DAHOMEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A003200090001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1966
• Content Type: CH

o - o c p - C o t t N i y // For Release 2002/01/03: CIA-RDP79T00826AO03200090001-1
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April 1966
OCI No. 1251/66
Copy N2 336
Current Intelligence Country Handbook
DAHOMEY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from oufamallc
downgrading and
dedauificnlion
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Current Intelligence Country Handbooks are designcd to give the
reader ready access to the salient facts about a country and its main
current problems. They are not intended to provide comprehensive
basic intelligence on a country or to speak with the authority of
coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the
best available as of the date at the top of the page.
This material contains information affecting the national defense
of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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April 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Dahomey's chronic instability produced an abrupt change of regime
in December 1965 when the country's military leaders seized power
in a bloodless coup. It was the third time since independence in
1960 that the army had intervened to force the resignation of a presi-
dent. On the two previous occasions-an army-supported, trade-
union, urban revolt in October 1963 and a limited military coup
in November 1965-the army quickly relinquished control to a civilian
government. Following the most recent extra-legal change of gov-
ernment, former army chief of staff Christophe Soglo assumed the
presidency. He apparently intends to hold power indefinitely. Bar-
ring a sudden and unexpected overthrow of the Soglo regime, it looks
as if Dahomey will have a military government for at least the next
two years.
Underlying Dahomey's instability is a deteriorating economy, a per-
petually quarreling leadership, and strong regional and ethnic differ-
ences. For more than a decade these deeply rooted differences were
reflected in a struggle for power among the country's top regional
leaders: Sourou-Migan Apithy (Southeast); Justin Ahomadegbe (South-
west); and Hubert Maga (Center and North). Each of these leaders
was backed by regional, tribal, or economic interest groups and
championed by various opportunists. None had a broad political
base, and their three-cornered competition usually resulted in an un-
stable alliance of two leaders against the third. The military take-
over in 1965 was motivated in part by the army's desire to halt fac-
tional maneuvering by civilian politicians and in part by the personal
ambition of some officers. Ex-presidents Ahomadegbc, Maga, and
Apithy have not been politically active since the coup, but cannot be
counted out in any future turning of the Dahomean political merry-
go-round.
General Soglo has suspended the constitution and dissolved the
parliament, local government bodies, and political parties. He has
announced that he will hold elections and install a civilian govern-
ment only after stability has been achieved and the Five Year Plan
(1966-70) is well underway. The Soglo government is staffed pri-
marily by civilian technicians and appears more competent than its
predecessors. It is, on the whole, moderate, although there are some
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM April 1966
liberal elements within it which chafe at some of the regime's con-
servative policies.
Soglo may have set up a competing source of power in a 36-member
advisory group called the National Renovation Committee. This com-
mittee, which includes representatives of labor, youth, alders, and the
old political parties, is a political hodgepodge. Although dominated
by its military elements it includes several influential leftist agitators
and troublemakers. The committee apparently looks on itself as an
incipient legislature and has on occasion criticized government initia-
tives. Soglo, andthe small group of army officers who wield essential
power in the government, view the committee purely as a consultative
organization and would probably not hesitate to dissolve it if it be-
came recalcitrant.
Probably the most serious potential challenge to Soglo's authority
lies within the army itself. In naming Major Alley as chief of staff,
Soglo gave up his personal power base, and must now rely on Alley's
loyalty and support. For the time being Alley and the small army
appear to be solidly backing the regime, but a future conflict between
Soglo and his more competent chief of staff cannot be ruled out.
Alley's political views and ambitions remain something of a question
mark, but there are indications that a regime headed by him might
be more leftist than the present one.
2. Economic
The problems posed by Dahomey's economic underdevelopment
and budgetary deficits have been repeatedly exploited by political op-
position elements to undermine the position of the national leadership
of the moment. Dahomey, however, would be unable to pay its own
way even with the most effective leadership. It is a poor country,
with grave economic problems stemming from a lack of natural re-
sources, primitive methods of agricultural cultivation, and a shortage
of investment capital. The virtually stagnant economy depends on
palm products (palm kernels and palm oil) which account for approxi-
mately two-thirds of Dahomean exports. The production of export
crops has increased only very slightly over the past ten years. Pro-
duction of subsistence crops increased slightly from 1959-1963 but
thereafter declined somewhat.
Dahomey is burdened with an unusually large group of semi-edu-
cated men who are unemployed and restless. This group has been
enlarged by the migration of the rural underemployed into the south-
ern cities and by the forced repatriation to these cities of Dahomean
2 - Dahomey
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April f96 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
wage-earners who had migrated to other African countries to work
in commerce and civil service. There are perhaps 20,000 unemployed
out of Cotonou's approximately 100,000 inhabitants. The unions have
tried to obtain economic advantages for their 25,000 or so members
but have been hampered by poor organization, lack of funds, and
quarreling leadership. The civil service is grossly overmanned and
contributes to the large budgetary deficits which the country has
had since 1961.
