COSTA RICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00826A003200070001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 30, 2001
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 1, 1966
Content Type:
CH
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July 1966
OCI No. 1747/66
Copy N2 412
Current Intelligence Country Handbook
COSTA RICA
This revision supersedes the handbook dated July 1965,
copies of which should be destroyed.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from aulomonc
downgrading and
declo,sifico ion
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Current Intelligence Country Handbooks are designed to give the
reader ready access to the salient facts about a country and its main
current problems. They are not intended to provide comprehensive
basic intelligence on a country or to speak with the authority of
coordinated national intelligence. The information presented is the
best available to the Office of Current Intelligence as of the date at
the top of the page.
This material contains information affecting the national defense
of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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July 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
1. Political
In February 1966, Costa Rica upheld its electoral tradition of
ousting the incumbent party every four years, and elected opposition
coalition candidate Jose Joaquin Trejos as president for the 1966-70
term. Also traditional were the extremely close margin by which Trejos
defeated National Liberation Party (PLN) candidate Daniel Oduber
A "clean hands" leader inexperi-
enced in government, Trejos has the further political problem that
his own vehicle to power, a coalition of parties cooperating for the
sole and negative purpose of wresting control from the PLN, is not
loyal to him. At the beginning of his term he is without a following
of his own and may get only a minimum of unified support from the
"coalition."
The profound acrimony engendered by the loss of hard fought
elections has produced deep schisms in the PLN, but this split among
the opposition PLN leaders will not necessarily benefit Trejos. It
may merely add to the strains within the legislature, which could easily
degenerate into a do-nothing congress at a time when political and
economic reform is sorely needed. To govern effectively, the new
administration will be heavily dependent upon Trejos' prestige and
untested skill in countering opposition hostility and internal pressures.
Present indications are that the government will have relatively limited
political capabilities.
2. Economic
Costa Rica is favored by its democratic tradition, stability, a largely
literate population, relatively advanced social services, and compara-
tively equitable distribution of land and income. The economy, how-
ever, is heavily dependent upon the export of coffee and bananas,
which account for about two-thirds of all exports. The fluctuations
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM July 1966
in prices of these two commodities in recent years, combined with a
rising level of imports, have resulted in chronic trade deficits since
1955. In 1965 the deficit increased to $66 million as imports rose
29 percent and exports were stable. A substantial part of the deficit
is covered by private foreign investment and drawings on long-term
loans, but the increasing demand by consumers for manufactured
goods has created a potentially serious payments problem.
As confidence and coffee production recovered after Mount Irazu
stopped erupting in January 1965, strong prosperity developed through
1965 and has continued into 1966. The growth rate through mid-1966
appeared to be about the same as in 1965, 7.5 percent. Tight credit
was the main factor limiting acceleration of the boom. The 1966-67
coffee crop is expected to be the best in history, and will probably
present major problems of storage or marketing. Costa Rica is ex-
ploring markets outside those covered by international agreements to
sell its over-quota production.
Preliminary figures show the 1965 GNP at $590 million, 7.6 percent
higher than in 1964. As the population is increasing at a rate of about
3.8 percent and prices are stable, this growth represents 3.8 percent
per capita, well above the Alliance for Progress target of 2.5 percent.
It does not appear that Trejos will make any basic changes in eco-
nomic policies. He has announced his desire to reduce the economic
role of the state and has promised heavy support for the private
sector. He has emphasized a high priority on private banking and
on solving the problem of "anarchy" in the country's autonomous in-
stitutions. These and other reforms intended by Trejos, however,
are likely to be hindered by the administration's lack of a majority
in the legislature.
Import duties continue to account for over half the government's
total revenue. Tax rates are the same for individuals and corpora-
tions. Tax incentives for new industry have cost the government
substantial revenues, particularly in exemptions from import duties.
So far the Industrial Protection and Encouragement Law, enacted in
1959, has attracted mainly industries that will not produce export
earnings.
Costa Rica has ratified all the basic agreements and joined all the
institutions established under the Central American Common Market,
and Trejos has affirmed his support for economic integration. Trade
between Costa Rica and the Communist countries is insignificant-
under 0.5 percent of total exchange-but Costa Rica is seeking markets
not inhibited by international agreements.
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July 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
3. International Relations
Costa Rica staunchly supports the US on most international issues.
