THE HARMEL STUDY - NATO LOOKS TO ITS FUTURE

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
THE HARMEL STUDY--NATO LOOKS TO ITS FUTURE
Secret
23
7 December 1967
No. 1680/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
EXCLI;I~F:fl F'Ic I.IM All TOMnS'IC
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 December 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Harmel Study: NATO Looks to its Future
Summary
For the past year, a special group of representa-
tives of the NATO member states has been studying the
future tasks of the Alliance. Named for Belgian Foreign
Minister Harmel, who proposed it, this study will
probably be concluded by a report issued by the NATO
ministers following their semiannual conference at
Brussels which begins on 12 December. Perhaps the
greatest impact of the Harmel study has been its revela-
tion of national sensitivities and concerns as member
governments were forced, through the extensive and
often heated process of developing the study, to con-
sider the viewpoints of each of the others.
The sponsors of the study hope that it will result
in extensive consultations on Germany and European
security and on arms control and disarmament--topics
of interest to the general European public which wants
detente and an end to the Cold War image of NATO.
The other topics considered in the course of the study
--defense problems in adjacent areas and crises out-
side the NATO region--are of less interest to Europeans.
The French have expressed reservations about the
Harmel study since its inception, fearing that it will
develop moves toward political integration within the
Alliance. There is a built-in conflict between De Gaullds
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and
the Office of National Estimates.
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policy of independence of the US and de-emphasis of
military blocs on the one hand, and, on the other,
the effort of NATO to plan, in fairly concrete terms,
for its long-term future. The ultimate position of
the French Government on the Harmel study remains
unclear, but it may accept a final report that leaves
the question of innovations for later consideration
by the North Atlantic Council.
The Harmel study also has implications for 1969,
the year in which NATO members may give notice of an
intention to withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance.
The whole drift of the Special Group's report implies
that NATO will go on past 1969, and there is even
explicit use of the phrase "in the years ahead."
The net impression made by the exercise so far is
that, with the possible exception of France, the mem-
ber states are determined to maintain the Alliance
for the indefinite future.
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Origins of the Study and Initial Developments
1. At various times during the past few years,
the suggestion has been made by one or another NATO
member that a reappraisal was needed of the organiza-
tion's function and direction. The time never seemed
ripe, however, until the fall of 1966. By then, the
pressures in Western Europe for an East-West detente,
the French-NATO crisis, and the short time remaining
until 1969 (when withdrawal from the Alliance would
be possible) all pointed to the wisdom of reaffirming
the continuing relevance of the North Atlantic Alliance
in order to resell it to European electorates.
2. Accordingly, in November 1966, Belgian Foreign
Minister Harmel proposed a NATO study "with the aim
of suggesting adaptations dictated by changing cir-
cumstances." He carefully cultivated the support
of all NATO members, including France, for his proposal,
for it was obvious that France, having just withdrawn
from the military organization of the Alliance, would
be unenthusiastic about plans for a revitalization
of the Alliance, The next month, the NATO ministerial
conference adopted a resolution "to study the future
tasks that face the Alliance, and its procedures for
fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alliance
as a factor for a durable peace." Ways of improving
consultation within the Alliance would especially be
examined. Surprisingly (and to his later regret),
French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville agreed to
the resolution provided that it developed no moves
toward political integration within the Alliance.
The study was to be carried out "at a high political
level," with a preliminary report to be made to the
ministerial meeting in the spring of 1967, and a final
report to the meeting in December, which would "draw
the appropriate conclusions that emerge from the en-
quiry."
3. The Belgians initiated conversations in Janu-
ary 1967 aimed at establishing procedures for imple-
menting the resolution. The French immediately began
expressing reservations, stating that the time was
not ripe for "political initiatives in NATO." None-
theless, they'went along when, in February, the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) set up "an open-ended Special
Group of Representatives designated by governments"
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to develop the study under the chairmanship of NATO
Secretary General Brosio. All NATO countries were
invited to participate if they chose, and they all
did so. Four study topics were proposed by Brosio:
(1) East-West relations; (2) inter-allied relations;
(3) the general defense policy of the Alliance; and
(4) developments in regions outside the NATO area.
4. Subgroups for each topic were formed, headed
in every case by "a rapporteur particularly well-in-
formed on the subject in question." It was specific-
ally provided that the rapporteur would be personally
responsible for his report, which would, however,
commit neither his subgroup nor the Special Group.