France has regularly made up the budgetary deficits but has re-
peatedly threatened that it cannot be counted on to bail Dahomey out
indefinitely. Nevertheless, as of early 1966 Paris appeared reconciled
to providing budget support at about the 1965 level of 750 million
francs CFA ($3 million). France's contribution to Dahomey's Five
Year Plan was under negotiation in March 1966. In 1965, the total
annual French aid level-including budgetary-was about $17 million.
Under French pressure, Dahomey has embarked, without notable
success, on an austerity program. The Soglo government has main-
tained the 25 percent cut in civil service salaries instituted by the
Ahomadegbe government, launched a new five year plan, and eagerly
sought foreign investors. Prospects for economic development are,
however, gloomy.
3. International Relations
Dahomey's foreign policy has fluctuated with the rise and fall of
its key politicians, with a pivotal issue in recent years being recogni-
tion of Communist China. Until the downfall of President Maga .in
October 1963 Dahomey was counted as a firm friend of Nationalist
China and one of the most conservative states of Africa. Under the
Apithy-Ahomadegbe regime, the country attempted to pursue a more
nonaligned policy, recognizing Communist China in November 1964.
The economic aid it hoped for never materialized, and one of the first
things General Soglo did was to suspend relations with Communist
China and expel all the Chinese Communists. In April 1966 the
Soglo government was negotiating an economic assistance agreement
with Nationalist China, with recognition hinging on the size of
Taiwan's aid.
Economic necessity and a long political tradition dictate the regime's
close ties with France. France is Dahomey's major trading partner,
receiving 75 percent of the country's exports. Paris provides budge-
tary support, capital for economic development, training and equip-
ment for the military forces. Through its diplomatic representatives
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Dahomey -3
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM April 1966
in Dahomey and through French technical counselors attached to
various ministries it is able to exercise considerable influence over
government operations. Dahomey's need for additional foreign in-
vestment is great; however, the Soglo regime has been energetically
seeking to diversify its political and economic associations. Dahomey
maintains diplomatic ties with the USSR and several East European
Communist countries, but these contacts have so far resulted only in
cultural exchange and minor economic agreements. None of these
countries has given a firm indication that it is willing to match or even
supplement France as an aid donor.
In African affairs Dahomey's major interest lies in regional groupings
which might be economically profitable. It tends, however, to be an
unsteady partner in such alliances because of a fear that it might lose
out on a more advantageous arrangement elsewhere. Dahomey is a
member of the conservative Ivory Coast-dominated Council of the
Entente and of the moderate African and Malagasy Common Organ-
ization (OCAM). It plays a minor role in the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) and has never had many illusions about being a leader
on the African continent.
4. Subversion
There is no Communist Party in Dahomey, nor is there any or-
ganized left-wing intellectual movement. Considerable discontent ex-
ists, however, among the unemployed, students, labor leaders, and
politicians both in and out of the administration. In the spring of
1965 the Ahomadegbe government arrested and later released several
members of a group called the "Committee of 104," an alleged sub-
versive organization rumored to be backed by ex-President Apithy.
Although there is as yet no significant organized opposition to the
Soglo regime, a number of anti-government tracts-apparently put out
by followers of either Ahomadegbe or Apithy-have been seized.
Northern tribal supporters of ex-President Maga, who is now in Paris,
possess some disruptive potential, particularly since the release from
prison of northern tribal leader Chabi Mama. For the present things
appear to be quiet in this area, however. Soviet officials in Dahomey
have been fairly active in making contacts with political and trade
union leaders but have not gained the support of any key leaders or
groups. Factors favoring the government's survival are the apathy
and passivity of most of the rural population, the inabilil y of the varied
opposition to unite around a program or leader, French pressures and
influence, and the support of the army.
4 - Dahomey
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April 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Marked sociological, geographic, and historic differences separate
the people of the north and south of Dahomey. These differences
have been the cause of sharp conflict historically and until the mili-
tary coup of December 1965 shaped the struggle for power between
leaders of the two regions. The southern tribes-comprising some
60 percent of Dahomey's population-consist of Adja, Fon, Goun,
Aizo, and Yoruba. They have the highest literacy rates, inhabit the
most fertile and developed area of the country, and dominate the
present government. The Northern tribes-of whom the Bariba
are the most important-are mostly poor and illiterate. They have
been inadequately represented in the central government since the
downfall of northern-born President Maga. In March 1964 a combi-
nation of regional and ethnic animosity erupted into violence as
Bariba tribesmen from Parakou attacked southerners living in that
city. Army troops had to be used to restore order. Such incidents
are uncommon, however. Dahomey is also troubled by rivalries
within the south itself, where local leaders in Abomey, Cotonou, and
Porto Novo tend to see the central government as a means by which
they may gain advantages for their town and undercut rival com-
munities.
Chronology of Key Events
1892 Area of modern Dahomey brought under French adminis-
tration.
1902 Dahomey officially designated a colony of France.
1958 Dahomey becomes an autonomous republic within the French
Community.
1959 Hubert Maga becomes premier.
1960 (August) Dahomey becomes independent.