It contributed a contingent to the OAS force in the Dominican Re-
public, but maintains an independent position in hemispheric affairs,
and may oppose the creation of a permanent hemispheric peace force
(IAPF). Under the new administration, support for the US may be
less ready, since many within the new government are convinced that
the US is partial toward their political enemy, the PLN. During the
election campaign, Trejos stated in effect that, while he regards the
US as Costa Rica's great friend, his government will seek to improve
and expand its relations with Europe, especially France. Trejos has
taken a step toward more cordial relations with neighboring Central
American countries and Panama with his preinaugural visit to those
republics. Relations with Nicaragua, particularly, should improve,
since the animosity between Costa Rica and Nicaragua is in large
part based on mutual ill will between the PLN and the Somoza family
in Nicaragua. The need for export markets to bolster its sagging
economy has caused Costa Rica to seek to expand its present insig-
nificant trade with the Communist countries.
The illegal Popular Vanguard (Communist Party-PVP), which has
a dedicated and well-trained leadership, an estimated 400 members
and 8-10,000 sympathizers, is the principal subversive group in the
country. Although the party normally has relative freedom to operate,
government security measures against it vary, e.g., there was a sharp
crackdown on Castro-Communists during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
PVP leaders were stunned by legislative action at the end of 1965
barring the Communist-front Popular Socialist Alliance (PAPS) from
participating in the February 1966 elections.
The PVP has tactically eschewed violence and favored democratic
means for attaining power. At least 31 PVP members have received
six months of guerrilla training in Cuba since 1960, and four have
received sabotage and paramilitary training in the USSR. Several of
these have been training small bands of party militants. It is unlikely
that the Communists have the capacity to mount sustained insurgent
activities, although isolated attempts cannot be ruled out. They are
probably fearful of the several small anti-Communist paramilitary
groups in the country. The AID public safety program is strength-
ening the internal security potential of the police forces in rural areas,
as well.
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM July 1966
The PVP is preparing for the future by sending large numbers of
leaders or potential leaders for training at party schools in the USSR.
Since October 1960 at least 107 Costa Ricans have received or are
now receiving party training either at the CPSU school for non-bloc
Communists or the Central Komsomol School in Moscow; 48 have
received five-year scholarships at Patrice Lumumba t,1niversity, Mos-
cow; and 16 are studying on scholarships at East European universities.
The Communist youth tends to challenge the old-line leadership which
is strongly oriented toward the Soviet line.
The sixth congress of the CGTC, a Communist labor confederation,
in September 1965 stressed the importance of peasant organizations
and announced two new Communist peasant unions,, one in Limon
Province near a large agrarian reform colony. Another important
Communist effort in Limon is a campaign to organize banana workers
employed by Standard Fruit. There is also renewed Communist in-
terest in the peasant leagues near Puerto Cortes and Piedras Blancas.
There are a significant number of anti-Somoza Nicaraguan exiles,
many of them pro-Communist, residing in Costa Rica. Like other
Central American extreme leftists, they have received small amounts
of money, materiel, and logistical support from the PVP, but their
subversive efforts are aimed at the Government of Nicaragua.
Costa Rica has no regular armed forces, and the strong anti-military
feeling of most Costa Ricans has resulted in highly inadequate ap-
propiations for internal security forces. The small public forces of
about 3,000 men perform police and quasi-military functions and are
loyal to the government. The Civil Guard, the principal component
of these forces, would be severely handicapped in any sustained cam-
paign by the lack of a professional officer corps and insufficient train-
ing, materiel, and mobility. The US Public Safety Mission is trying
to help the government establish a truly professional police force.
Chronology of Key Events
1948 (1 Mar) National Assembly nullifies elections when victory
of opposition National Union Party (PUN) candidate Otilio
Ulate becomes evident.
(12 Mar) Civil war erupts with revolutionary army led by
Jose Figueres. Government forces are defeated after six
weeks of strife.
(8 May) Figueres heads "Founding Junta of the Second Re-
public," in control for transition period until Ulate's inau-
guration.
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July 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
1948 (May-Dee) Caribbean Legion, an irregular military force of
refugees from area dictatorships which helped Figueres'
revolution, plots against regimes in Nicaragua and the
Dominican Republic from its base in Costa Rica.
(Dec) Nicaraguan-supported forces of ex-president Calderon
invade Costa Rica from Nicaragua. Invasion repelled with
assistance from OAS, which calls for halt to subversion and
disbanding of Caribbean Legion.
1949 (15 Jan) Constituent Assembly, elected in December, meets
to draft new constitution.
(2 Oct) PUN wins 30 of the 45 seats in Legislative Assembly
election.
(8 Nov) Ulate is inaugurated President; new constitution goes
into effect.