This arrangement resulted in some very subjective
reports on which agreement proved difficult. Selection
of the rapporteurs involved a number of political
considerations; the Scandinavians, for example, objected
to a West German rapporteur on the first topic and
secured a compromise agreement that Adam Watson of
the United Kingdom and Klaus Schuetz of the Federal
Republic of Germany would act as co-rapporteurs.
The Belgians named Paul-Henri Spaak as rapporteur
for the second topic, and the United States appointed
Foy Kohler to serve as the rapporteur on the general
defense policy of the Alliance. As there was consider-
able difficulty in developing any consensus on the
fourth topic, the Candian and Italian governments
declined requests to name a rapporteur for it, permit-
ling the Dutch to appoint a former parliamentarian
and international law expert, C.L. Patijn.
The Four Subgroup Reports
5. The discussions in the four subgroups had
barely begun by the time of the NATO ministerial meet-
ing in the spring of 1967. Consequently, the interim
report at that time merely indicated that progress
was "encouraging" and that the study was providing
"a useful framework for a free discussion of difficult
and delicate problems which are of deep interest for
the future of the Alliance."
6. There were lively debates in the subgroup
on East-West relations. No governments questioned
that the Alliance was still required as a military
deterrent, but many of them thought that this rationale
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was not sufficiently understood, especially by young
people. They therefore sought a second rationale
for the continuance of the Alliance based on a role
of detente management. Nonetheless, views on how
this role might be carried out varied considerably.
In working out the Watson-Schuetz report, important
differences were exposed on such matters as new initia-
tives on the German question and efforts generally
to concert Western positions. Several members--Norway,
Denmark, the UK, and Canada--wanted NATO to develop
moves toward a settlement with the Soviet Union, but
the West Germans, with strong French support, sought
to preserve their Eastern policy on a bilateral basis
and were also reluctant to see any erosion of quadri-
partite responsibility for Berlin. The report, as
it came out, proposed no new NATO machinery to deal
with East-West relations and noted that "both bilateral
and multilateral contacts will be needed" to overcome
the present division of Europe. It stressed the need
for close and urgent study of the sort of European
settlement toward which the Allies should work.
7. The subgroup on inter-allied relations was
racked with dissension, as Spaak insisted on his per-
sonal formulations. His paper, which he titled "The
Ideological Basis and the Unity of the Alliance,"
contained extensive references to the 1956 report
of the Three Wise Men (the Committee of Three on Non-
military Cooperation in NATO), citing their recognition
of the need for "a significant strengthening of politi-
cal consultation." Spaak transformed this into a
call for NATO members to adopt a "common policy" on
current issues, and warned that Communism "has renounced
none of its aims and still hopes to defeat its oppon-
ents". The French Government was opposed to any sug-
gestion that NATO members must conform to the views
of the majority or the largest members. Consequently,
the French representative made vehement objections
to the Spaak report, which was also fairly direct
in making explicit criticisms of French policy. The
French were backed by the Danes and Canadians, but
they were unable to get Spaak to alter his objection-
able text.
8. The discussions in the subgroup on topic
three developed the least amount of controversy, pro-
bably because the Fourteen (the NATO members minus
France) already had reached a consensus on military
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matters in response to the French withdrawal from the
NATO military framework. Kohler concentrated on general
principles and political aims for defense policy and
on broad aspects of arms control and disarmament. He
advocated exploration of means to achieve balanced
mutual force reductions and proposed "a permanent
Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of NATO," an
idea opposed only by the French. The Norwegians and
the Danes joined the French in mildly criticizing
Kohler for having minimized detente prospects.
9. The great interest of the US in the fourth
topic(developments outside the NATO area)tended to
further European doubt as to the relative priority
which the US attaches to its European commitment.
Patijn's report received criticism similar to that
of the Spaak report for being too subjective. Patijn
wrote: "NATO's task beyond the Treaty area is ...
to devise common policies for its members." At least
five NATO members joined France in objecting that
Patijn had gone too far in trying to systematize Alli-
ance activity on problems beyond the Treaty area.
Growing French Dissatisfaction
10. As the Harmel study progressed, the French
became increasingly worried. There was, of course,
a built-in conflict between De Gaulle's policy of
independence of the US and deemphasis of military
blocs on the one hand, and, on the other, the effort
of NATO to plan, in fairly concrete terms, for its
long-term future.
