sec 35 Ports and Naval Facilities
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November 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Map
The best available general reference map is: Central Intelligence
Agency; Ghana; 1:1,500,000; Map #50608; 1965. Inserts show vege-
tation, economic activity and administrative regions.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Ghana -9
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