1953 (26 Jul) Figueres, candidate of National Liberation Party
(PLN), is elected President; PLN wins 30 of 45 legislative
seats.
1954 (3-4 Apr) Nicaraguan exiles based in Costa Rica unsuccess-
fully attempt to assassinate Nicaraguan President Somoza.
Somoza, convinced of Figueres' implication, vows revenge.
1955 (Jan) Invasion of Nicaraguan-based Costa Rican exiles
backed by Somoza is halted by OAS intervention.
1958 (2 Feb) Opposition (PUN) candidate Mario Echandi wins
presidential election but legislative majority is controlled
by PLN.
1960 (16-29 Aug) 6th and 7th meetings of OAS foreign ministers
result in Declaration of San Jose, repudiating Communist
bloc intervention in the affairs of the Americas.
1962 (4 Feb) PLN candidate Francisco Orlich Balmarcich elected
President; PLN wins 28 of 57 legislative seats.
1963 (18-20 Mar) President Kennedy meets with Central American
presidents in San Jose.
(Mar) Ashfall from erupting Irazu volcano begins.
1965 (29 Oct) Communist front Popular Socialist Alliance (PAPS)
is outlawed by legislature.
1966 (6 Feb) Jose Joaquin Trejos, candidate of coalition formed to
defeat PLN candidate Daniel Odubcr, wins narrow elec-
tion victory. PLN retains legislative majority.
(Apr) President-elect Trejos visits Central American republics
and Panama.
(8 May) Trejos inaugurated President.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Costa Rica - 5
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM July 1966
Holidays and Significant Dates
1 Jan Circumcision and New Year's Day
19 Mar Feast of St. Joseph (patron saint of Costa Rica)
Mar-Jun Movable religious observances: Holy Thursday, Good
Friday, Holy Saturday, and Corpus Christi
11 Apr Anniversary of Battle of Rivas (marking defeat in 1854
of William Walker, an American soldi(r of fortune)
1 May Labor Day
29 Jun Feasts of Sts. Peter and Paul
2 Aug Feast of Our Lady of Angels
15 Aug Assumption
15 Sep Independence Day
12 Oct Columbus Day
8 Dec Immaculate Conception
25 Dec Christmas
LAND
Total sq. miles: 19,647; 10% arable, of which 1/2 is cultivated; 80%
forested; 10% inland water or waste
PEOPLE
Population: 1,558,000 (1966 est.); males 15-49, 297,000; fit for mili-
tary service, 210,000
Ethnic groups: 97.6% white including some mestizo; 2% Negro;
0.3% Indian; 0.1% Asian
Religion: 95% Roman Catholic
Language: Spanish; English, taught in elementary and secondary
schools, is most popular secondary language
Literacy: 80 %
Labor force: 400,000 active, 10%-25% unemployed (1964)
Organized labor: About 5% (1966)
GOVERNMENT
Type of government: unitary republic, constitutional democracy;
considerable political maturity and experience in operation of
representative government, by Latin American standards.
Branches of government: president and 57-member unicameral
legislature elected by direct popular vote every 4 Years; 17-mem-
ber Supreme Court elected for 8-year terms by the assembly is
constitutionally and actually an independent brani h; cabinet ap-
pointed by president.
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July 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
President: Jose Joaquin Trejos
Government attitude toward US: friendly
Capital: San Jose
Regional breakdown: Seven provinces with almost no local au-
tonomy.
Principal political parties:
National Liberation Party (PLN): Leaders Francisco Orlich,
Daniel Oduber, and Jose Figueres. Oduber, presidential candi-
date in 1966, polled 49 % of the vote. PLN has 29 deputies
in the assembly and constitutes the legislative majority.
National Union Party (PUN), led by Otilio Ulate
Republican Party (PR), led by Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia
Authentic Republican Union Party (PURA), led by Mario Echandi
The National Unification (UN) coalition of PUN, PR, and PURA
polled 50% of the vote in 1966.
Popular Vanguard Party (PVP), the Communist Party, is led by
Manuel Mora and has been illegal since 1948; has 400 members
and 8-10,000 sympathizers.
Popular Socialist Alliance (PAPS), a Communist front led by
Marcial Aguiluz, was outlawed by the legislature in October
1965.
Suffrage: Compulsory for men and women aged 20 or over.
Significant exclusions from voting: none
Registered voters as % of population in 1966: 37%
Abstention (1966) : About 20% of registered voters
Extent of fraud: relatively insignificant in Latin American context
System of balloting: direct vote for president, proportional repre-
sentation for national legislature and municipal councilmen;
separate ballots for president, legislature, and municipal races
Election laws on the whole encourage multiparty system; party
registration is not difficult and may be on a nationwide or local
basis.