11. By September of this year, French spokesmen
were vigorously objecting to the "dangerous" direction
in which the rapporteurs, particularly Spaak and Patijn,
were taking the Harmel study. Couve de Murville in-
formed Brosio that he must be "very careful" in his
actions on the study because "if the intention... was
to embarrass the French, they are ready to stand strongly
against this." Couve told US Ambassador Bohlen that
France was prepared for a "showdown" on the report to
conclude the Harmel study. He added that France opposed
"making what originally had been conceived as an aca-
demic study into a set of principles and recommendations
of a more specific nature."
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Reactions of the Other NATO Members
12. The reactions of other NATO members to
French objections were diverse. The West Germans
particularly sought to avoid any provocation of the
French as they did not want to risk what they al-
ready had---an Alliance that included France, plus
a recognized and proven forum for consideration of
the German, problem. The British did not wish to
shelve the Harmel study, but also were worried that
a dispute over it could adversely influence their
Common Market membership application. The Scandi-
navians, while seeking a new image for NATO, indi-
cated that innovations were a lesser concern when
compared to retaining France as a counterweight to
Germany in NATO. Belgium, the Netherlands, and
the US were the most determined to see the study
through to a successful conclusion.
13. The reports of the four subgroups were
submitted to Secretary General Brosio at a meeting
of the rapporteurs at Ditchley Park in the United
Kingdom on 11-12 October. In an apparent attempt
to avoid contentious phrases, particularly those
in the Spaak and Patijn reports, Bowie of the US
and von Bellinghen of Belgium produced a 16-page
summary of the four reports. Patijn objected to
the summary and rewrote two sections. An agreement
was reached that the reports and the summary would
be presented to a meeting of the Special Group in
November with a covering letter stating that the
rapporteurs considered the summary to be "no sub-
stitute for the reports themselves." At this time,
Brosio was reportedly thinking of seeking a minimum
agreement with the French in December and continuing
the study on unagreed issues after the ministerial
meeting.
14. At a long private meeting on 25 October,
the NATO permanent representatives heard French
representative Seydoux characterize the Bowie - von
Bellinghen summary as "absolutely unacceptable
even as a point of departure for discussion." He
maintained that it reflected all of the rapporteurs'
reports, at least some of which were totally con-
demned by the French, and that the principle of a
common NATO policy was stated "at almost every page."
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With the representatives "verging on despair,"
Brosio agreed to prepare "a list of major substan-
tive points or questions for consideration" by
the Special Group. He wrote a short statement to
provide the French with "a piece of paper un-
contaminated by reference to previous documents."
US NATO representative Cleveland felt that the
Brosio paper "has the merit of preserving the
Ditchley document from emasculation." Cleveland,
together with UK representative Burrows, was push-
ing for a study report providing for a political
work program, possibly to be implemented by the
Defense Planning Committee, the chief organ of the
Fourteen.
The First Special Group Meeting
15. As the 7 November meeting of the Special
Group approached the West Germans made an effort
to crime to an agreement with the French on the
end product of the Harmel study, Together they
worked out a short statement regarding a political
work program. 'But on the morning of the meeting,
the French NATO representative, Seydoux, canceled
the agreement as a result of a discussion the day
before between De Gaulle and Couve de Murville.
He informed the German NATO representative, Grewe,
that the French would support nothing beyond lan-
guage in the December ministerial communique` to
conclude the study, and would oppose any new com-
mittees or declarations. Speeches by other countries
at the meeting on 7 November, however, indicated
broad support for a future political work program
that would include "intensified and systematic at-
tention" to East-West relations, European security
and the German problem, arms control and disarmament,
and security in the Mediterranean area. When the
other representatives attempted to secure approval
for Brosio to draft a report to the ministers on
the basis of the discussions on 7 November, Seydoux
asked for and obtained an overnight postponement of
such a decision. The following day, after consult-
ing Paris for instructions, Seydoux stated that he
would "stand aside" to permit Brosio to draft the
report, which he described as a "superfluous seventh
document." He maintained that the ministers them-
selves must negotiate a document summarizing the
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Harmel study. It was agreed that the Brosio draft
would be reviewed by the Special Group at meetings
on 22-23 November.
