WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A002900140001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 13, 1967
• Content Type: IR

Approved Forelease 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T008-002900
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Weekly Report
Prepared Exclusively for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group
Secret
43
13 November 1967
No. 0436/67
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900140001-9
 Approved For R lease 2005/08 iGAWNb 9T0082 2900140001-9
25X1
WARNING
1'his document contains information affectin? the national
defense of the United States, within the mea:ling of Title
18, sections 793 and 79-1, of the US Code, is amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its conteTts to or re-
o ipt by an unauthorized person is prohilnted by law.
;now, I
C) flioM AI;'^o MAti('
SECRET!'
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02900140001-9
 Approved Foelease 2005/DY6i:tADP79T008WA002900140001-9
Page
1. UAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Soviet Air Service to the Western
Hemisphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25X1 C
5. Succession in Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02900140001-9
 25X1
Approved Focytel
The Israeli shelling of Egypt's two petroleum
refineries at Suez has dealt a major blow to the
Egyptian economy.
Industrial output, which accounts for well over
half of Egypt's petroleum consumption, will be cur-
tailed for some time by petroleum supply and distri-
bution problems. A cutback in fertilizer production
as a result of damage to an adjacent fertilizer com-
plex may also cause some reduction in agricultural
output. In addition, Egypt's transport and communi-
cations facilities, fueled largely by petroleum, will
be hampered.
Although the actual extent of damage still is not
known, the entire production at Suez of 140,000 ar-
rels per day (bpd) has been stopped temporarily.
Up to $150 million may be invo ve
in completely rebuilding these facilities. Domestic
refining capacity now in operation consists only of
a refinery at Alexandria that can produce about
30,000 barrels per day--a quarter of Egypt's domestic
consumption of 120,000 bpd.
Egypt has taken a stopgap measure to obtain im-
mediate essential requirements for refined products.
An arrangement has been worked out with the British
Petroleum Company for its refinery at Aden to process
enough crude oil from Egypt's Morgan field to pro-
vide about 50,000 bpd of products to be shipped back
to Suez for use in Egypt. In the meantime, Egypt
will continue to seek additional supplies from all
possible sources, including the USSR, US-owned com-
panies, and other Arab states.
-1- 13 November 1967
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For
 25X1
Approved
2. SOVIET AIR SERVICE TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Soviet air service to the hemisphere is provid-
ing another irritant in US-Canadian relations. The
Canadians have thus far declined to act on a renewed
Soviet request for landing rights at Gander for on-
ward flights to Cuba but are giving the proposal
further consideration. Ottawa might react favorably
if convinced that reciprocal rights were of suffi-
cient value to Canada.
Canadian approval of such onward flights to Cuba--
sought by Moscow since the inception-of its service
to Havana in December 1962--would nullify US efforts
of the past five years to prevent the USSR from
acquiring a more advantageous and economical route
to Havana. Largely as a result of these efforts,
Soviet endeavors to fly to Cuba via Africa or Europe
have been unsuccessful and Moscow has been compelled
to make long, costly, and hazardous flights via Mur-
mansk over 5,000 nautical miles of international
waters.
Service to New York, originally targeted for
last spring, was delayed until the Soviet IL-62 jet
transport entered international service. Technical
data on the IL-62 now has been submitted to the
Federal Aviation Authority, paving the way for a
proving flight on 27 November4 There also are in-
dications that the USSR is prepared to accept the
$75,000 passenger indemnity required by the US.
Moscow recently received Canadian approval permit-
ting its airline to combine service to New York
with that to Montreal, thus making the North Ameri-
can operation more economical.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900140001-1
 25X1C
L Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02900140001-9
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02900140001-9
 Approved For` ease 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00
4. SOUTH ARABIA
With British evacuation slated to take place be-
fore the end of the month, the National Liberation
Front (NLF) has emerged as the dominant political
group in South Arabia.
Britain's reluctance to give a firm answer to
the NLF's demand for recognition and negotiations
has complicated the already difficult problem of
the turnover of power. The NLF now has little chance
to set up and consolidate an effective government be-
fore the British leave.
Chances for future stability have been improved,
however, by the army's open declaration of support
for the NLF. The army presumably decided to jump
on the bandwagon once it became clear that the NLF
had soundly beaten its rival, the Front for the Lib-
eration of occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), in last
week's fighting. A few pockets of FLOSY resistance
remain, but the NLF seems to have the military sit-
uation well in hand.
Establishing a viable government is something
else again, however. If an NLF government is to
have any chance of survival, its principal immediate
need is money to pay the army and police forces. If
some kind of order can be established, at least in
Aden, some trade would be encouraged to return which
might attract external aid and assistance. At pres-
ent there is no sign of anyone putting up the neces-
sary funds for payment of the security forces.
Any new government that is set up will be con-
fronted with South Arabia's endemic factionalism and
divisive tribalism, as well as the problem of rela-
tions with Yemen. Although Adenis are presumably
weary of continued fighting, deeply rooted blood
feuds and factionalism may n-rnim ssible to eradi-
cate.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900140001-9
 25X1
Appro
5. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN
New reports that Generalissimo Franco's health
is deteriorating are again focusing attention on
the succession problem. Barring death or severe
incapacitation, Franco is unlikely to give up
either his position as chief of state or as presi-
dent of the government.
A new constitutional law which became effective
in January 1967 permits Franco to designate a pres-
ident of the government. The appointment in Sep-
tember 1967 of Admiral Carrero Blanco to the vice
presidency suggests that Franco does not intend to
name his own successor as president of the govern-
ment. Should Franco die or become incapacitated,
Carrero would succeed him as president until the
formal process of choosing a successor is completed.
As vice president, Carrero, who has long been Franco's
right hand, can now easily assume such duties and
functions as Franco desires. Thus Franco is now in a
position to delegate authority without having to
share command powers.
Though some new appointments and several reas-
signments are likely to be made in the cabinet be-
fore the end of the year to deal with economic prob-
lems and labor and student unrest, no important modi-
fications of the basic policies are expected.
Franco is also unlikely to act on the problem
of naming a successor as chief of state. Vice Pres-
ident Carrero, a promonarchist, leans to Juan Carlos,
son of the chief pretender Don Juan. But the choice
of a nonroyal regent permitted by the succession
law still cannot be ruled out.
Ultimately the succession is expected to be con-
trolled by the military. Any new government would
have trouble channeling the long-deferred and ris-
ing demands of various groups for uicke
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826A002900140001-9
 Secreipproved For F rase 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826A 2900140001-9
Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/01 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO02900140001-9