Next national election: February 1970
Member: UN, OAS, Organization of Central American States, and
the Central American Common Market
ECONOMY
GNP: US$590 million (1965 in current prices); estimated 7.6% in-
crease over 1964; $393 per capita; rate of inflation 1963-64 about
3%; no change in cost-of-living index in 1965.
Agriculture: main crops: coffee, bananas, cacao, sugar, corn, cattle
raising gaining in importance. Almost self-sufficient.
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM July 1966
Major industries: food processing, footwear, clothing, construction
materials, auto assembly
Critical shortages: manufactured consumer goods and capital equip-
ment
Electric power: 156,000 kw capacity in 1965, with estimated pro-
duction of 600 million kw-hr
Exports: coffee, 41.4%; bananas, 26.1%; cattle and beef, 4.1%;
sugar, 3.9%. Total value of exports, f.o.b., US$112.3 million
(1965)
Imports: wheat and other grains, manufactured consumer goods,
capital equipment; total value of imports, c.i.f., US$178.2 million
(1965)
Exports to US in 1965: US$56.4 million (50%)
Imports from US in 1965: US$71 million (40%)
Trade/aid: principal trading partners are the US, Germany, Nether-
lands, Japan, UK, and Central American republic:-,. Costa Rica
has had an unfavorable balance of trade since 1955. US devel-
opment loans 1946-65, $33.85 million authorized; total assistance
estimated for FY 1966: US$12 million.
COMMUNICATIONS
Railroads: 490 miles of single-track 3'6" gage, of which 77 miles
are electrified (1966)
Highways: 3,400 miles including 430 miles bituminous surface, 65
miles concrete, 655 miles gravel or crushed stone, and 2,250 miles
improved earth (1966).
Inland waterways: 455 miles perennially navigable
Ports: 1 principal, 2 secondary, 4 minor
Merchant marine: none
Airfields: 165 (73 civil air, 92 airfield sites, 2 seaplane stations; 1 air-
field handles jets)
Telecommunications: domestic service poor; international, above
average in Central America and satisfies most of the country's
requirements
DEFENSE FORCES
Personnel: civil guard 1,700
Loyalty of forces to incumbent regime: loyal
Aircraft: 3 Cessna 185, 1 Cessna 180
Air facilities: civil airfields used
Supply: dependent on imports
US missions: Military Assistance Group
US military aid: $0.1 million for FY 1967
Military budget: $2.3 million, 2% of 1965 budget ($123.7 million)
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July 1966 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Resident diplomatic and consular missions: none; Czech and Polish
trade missions
Binational cultural centers: none
Imports in 1964: $644,630 (0.46% of total imports)
Exports in 1964: none
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are relevant:
NIS Area 76 (Costa Rica)
General Survey in draft, to be published in fall 1966
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions (Nov. 64)
Sec 23 Weather and Climate (Mar 57)
Sec 24 Topography (May 64)
Sec 25 Urban Areas (Jan 60)
Sec 35 Ports and Naval Facilities (Mar 61)
Sec 36 Merchant Marine (Aug 56)
Sec 37 Civil Air (Nov 61)
Sec 38 Telecommunications (Dec 58)
Sec 41 Population (Feb 55)
Sec 42 Characteristics of the People (Apr 58)
Sec 43 Religion, Education, and Public Information (May 55)
Sec 44 Manpower (Jun 55)
Sec 45 Health and Sanitation (Oct 56)
Sec 51 The Constitutional System (Feb 55)
Sec 52 Structure of the Government (Jun 55)
Sec 53 Political Dynamics (Oct 62)
Sec 54 Public Order and Safety (Jun 56)
Sec 55 National Policies (Nov 62)
Sec 57 Subversion (Jan 56)
Sec 58 Propaganda (Feb 55)
Sec 65 Trade and Finance (Dec 54)
Sec 91-94 Map and Chart Appraisal (Oct 59)
Gazetteer (Apr 56)
NIS Area 71-77 (Central America)
Sec 22 Coast and Landing Beaches (Mar 56)
Map
The best available general reference map is: Texaco; Costa Rica;
1:850,000; 1964
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?S'djita Cruz
G U N A
COSTA RICA
International boundary
- ---- Provincia boundary
Q National capital
o Provincia capital
Railroad
Road
0 30 20 30 Kil40 50 Miles
l l l l r l
0 10 20 30 00 50 omelerc
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