16. Spokesmen for most NATO nations were gen-
erally disappointed with the outcome, Both Denmark
and Italy reacted to the French negativism by sug-
gesting that the NATO ministers receive an interim
report in December, postponing the final report
until the June 1968 ministerial meeting. Luxem-
bourg was "not encouraged" by results of the Special
Group conference and did not expect more than "some
face-saving pronouncements" from the ministerial
meetings in December. Dutch Foreign Minister Luns,
citing the French attitude, believed that "nothing
significant could come from the Harmel exercise."
Bonn hoped that Brosio (instead of the NATO minis-
ters) would sign the report concluding the Harmel
study, thereby permitting the Germans to avoid
endorsing a report to which France objected.
Results of the Second Special Group Meeting
17. In discussions on the weekend of 18-20
November, the Belgians and the French agreed to
an informal document outlining points to be made
in the ministerial declaration in December. The
document reportedly described a number of methods
by which the "Alliance should intensify and improve
its consultations." Another key provision was
that "the Alliance should reinforce cohesion and
solidarity of the 15 Atlantic nations, though not
controlling national policy, nor acting as execu-
tive agency for what they may have discussed or
even agreed among themselves."
18, At the Special Group meeting on 22 No-
vember, the Belgian-French informal agreement was
not discussed, but this formulation of language
acceptable to the French did provide a "useful key"
in the writing of the Group's report to the NATO
ministers. Seydoux concentrated his fire on Brosio's
draft, stating that it could not serve as a basis
for discussion, but after a lengthy procedural
wrangle, he acquiesced in a detailed consideration
of the draft without commitments. The Special Group
took 12 hours to work out a report to the ministers.
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In the process, a broad consensus developed, often
excluding the French, on key issues. According
to Cleveland, "the year-long exercise had exposed
and pointed up national interests to such an extent
that some of the usual wells of sympathy for French
obstinacy had run dry."
19. The text of this Special Group report to
the NATO ministers contains a number of alternative
phrases at important points in the statement. The
alternative phrases concern such matters as refer-
ences to Soviet military strength, multilateral
versus bilateral contacts with the Soviet bloc,
and harmonization of policies. With one exception,
these language problems developed through disagree-
ments between France and the fourteen. One state-
ment suggested by the fourteen seems a definite at-
tack on Gaullist foreign policy: "The way to peace
and stability in Europe is not to dissolve exist-
ing groupings but to use them constructively to the
advantage of detente." The Italians, fearing that
a squabble with the French might affect the approach-
ing national elections, wanted to insert a phrase
postponing the report of the Special Group until
the ministerial conference in June 1968, but most
members do not think the Italians will maintain this
position. All 15 agreed to the statement that the
NATO ministers "will decide what conclusions are to
be drawn from the study assigned to the Special
Group."
Outlook for the December Ministerial Conference
20. It seems likely that the French will con-
tinue to test the resolve of the 14, probing for
weaknesses regarding support for an increased polit-
ical role for the Alliance and taking advantage of
any divisions that might appear in order to press
for a minimal declaration on the future tasks of
the Alliance. The French tactical position can,
as it has in the past, shift on short notice, add-
ing to the discomfiture of the fourteen. The un-
resolved phraseology in the Special Group report,
and the agreement that the NATO ministers will de-
cide what conclusions are to be drawn from the
study, leave the French with plenty of room for
maneuvers designed to enhance their viewpoint.
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Seydoux announced on 24 November that his approval
of the report for transmission to the ministers was
ad referendum and did not prejudice the ultimate
position of the French Government. Probably the
French will win some--perhaps most--of the battles
over the alternative statements (in some cases,
both options may be dropped), and to help placate
the Italians, specific notice may be taken of sev-
eral issues raised by the Harmel study which will
be examined in detail in the coming months. But
the NATO ministerial conference in December will
probably adopt the Special Group's report in very
much its present form.
Impact of the Study on the Future of the Alliance
21. Perhaps the greatest impact of the study
has been its revelation of national sensitivities
and concerns as member governments were forced,
through the extensive and often heated process of
developing the study, to consider the viewpoints
of each of the others. For the French, the Harmel
study has produced some surprises. Although France
retains considerable freedom for maneuver in deter-
mining the outcome of the study, it is equally true
that some of the previous patience with French ob-
struction has run low. The Danes, Canadians, and
West Germans, for example, are now apparently de-
termined to obtain a public document beyond "com-
munique language" at the ministerial conference in
December, The Fourteen have mildly indicated that
they may, if faced with continued French intran-
sigence, switch much of the proposed work program
to the Defense Planning Committee in which France
does not participate.