(December) National Assembly elections; Maga elected presi-
dent and Sourou-Migan Apithy vice president.
1963 (October) Maga regime overthrown by trade union and other
urban elements whose leaders urge army chief of staff
Christophe Soglo to assume temporary control.
(December) The Parti Democratique Dahomean (PDD) is
formed as a national unity party.
1964 (January) New constitution approved by popular referendum.
Apithy elected president and Ahomadegbe vice president in
uncontested elections.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Dahomey -5
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1965 (November) The army, with a minimum show of force, pres-
sures both Apithy and Ahomadegbe to resign. A pro-
visional government, headed by National Assembly Presi-
dent Congacou (next in line according to th( - constitution)
takes over.
(December) General Soglo seizes power in a bloodless mili-
tary coup, suspends 1964 constitution, local government
bodies, and all political parties.
Selected Factual Data
LAND
44,700 sq. mi., southern third of country is most fertile; cultivated
land 131/c, forests 19%, remainder fallow, vacant, pasture, waste
PEOPLE
Population: 2.4 million; males 15-49, 568,000; 285,000 fit for mil.
service; about 25,000 males and 20,000 females reach mil. age
(18) annually; both sexes liable for mil, service
Ethnic Divisions: 99% Africans (Fon, Adja, Aizo, Y(,ruba, Bariba,
Fulani, Dendi, Somba, Pila-Pila), 0.4%. Europeans
Religion: 12V, Muslim, 8% Christian, 80'/( animist
Language: French official; Fon and Yoruba most common vernacu-
lars in south, at least six major tribal languages in north
Literacy: about 10%
Labor force: 85% of labor force engaged in agr., 15j; civil service,
artisans, and ind.
Organized labor: approximately 75% of wage earniers; divided
among two major and several minor unions
GOVERNMENT
Capital: Porto Novo (official), Cotonou (de facto)
Regional breakdown: 6 regions
Type: independent republic since 1960; regime established follow-
ing revolution in 1963 was replaced Nov. 1965 by a provisional
government
Branches: elected president and vice president, unicameral legis-
lature, independent judiciary
Government leader: General Christophe Soglo
Suffrage: universal for adults
Elections: last elections Jan. 1964; election ?unconte~.ted, with re-
gime candidates receiving over 95% of votes; a iew elections
pending
6 - Dahomey
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April 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Political parties and leader: Dahomey Democratic Party (PDD) only
party; led by Secretary General Gabriel Lozes
Communists: some; probably some sympathizers
Member of: UN (ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, UPU, ITU,
WMO), Afro-Malagasy Common Organization, Organization of
African Unity, EEC (associate)
ECONOMY
GDP: about US$140 million (1963), under $75 per capita
Agriculture: major cash crop is oil palms; peanuts, cotton, tobacco
also produced; main food crops-corn and root crops; animal hus-
bandry
Major industries: light and processing industries
Electric power: 7,000 kw. capacity (1964); 16.5 million kw.-hr. con-
sumed (1963)
Exports: $13.2 million (1964); about three-fourths palm kernels and
palm oil; other agricultural products
Imports: $31.4 million (1964); consumer goods, cement, fuels
Trade: mostly with France
Aid: French aid, over $15 million a year; US economic through
(FY 1965) $8.7 million, now about $1.0 million a year
Exchange rate: 247 Communaute Financiere Africaine francs=US$1
Fiscal year: calendar year
COMMUNICATIONS
Railroads: 359 mi., all meter gage (3'33/a"); government owned
Highways: 3,828 mi.; 369 mi. paved, 2,529 mi. otherwise improved,
930 mi. unimproved
Inland waterways: 445 mi. navigable
Ports: 1 principal (Cotonou), 1 minor
Civil Air: no major transport aircraft
Airfields: 7 total (including 1 inactive airfield site); 1 with perma-
nent-surface runway; 2 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.
Telecommunications: telephone service concentrated in south, 3,100
telephones; telegraph limited, but more extensive than telephone;
fair radio coverage with 1 AM station
DEFENSE FORCES
Personnel; army 1,060, air force 26, gendarmerie 1,270, French mis-
sion 50
Major ground units: 3 infantry battalions
Aircraft: 6 (no jets)
Supply: dependent on France
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Dahomey -7
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Military budget: for fiscal year ending 31 Dec. 1965, $4,106,000;
less than 13% of total budget
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are relevant:
NIS Area 50M (Dahomey)
GENERAL SURVEY
Gazetteer
NIS Area 50 (West Africa)
Sec 35 Ports and Naval Facilities
NIS Area 50-II (West Africa, Southern Part)
Sec 23 Weather and Climate
NIS Area 50C (French West Africa, Togo & Spanish Sahara)
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions
Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches
Sec 24 Topography
Sec 25 Urban Areas
Sec 31 Railway
Sec 32 Highway
Sec 91-94 Map and Chart Appraisal
Map
The best available general reference map is: US Army Map Serv-
ice; World (Africa) 1:1,000,000'; Series 1301, sheets NB 31 and NC
31; 1961.
8 - Dahomey
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