22. The Germans continue to insist on bi-
lateral contacts with the Soviet bloc and on quad-
ripartite responsibility for the German problem,
but they have told the Special Group that the other
11 NATO members "would be fully consulted and their
views sought once the Four had some suggestions or
proposals to make." Such "timely discussions"
would not impair the special responsibilities of
the Four.
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23. If the Special Group's report were to be
approved by France as well as the other nations at
the ministerial conference in December, the Harmel
study would have a potential impact on the future
of the Alliance. The ultimate test of the value
of the study will be the degree of implementation
after the ministerial meeting in December, The
Special Group's report defers to the French aver-
sion to new Alliance machinery and advocates "build-
ing on the methods and procedures which have proved
their value over many years," It refers to the Al-
liance serving as "an effective forum and central
clearing house" for exchange of viewpoints, but it
finds that "the practice of frank and timely con-
sultations needs to be deepened and improved?"
24. The Special Group makes four main pro-
posals: (1) that NATO "examine and review suita-
ble policies designed to achieve a just and stable
order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany
and to foster European security"; (2) that NATO
conduct "intensified" studies on disarmament and
practical arms control measures, including the
possibility of balanced force reductions; (3) that
NATO examine the defense problem of "exposed" areas-
the southeastern flank of NATO is cited as an ex-
ample; (4) that "the Allies or such of them as
wish to do so" continue consultations on crises out-
side the NATO area. In the view of the Special
Group, these four activities could be carried out
"either by intensifying work already in hand or by
activating highly specialized studies by more sys-
tematic use of experts and officials sent from
capitals."
25, of the four lines of action, European sup-
porters of the Harmel study hope that NATO will
give primary attention to Germany and European se-
curity, and to arms control and disarmament. These
topics are of interest to the public which wants
detente and an end to the Cold War image of NATO,
The Europeans are less interested in the third and
fourth topics--defense problems in adjacent areas
and crises outside the NATO region.
26. The Harmel study also has implications
for 1969, the year in which NATO members may give
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notice of an intention to withdraw from the Atlantic
Alliance. The whole drift of the Special Group's
report implies that NATO will go on past 1969, and
there is even explicit use of the phrase "in the
years ahead." The net impression made by the exer-
cise so far is that, with the possible exception
of France, the member states are determined to
maintain the Alliance for the indefinite future.
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MEMO NO 1680/67
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DATE 7 Dec '67 Due D/OCI R
SUBJECT: fl XT 1 Study--.NATO Locke to It,; "U ' i
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PURPOSE: the agenda of the NATO Foreign. Min
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DCI EXEC. DIR, 54 PTO 65,66-'INDICO
DDCI 50 D/ONE 55-63 OPSCEN
EXEC. REG. 51-53 PDB 64 OPSCEN FOR CSDO
67,68
69
70
71
72-74
75
76-88
D/NIPE
G. COUNS.
I.G.
O/DCI
DD/S&
OSP, DD/S&T
(COLLATERAL)
89 DIR/PPB
90,91 ONE
92 ONE Reading Room
93-96 D/OER (CSS)
97-101 D/OSI
:102-105 D/CRS (DLB/CRS)
106-109 DIR/NPIC
110 D/OSR
EXTERNAL
25X1
THE WHITE HOUSE
Smith
The Vice President
CI-a07-1
TREASURY
Fowler-1
BUDGET
-5
-1
USIA
Marks -1
USIB (Distribution Points)
L) -15
-1
-2
-1
-4
-5
-4
-4
-1
111
112
113
114
115,116
117,118
119,120
121,122
123
124-127
128
129
130,131
132,133
STATE
-.:AID
Gaud -1
ACDA NASA
Foster -1 Halpern -1
DIA (COLLATERAL) -60
}
Brown (AEC) -1
NON-USIB (Intelli ence Distribution Points)
Special Instructions: Distribution
authorized b
Sillli~v .ij ('F 3X) -1
To be released by 8 December 1967
No. Copies
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00826A003000280001-1
SECRET
DDI/IRS
NMCC (OPSCEN)
DDI/SRS
SA/R
CA/EUR
CA/MEA
CA/WH
CA/FE
CD/West
CS/PRES
ADMIN (VM)
Orig. Div.
Orig. Br.
DEFENSE'
H a